Abbey Adams Logo

Defending Liability, Employment Claims and Appeals Since 1982

  • Skip to main content
  • Skip to primary sidebar
  • Skip to footer

  • Bloglovin
  • Facebook
  • LinkedIn
  • Phone
  • Home
  • Locations
    • Where We Practice in Florida
    • Where We Are Available to Practice In Illinois
  • Practices
  • Blog
  • Attorneys
    • David J. Abbey
    • Jeffrey M. Adams
    • Robert P. Byelick
    • Jennifer J. Kennedy
    • John D. Kiernan (1947-2016)
    • V. Joseph Mueller
    • Elisabeth K. Eubanks
  • Links
  • Contact Us

June 13, 2023 by Jennifer Kennedy

Civil procedure — Amended summary judgment rule does not provide that summary judgment may be granted based solely on nonmovant’s failure to respond — If party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by rule 1.510(c), court may, among other things, consider that fact undisputed for purposes of the motion or may grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials, including the facts considered to be undisputed, show that movant is entitled to it — Rule also requires trial court to state on the record the reasons for granting or denying motion — Trial court’s stated reason that it had “no alternative but to find that” facts were undisputed because of plaintiff’s failure to respond did not support a conclusion that defendant was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law — To extent trial court believed it lacked discretion to engage in any analysis because of nonmovant’s failure to respond, this was error — Remand for further proceedings

48 Fla. L. Weekly D1102b

NATALIA DEMARCO FUENTES, Appellant, v. LUXURY OUTDOOR DESIGN, INC., a Florida for profit corporation, ROBERT COGGINS, an individual, and ROBERT ANASTASI, an individual, Appellees. 4th District. Case No. 4D22-332. May 31, 2023. Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Keathan Frink, Judge; L.T. Case No. 16-15675 CACE (12). Counsel: Debbie R. Campbell of Campbell Legal Group PLLC, Coral Gables, for appellant. No appearance for appellees.

ON MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION

[Original Opinion at 48 Fla. L. Weekly D510a]

(PER CURIAM.) Upon consideration of the motion for clarification filed by the appellee, Robert Coggins, we grant the motion, withdraw the opinion filed March 8, 2023, and substitute the following opinion in its place. We note the appellant’s response to the motion for clarification, deny her requests therein for clarification and for an order to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed, and deny her motion for rehearing, clarification, and written opinion.

Natalia Fuentes (“the plaintiff”) appeals two orders addressing her complaint against Robert Coggins (“the defendant”): 1) the order granting dismissal of most counts, and 2) the summary judgment order disposing of the two remaining counts. She raises multiple issues on appeal but we find merit as to only one, namely her argument that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on her failure to respond to the defendant’s summary judgment motion. With respect to the remaining issues, we affirm without further discussion.

The plaintiff filed a complaint and then an amended complaint. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint, but before the hearing, the plaintiff filed a Substitute Amended Complaint. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss the amended complaint, the defendant agreed that the court could consider the motion to dismiss as directed to the Substitute Amended Complaint. After the trial court granted the motion to dismiss as to most of the counts against the defendant in the Substitute Amended Complaint,1 he filed an answer and raised affirmative defenses and moved for summary judgment concerning the remaining counts, negligence and negligent misrepresentation. The plaintiff did not file a response to the motion.

During a hearing on the motion, the trial court observed that the plaintiff had failed to file a response and that the summary judgment rule requires the nonmovant to serve a response, including a supporting factual position, at least twenty days before the summary judgment hearing. The trial court found that “[b]ased on the failure to properly respond to the motion for summary judgment, according to amended rule 1.510(c)(5), the court has no alternative but to find that there is no dispute of the factual allegations raised by . . . [the] defendant in the motion for summary judgment,” and it granted the motion.

First, we note that the motion for summary judgment quoted from and attached the first amended complaint rather than the operative complaint, which was styled as the Substitute Amended Complaint.

Second, the amended summary judgment rule, which applies here, does not provide that summary judgment may be granted based solely on the nonmovant’s failure to respond. Rather, the rule provides that “[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by rule 1.510(c), the court may,” among other things, “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion,” or “grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials — including the facts considered undisputed — show that the movant is entitled to it[.]” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(e) (2022); see also Lloyd S. Meisels, P.A., v. Dobrofsky, 341 So. 3d 1131, 1134-36 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (recognizing that pursuant to rule 1.510(c)(5), the requirement of filing a response is mandatory, and if one is not filed, rule 1.510(e) “provides discretionary options for the trial court,” including “grant[ing] summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials — including the facts considered undisputed — show that the movant is entitled to it”). Further, the rule requires the trial court to “state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a).

The trial court’s stated reason for granting the motion was that, based on the plaintiff’s failure to respond, it had “no alternative but to find that” the facts were undisputed. However, this reasoning does not support a conclusion that the defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. In other words, this reasoning does not indicate that the court analyzed whether the “supporting materials — including the facts considered undisputed,” would necessarily result in the defendant’s entitlement to summary judgment based on any of the defendant’s myriad arguments in support of summary judgment, nor is there any indication that the trial court considered these arguments.

To the extent the trial court believed it lacked discretion to engage in any analysis because the nonmovant failed to respond to the summary judgment motion, this was error. While the trial court may have found that the defendant, based on the undisputed facts alleged and arguments raised by the defendant in his motion, was entitled to summary judgment, that finding is not apparent from the reasons stated on the record.

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the order granting dismissal, reverse the summary judgment, and remand for further proceedings on the negligence and negligent misrepresentation counts.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. (WARNER, CIKLIN and FORST, JJ., concur.)


1The order granting in part the motion to dismiss stated that the operative complaint was the amended complaint. This appears to be a clerical error, as the trial court ruled on the Substitute Amended Complaint, thus making it the operative complaint.


Filed Under: Uncategorized

Primary Sidebar

Recent Posts

  • Insurance — Automobile — Insurer who filed a claim under her automobile insurance policy after her vehicle was damaged in an accident sued insurer claiming breach of policy after insured declared the vehicle a total loss and paid her what it deemed the actual cash value of vehicle — Breach of contract — Insurer was entitled to summary judgment on claim that insurer breached the policy by using an illegal methodology to calculate actual cash value — District court did not err in ruling insurer’s methodology for calculating actual cash value complied with Florida law — As matter of first impression, Section 626.9743(5), Florida Statutes, which provides that, in calculating “actual cash value” of insured’s vehicle based on actual cost to purchase comparable motor vehicle “derived from … two or more comparable motor vehicles available [in local market area] within the preceding 90 days,” did not require that “actual cash value” equal actual cost to purchase comparable vehicle — Insurer’s use of the Uniform Condition Adjustment, advertised prices of comparable motor vehicles, and the Certified Collateral Corporation ONE Market Valuation system to calculate the actual cash value of insured’s vehicle complied with Florida statute — Statute did not require that insurer use “retail cost as determined from generally recognized motor vehicle industry source” if it utilized one of other two statutory alternative methods for determining cost to purchase comparable motor vehicle — Insurer was entitled to summary judgment on claim that it breached the policy by failing to pay, as part of vehicle’s actual cash value, dealer fees incurred in purchasing replacement vehicle — Insurer was not required to pay insured’s out-of-pocket dealer fees — Under Florida and Eleventh Circuit law, “actual cash value” in an insurance policy means replacement cost less depreciation, and replacement cost includes dealer fees if the policyholder is reasonably likely to need to incur dealer fees — Insured failed to satisfy the standard for inclusion of dealer fees in replacement cost where insured showed a reasonable likelihood that she would incur dealer fees if she chose to purchase her replacement vehicle from a dealer and that a policyholder is reasonably likely to purchase a replacement vehicle from a dealer, but failed to show that a policyholder is reasonably likely to need to purchase a replacement vehicle from a dealer
  • Torts — Punitive damages — Amendment of complaint — Action alleging that vibration from defendant’s installation of sheet piles during construction on its parcel caused damage to plaintiff’s building — Trial court erred in granting plaintiff’s motion to amend its complaint to assert a claim for punitive damages based on allegation of gross negligence where plaintiff did not make required evidentiary showing to support such a claim — Report produced by third-party contractor warning defendant against the use of large vibratory compaction equipment in construction project, when read together with contractor’s deposition testimony, offered no evidentiary support for plaintiff’s claim that contractor warned defendant against using vibratory equipment in installation of sheet piles — Plaintiff’s expert’s affidavit, which drew illogical conclusions from contractor’s report, offered no support for gross negligence claim
  • Torts — Premises liability — Malls — Dangerous condition — Landscaping features — Vicarious liability — Action against operator of mall arising from injuries plaintiff suffered after stepping into a hole or depression in a raised landscape area which separated mall’s parking lot from the sidewalk that led to mall’s entrance — No error in entering summary judgment in favor of defendant because, as a matter of law, the landscaped area was not a dangerous condition — Evidence that a few people had walked across the landscaped area to get to the sidewalk was not sufficient to create a duty where there was no evidence that the grass bed had become a well-trampled footpath or that the grass bed has been in continuous and obvious use as a pedestrian shortcut such that defendant was put on constructive notice of the condition — Defendant cannot be held vicariously liable for condition created by landscapers where landscapers were not found liable
  • Torts — Automobile accident — Permanent injury — Causation — Trial court improperly directed verdict on causation given conflicting evidence which would have permitted reasonable jury to conclude that plaintiff had a pre-existing back injury caused by weight training or prior participation in competitive crew rowing
  • Insurance — Homeowners — Coverage — Vandalism — Trial court erred by denying insurer’s motion for directed verdict where policy limited coverage to insured’s “residence premises,” and insured did not “reside” at the property at the time of loss — Fact that insured was no longer leasing the property and was intending to move back when property was vandalized does not alter analysis

Blog Archives

Footer

The materials available at this website are for informational purposes only and not for the purpose of providing legal advice. You should contact your attorney to obtain advice with respect to any particular issue or problem. Use of and access to this Website or any of the e-mail links contained within the site do not create an attorney-client relationship between Abbey, Adams, Byelick & Mueller, L.L.P. and the user or browser. The opinions expressed at or through this site are the opinions of the individual author and may not reflect the opinions of the firm or any individual attorney. opens in a new windowAbbey, Adams, Byelick, & Mueller XML Sitemap Index

Copyright © 2023 · Abbey Adams Byelick & Mueller, LLP · All Rights Reserved · Defending Liability, Employment Claims and Appeals Since 1982