39 Fla. L. Weekly D738b
Dissolution of marriage — Attorney’s fees — Appeals —
Order which addresses entitlement to fees but not the amount of fees is not ripe
for appeal
Order which addresses entitlement to fees but not the amount of fees is not ripe
for appeal
VALENTIN ALARCON, JR., Appellant, v. ALEXIS E. ALARCON, Appellee. 2nd
District. Case No. 2D13-1476. Opinion filed April 9, 2014. Appeal from the
Circuit Court for Lee County; Elisabeth Adams, Judge. Counsel: Vana Renejuste of
Renejuste Law & Associates, Fort Myers, for Appellant. Robert L. Donald of
Law Office of Robert L. Donald, Fort Myers, for Appellee.
District. Case No. 2D13-1476. Opinion filed April 9, 2014. Appeal from the
Circuit Court for Lee County; Elisabeth Adams, Judge. Counsel: Vana Renejuste of
Renejuste Law & Associates, Fort Myers, for Appellant. Robert L. Donald of
Law Office of Robert L. Donald, Fort Myers, for Appellee.
(SILBERMAN, Judge.) In this postdissolution proceeding, Valentin Alarcon, Jr.
(the Former Husband), appeals a supplemental final judgment that modifies
timesharing and child support and determines entitlement to attorney’s fees in
favor of Alexis E. Alarcon (the Former Wife). We affirm without discussion on
the timesharing and child support. However, we dismiss the appeal as premature
regarding the issue of attorney’s fees.
(the Former Husband), appeals a supplemental final judgment that modifies
timesharing and child support and determines entitlement to attorney’s fees in
favor of Alexis E. Alarcon (the Former Wife). We affirm without discussion on
the timesharing and child support. However, we dismiss the appeal as premature
regarding the issue of attorney’s fees.
Because the trial court’s ruling only addressed entitlement to fees and not
the amount that the Former Husband is obligated to pay, that portion of the
supplemental judgment is not ripe for appeal. See Shadwick v.
Shadwick, 39 Fla. L. Weekly D374, D374 (Fla. 2d DCA Feb. 14, 2014);
Zuberer v. Zuberer, 28 So. 3d 993, 993-94 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). Thus, we
dismiss the appeal in part as premature with respect to the attorney’s fees
portion of the supplemental final judgment.
the amount that the Former Husband is obligated to pay, that portion of the
supplemental judgment is not ripe for appeal. See Shadwick v.
Shadwick, 39 Fla. L. Weekly D374, D374 (Fla. 2d DCA Feb. 14, 2014);
Zuberer v. Zuberer, 28 So. 3d 993, 993-94 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). Thus, we
dismiss the appeal in part as premature with respect to the attorney’s fees
portion of the supplemental final judgment.
Affirmed in part and dismissed in part. (BLACK and SLEET, JJ., Concur.)
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