Dissolution of marriage — Alimony — Appeals — Timeliness — Husband’s
appeal of award of durational alimony to wife was not timely where notice of
appeal was filed more than 30 days after rendition of order — Time for filing
notice of appeal commenced on date of original judgment, not date of subsequent
amended judgment, where amendment of judgment was solely to correct scrivener’s
error in date and did not effect substantive change

STANLEY PANOPOULOS, Appellant, v. MARIA M. PANOPOULOS, Appellee. 2nd
District. Case No. 2D13-5234. Opinion filed January 23, 2015. Appeal pursuant to
Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for Pasco County; Daniel D. Diskey,
Judge. Counsel: John A. Shahan, Tarpon Springs, for Appellant. Johnny D. Drizis
of Law Office of Johnny D. Drizis, Clearwater, for Appellee.

(PER CURIAM.) In this appeal, Michael Panopoulos, Former Husband, challenges
an award of durational alimony to Maria Panopoulos, Former Wife. Because the
relevant order was not timely appealed, we dismiss this appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.

Former Wife petitioned for dissolution of her twenty-three-year marriage to
Former Husband. In a highly unusual procedure, the circuit court trifurcated the
dissolution proceedings.1 The circuit court
first dissolved the marriage by an order not on appeal. It then separated the
remainder of the proceedings by purporting to address “all financial issues”
first: it entered the appealed-from “partial final judgment” on those issues,
while reserving on timesharing and child support for the parties’ minor
children. In her petition, Former Wife sought retroactive alimony which the
court denied; however, in its “partial final judgment,” it awarded alimony to be
paid starting on October 1, 2012. The parties agreed that there was a
scrivener’s error and decided to contact the judge’s judicial assistant, rather
than filing a motion for rehearing, recognizing the date in the order should
have been October 1, 2013. The court issued an amended order that
corrected the error. Former Husband filed his notice to appeal that order on
October 23, 2013.

Former Husband’s notice of appeal was not timely. The initial order was
rendered on September 18, 2013. The order was amended to correct the scrivener’s
error in a date and the amended order was rendered on October 14, 2013. The
notice of appeal was filed on October 23, 2013. Accordingly, the notice was
timely filed from the corrected order but untimely as filed from the initial.
See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(b) (stating that a notice of appeal must be
filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed). The timing of
the filing of the notice of appeal is a jurisdictional matter. El Gohary v.
El Gohary, 76 So. 3d 355, 356-57 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). The case law is clear
that where a judgment is amended to correct only a scrivener’s error, the time
for appeal is not tolled and instead is counted from the date of the initial
order. See Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. Freeman, 884 So. 2d
164, 168 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (“When a party wishes to challenge a judgment by
motion or appeal, the time to challenge the judgment runs from the original
judgment unless an amendment changes or clarifies a matter of substance.”
(citing St. Moritz Hotel v. Daughtry, 249 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1971))). In
this case, the amendment of the judgment was solely to correct an error in a
date and did not effect a substantive change. Accordingly, the time to appeal
from the order in this case commenced September 19, 2013, the day after the
first order was rendered. See Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.514(a)(1)(A). The
filing of the notice of appeal was October 23, over thirty days later. Thus, the
appeal was untimely and we are without jurisdiction to entertain it. Fortunately
for Former Husband, due to the unusual proceedings in this case, the issues
raised in this appeal will likely be within the scope of review of an appeal
from a final order of dissolution. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(h) (“The
court may review any ruling or matter occurring before filing of the notice.”).

Appeal dismissed. (ALTENBERND, NORTHCUTT, and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur.)

__________________

1It is an exceptional dissolution
proceeding in which bifurcation is a good idea. A trial court should not
bifurcate proceedings unless “it is clearly necessary for the best interests or
their children.” Claughton v. Claughton, 393 So. 2d 1061, 1062 (Fla.
1980). This trifurcation is even more unusual.