Appeals
— Certiorari — Workers’ compensation — Timeliness of petition — Even in
workers’ compensation cases, deadline for filing petition for writ of
certiorari is controlled by rule 9.100(c), which requires that petition be
filed within 30 days after rendition of order to be reviewed — Petition filed
31 days after rendition of order dismissed for lack of jurisdiction — Five-day
mailing period applicable in cases in which a party may or must act within
specified time after service does not apply to requirement that certiorari
petition be filed within 30 days after rendition of order to be reviewed

RONALD MATHENY, Petitioner, v. INDIAN RIVER FIRE RESCUE/ JOHNS EASTERN
COMPANY, INC., Respondents. 1st District. Case No. 1D15-2719. Opinion filed
October 2, 2015. Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Counsel: Kristine Callagy of
Bichler, Kelley, Oliver, Longo & Fox, PLLC, Maitland, for Petitioner.
William H. Rogner of Hurley, Rogner, Miller, Cox & Waranch, P.A., Winter
Park, for Respondents.

(KELSEY, J.) We dismiss the petition for writ of certiorari for lack of
jurisdiction because it was untimely. Even in workers’ compensation cases, the
deadline for filing a petition for writ of certiorari is controlled by Florida
Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.100(c). See Fla. R. App. P. 9.180(a)
(“Appellate review of proceedings in workers’ compensation cases shall be as in
civil cases except as specifically modified in this rule.”). Rule 9.100(c)
requires such a petition to be filed within thirty days after rendition of the
order to be reviewed.

In this case it is undisputed that the lower tribunal rendered the order under
review on May 12, 2015. The lower tribunal did not thereafter alter the order.
The last day to file a petition for writ of certiorari was June 11, 2015, which
did not fall on a weekend or holiday. Nevertheless, Petitioner filed the
petition on June 12, 2015 — thirty-one days after rendition of the order.
Because the filing deadline set forth in Rule 9.100(c) is jurisdictional, and
Petitioner did not meet the deadline, this Court lacks jurisdiction. See
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. Lewis, 122 So. 3d 504, 505 (Fla.
3d DCA 2013); see also § 59.081(2), Fla. Stat. (2014) (“Failure to
invoke the jurisdiction of any such court within the time prescribed by such
rules shall divest such court of jurisdiction to review such cause.”).

On jurisdictional screening, this Court entered an order requiring
Petitioner to show cause why the petition should not be dismissed as untimely
under Rule 9.100(c). In response, Petitioner claimed entitlement to an
additional five days under Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.514(b).
Rule 2.514(b) provides that “when a party may or must act within a specified
time after service and service is made by mail or e-mail, 5 days are
added after the period that would otherwise expire . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
This rule applies only when another rule, a court order, or a statute requires
a party to act within a specified time after service. In contrast, Rule
9.100(c) requires a petition for writ of certiorari to be filed within thirty
days after “rendition of the order to be reviewed.” (Emphasis added.)
Rendition is not the same thing as service. When a deadline is tied to a date
of rendition, the extra five days under Rule 2.514(b) do not apply. See Miccosukee
Tribe, 122 So. 3d at 506 (“Rule 2.514(b) affords no additional time when a
rule (in this case rule 9.100(c)(1)) requires a party to act within a specified
time after rendition of an order.”).

This principle is nothing new. The Florida Supreme Court and every
district court of appeal have affirmed it. It applies in general civil and
criminal practice as well as in workers’ compensation practice, unless another
statute, rule, or authorized court order expressly provides otherwise. See,
e.g., Bell v. U.S.B. Acquisition Co., 734 So. 2d 403, 412 (Fla.
1999) (applying former Rule 9.420(d), which then set forth the extra-five-day
provision); Miccosukee Tribe, 122 So. 3d at 506; Moonier v. Fla.
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 73 So. 3d 366 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); Turner
v. State, 557 So. 2d 939, 939 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Bouchard v. State,
Dep’t of Bus. Regulation, Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 448
So. 2d 1126, 1127 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Franchi v. Fla. Dep’t of Commerce,
Div. of Emp’t Sec., Bd. of Review, 375 So. 2d 1154, 1156 (Fla. 4th DCA
1979).

The petition for writ of certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction. Because this Court lacks jurisdiction over this petition, we also
deny Petitioner’s alternative request that this case be consolidated with
another case now pending in this Court that involves similar issues of law.
Nothing herein should be construed as suggesting that we would have certiorari
jurisdiction to review an order such as that at issue here. See, e.g., Dep’t
of Revenue v. Groman, 46 So. 3d 1058, 1061 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (certiorari
will not lie to review order that can be remedied by plenary appeal after entry
of final order). (WETHERELL and RAY, JJ., CONCUR.)

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