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Fla. L. Weekly D2068aTop of Form
Fla. L. Weekly D2068aTop of Form
Torts
— Automobile accident — Rear-end collision — Error to grant summary judgment
in favor of front driver finding that rear driver’s negligence caused car
accident occurring when rear driver hit the back of front driver’s car, where
rear driver rebutted rear-end presumption of negligence by showing through
credible evidence that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
front driver contributed to cause of accident by suddenly changing lanes —
Rear driver’s deposition testimony that he did not see front driver’s car until
she abruptly appeared in front of him, at which point he was unable to avoid
the collision, rebutted rear-end presumption, and thus raised factual question
as to whether front driver suddenly changed lanes and contributed to cause of
accident — Cases involving rear-end collisions that did not involve evidence
of a sudden or unexpected maneuver by front driver, and that reviewed rulings
on motions for directed verdict, are distinguishable
— Automobile accident — Rear-end collision — Error to grant summary judgment
in favor of front driver finding that rear driver’s negligence caused car
accident occurring when rear driver hit the back of front driver’s car, where
rear driver rebutted rear-end presumption of negligence by showing through
credible evidence that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
front driver contributed to cause of accident by suddenly changing lanes —
Rear driver’s deposition testimony that he did not see front driver’s car until
she abruptly appeared in front of him, at which point he was unable to avoid
the collision, rebutted rear-end presumption, and thus raised factual question
as to whether front driver suddenly changed lanes and contributed to cause of
accident — Cases involving rear-end collisions that did not involve evidence
of a sudden or unexpected maneuver by front driver, and that reviewed rulings
on motions for directed verdict, are distinguishable
MARCOS
PADILLA, Appellant, v. JUNE B. SCHWARTZ, Appellee. 4th District. Case No.
4D14-3874. September 7, 2016. Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth
Judicial Circuit, Broward County; John B. Bowman, Judge; L.T. Case No.
12014765-CACE-02. Counsel: William G. Wolk of Eaton & Wolk, PL, Miami, for
appellant. John P. Joy and Sara M. Sandler of Walton Lantaff Schroeder &
Carson, LLP, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
PADILLA, Appellant, v. JUNE B. SCHWARTZ, Appellee. 4th District. Case No.
4D14-3874. September 7, 2016. Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth
Judicial Circuit, Broward County; John B. Bowman, Judge; L.T. Case No.
12014765-CACE-02. Counsel: William G. Wolk of Eaton & Wolk, PL, Miami, for
appellant. John P. Joy and Sara M. Sandler of Walton Lantaff Schroeder &
Carson, LLP, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
(KLINGENSMITH,
J.) Marcos Padilla appeals from a final summary judgment in favor of June
Schwartz finding that his negligence caused the car accident from which this
case arose. The court concluded that no genuine issue of material fact existed
since Padilla failed to rebut the rebuttable presumption of negligence which,
under Florida law, attaches to the rear driver in a rear-end collision. After
careful review of the facts of this case, we reverse.
J.) Marcos Padilla appeals from a final summary judgment in favor of June
Schwartz finding that his negligence caused the car accident from which this
case arose. The court concluded that no genuine issue of material fact existed
since Padilla failed to rebut the rebuttable presumption of negligence which,
under Florida law, attaches to the rear driver in a rear-end collision. After
careful review of the facts of this case, we reverse.
We
review the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo. E.g.,
Ergas v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 114 So. 3d 286, 288 (Fla.
4th DCA 2013) (stating that the standard of review for an order granting
summary judgment is de novo). “A party moving for summary judgment must show
conclusively the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and the court
must draw every possible inference in favor of the party against whom summary
judgment is sought.” Lindsey v. Bell S. Telecomms., Inc., 943 So. 2d
963, 964-65 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); see also Vander Voort v. Universal Prop.
& Cas. Ins. Co., 127 So. 3d 536, 538 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (stating that
“[a]n appellate court must examine the record in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party” when reviewing an order granting summary judgment). “If
material facts are at issue and the slightest doubt exists, summary judgment
must be reversed.” Suker v. White Family Ltd. P’ship, 193 So. 3d 1028,
1029 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting Aery v. Wallace Lincoln-Mercury, LLC,
118 So. 3d 904, 910 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)).
review the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo. E.g.,
Ergas v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 114 So. 3d 286, 288 (Fla.
4th DCA 2013) (stating that the standard of review for an order granting
summary judgment is de novo). “A party moving for summary judgment must show
conclusively the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and the court
must draw every possible inference in favor of the party against whom summary
judgment is sought.” Lindsey v. Bell S. Telecomms., Inc., 943 So. 2d
963, 964-65 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); see also Vander Voort v. Universal Prop.
& Cas. Ins. Co., 127 So. 3d 536, 538 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (stating that
“[a]n appellate court must examine the record in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party” when reviewing an order granting summary judgment). “If
material facts are at issue and the slightest doubt exists, summary judgment
must be reversed.” Suker v. White Family Ltd. P’ship, 193 So. 3d 1028,
1029 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting Aery v. Wallace Lincoln-Mercury, LLC,
118 So. 3d 904, 910 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)).
This
case materialized following a car accident which occurred on the Florida
Turnpike. Padilla testified during a deposition that he was driving within the
posted speed limit surrounding a construction zone, and did not see any nearby
cars on the road immediately before the accident occurred. He claimed that
Schwartz’s car then appeared suddenly in front of him without warning, and
though he applied the brakes, he was unable to avoid hitting the back left area
of Schwartz’s vehicle.
case materialized following a car accident which occurred on the Florida
Turnpike. Padilla testified during a deposition that he was driving within the
posted speed limit surrounding a construction zone, and did not see any nearby
cars on the road immediately before the accident occurred. He claimed that
Schwartz’s car then appeared suddenly in front of him without warning, and
though he applied the brakes, he was unable to avoid hitting the back left area
of Schwartz’s vehicle.
Padilla
subsequently filed a negligence action against Schwartz. When Schwartz moved
for summary judgment, Padilla countered that there was evidence — albeit from
his own sworn deposition testimony — that there was no car in front of him
until Schwartz suddenly invaded his lane, which was more than sufficient
evidence to rebut the presumption. After a hearing, the trial court granted
Schwartz’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Padilla’s testimony was
consistent with a finding that he was negligent, and thereafter rendered final
judgment for Schwartz.
subsequently filed a negligence action against Schwartz. When Schwartz moved
for summary judgment, Padilla countered that there was evidence — albeit from
his own sworn deposition testimony — that there was no car in front of him
until Schwartz suddenly invaded his lane, which was more than sufficient
evidence to rebut the presumption. After a hearing, the trial court granted
Schwartz’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Padilla’s testimony was
consistent with a finding that he was negligent, and thereafter rendered final
judgment for Schwartz.
In
Florida, “there is a rebuttable presumption of negligence that attaches to the
rear driver in a rear-end motor vehicle collision case.” Birge v. Charron,
107 So. 3d 350, 353 (Fla. 2012). This presumption is “an evidentiary tool that
facilitates a particular type of negligence case by filling an evidentiary void
where the evidence is such that there is no relevant jury question on the issue
of liability and causation.” Id. at 360-61.
Florida, “there is a rebuttable presumption of negligence that attaches to the
rear driver in a rear-end motor vehicle collision case.” Birge v. Charron,
107 So. 3d 350, 353 (Fla. 2012). This presumption is “an evidentiary tool that
facilitates a particular type of negligence case by filling an evidentiary void
where the evidence is such that there is no relevant jury question on the issue
of liability and causation.” Id. at 360-61.
The usefulness of the
[rear-end collision] rule is obvious. A plaintiff ordinarily bears the burden
of proof of all four elements of negligence — duty of care, breach of that
duty, causation and damages. Yet, obtaining proof of two of those elements,
breach and causation, is difficult when a plaintiff driver who has been
rear-ended knows that the defendant driver rear-ended him but usually does not
know why.
[rear-end collision] rule is obvious. A plaintiff ordinarily bears the burden
of proof of all four elements of negligence — duty of care, breach of that
duty, causation and damages. Yet, obtaining proof of two of those elements,
breach and causation, is difficult when a plaintiff driver who has been
rear-ended knows that the defendant driver rear-ended him but usually does not
know why.
Jefferies
v. Amery Leasing, Inc., 698 So. 2d 368, 370-71 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1997) (citations omitted).
v. Amery Leasing, Inc., 698 So. 2d 368, 370-71 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1997) (citations omitted).
The
presumption, however, can be rebutted by evidence from which a jury could
conclude that the front driver was negligent and comparatively at fault in the
accident. Birge, 107 So. 3d at 361 (“[W]here evidence is produced from
which a jury could conclude that the front driver in a rear-end collision was
negligent and comparatively at fault in bringing about the collision, the
presumption is rebutted and the issues of disputed fact regarding negligence
and causation should be submitted to the jury.”); see also McGill v. Perez,
59 So. 3d 388, 390 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (“The presumption that the following
driver in a motor vehicle accident is negligent can be rebutted when that
driver ‘produces evidence which fairly and reasonably tends to show that the
real fact is not as presumed.’ ” (quoting Gulle v. Boggs, 174 So. 2d 26,
28-29 (Fla. 1965))).
presumption, however, can be rebutted by evidence from which a jury could
conclude that the front driver was negligent and comparatively at fault in the
accident. Birge, 107 So. 3d at 361 (“[W]here evidence is produced from
which a jury could conclude that the front driver in a rear-end collision was
negligent and comparatively at fault in bringing about the collision, the
presumption is rebutted and the issues of disputed fact regarding negligence
and causation should be submitted to the jury.”); see also McGill v. Perez,
59 So. 3d 388, 390 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (“The presumption that the following
driver in a motor vehicle accident is negligent can be rebutted when that
driver ‘produces evidence which fairly and reasonably tends to show that the
real fact is not as presumed.’ ” (quoting Gulle v. Boggs, 174 So. 2d 26,
28-29 (Fla. 1965))).
The
Fifth District’s decision in Alford v. Cool Cargo Carriers, Inc., 936
So. 2d 646 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006), is most analogous to the circumstances
presented here. There, Alford was injured after the car in which he was riding
was struck from behind. Id. at 648. Alford filed suit against the owner
and driver of the rear car, who later moved for summary judgment arguing that a
sudden lane change and low rate of speed by the driver of Alford’s vehicle
“were the sole and proximate cause of the accident.” Id. at 649. Alford
argued that the presumption of negligence attached, as the rear driver could
not rebut the presumption since he “admitted that he had not seen [Alford’s]
vehicle until it started to enter the middle lane.” Id.
Fifth District’s decision in Alford v. Cool Cargo Carriers, Inc., 936
So. 2d 646 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006), is most analogous to the circumstances
presented here. There, Alford was injured after the car in which he was riding
was struck from behind. Id. at 648. Alford filed suit against the owner
and driver of the rear car, who later moved for summary judgment arguing that a
sudden lane change and low rate of speed by the driver of Alford’s vehicle
“were the sole and proximate cause of the accident.” Id. at 649. Alford
argued that the presumption of negligence attached, as the rear driver could
not rebut the presumption since he “admitted that he had not seen [Alford’s]
vehicle until it started to enter the middle lane.” Id.
The
trial court granted the rear driver’s motion for summary judgment based on its
finding that the evidence sufficiently rebutted the rear-end presumption. Id.
On appeal, the Fifth District agreed there was conflicting evidence as to
whether the lane change was sudden and unexpected which was sufficient to rebut
the presumption, and held that “summary judgment [was] improper and the case
should [have been] submitted to the jury.” Id. at 650. The court also
noted that there was a possibility that both parties were negligent, further
rendering “summary judgment inappropriate.” Id. at 650-51.
trial court granted the rear driver’s motion for summary judgment based on its
finding that the evidence sufficiently rebutted the rear-end presumption. Id.
On appeal, the Fifth District agreed there was conflicting evidence as to
whether the lane change was sudden and unexpected which was sufficient to rebut
the presumption, and held that “summary judgment [was] improper and the case
should [have been] submitted to the jury.” Id. at 650. The court also
noted that there was a possibility that both parties were negligent, further
rendering “summary judgment inappropriate.” Id. at 650-51.
Here,
Padilla’s deposition testimony about what he observed prior to the accident
constituted evidence regarding Schwartz’s vehicle and her manner of driving.
Those statements established that Padilla was focused on the road ahead of him
and did not look away, and that there were no cars directly in front of him
until Schwartz’s car suddenly appeared. We find that his testimony that he did
not see the other car until Schwartz invaded his lane sufficiently rebutted the
rear-end presumption, and thus raised a factual question as to whether Schwartz
suddenly changed lanes and contributed to the cause of the accident. Similar to
the rear driver in Alford, Padilla claimed he did not see Schwartz’s car
until she abruptly appeared in front of him, at which point he was unable to
avoid the collision. 936 So. 2d at 648-49.
Padilla’s deposition testimony about what he observed prior to the accident
constituted evidence regarding Schwartz’s vehicle and her manner of driving.
Those statements established that Padilla was focused on the road ahead of him
and did not look away, and that there were no cars directly in front of him
until Schwartz’s car suddenly appeared. We find that his testimony that he did
not see the other car until Schwartz invaded his lane sufficiently rebutted the
rear-end presumption, and thus raised a factual question as to whether Schwartz
suddenly changed lanes and contributed to the cause of the accident. Similar to
the rear driver in Alford, Padilla claimed he did not see Schwartz’s car
until she abruptly appeared in front of him, at which point he was unable to
avoid the collision. 936 So. 2d at 648-49.
Although
Schwartz cites a number of cases involving rear-end collisions, they are
distinguishable since none involved evidence of a sudden or unexpected maneuver
by the front driver. See Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v.
Saleme, 963 So. 2d 969, 977 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (“Saleme failed to present
any evidence to support his claim that Trooper Lozano made a sudden lane change
or unexpected lane change . . . .”); Ortlieb v. Butts, 849 So. 2d 1165,
1169 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (“The evidence does not show that Butts’ stop was
sudden and unexpected.”); Tozier v. Jarvis, 469 So. 2d 884, 885 (Fla.
4th DCA 1985) (“Jarvis could not testify, however, that he saw the vehicle in
motion in any direction.”). The cases Schwartz relies on are also distinct in
that they reviewed rulings on motions for directed verdict, while Alford and
this case concern summary judgment. Compare Saleme, 963 So. 2d at 970, Ortlieb,
849 So. 2d at 1166, and Tozier, 469 So. 2d at 885, with Alford,
936 So. 2d at 648.
Schwartz cites a number of cases involving rear-end collisions, they are
distinguishable since none involved evidence of a sudden or unexpected maneuver
by the front driver. See Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v.
Saleme, 963 So. 2d 969, 977 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (“Saleme failed to present
any evidence to support his claim that Trooper Lozano made a sudden lane change
or unexpected lane change . . . .”); Ortlieb v. Butts, 849 So. 2d 1165,
1169 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (“The evidence does not show that Butts’ stop was
sudden and unexpected.”); Tozier v. Jarvis, 469 So. 2d 884, 885 (Fla.
4th DCA 1985) (“Jarvis could not testify, however, that he saw the vehicle in
motion in any direction.”). The cases Schwartz relies on are also distinct in
that they reviewed rulings on motions for directed verdict, while Alford and
this case concern summary judgment. Compare Saleme, 963 So. 2d at 970, Ortlieb,
849 So. 2d at 1166, and Tozier, 469 So. 2d at 885, with Alford,
936 So. 2d at 648.
Under
Alford, and considering the evidence in the light most favorable to
Padilla, we find that Padilla sufficiently rebutted the presumption by showing
through credible evidence that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Schwartz contributed to causing the accident by suddenly changing
lanes. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of Schwartz was improper.
Alford, and considering the evidence in the light most favorable to
Padilla, we find that Padilla sufficiently rebutted the presumption by showing
through credible evidence that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Schwartz contributed to causing the accident by suddenly changing
lanes. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of Schwartz was improper.
Reversed
and Remanded. (CIKLIN, C.J., and CONNER J., concur.)
and Remanded. (CIKLIN, C.J., and CONNER J., concur.)
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