CHRIS THOMAS CHRISTENSEN, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. SANDRA MARIE CHRISTENSEN, Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 2nd District. Case No. 2D19-1292. March 6, 2020. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Collier County; John O. McGowan, Judge. Counsel: Daniel D. Peck of Peck & Peck, P.A., Naples; and Beverly L. Brennan of McLaughlin & Stern, PLLC, Naples (substituted as counsel of record), for Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Christopher D. Donovan of Roetzel & Andress, LPA, Naples, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

(MORRIS, Judge.) Chris Thomas Christensen, the former husband, appeals the order on Sandra Marie Christensen’s, the former wife’s, amended motion for enforcement and contempt in the parties’ underlying dissolution of marriage action. The former wife cross-appeals the portion of the same order denying her request for attorneys’ fees pursuant to the parties’ marital settlement agreement and section 61.16, Florida Statutes (2018). We conclude that the trial court did not err in entering the order as against the former husband, and therefore, we affirm the main appeal without further comment. However, we agree with the former wife that she was entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to the parties’ marital settlement agreement. Consequently, we reverse that portion of the order.

“Provisions in ordinary contracts awarding attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing party are generally enforced.” Lashkajani v. Lashkajani, 911 So. 2d 1154, 1158 (Fla. 2005). “Trial courts do not have the discretion to decline to enforce such provisions, even if the challenging party brings a meritorious claim in good faith.” Id. Such clauses “do not address either spouse’s need for support. They merely solidify the party’s agreement by providing a disincentive to spouses who may frivolously challenge it.” Id. at 1159. Notably, because marital settlement agreements are governed by contract principles, when such an agreement contains a provision requiring fees to be awarded to a prevailing party, trial courts must enforce those provisions. Mott v. Mott, 800 So. 2d 331, 333 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); see also Conway v. Conway, 111 So. 3d 925, 928 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 687 So. 2d 912, 913 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).

In the order under review, the trial court summarily denied the former wife’s fee request without explanation. The marital settlement agreement contains two fee provisions: a general fee provision in section 7.1 providing that each party is responsible for paying their own attorneys’ fees and costs, and a second, more detailed provision in section 10.15. It is the second fee provision which is applicable here. That section provides:

If either party fails to comply with the provisions of this Agreement, the defaulting party must pay all attorney’s fees and costs incurred, including any fees and costs incurred for appeals, as a result of any enforcement action. If as a result of one party’s claim that the other party has defaulted, the parties agree on an enforcement plan, or modification, although without an order of enforcement from this Court, the non-claiming party will be responsible for all fees and costs. In the event that either party challenges the validity or enforceability of this agreement and that party is unsuccessful, that party shall pay for the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs for both parties.

Because the former wife was the prevailing party in her enforcement action — as evidenced by the trial court’s order as it related to the former husband — she was entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 10.15 of the marital settlement agreement. Thus the trial court erred by denying her request for attorneys’ fees pursuant to the marital settlement agreement, and we reverse that portion of the order and remand for further proceedings.

Because we have concluded that the former wife is entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to the marital settlement agreement, it is unnecessary for us to resolve whether she is also entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 61.16.¹

Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded. (KHOUZAM, C.J., and LUCAS, J., Concur.)

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¹Even if we addressed the former wife’s argument regarding entitlement to fees pursuant to section 61.16, our review would be hampered by the lack of a transcript from the hearing and the parties’ failure to provide this court with a stipulated statement of the facts. The findings that are required by section 61.16 can be made orally, see Allen v. Juul, 278 So. 3d 783, 785 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019), and Perez v. Perez, 100 So. 3d 769, 771 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012), but without a transcript, this court would be unable to determine if the trial court failed to make the required findings or if there was a basis beyond the obvious financial disparity between the parties for a denial of fees pursuant to the statute.