2017
WL 104464
WL 104464
United
States Court of Appeals,
States Court of Appeals,
Seventh
Circuit.
Circuit.
JOHN
BAUGH, by and through his Wife and Next Friend, Sharon Baugh,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
BAUGH, by and through his Wife and Next Friend, Sharon Baugh,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CUPRUM
S.A. DE C.V., Defendant-Appellant.
S.A. DE C.V., Defendant-Appellant.
No.
16-1106
16-1106
ARGUED
NOVEMBER 2, 2016DECIDED JANUARY 11, 2017
NOVEMBER 2, 2016DECIDED JANUARY 11, 2017
Appeal
from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No.
08 CV 4204
08 CV 4204
Before
WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.
*1 John Baugh fell off a ladder while replacing gutter
screws and suffered a traumatic brain injury. He sued the ladder’s
manufacturer, Cuprum, alleging that the ladder had unexpectedly collapsed and
caused him to fall because it had been defectively designed. At the conclusion
of trial, a jury, finding in Baugh’s favor, awarded him over $11 million in
damages. Following the verdict, Cuprum filed a motion for a new trial and for
judgment as a matter of law, but the district judge denied it.
screws and suffered a traumatic brain injury. He sued the ladder’s
manufacturer, Cuprum, alleging that the ladder had unexpectedly collapsed and
caused him to fall because it had been defectively designed. At the conclusion
of trial, a jury, finding in Baugh’s favor, awarded him over $11 million in
damages. Following the verdict, Cuprum filed a motion for a new trial and for
judgment as a matter of law, but the district judge denied it.
On appeal, Cuprum contends that this denial was improper.
Cuprum maintains that it was entitled to a new trial primarily because the
district judge erroneously permitted two of Baugh’s experts to testify about
critical issues. But both experts’ methodologies were adequate, and Cuprum’s various
complaints affected the weight of the experts’ testimony rather than its
admissibility. In addition, Cuprum contends that it was entitled to judgment as
a matter of law because Baugh had failed to prove that the ladder contained an
unreasonably dangerous condition and that this condition was the most probable
cause of the accident. When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Baugh, however, we conclude that a reasonable jury could have found in Baugh’s
favor. Baugh supplied sufficient evidence demonstrating that a feasible
alternative existed, and that the accident was more likely attributable to the
ladder’s original defective design than to an improper use of the ladder. So we
affirm the district court’s judgment in Baugh’s favor.
Cuprum maintains that it was entitled to a new trial primarily because the
district judge erroneously permitted two of Baugh’s experts to testify about
critical issues. But both experts’ methodologies were adequate, and Cuprum’s various
complaints affected the weight of the experts’ testimony rather than its
admissibility. In addition, Cuprum contends that it was entitled to judgment as
a matter of law because Baugh had failed to prove that the ladder contained an
unreasonably dangerous condition and that this condition was the most probable
cause of the accident. When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Baugh, however, we conclude that a reasonable jury could have found in Baugh’s
favor. Baugh supplied sufficient evidence demonstrating that a feasible
alternative existed, and that the accident was more likely attributable to the
ladder’s original defective design than to an improper use of the ladder. So we
affirm the district court’s judgment in Baugh’s favor.
I. BACKGROUND
John Baugh fell off a five-foot, A-frame aluminum ladder
while replacing several rusty screws in a gutter on his garage. Baugh sustained
significant bruising and bleeding in the frontal area of his brain, which
caused him to suffer seizures, dementia, and quadriplegia and inhibited his
ability to perform myriad routine functions such as taking medicine orally,
urinating without a catheter, recognizing shapes and angles, and reading a
one-paragraph excerpt and answering simple questions like who, what, and where.
On his behalf, Baugh’s wife Sharon sued Cuprum, a Mexico-based company that
designed and manufactured the ladder, alleging a design defect under strict
liability and negligence theories. Baugh argued that the ladder was not
designed to be strong enough to accommodate the weight of individuals at or
near 200 pounds,1 and that a feasible alternate design would have
prevented the accident. But Cuprum argued that the ladder was designed to
adequately support the weight of individuals weighing up to 200 pounds, and
that the accident occurred because Baugh climbed too high on the ladder and
stood on its fourth step and pail shelf, neither of which were intended to be
stood on. (Pail shelves are often square in shape, attached near the top of
ladders, and used to hold paint cans and other painting equipment.)
while replacing several rusty screws in a gutter on his garage. Baugh sustained
significant bruising and bleeding in the frontal area of his brain, which
caused him to suffer seizures, dementia, and quadriplegia and inhibited his
ability to perform myriad routine functions such as taking medicine orally,
urinating without a catheter, recognizing shapes and angles, and reading a
one-paragraph excerpt and answering simple questions like who, what, and where.
On his behalf, Baugh’s wife Sharon sued Cuprum, a Mexico-based company that
designed and manufactured the ladder, alleging a design defect under strict
liability and negligence theories. Baugh argued that the ladder was not
designed to be strong enough to accommodate the weight of individuals at or
near 200 pounds,1 and that a feasible alternate design would have
prevented the accident. But Cuprum argued that the ladder was designed to
adequately support the weight of individuals weighing up to 200 pounds, and
that the accident occurred because Baugh climbed too high on the ladder and
stood on its fourth step and pail shelf, neither of which were intended to be
stood on. (Pail shelves are often square in shape, attached near the top of
ladders, and used to hold paint cans and other painting equipment.)
*2 The parties proceeded to trial and a jury found in
Cuprum’s favor. However, we remanded the case for a new trial because the
exemplar ladder, which had the same core specifications as Baugh’s, was
improperly given to jurors during jury deliberations. See generally Baugh ex
rel. Baugh v. Cuprum S.A. de C.V., 730 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2013).
Cuprum’s favor. However, we remanded the case for a new trial because the
exemplar ladder, which had the same core specifications as Baugh’s, was
improperly given to jurors during jury deliberations. See generally Baugh ex
rel. Baugh v. Cuprum S.A. de C.V., 730 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2013).
During the second trial, Baugh elicited testimony from two
of his neighbors and a paramedic, all of whom arrived to the scene
post-accident. However, Baugh—the only eyewitness to the accident—did not
testify at either trial, we assume, because of the severity of his injuries. Baugh
also elicited testimony from a number of experts relating to the cause of the
accident and the severity of his resulting physical injuries. Notably, Dr. Jack
Vinson, a mechanical engineer, testified about the ladder’s design. Relying on
handwritten calculations based on centuries-old mathematics principles, Dr.
Vinson opined that the ladder could withstand up to 35,000 pounds per square
inch (PSI), and that a 200-pound person could exert as many as 97,700 PSI while
using the ladder. Dr. Vinson opined further that the ladder could have
accommodated a 200-pound person if it had thicker legs and thicker and longer
gussets. (Gussets are metal bars that provide bracing support by connecting the
leg of a ladder to the first step.)
of his neighbors and a paramedic, all of whom arrived to the scene
post-accident. However, Baugh—the only eyewitness to the accident—did not
testify at either trial, we assume, because of the severity of his injuries. Baugh
also elicited testimony from a number of experts relating to the cause of the
accident and the severity of his resulting physical injuries. Notably, Dr. Jack
Vinson, a mechanical engineer, testified about the ladder’s design. Relying on
handwritten calculations based on centuries-old mathematics principles, Dr.
Vinson opined that the ladder could withstand up to 35,000 pounds per square
inch (PSI), and that a 200-pound person could exert as many as 97,700 PSI while
using the ladder. Dr. Vinson opined further that the ladder could have
accommodated a 200-pound person if it had thicker legs and thicker and longer
gussets. (Gussets are metal bars that provide bracing support by connecting the
leg of a ladder to the first step.)
Kevin Smith, a mechanical engineer, supplied causation
testimony on Baugh’s behalf.
testimony on Baugh’s behalf.
He opined that: (i) Baugh was facing the house and the
gutter as he climbed the ladder (which was the intended use); (ii) all four of
the ladder’s feet were in Baugh’s concrete driveway; (iii) Baugh was standing
on the third step of the ladder (the highest intended step); (iv) the ladder
tipped to the right; (v) the shorter-than-necessary gusset on the ladder’s
right front side could not support Baugh’s weight, thereby causing the ladder’s
right front leg to fail and Baugh to fall onto his concrete driveway; and (vi)
a longer gusset would have prevented the accident.
gutter as he climbed the ladder (which was the intended use); (ii) all four of
the ladder’s feet were in Baugh’s concrete driveway; (iii) Baugh was standing
on the third step of the ladder (the highest intended step); (iv) the ladder
tipped to the right; (v) the shorter-than-necessary gusset on the ladder’s
right front side could not support Baugh’s weight, thereby causing the ladder’s
right front leg to fail and Baugh to fall onto his concrete driveway; and (vi)
a longer gusset would have prevented the accident.
Cuprum elicited contrary testimony regarding design and
causation. Dr. Michael Stevenson, a metallurgical engineer, opined that a
250-pound person could never exert more than 24,000 PSI—well within the
ladder’s range of tolerance. Dr. Stevenson reached this conclusion using the
computer-based “finite element analysis” method.
causation. Dr. Michael Stevenson, a metallurgical engineer, opined that a
250-pound person could never exert more than 24,000 PSI—well within the
ladder’s range of tolerance. Dr. Stevenson reached this conclusion using the
computer-based “finite element analysis” method.
In addition, Michael Van Bree, a mechanical engineer, opined
that: (i) Baugh was facing away from the house and gutter as he climbed the
ladder (an improper use); (ii) two of the ladder’s feet were in the driveway,
while the other two were in an adjacent flower bed; (iii) the ladder tipped to
the left while Baugh was straddling it, with one foot on the pail shelf and the
other on the ladder’s fourth step (both improper uses); and (iv) Baugh lost
balance, causing the ladder to tip over and Baugh to fall into the flower bed.
that: (i) Baugh was facing away from the house and gutter as he climbed the
ladder (an improper use); (ii) two of the ladder’s feet were in the driveway,
while the other two were in an adjacent flower bed; (iii) the ladder tipped to
the left while Baugh was straddling it, with one foot on the pail shelf and the
other on the ladder’s fourth step (both improper uses); and (iv) Baugh lost
balance, causing the ladder to tip over and Baugh to fall into the flower bed.
The jury ultimately found in Baugh’s favor and awarded him
$11 million. The district judge denied Cuprum’s motion for judgment as a matter
of law and, alternatively, for a new trial. This appeal followed.
$11 million. The district judge denied Cuprum’s motion for judgment as a matter
of law and, alternatively, for a new trial. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A.
Cuprum Not Entitled to a New Trial
Cuprum Not Entitled to a New Trial
On appeal, Cuprum maintains that the district judge erred in
denying its motion for a new trial. We review such denials for abuse of
discretion and where, as here, the moving party alleges an erroneous admission
of evidence during trial, “we will grant a new trial only if the error had a
substantial influence over the jury and the result reached was inconsistent
with substantial justice.” Saathoff v. Davis, 826 F.3d 925, 930 (7th
Cir. 2016).
denying its motion for a new trial. We review such denials for abuse of
discretion and where, as here, the moving party alleges an erroneous admission
of evidence during trial, “we will grant a new trial only if the error had a
substantial influence over the jury and the result reached was inconsistent
with substantial justice.” Saathoff v. Davis, 826 F.3d 925, 930 (7th
Cir. 2016).
*3 Cuprum’s principal justification for a new trial concerns
the district judge’s denial of several of its motions in limine (MILs)
concerning Dr. Vinson, Baugh’s design expert, and Smith, Baugh’s causation
expert. Although none of the MILs explicitly cited Federal Rule of Evidence 702
or Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), their
substantive arguments were unequivocally rooted in both—specifically, that Dr.
Vinson’s alternative-design opinions were unreliable, and that Smith was
unqualified and proffered causation opinions based on unreliable methodology.
Indeed, the MILs repeatedly used these Rule 702/Daubert buzzwords and
cited multiple cases applying the related framework. So the district judge
should have treated the MILs as invoking Rule 702 and Daubert. And it
appears that he did—at least with regard to reliability—since he denied the
MILs on the ground that “there is nothing about the witnesses’ opinions that
falls outside the realm of acceptable science.”
the district judge’s denial of several of its motions in limine (MILs)
concerning Dr. Vinson, Baugh’s design expert, and Smith, Baugh’s causation
expert. Although none of the MILs explicitly cited Federal Rule of Evidence 702
or Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), their
substantive arguments were unequivocally rooted in both—specifically, that Dr.
Vinson’s alternative-design opinions were unreliable, and that Smith was
unqualified and proffered causation opinions based on unreliable methodology.
Indeed, the MILs repeatedly used these Rule 702/Daubert buzzwords and
cited multiple cases applying the related framework. So the district judge
should have treated the MILs as invoking Rule 702 and Daubert. And it
appears that he did—at least with regard to reliability—since he denied the
MILs on the ground that “there is nothing about the witnesses’ opinions that
falls outside the realm of acceptable science.”
However, the problem with that conclusion was that it was
not accompanied by any further analysis regarding the considerations that
animated the judge’s ruling. See, e.g., Metavante Corp. v. Emigrant
Sav. Bank, 619 F.3d 748, 760 (7th Cir. 2010) (observing that a proper Daubert
inquiry cannot be comprised solely of conclusory statements regarding
admissibility). Nor was this deficiency remedied by either of the district
judges who were subsequently assigned to the case, as both simply adopted the
original judge’s conclusion without elaboration. So rather than reviewing the
denial of the MILs for abuse of discretion, as we typically do when a judge has
adequately applied the Rule 702/Daubert framework, we review the denial
here de novo. See Hall v. Flannery, 840 F.3d 922, 926 (7th Cir. 2016)
(citations omitted).
not accompanied by any further analysis regarding the considerations that
animated the judge’s ruling. See, e.g., Metavante Corp. v. Emigrant
Sav. Bank, 619 F.3d 748, 760 (7th Cir. 2010) (observing that a proper Daubert
inquiry cannot be comprised solely of conclusory statements regarding
admissibility). Nor was this deficiency remedied by either of the district
judges who were subsequently assigned to the case, as both simply adopted the
original judge’s conclusion without elaboration. So rather than reviewing the
denial of the MILs for abuse of discretion, as we typically do when a judge has
adequately applied the Rule 702/Daubert framework, we review the denial
here de novo. See Hall v. Flannery, 840 F.3d 922, 926 (7th Cir. 2016)
(citations omitted).
1.
Dr. Vinson’s Testimony Was Admissible
Dr. Vinson’s Testimony Was Admissible
On appeal, Cuprum challenges the methodology that led Dr.
Vinson to opine that a design featuring thicker legs and a thicker and longer
gusset would have prevented Baugh’s accident. When determining the reliability
of a qualified expert’s testimony under Daubert, courts are to consider,
among other things: (1) whether the proffered theory can be and has been
tested; (2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review; (3) whether
the theory has been evaluated in light of potential rates of error; and (4)
whether the theory has been accepted in the relevant scientific community. Smith
v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 719 (7th Cir. 2000). We have emphasized
that “no single factor is either required in the analysis or dispositive as to
its outcome.” Id.; accord Kumho Tires Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S.
137, 151–52 (1999).
Vinson to opine that a design featuring thicker legs and a thicker and longer
gusset would have prevented Baugh’s accident. When determining the reliability
of a qualified expert’s testimony under Daubert, courts are to consider,
among other things: (1) whether the proffered theory can be and has been
tested; (2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review; (3) whether
the theory has been evaluated in light of potential rates of error; and (4)
whether the theory has been accepted in the relevant scientific community. Smith
v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 719 (7th Cir. 2000). We have emphasized
that “no single factor is either required in the analysis or dispositive as to
its outcome.” Id.; accord Kumho Tires Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S.
137, 151–52 (1999).
Cuprum attacks Dr. Vinson’s alternate-design opinion on
several grounds. Its primary criticism is that Dr. Vinson failed to test this
alternative design, either with a specially made exemplar ladder or using
finite element analysis (the latter being the preferred method of Dr.
Stevenson, Cuprum’s design expert). But Dr. Vinson did test his alternative
design, using centuries-old mathematics principles that Dr. Stevenson himself
conceded can be used to analyze stress in a ladder. The fact that these
calculations were not accompanied with live testing of an exemplar
ladder is irrelevant to Rule 702 and Daubert. See Lapsley v. Xtek,
Inc., 689 F.3d 802, 815–16 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[P]hysical re-creations of
industrial accidents are not always feasible or prudent…. A mathematical or
computer model is a perfectly acceptable form of test” for a proposed
alternative design.); Schmude v. Tricam Indus., 556 F.3d 624, 626 (7th
Cir. 2009) (rejecting claim that plaintiff’s expert should have been barred
from testifying due to failure to conduct live recreation of accident, and
discussing defendant’s dubious re-creation attempt); Cummins v. Lyle Indus.,
93 F.3d 362, 369 (7th Cir. 1996) (“We do not mean to suggest … that hands-on
testing is an absolute prerequisite to the admission of expert testimony.”).
several grounds. Its primary criticism is that Dr. Vinson failed to test this
alternative design, either with a specially made exemplar ladder or using
finite element analysis (the latter being the preferred method of Dr.
Stevenson, Cuprum’s design expert). But Dr. Vinson did test his alternative
design, using centuries-old mathematics principles that Dr. Stevenson himself
conceded can be used to analyze stress in a ladder. The fact that these
calculations were not accompanied with live testing of an exemplar
ladder is irrelevant to Rule 702 and Daubert. See Lapsley v. Xtek,
Inc., 689 F.3d 802, 815–16 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[P]hysical re-creations of
industrial accidents are not always feasible or prudent…. A mathematical or
computer model is a perfectly acceptable form of test” for a proposed
alternative design.); Schmude v. Tricam Indus., 556 F.3d 624, 626 (7th
Cir. 2009) (rejecting claim that plaintiff’s expert should have been barred
from testifying due to failure to conduct live recreation of accident, and
discussing defendant’s dubious re-creation attempt); Cummins v. Lyle Indus.,
93 F.3d 362, 369 (7th Cir. 1996) (“We do not mean to suggest … that hands-on
testing is an absolute prerequisite to the admission of expert testimony.”).
*4 Cuprum also claims that Dr. Vinson’s alternative design
is deficient because it was not subjected to peer review. But Cuprum only
claims that one of Dr. Vinson’s three papers featuring his design went
unreviewed, whereas Dr. Vinson testified (without contradiction) that the other
two papers were in fact peer reviewed. And even assuming none of the three
papers were reviewed, Dr. Vinson “was merely applying well-established
engineering techniques to the particular materials at issue in this case, …
[so] his failure to submit those techniques to peer review establishes nothing
about their reliability.” Smith, 215 F.3d at 720. This reasoning applies
equally to Cuprum’s complaint that Dr. Vinson’s alternative design has not been
adopted by the ladder industry. And the significance of these two complaints is
further diminished by the fact that Dr. Stevenson reviewed the calculations
that Dr. Vinson shared with the jury and found only one error—one that neither
Dr. Stevenson nor Cuprum claims was significant enough to cast doubt on any of
Dr. Vinson’s conclusions.
is deficient because it was not subjected to peer review. But Cuprum only
claims that one of Dr. Vinson’s three papers featuring his design went
unreviewed, whereas Dr. Vinson testified (without contradiction) that the other
two papers were in fact peer reviewed. And even assuming none of the three
papers were reviewed, Dr. Vinson “was merely applying well-established
engineering techniques to the particular materials at issue in this case, …
[so] his failure to submit those techniques to peer review establishes nothing
about their reliability.” Smith, 215 F.3d at 720. This reasoning applies
equally to Cuprum’s complaint that Dr. Vinson’s alternative design has not been
adopted by the ladder industry. And the significance of these two complaints is
further diminished by the fact that Dr. Stevenson reviewed the calculations
that Dr. Vinson shared with the jury and found only one error—one that neither
Dr. Stevenson nor Cuprum claims was significant enough to cast doubt on any of
Dr. Vinson’s conclusions.
Cuprum’s reliance on Dhillon v. Crown Controls, 269
F.3d 865 (7th Cir. 2001), is misplaced. In Dhillon, we concluded that
the district judge did not abuse his discretion in finding the challenged
expert’s testimony to be inadmissible. But unlike Dr. Vinson, most of the
experts in Dhillon had failed to create or test their proposed
alternative design, and the one expert who did conduct testing did so after
forming his opinion and was unable to bridge the tests and the opinions. Id.
at 869–70. To be sure, this latter expert bears some similarity to Dr. Vinson
in that the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) had not expressly
embraced either experts’ bottom-line design. Nevertheless, the Dhillon
expert is distinguishable since ANSI rejected his design on two separate
occasions, whereas ANSI’s review of Dr. Vinson’s design had never reached
completion. Nor do we find that ANSI’s stamp of approval, standing alone, is a
dispositive consideration.
F.3d 865 (7th Cir. 2001), is misplaced. In Dhillon, we concluded that
the district judge did not abuse his discretion in finding the challenged
expert’s testimony to be inadmissible. But unlike Dr. Vinson, most of the
experts in Dhillon had failed to create or test their proposed
alternative design, and the one expert who did conduct testing did so after
forming his opinion and was unable to bridge the tests and the opinions. Id.
at 869–70. To be sure, this latter expert bears some similarity to Dr. Vinson
in that the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) had not expressly
embraced either experts’ bottom-line design. Nevertheless, the Dhillon
expert is distinguishable since ANSI rejected his design on two separate
occasions, whereas ANSI’s review of Dr. Vinson’s design had never reached
completion. Nor do we find that ANSI’s stamp of approval, standing alone, is a
dispositive consideration.
Finally, Cuprum suggests that Dr. Vinson lacked the
requisite qualifications to opine on ladder design, due to his advanced age (he
received his bachelor’s degree in 1952 and his Ph.D. in 1961) and his
concessions at trial that he had never designed a ladder for commercial use or
worked in the ladder industry. But it appears that Cuprum forfeited this
argument by failing to raise it in a motion in limine, an objection at
trial, or in its post-trial motions. See, e.g., Pole v. Randolph,
570 F.3d 922, 937–38 (7th Cir. 2009).
requisite qualifications to opine on ladder design, due to his advanced age (he
received his bachelor’s degree in 1952 and his Ph.D. in 1961) and his
concessions at trial that he had never designed a ladder for commercial use or
worked in the ladder industry. But it appears that Cuprum forfeited this
argument by failing to raise it in a motion in limine, an objection at
trial, or in its post-trial motions. See, e.g., Pole v. Randolph,
570 F.3d 922, 937–38 (7th Cir. 2009).
Forfeiture aside, the claim lacks merit. For one, Cuprum
fails to explain how Dr. Vinson’s age and lack of experience within the
ladder industry render him unqualified to opine about PSI thresholds using
well-established mathematical principles. Cf. Doe v. Cutter Biological, Inc.,
971 F.2d 375, 385 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Ordinarily, courts impose no requirement
that an expert be a specialist in a given field, although there may be a
requirement that he or she be of a certain profession, such as a doctor.”). Nor
are Dr. Vinson’s purported experiential shortcomings evidenced in the record.
Notably, Dr. Vinson studied mechanical engineering at Cornell University,
Cambridge University, and the University of Pennsylvania. He is a professor
emeritus of mechanical and aerospace engineering at the University of Delaware,
is a member of the American Society of Testing Materials, and has served on the
editorial boards of Advanced Composites and Materials Journal and Advanced
Materials and Structures. He has also co-authored several articles relevant
to aluminum step ladders entitled, “Experimental Evaluation of the Structural
Characteristics of Extruded Aluminum Step Ladders,” “Failure Analysis of Step
Ladders Manufactured from Extruded Aluminum,” and “Fiberglass and Aluminum Step
Ladder Performance Under Dynamic Loading Conditions.” In addition, Dr. Vinson
testified that his calculations are rooted in well-established principles that
have been used for centuries to help assemble more complicated structures such
as the Eiffel Tower. So Dr. Vinson’s qualifications were adequate, and the
district judge did not err in permitting him to testify about his proposed
alternative design.
fails to explain how Dr. Vinson’s age and lack of experience within the
ladder industry render him unqualified to opine about PSI thresholds using
well-established mathematical principles. Cf. Doe v. Cutter Biological, Inc.,
971 F.2d 375, 385 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Ordinarily, courts impose no requirement
that an expert be a specialist in a given field, although there may be a
requirement that he or she be of a certain profession, such as a doctor.”). Nor
are Dr. Vinson’s purported experiential shortcomings evidenced in the record.
Notably, Dr. Vinson studied mechanical engineering at Cornell University,
Cambridge University, and the University of Pennsylvania. He is a professor
emeritus of mechanical and aerospace engineering at the University of Delaware,
is a member of the American Society of Testing Materials, and has served on the
editorial boards of Advanced Composites and Materials Journal and Advanced
Materials and Structures. He has also co-authored several articles relevant
to aluminum step ladders entitled, “Experimental Evaluation of the Structural
Characteristics of Extruded Aluminum Step Ladders,” “Failure Analysis of Step
Ladders Manufactured from Extruded Aluminum,” and “Fiberglass and Aluminum Step
Ladder Performance Under Dynamic Loading Conditions.” In addition, Dr. Vinson
testified that his calculations are rooted in well-established principles that
have been used for centuries to help assemble more complicated structures such
as the Eiffel Tower. So Dr. Vinson’s qualifications were adequate, and the
district judge did not err in permitting him to testify about his proposed
alternative design.
2.
Smith’s Testimony Was Admissible
Smith’s Testimony Was Admissible
*5 Cuprum also used MILs in an attempt to restrict the scope
of Smith’s trial testimony. For example, Cuprum asked the district judge to bar
Smith from testifying about the results of the “drop” test he performed on two
six-foot, A-frame ladders designed and manufactured by Cuprum. (According to
Cuprum, “the ‘drop’ test assesses the strength and durability of the ladder
when it is dropped from different heights for purposes of determining how much
the ladder could be damaged during handling and transport.”) Cuprum argues
these tests were not reliable because they were not performed in the manner
mandated by ANSI. Smith dropped (i.e., tested) each ladder multiple times,
whereas ANSI stipulates that a ladder need only be dropped once. But Cuprum
does not explain why this deviation demonstrates unreliability, nor is
it obvious to us. The record indicates that while the ANSI-based standard
requires a single drop, multiple drops are not prohibited. Moreover, it
seems entirely plausible that, in real life, ladders may be dropped or
otherwise subjected to wear and tear on multiple occasions before an incident
occurs. So Smith’s deviation from ANSI in this way was not problematic.
of Smith’s trial testimony. For example, Cuprum asked the district judge to bar
Smith from testifying about the results of the “drop” test he performed on two
six-foot, A-frame ladders designed and manufactured by Cuprum. (According to
Cuprum, “the ‘drop’ test assesses the strength and durability of the ladder
when it is dropped from different heights for purposes of determining how much
the ladder could be damaged during handling and transport.”) Cuprum argues
these tests were not reliable because they were not performed in the manner
mandated by ANSI. Smith dropped (i.e., tested) each ladder multiple times,
whereas ANSI stipulates that a ladder need only be dropped once. But Cuprum
does not explain why this deviation demonstrates unreliability, nor is
it obvious to us. The record indicates that while the ANSI-based standard
requires a single drop, multiple drops are not prohibited. Moreover, it
seems entirely plausible that, in real life, ladders may be dropped or
otherwise subjected to wear and tear on multiple occasions before an incident
occurs. So Smith’s deviation from ANSI in this way was not problematic.
Cuprum similarly complains that Smith used heavier loads for
the “cantilever bend” test than ANSI requires—as high as 190 pounds, rather
than the mandated 150 pounds. (Cuprum explains that “[t]he ‘cantilever bend’
test is conducted by placing loads of various amounts on the ladder to see if
the section of the leg that is cantilevered out from the first step to the foot
will bend.”) Again, the missing link in Cuprum’s argument is an explanation of
why this deviation speaks to reliability. If a ladder is expressly meant to
support individuals weighing as much as 200 pounds, it strikes us as entirely
reasonable that loads exceeding 150 pounds would be used to test the ladder’s
strength. Cuprum has proven nothing to the contrary.
the “cantilever bend” test than ANSI requires—as high as 190 pounds, rather
than the mandated 150 pounds. (Cuprum explains that “[t]he ‘cantilever bend’
test is conducted by placing loads of various amounts on the ladder to see if
the section of the leg that is cantilevered out from the first step to the foot
will bend.”) Again, the missing link in Cuprum’s argument is an explanation of
why this deviation speaks to reliability. If a ladder is expressly meant to
support individuals weighing as much as 200 pounds, it strikes us as entirely
reasonable that loads exceeding 150 pounds would be used to test the ladder’s
strength. Cuprum has proven nothing to the contrary.
Finally, Cuprum sought to bar Smith from testifying about
the accident and the ladder’s design on the ground that he lacked the requisite
factual basis to support his opinions. According to Cuprum, Smith knew so
little about what actually occurred immediately before the accident—for
example, Smith could not say with certainty where on the ladder Baugh had been
positioned when the accident occurred, and whether he was climbing, standing,
or descending—that the opinions he supplied were inadmissible bottom-line,
off-the-cuff statements. This lack of knowledge is critical, Cuprum claims,
because it means that Baugh cannot prove that the most probable cause of the
accident was a design defect that manifested while Baugh was using the ladder
as directed.
the accident and the ladder’s design on the ground that he lacked the requisite
factual basis to support his opinions. According to Cuprum, Smith knew so
little about what actually occurred immediately before the accident—for
example, Smith could not say with certainty where on the ladder Baugh had been
positioned when the accident occurred, and whether he was climbing, standing,
or descending—that the opinions he supplied were inadmissible bottom-line,
off-the-cuff statements. This lack of knowledge is critical, Cuprum claims,
because it means that Baugh cannot prove that the most probable cause of the
accident was a design defect that manifested while Baugh was using the ladder
as directed.
We disagree. In order to reach his opinions, Smith reviewed,
among other things, photographs of the scene of the accident with overlaid
measurements, transcripts of deposition testimony supplied by witnesses to the
aftermath of the accident, the actual ladder that Baugh had used, and an
exemplar ladder. That supplied Smith with enough facts to render his opinion.
Moreover, the mere fact that Smith could not testify about certain facts
relating to the accident with absolute certainty does not render his opinions
unreliable or irrelevant. See Manpower, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 732
F.3d 796, 806 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Reliability … is primarily a question of the
validity of the methodology employed by an expert, not the quality of the data
used in applying the methodology or the conclusions produced.”); Stollings
v. Ryobi Techs., Inc., 725 F.3d 753, 768 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[E]xpert
testimony does not need to be conclusive to be relevant.”). Indeed, it is often
the case that experts reach conflicting conclusions based on applying different
but nevertheless reliable methodologies to a set of partially known facts. The
determination of which opinion (if any) identifies the most probable cause of
an injury is typically a question of weight, not reliability. Cf. Smith v.
Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 718 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The soundness of the
factual underpinnings of the expert’s analysis and the correctness of the
expert’s conclusions based on that analysis are factual matters to be
determined by the trier of fact ….”).
among other things, photographs of the scene of the accident with overlaid
measurements, transcripts of deposition testimony supplied by witnesses to the
aftermath of the accident, the actual ladder that Baugh had used, and an
exemplar ladder. That supplied Smith with enough facts to render his opinion.
Moreover, the mere fact that Smith could not testify about certain facts
relating to the accident with absolute certainty does not render his opinions
unreliable or irrelevant. See Manpower, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 732
F.3d 796, 806 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Reliability … is primarily a question of the
validity of the methodology employed by an expert, not the quality of the data
used in applying the methodology or the conclusions produced.”); Stollings
v. Ryobi Techs., Inc., 725 F.3d 753, 768 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[E]xpert
testimony does not need to be conclusive to be relevant.”). Indeed, it is often
the case that experts reach conflicting conclusions based on applying different
but nevertheless reliable methodologies to a set of partially known facts. The
determination of which opinion (if any) identifies the most probable cause of
an injury is typically a question of weight, not reliability. Cf. Smith v.
Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 718 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The soundness of the
factual underpinnings of the expert’s analysis and the correctness of the
expert’s conclusions based on that analysis are factual matters to be
determined by the trier of fact ….”).
3.
Other Arguments Lack Merit
Other Arguments Lack Merit
*6 Cuprum identifies several non-Daubert-related
grounds that supposedly warrant a new trial. It claims, for example, that the
district judge erred in prohibiting Cuprum from asking its director of product
safety and engineering, Thomas Schmitt, to explain whether Cuprum had ever
changed the gusset length in the type of ladder at issue based on a fear of
collapse. However, Cuprum has failed to demonstrate precisely how this
testimony is relevant to the case, stating in conclusory fashion that the
testimony is somehow “relevant to plaintiff’s theory of alternative design,
which focused solely on the gusset.” And as Baugh notes, Schmitt was precluded
from testifying because he lacked personal knowledge about the subject. Cuprum
does not dispute the validity of that factual predicate.
grounds that supposedly warrant a new trial. It claims, for example, that the
district judge erred in prohibiting Cuprum from asking its director of product
safety and engineering, Thomas Schmitt, to explain whether Cuprum had ever
changed the gusset length in the type of ladder at issue based on a fear of
collapse. However, Cuprum has failed to demonstrate precisely how this
testimony is relevant to the case, stating in conclusory fashion that the
testimony is somehow “relevant to plaintiff’s theory of alternative design,
which focused solely on the gusset.” And as Baugh notes, Schmitt was precluded
from testifying because he lacked personal knowledge about the subject. Cuprum
does not dispute the validity of that factual predicate.
Cuprum also contends that the district judge erred in
overruling two objections made by Cuprum during closing statements. The first
objection concerned Baugh’s statement that the evidence indicated the ladder’s
right front leg was capable of bending inward while the ladder’s four feet were
on the driveway. Cuprum contends that this statement was not anchored to any
evidence presented at trial, but that would be true only if one ignores the
testimony supplied by Dr. Vinson and (especially) Smith. And since the
testimony from these experts was admissible, there was adequate evidence to
support Baugh’s statement, and the district judge did not abuse his discretion
in overruling the objection. And even if an abuse somehow occurred, it was
rendered harmless by the judge’s curative instruction to the jury that closing
statements are not facts, notwithstanding Cuprum’s conclusory claim to the
contrary. See United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir.
1991) (“[P]erfunctory and undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are
unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived ….”).
overruling two objections made by Cuprum during closing statements. The first
objection concerned Baugh’s statement that the evidence indicated the ladder’s
right front leg was capable of bending inward while the ladder’s four feet were
on the driveway. Cuprum contends that this statement was not anchored to any
evidence presented at trial, but that would be true only if one ignores the
testimony supplied by Dr. Vinson and (especially) Smith. And since the
testimony from these experts was admissible, there was adequate evidence to
support Baugh’s statement, and the district judge did not abuse his discretion
in overruling the objection. And even if an abuse somehow occurred, it was
rendered harmless by the judge’s curative instruction to the jury that closing
statements are not facts, notwithstanding Cuprum’s conclusory claim to the
contrary. See United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir.
1991) (“[P]erfunctory and undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are
unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived ….”).
The second statement that Cuprum objected to at closing
concerned Baugh’s use of already-accrued medical bills to calculate future
medical costs. According to Cuprum, the past bills were an inappropriate
comparator because “most of [Baugh]’s past damages were related to the acute
care he received during the first two years after the accident and so will not
be incurred again.” But Cuprum fails to cite anything in the record to support
this assertion, and, in any case, Baugh elicited testimony to the contrary. For
example, Dr. Gary Yarkony, a specialist in physical medicine and
rehabilitation, testified that Baugh is partially paralyzed in all four
extremities, has diminished cognitive function, and will need for the remainder
of his life round-the-clock nursing care and access to durable medical
equipment such as a motorized wheel chair and a lift to transfer him into and
out of bed. Dr. Yarkony also opined that Baugh would need “additional medical
care [beyond] just your routine internal medicine care” such as “rehab doctors,
neurologists, [and] foot care.” In short, there was ample evidence indicating
that Baugh’s injuries were permanent and would require significant medical
treatment indefinitely.
concerned Baugh’s use of already-accrued medical bills to calculate future
medical costs. According to Cuprum, the past bills were an inappropriate
comparator because “most of [Baugh]’s past damages were related to the acute
care he received during the first two years after the accident and so will not
be incurred again.” But Cuprum fails to cite anything in the record to support
this assertion, and, in any case, Baugh elicited testimony to the contrary. For
example, Dr. Gary Yarkony, a specialist in physical medicine and
rehabilitation, testified that Baugh is partially paralyzed in all four
extremities, has diminished cognitive function, and will need for the remainder
of his life round-the-clock nursing care and access to durable medical
equipment such as a motorized wheel chair and a lift to transfer him into and
out of bed. Dr. Yarkony also opined that Baugh would need “additional medical
care [beyond] just your routine internal medicine care” such as “rehab doctors,
neurologists, [and] foot care.” In short, there was ample evidence indicating
that Baugh’s injuries were permanent and would require significant medical
treatment indefinitely.
Cuprum also claims that by calculating the average annual
cost of Baugh’s past medical expenses and by multiplying it by Baugh’s
remaining life expectancy, Baugh improperly sought so-called “per diem”
damages. Cuprum directs our attention to Caley v. Manicke, in which the
Illinois Supreme Court held that it had been improper for counsel to suggest
during closing statements that certain damages should be calculated using a
rigid cost-per-day mathematical formula. 182 N.E.2d 206, 207–09 (Ill. 1962).
However, Caley was only concerned with damages relating to pain and
suffering, whereas Baugh’s statement at closing referenced damages relating
to medical costs—which often are amenable to per diem calculations due to the
repetitive nature of expenses such as medical check-ups, tests, and supplies.
cost of Baugh’s past medical expenses and by multiplying it by Baugh’s
remaining life expectancy, Baugh improperly sought so-called “per diem”
damages. Cuprum directs our attention to Caley v. Manicke, in which the
Illinois Supreme Court held that it had been improper for counsel to suggest
during closing statements that certain damages should be calculated using a
rigid cost-per-day mathematical formula. 182 N.E.2d 206, 207–09 (Ill. 1962).
However, Caley was only concerned with damages relating to pain and
suffering, whereas Baugh’s statement at closing referenced damages relating
to medical costs—which often are amenable to per diem calculations due to the
repetitive nature of expenses such as medical check-ups, tests, and supplies.
*7 Finally, Cuprum claims that the verdict is “against the
manifest weight of the evidence, excessive, or otherwise unreasonable.” This
claim is easily dispatched, however, since it merely incorporates, without
explanation, the section of Cuprum’s opening appellate brief concerning the
Rule 702/Daub-ert issues that we rejected above. Cf. United States v.
Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“A skeletal ‘argument,’ really
nothing more than an assertion, does not preserve a claim.”). Nor has Cuprum
demonstrated cumulative error, since it has failed to identify any error that
individually or in combination with others deprived him of a fair trial. See,
e.g., United States v. Powell, 652 F.3d 702, 706 (7th Cir. 2011)
(Cumulative error requires proof “(1) that multiple errors occurred at trial;
and (2) those errors, in the context of the entire trial, were so severe as to
have rendered his trial fundamentally unfair.”). So the district judge did not
abuse his discretion in declining to grant Cuprum a new trial.
manifest weight of the evidence, excessive, or otherwise unreasonable.” This
claim is easily dispatched, however, since it merely incorporates, without
explanation, the section of Cuprum’s opening appellate brief concerning the
Rule 702/Daub-ert issues that we rejected above. Cf. United States v.
Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“A skeletal ‘argument,’ really
nothing more than an assertion, does not preserve a claim.”). Nor has Cuprum
demonstrated cumulative error, since it has failed to identify any error that
individually or in combination with others deprived him of a fair trial. See,
e.g., United States v. Powell, 652 F.3d 702, 706 (7th Cir. 2011)
(Cumulative error requires proof “(1) that multiple errors occurred at trial;
and (2) those errors, in the context of the entire trial, were so severe as to
have rendered his trial fundamentally unfair.”). So the district judge did not
abuse his discretion in declining to grant Cuprum a new trial.
B. Cuprum Not Entitled to Judgment as a Matter of Law
We review the district judge’s denial of Cuprum’s motion for
judgment as a matter of law de novo, and view the evidence in the light most
favorable to Baugh as the non-moving party. Venson v. Altamirano, 749
F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 2014). We will reverse the district judge’s decision
only if no rational jury could have found in Baugh’s favor. Id. Cuprum
claims that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Baugh failed
to prove two of the requisite elements of a defective design claim—an
unreasonably dangerous condition and causation. We address each issue in turn.
judgment as a matter of law de novo, and view the evidence in the light most
favorable to Baugh as the non-moving party. Venson v. Altamirano, 749
F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 2014). We will reverse the district judge’s decision
only if no rational jury could have found in Baugh’s favor. Id. Cuprum
claims that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Baugh failed
to prove two of the requisite elements of a defective design claim—an
unreasonably dangerous condition and causation. We address each issue in turn.
1.
Unreasonably Dangerous Condition
Unreasonably Dangerous Condition
As noted above, Baugh asserted design defect under both
strict liability and negligence theories. The jury was instructed on both
claims but returned a general verdict in Baugh’s favor, so it is unclear
whether the verdict was based on one or both of the theories. But this
uncertainty is unimportant, since, as discussed below, Cuprum’s arguments
implicate both theories.
strict liability and negligence theories. The jury was instructed on both
claims but returned a general verdict in Baugh’s favor, so it is unclear
whether the verdict was based on one or both of the theories. But this
uncertainty is unimportant, since, as discussed below, Cuprum’s arguments
implicate both theories.
Under Illinois law—which the parties agree applies here—a
plaintiff alleging defective design under a strict product liability theory
must prove that (i) the product has an unreasonably dangerous condition, (ii)
the condition existed when the product left the defendant’s control, and (iii)
the condition caused the plaintiff to suffer an injury. E.g., Mikolajczyk
v. Ford Motor Co., 901 N.E.2d 329, 345 (Ill. 2008) (citations omitted). A
product may be unreasonably dangerous if it failed to perform as safely as an
ordinary consumer would expect (the “consumer-expectation test”), or if the
product’s risks outweigh its benefits (the “risk-utility test”). Id. at
336 (citing Lamkin v. Towner, 536 N.E.2d 449, 457 (Ill. 1990)).
plaintiff alleging defective design under a strict product liability theory
must prove that (i) the product has an unreasonably dangerous condition, (ii)
the condition existed when the product left the defendant’s control, and (iii)
the condition caused the plaintiff to suffer an injury. E.g., Mikolajczyk
v. Ford Motor Co., 901 N.E.2d 329, 345 (Ill. 2008) (citations omitted). A
product may be unreasonably dangerous if it failed to perform as safely as an
ordinary consumer would expect (the “consumer-expectation test”), or if the
product’s risks outweigh its benefits (the “risk-utility test”). Id. at
336 (citing Lamkin v. Towner, 536 N.E.2d 449, 457 (Ill. 1990)).
The consumer-expectation test is a simpler inquiry than the
risk-utility test, as the latter asks courts to consider the following
non-exhaustive list of factors:
risk-utility test, as the latter asks courts to consider the following
non-exhaustive list of factors:
the availability and
feasibility of alternate designs at the time of the product’s manufacture; …
[whether] the design used … conform[ed] to the design standards in the
industry, design guidelines provided by an authoritative voluntary
organization, or design criteria set by legislation or governmental
regulation[;] … the utility of the product to the user and to the public as a
whole[;] the safety aspects of the product including the likelihood that it
will cause injury and the probable seriousness of the injury [;] and the
manufacturer’s ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without
impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
feasibility of alternate designs at the time of the product’s manufacture; …
[whether] the design used … conform[ed] to the design standards in the
industry, design guidelines provided by an authoritative voluntary
organization, or design criteria set by legislation or governmental
regulation[;] … the utility of the product to the user and to the public as a
whole[;] the safety aspects of the product including the likelihood that it
will cause injury and the probable seriousness of the injury [;] and the
manufacturer’s ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without
impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
Jablonski v. Ford Motor Co.,
955 N.E.2d 1138, 1154 (Ill. 2011) (citations omitted).
955 N.E.2d 1138, 1154 (Ill. 2011) (citations omitted).
Like strict liability, negligence focuses on the allegedly
unreasonably dangerous condition of a product. Calles v. ScriptoTokai Corp.,
864 N.E.2d 249, 263–64 (Ill. 2007). For some time, Illinois courts have
differentiated between the two theories on the ground that negligence alone
inquires into the defendant’s alleged fault—i.e., whether the defendant
breached its “nondelegable duty to design reasonably safe products” by failing
to exercise reasonable care. Id. In practice, however, this distinction
may sometimes be illusory, as the Illinois Supreme Court has recently observed
that “risk-utility balancing remains operative in determining whether a
defendant’s conduct is reasonable in a negligent-design case.” Jablonski,
955 N.E.2d at 1154–55 (referencing approvingly the conclusion of numerous
commentators that “the balancing test developed for strict liability claims …
is essentially identical to the test applied in determining whether a
defendant’s conduct in designing a product is reasonable”).
unreasonably dangerous condition of a product. Calles v. ScriptoTokai Corp.,
864 N.E.2d 249, 263–64 (Ill. 2007). For some time, Illinois courts have
differentiated between the two theories on the ground that negligence alone
inquires into the defendant’s alleged fault—i.e., whether the defendant
breached its “nondelegable duty to design reasonably safe products” by failing
to exercise reasonable care. Id. In practice, however, this distinction
may sometimes be illusory, as the Illinois Supreme Court has recently observed
that “risk-utility balancing remains operative in determining whether a
defendant’s conduct is reasonable in a negligent-design case.” Jablonski,
955 N.E.2d at 1154–55 (referencing approvingly the conclusion of numerous
commentators that “the balancing test developed for strict liability claims …
is essentially identical to the test applied in determining whether a
defendant’s conduct in designing a product is reasonable”).
*8 Here, Cuprum implicates both theories by arguing that Baugh
failed to prove the existence of an alternate design at trial, a frequent
prerequisite for liability under the risk-utility test and one that Baugh pursued
in this case. In doing so, however, Cuprum relies primarily on the same
arguments rejected above regarding the admissibility of Dr. Vinson’s
methodology—specifically, that Dr. Vinson failed to test his alternative
design, that this design was not subjected to peer review or review by ANSI,
that the design had not been embraced by the ladder industry, and that Dr.
Vinson was unqualified to opine about alternative designs. Without those
arguments, Cuprum is left with its contention that its own expert, Dr.
Stevenson, relied on superior methodology in opining that the ladder possessed
the requisite structural strength to support an individual like Baugh (i.e.,
that it did not contain an unreasonably dangerous condition). But this argument
cannot carry the day for Cuprum. Cuprum had ample opportunity to enhance Dr.
Stevenson’s credibility by using Dr. Stevenson to highlight the strengths of
finite element analysis and the shortcomings of Dr. Vinson’s calculations, and
by cross examining Dr. Vinson directly. All of this occurred in front of the
jury, and based on the evidence presented, the jury found Dr. Vinson’s approach
more convincing and entered a verdict in Baugh’s favor.
failed to prove the existence of an alternate design at trial, a frequent
prerequisite for liability under the risk-utility test and one that Baugh pursued
in this case. In doing so, however, Cuprum relies primarily on the same
arguments rejected above regarding the admissibility of Dr. Vinson’s
methodology—specifically, that Dr. Vinson failed to test his alternative
design, that this design was not subjected to peer review or review by ANSI,
that the design had not been embraced by the ladder industry, and that Dr.
Vinson was unqualified to opine about alternative designs. Without those
arguments, Cuprum is left with its contention that its own expert, Dr.
Stevenson, relied on superior methodology in opining that the ladder possessed
the requisite structural strength to support an individual like Baugh (i.e.,
that it did not contain an unreasonably dangerous condition). But this argument
cannot carry the day for Cuprum. Cuprum had ample opportunity to enhance Dr.
Stevenson’s credibility by using Dr. Stevenson to highlight the strengths of
finite element analysis and the shortcomings of Dr. Vinson’s calculations, and
by cross examining Dr. Vinson directly. All of this occurred in front of the
jury, and based on the evidence presented, the jury found Dr. Vinson’s approach
more convincing and entered a verdict in Baugh’s favor.
We reject the notion that no reasonable jury could have
concluded the same: Dr. Vinson adequately explained why a ladder like Baugh’s
could fail when used as instructed, how the legs and gussets could be modified
to prevent such a failure, and why the finite element analysis on which Dr.
Stevenson relied was an inferior method of calculating the varying levels of
force users apply on ladders. So Cuprum was not entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on the unreasonably dangerous condition element. See, e.g.,
Gicla v. United States, 572 F.3d 407, 414 (7th Cir. 2009) (observing
that the case “presented a classic battle of the experts … [that] called upon
the factfinder to determine what weight and credibility to give to each
expert”); Wipf v. Kowalski, 519 F.3d 380, 385 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[I]n a
case of dueling experts … it is left to the trier of fact, not the reviewing
court, to decide how to weigh the competing expert testimony.”); Spesco,
Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 719 F.2d 233, 237–38 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[T]his case
presents a typical example of opposing experts offering conflicting views to
the jury …. It is within the province of the jury to determine which of two
contradictory expert statements is deserving of credit.”).
concluded the same: Dr. Vinson adequately explained why a ladder like Baugh’s
could fail when used as instructed, how the legs and gussets could be modified
to prevent such a failure, and why the finite element analysis on which Dr.
Stevenson relied was an inferior method of calculating the varying levels of
force users apply on ladders. So Cuprum was not entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on the unreasonably dangerous condition element. See, e.g.,
Gicla v. United States, 572 F.3d 407, 414 (7th Cir. 2009) (observing
that the case “presented a classic battle of the experts … [that] called upon
the factfinder to determine what weight and credibility to give to each
expert”); Wipf v. Kowalski, 519 F.3d 380, 385 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[I]n a
case of dueling experts … it is left to the trier of fact, not the reviewing
court, to decide how to weigh the competing expert testimony.”); Spesco,
Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 719 F.2d 233, 237–38 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[T]his case
presents a typical example of opposing experts offering conflicting views to
the jury …. It is within the province of the jury to determine which of two
contradictory expert statements is deserving of credit.”).
2.
Causation
Causation
Cuprum also claims that it is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law because Baugh failed to prove causation. When relying on
circumstantial evidence to establish causation under Illinois law, as Baugh
does here, “the conclusion sought must be more than speculative; rather the
conclusion must be the only probable conclusion.” Williams v. Chi. Bd. of
Educ., 642 N.E.2d 764, 768 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (citations omitted).
Unsurprisingly, this means that a fact “cannot be inferred from the evidence
when the existence of another fact inconsistent with the first can be inferred
with equal certainty from the same evidence.” Pyne v. Witmer, 543 N.E.2d
1304, 1313 (Ill. 1989) (citation omitted). However, circumstantial evidence
need not go so far as to “exclude all other possible inferences” to show that a
causal link exists. Id.
matter of law because Baugh failed to prove causation. When relying on
circumstantial evidence to establish causation under Illinois law, as Baugh
does here, “the conclusion sought must be more than speculative; rather the
conclusion must be the only probable conclusion.” Williams v. Chi. Bd. of
Educ., 642 N.E.2d 764, 768 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (citations omitted).
Unsurprisingly, this means that a fact “cannot be inferred from the evidence
when the existence of another fact inconsistent with the first can be inferred
with equal certainty from the same evidence.” Pyne v. Witmer, 543 N.E.2d
1304, 1313 (Ill. 1989) (citation omitted). However, circumstantial evidence
need not go so far as to “exclude all other possible inferences” to show that a
causal link exists. Id.
Here, we conclude that a rational fact finder could conclude
that, based on a preponderance of the evidence, the alleged defect in the
ladder (and not ladder misuse) was the most probable cause of the accident. The
testing that Smith conducted provided the jury with sufficient information to conclude
that the damage to the ladder likely occurred while Baugh was using the ladder
properly. Moreover, the fact that both Baugh and the ladder were found in the
driveway suggests that the ladder fell into the driveway (Baugh’s theory)
rather than into the adjacent flower bed (Cuprum’s theory). Indeed, as Cuprum
concedes, no dirt, vegetation, or anything else was found on Baugh’s body or
clothes that suggested he fell into the flower bed, and Baugh’s profound
post-accident disorientation—non-communicative and non-responsive to his
rescuers—makes it unlikely that he moved both himself and the ladder to the
driveway after the fall. And after reviewing Cuprum’s videotaped “reenactment”
of the accident, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Baugh—65 years
old and 224 pounds at the time—likely did not attempt to straddle the ladder in
the physically awkward fashion that Cuprum suggests.
that, based on a preponderance of the evidence, the alleged defect in the
ladder (and not ladder misuse) was the most probable cause of the accident. The
testing that Smith conducted provided the jury with sufficient information to conclude
that the damage to the ladder likely occurred while Baugh was using the ladder
properly. Moreover, the fact that both Baugh and the ladder were found in the
driveway suggests that the ladder fell into the driveway (Baugh’s theory)
rather than into the adjacent flower bed (Cuprum’s theory). Indeed, as Cuprum
concedes, no dirt, vegetation, or anything else was found on Baugh’s body or
clothes that suggested he fell into the flower bed, and Baugh’s profound
post-accident disorientation—non-communicative and non-responsive to his
rescuers—makes it unlikely that he moved both himself and the ladder to the
driveway after the fall. And after reviewing Cuprum’s videotaped “reenactment”
of the accident, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Baugh—65 years
old and 224 pounds at the time—likely did not attempt to straddle the ladder in
the physically awkward fashion that Cuprum suggests.
*9 Cuprum raises a number of arguments in support of its
position that ladder failure is not the most probable cause, but none are
persuasive—especially when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Baugh,
as we must. For example, Cuprum claims that Vinson and Smith disagreed about
how the ladder’s design caused the accident and how the ladder’s left leg and pail
shelf became damaged. But this misrepresents the two men’s testimony; because
Vinson’s opinions on these topics ranged from equivocal to entirely absent,
there was no meaningful disagreement between him and Smith.
position that ladder failure is not the most probable cause, but none are
persuasive—especially when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Baugh,
as we must. For example, Cuprum claims that Vinson and Smith disagreed about
how the ladder’s design caused the accident and how the ladder’s left leg and pail
shelf became damaged. But this misrepresents the two men’s testimony; because
Vinson’s opinions on these topics ranged from equivocal to entirely absent,
there was no meaningful disagreement between him and Smith.
Cuprum also criticizes Baugh’s experts for not knowing the
specific PSI that Baugh was exerting on the ladder immediately before the
accident. But we fail to see why this absence is dispositive. Vinson testified
that a 200-pound individual could exert more than twice the PSI that the ladder
was designed to withstand, and Smith opined that the damage to and
post-accident location of the ladder were consistent with failure and tip-over.
That seems sufficient. And it is unsurprising that the specific PSI is unknown,
since no expert on either side could testify with certainty as to Baugh’s
specific location on the ladder when the accident occurred.
specific PSI that Baugh was exerting on the ladder immediately before the
accident. But we fail to see why this absence is dispositive. Vinson testified
that a 200-pound individual could exert more than twice the PSI that the ladder
was designed to withstand, and Smith opined that the damage to and
post-accident location of the ladder were consistent with failure and tip-over.
That seems sufficient. And it is unsurprising that the specific PSI is unknown,
since no expert on either side could testify with certainty as to Baugh’s
specific location on the ladder when the accident occurred.
Another complaint of Cuprum’s is that Baugh could not have
easily reached the gutter screws he was replacing by standing on the ladder’s
first, second, or third steps—the only proper steps for standing. In support,
Cuprum notes that Van Bree, who is six feet tall, could barely touch one of the
screws with his hand, and that Baugh is even shorter than Van Bree, at five
feet ten inches. However, a reasonable jury could discount this testimony on
several grounds—for example, that Van Bree’s superior height does not establish
that his standing reach was longer than Baugh’s, or more importantly, that the
use of a screwdriver could have given Baugh the few inches necessary to make
the screws more comfortably reachable.
easily reached the gutter screws he was replacing by standing on the ladder’s
first, second, or third steps—the only proper steps for standing. In support,
Cuprum notes that Van Bree, who is six feet tall, could barely touch one of the
screws with his hand, and that Baugh is even shorter than Van Bree, at five
feet ten inches. However, a reasonable jury could discount this testimony on
several grounds—for example, that Van Bree’s superior height does not establish
that his standing reach was longer than Baugh’s, or more importantly, that the
use of a screwdriver could have given Baugh the few inches necessary to make
the screws more comfortably reachable.
And while Cuprum claims that Van Bree’s theory is the only
one that accounts for all of the damage to Baugh’s ladder, that overlooks
several criticisms that the jury could have found compelling. For example, Van
Bree opined that the ladder’s right front leg bent not because of a design
failure but because Baugh had fallen on it after the ladder tipped over. In
support of this theory, Van Bree noted that he dropped a sandbag onto an
exemplar ladder, but the jury could have reasonably found that the bag could
not replicate the effects of a human body. Similarly, when asked to explain how
the right front leg could have been bent down by Baugh falling on it but still
ended up on the ground with the bend pointing up, Van Bree opined that the
entire ladder had flipped over 180°> after Baugh fell onto it. The jury was
entitled to view this opinion with skepticism. And although Van Bree opined
that the pail shelf was damaged by Baugh standing on it, there was no evidence
ruling out the possibility that the shelf had been damaged before the accident.
So Cuprum was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on causation.
one that accounts for all of the damage to Baugh’s ladder, that overlooks
several criticisms that the jury could have found compelling. For example, Van
Bree opined that the ladder’s right front leg bent not because of a design
failure but because Baugh had fallen on it after the ladder tipped over. In
support of this theory, Van Bree noted that he dropped a sandbag onto an
exemplar ladder, but the jury could have reasonably found that the bag could
not replicate the effects of a human body. Similarly, when asked to explain how
the right front leg could have been bent down by Baugh falling on it but still
ended up on the ground with the bend pointing up, Van Bree opined that the
entire ladder had flipped over 180°> after Baugh fell onto it. The jury was
entitled to view this opinion with skepticism. And although Van Bree opined
that the pail shelf was damaged by Baugh standing on it, there was no evidence
ruling out the possibility that the shelf had been damaged before the accident.
So Cuprum was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on causation.
III. CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.