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May 27, 2016 by admin

Attorney’s fees — Trial court abused its discretion when it awarded attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105(1) without making detailed findings in its order regarding basis for the fees sanction

41 Fla. L. Weekly D1236aTop of Form

Attorney’s
fees — Trial court abused its discretion when it awarded attorney’s fees
pursuant to section 57.105(1) without making detailed findings in its order
regarding basis for the fees sanction

CLAUTIDE JEAN-PIERRE, JAMES JEAN-PIERRE, and REYNOLD
JEAN-PIERRE, Appellants, v. MADELINE GLABERMAN, Appellee. 4th District. Case
No. 4D15-2582. May 25, 2016. Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth
Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Joel T. Lazarus, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE
12-021433 11. Counsel: James Jean-Francois of James Jean-Francois, P.A.,
Hollywood, for appellants. No brief filed for appellee.

(PER CURIAM.) The homeowners appeal three trial court orders
(1) entering a final judgment of foreclosure in favor of appellee, (2) entering
a writ of bodily attachment against the homeowners, and (3) granting the
appellee’s motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105. We affirm the
first two orders without discussion, and reverse the third order because the
trial court failed to make written findings regarding the reasons for granting
the motion.

The underlying dispute in this case involved a mortgage
foreclosure. During the pendency of the case, the appellee filed a motion for
attorney’s fees, pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2015), which was
granted by the trial court, holding the homeowners and their legal counsel
“jointly and severally liable for sanctions in the form of attorney’s fees.”

“Generally, the standard of review of a trial court’s order
awarding section 57.105(1) attorney’s fees is abuse of discretion. However, to
the extent a trial court’s order on fees is based on an issue of law, this
court applies de novo review.” Lago v. Kame By Design, LLC, 120 So. 3d
73, 74 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (citations omitted).

We agree with the homeowners that the trial court erred when
it failed to make detailed findings in its order regarding the basis for the
fees sanction. In Blue Infiniti, LLC v. Wilson, 170 So. 3d 136 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2015), we explained:

Additionally,
the only finding that the trial court made in its order was its “finding the
Civil RICO claim was frivolous.” This falls short of the requirement that the
trial court make detailed and specific findings of bad faith.
“[I]f the trial court concludes that an award of fees under section 57.105 is
an appropriate sanction, ‘it should recite in its order the facts upon which it
bases that conclusion.’ ” Lago, 120 So. 3d at 75 (quoting Regions
Bank v. Gad,
102 So. 3d 666, 667 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)); see also Avis
Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Newman,
641 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). It was
therefore error for the trial court to impose sanctions upon Blue Infiniti and
its attorney prior to affording a full opportunity to be heard and without
making detailed findings in its order.

Id. at 140-41. Since there are no
findings of fact in the order on the motion for sanctions in this case, the
order does not fully comply with the requirements of the law. Therefore, we
remand the case for the trial court to make the appropriate findings. See
id.
(reversing and remanding for the trial court to allow for a full
hearing); cf. Bank of New York Mellon v. Kossis, 165 So. 3d 793, 796
(Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (remanding, in a case that required written findings of
fact, for the trial court to make such findings).

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. (WARNER,
MAY and CONNER, JJ., concur.)

* *
*

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