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May 31, 2018 by Jennifer Kennedy

Appeals — Order granting counter-defendants’ motion for summary judgment on counterclaims and dismissing the counterclaims improperly included words of finality, “go hence without day,” where order did not dispose of plaintiff’s claims against counter-claimant

43 Fla. L. Weekly D1211a

Appeals — Order granting counter-defendants’ motion for summary judgment on counterclaims and dismissing the counterclaims improperly included words of finality, “go hence without day,” where order did not dispose of plaintiff’s claims against counter-claimant

TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, INC. and CARRIER EQUIPMENT, INC., Appellants, vs. SEABOARD MARINE LTD., Appellee. 3rd District. Case No. 3D17-1682. L.T. Case No. 16-3975. May 30, 2018. An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Antonio Marin, Judge. Counsel: Aponte Law and Darren R. Aponte, for appellants. Blanck & Cooper and Jonathan S. Cooper, for appellee.

(Before ROTHENBERG, C.J., and SALTER and SCALES, JJ.)

(PER CURIAM.) Defendants/counter-plaintiffs/appellants, Transportation Services, Inc., and Carrier Equipment, Inc., have appealed an order in favor of plaintiff/counter-defendant/appellee, Seaboard Marine Ltd., captioned “Final Judgment for Counterdefendant Seaboard Marine.” That order granted Seaboard Marine’s motion for summary judgment on the appellants’ counterclaims, dismissing those counterclaims, and concluding that the appellants “shall take nothing by this suit and [the appellee] shall go hence without day.” The order did not address or dispose of the appellee’s still-pending claims as plaintiff against the appellants; those claims and the appellants’ counterclaims arose from the same transactions and occurrences.

We issued an order to the parties to show cause why the order on appeal should not be reversed to exclude the purported words of finality, “go hence without day,” without prejudice to the rights of the parties to appeal when both the claims and counterclaims have been fully adjudicated, citing Haven Center, Inc. v. Meruelo, 22 So. 3d 849, 850 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). No responses were filed.

We reverse the order sought to be appealed, and remand the case for the deletion from the order of the phrase “go hence without day.” The reversal does not disturb the trial court’s decision to grant the appellee’s motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim, and is without prejudice to the rights of the parties to appeal when the claims and counterclaims have been fully adjudicated.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

* * *

Filed Under: Uncategorized

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