39 Fla. L. Weekly D1907b
Attorney-client privilege is applicable to discovery sought by injured party in
third-party bad faith action against liability insurer where there was been no
assignment from insured to injured party — Trial court departed from essential
requirements of law in ordering attorney for insured and insurer to submit to
deposition and produce documents without adequate consideration of insured’s
attorney-client privilege — Question certified: Do the decisions in Allstate
Indemnity Co. v. Ruiz, 899 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 2005), and Genovese v.
Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co., 74 So. 3d 1064 (Fla. 2011),
shield attorney-client privileged communications from discovery in third-party
bad faith litigation?
STALLEY, AS GUARDIAN OF, ETC., ET AL., Respondents. 5th District. Case No.
5D13-4365. Opinion filed Sep. 5, 2014. Petition for Certiorari Review of Order
from the Circuit Court for Brevard County, George Maxwell III, Judge. Counsel:
Jane Anderson and Kansas R. Gooden, of Boyd & Jenerette, PA, Jacksonville,
for Petitioner, Emily Boozer. R. David De Armas, of Cramer Price & De Armas,
PA, Orlando, for Petitioner, Virgil Wright, III, Esq. Karissa L. Owens, of
Rissman, Barrett, Hurt, Donahue & McLain, P.A., Orlando; Sylvia H. Walbolt
and Matthew J. Conigliaro, of Carlton Fields Jordan Burt, P.A., Tampa, for
Respondent, Holmes Regional Medical Center, Inc. Mark D. Tinker and Charles W.
Hall, of Banker Lopez Gassler P.A., St. Petersburg, for Respondents, Allstate
Insurance Company and Allstate Indemnity Company. Shea Moxon and Angela Rodante,
of Swope, Rodante P.A., Tampa, for Respondent, Douglas Stalley.
Wright, III, seek certiorari review to quash the trial court’s order allowing
Douglas Stalley, guardian of the property of Benjamin Hintz, to depose and
obtain documents from Boozer’s attorney, Wright. We consider this case en banc,
sua sponte, to recede from Dunn v. National Security Fire & Casualty
Co., 631 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993), insofar as it addresses the
discovery of attorney-client protected communications in bad faith insurance
actions. We grant the petition and quash the order to the extent that it ordered
Wright to submit to a deposition and produce documents without adequate
consideration of Boozer’s attorney-client privilege.
Boozer’s liability for the accident was covered under at least two insurance
policies, one issued by Allstate Indemnity Company and the other by Allstate
Insurance Company (collectively, “Allstate”). Together, the two polices provided
a total of $1.1 million in bodily injury liability coverage. Stalley, Hintz’s
guardian, filed an auto negligence suit against Boozer, and Allstate retained
Wright to defend her. Settlement discussions failed to resolve the dispute and
following a trial, Stalley recovered a judgment against Boozer in excess of
$11.1 million, which was not appealed. Allstate paid its policy limits of $1.1
million, leaving the remainder of the judgment unsatisfied. Stalley’s current
efforts to collect on the judgment include filing a bad faith action against
Allstate. Attorneys hired by Allstate, including Wright, have continued to
appear on Boozer’s behalf in the post-judgment proceedings.
Boozer’s attorney, Wright, and subpoenaed his original files in the underlying
action. Asserting the attorney-client privilege on behalf of Boozer and
Allstate, Wright and Boozer moved for a protective order, asking the trial court
to limit both the deposition and the document production to prevent the forced
disclosure of attorney-client privileged information. At a hearing on the
motion, Wright argued that he represented Boozer and their communications were
protected by the attorney-client privilege. Wright explained that Boozer’s
interests were not aligned with Stalley and that she had not assigned any of her
rights to him. Relying on this Court’s decision in Dunn, Continental
Casualty Co. v. Aqua Jet Filter Systems, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 3d DCA
1993), and Baxley v. Geico General Insurance Co., No. 5:09cv343/RS/MD,
2010 WL 1780796 (N.D. Fla. May 4, 2010), the trial court denied Wright’s motion
and his request to stay the deposition pending appellate review of the order.
correspondence from his file. He answered general questions concerning how his
files were organized and the case management system that the firm used. However,
after he refused to answer any questions or produce any documents related to his
direct representation of Boozer, the deposition was adjourned. Wright and Boozer
then filed the instant petition for writ of certiorari, arguing that the trial
court’s denial of the motion for protective order constituted a departure from
the essential requirements of the law, which causes irreparable injury that
cannot be remedied on appeal. Stalley responds that long-standing Florida
precedent holds that in the context of third-party bad faith litigation, he
stands in the shoes of Boozer and may obtain discovery of any materials that
would be available to her, including those that would otherwise be protected by
the attorney-client privilege.
essential requirements of law, causing material injury to a petitioner
throughout the remainder of the proceedings below and effectively leaving no
adequate remedy on appeal. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Langston, 655 So. 2d 91,
94 (Fla. 1995); Montanez v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 135 So. 3d 510, 512
(Fla. 5th DCA 2014). Discovery of certain types of information may cause
material injury of an irreparable nature, including “cat out of the bag”
material that constitutes work product or material protected by privilege.
E.g., Langston, 655 So. 2d at 94; Wilder v. Wilder, 993 So.
2d 182, 184 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Vreeland, 973 So.
2d 668, 671 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). “When an order directs disclosure of information
that is allegedly privileged, ‘[t]he next question is whether the order departs
from the essential requirements of law.’ ” Coates v. Akerman, Senterfitt
& Eidson, P.A., 940 So. 2d 504, 506 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (quoting
Estate of Stephens v. Galen Health Care, Inc., 911 So. 2d 277, 279 (Fla.
2d DCA 2005)).
could be deposed and required to produce his file in a subsequent bad faith
action brought by the injured party without an assignment from the insured was
first considered in Boston Old Colony Insurance Co. v. Gutierrez, 325 So.
2d 416, 416 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). In allowing the attorney to be deposed, the
third district explained:
In Shingleton v. Bussey, Fla. 1969, 223 So. 2d 713, the
Florida Supreme Court established the doctrine that an insured has the right to
recover against his insurer because of the latter’s bad faith in failing to
settle a claim against its insured within policy limits. In extending the
Shingleton doctrine, the Florida Supreme Court held, in Thompson v.
Commercial Union Insurance Company of New York, Fla. 1971, 250 So. 2d 259,
that a plaintiff in a personal injury action who obtained a judgment against a
defendant in excess of the defendant’s insurance coverage could bring an action
for bad faith against the insurance company without [an] assignment from the
defendant insured on the third party beneficiary theory. It is well established
that a third person can enforce a contract entered into between others for his
benefit. See 81 A.L.R. 1279. As a third party beneficiary of the
insurance policy, Gutierrez stands in the same posture as that of Brown, the
insured. Just as Brown would be entitled to discovery, including deposition and
production of files by the attorneys, since both he (Brown) and Boston Old
Colony were their clients, Gutierrez has the same right of discovery in
furtherance of the preparation of his case.
trial court correctly ruled that Aqua Jet had the right to obtain Kubicki
Draper’s litigation files where the attorney-client and work product privileges
do not preclude production of the files in a third party bad faith context.”);
Stone v. Travelers Ins. Co., 326 So. 2d 241, 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
(citing Boston Old Colony, and holding plaintiff in third-party bad faith
action against insurance company for failure to settle claim for policy limits
is entitled to entire litigation file of insured’s counsel from inception of
lawsuit until date that judgment was entered in underlying action since
plaintiff judgment creditor stands in same posture as insured).
when the plaintiff in a third-party bad faith claim sought the insurer’s claim
and litigation file. In rejecting the insurer’s claim of work product and
attorney-client privilege, we reasoned:
In bad faith suits against insurance companies for failure to settle
within the policy limits, all materials in the insurance company’s claim file up
to the date the judgment in the underlying suit are obtainable, and should be
produced when sought by discovery. Continental Casualty Co. v. Aqua Jet
Filter Systems, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); U.S. Fire
Insurance Co. v. Clearwater Oaks Bank, 421 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982);
Aaron v. Allstate Insurance Co., 559 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev.
denied, 569 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 1990); Koken v. American Service Mutual
Insurance Co., Inc., 330 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Stone v.
Travelers Insurance Co., 326 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). Additional memos
or documents in the file after date of the judgment can be obtained with
a showing of good cause. Stone v. Travelers Insurance Co.
Discovery of the insurer’s claim file and litigation file is allowed
in a bad faith case over the objections of the insurer that production of the
file would violate the work product or attorney/client privilege. Continental
Casualty Co. The rationale (as discussed above) is because the injured third
party “stands in the shoes” of the insured party in a third party bad faith case
and the insurer owed a fiduciary duty to its insured. Aaron v. Allstate
Insurance Co.; Continental Casualty Co. v. Aqua Jet Filter Systems,
Jennings, 731 So. 2d 1258, 1260 (Fla. 1999) (holding that victim stood in
shoes of insured by virtue of stipulation that served as functional equivalent
of excess judgment, and neither attorney-client nor work product privileges
protected claims file through date of stipulation). Collectively, these
decisions support Stalley’s argument, and the trial court’s ruling, that the
attorney-client privilege does not prevent him from reviewing Wright’s tort
litigation file or deposing Wright concerning his representation of Boozer in
the underlying tort litigation. However, several decisions subsequent to
Dunn and Jennings require us to rethink our holding that allowed
discovery of attorney-client privileged information in bad faith actions.
the Florida Supreme Court held that in first-party bad faith actions brought
pursuant to section 624.155, Florida Statutes (2002), work product materials
were discoverable. Important to our consideration of this case, the Ruiz
decision moved away from past case law distinguishing first- and third-party bad
faith actions, explaining that the enactment of section 624.155, “created a
statutory first-party bad faith cause of action for first-party insureds” that
“ushered out the distinction between first- and third-party statutory claims for
the purposes of initiating bad faith actions.” Id. The court noted that
“some court decisions have continued to draw inappropriate distinctions in
defining the parameters of discovery in those bad faith actions,” but indicated
that “any distinction between first- and third-party bad faith actions with
regard to discovery purposes is unjustified and without support under section
624.155 and creates an overly formalistic distinction between substantively
identical claims.” Id. at 1126, 1128. Making the point clearly, the court
said that “[t]here simply is no basis upon which to distinguish between first-
and third-party cases with regard to the rationale of the discoverability of the
claim file type material.” Id. at 1129.1
shift in the landscape when we held in West Bend Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Higgins, 9 So. 3d 655, 658 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009),2 that in the context of a first-party bad faith
proceeding, Ruiz did not extend to materials protected by the
attorney-client privilege, reasoning:
Although the Florida Supreme Court has concluded that section
624.155 applies to first-party insurance disputes as well as third-party claims,
and that the immunity from disclosure of the claim file based on work product
ought not to apply, nothing in Ruiz suggests that the attorney-client
privilege available to any contracting party, including insurers, somehow
evaporates uniquely for insureds upon the filing of a bad-faith claim. We see
nothing in Ruiz to suggest that a first-party insurer against whom a bad
faith claim has been made is subject to the exposure of all its communications
with its own counsel.
same conclusion, holding that the attorney-client privilege continues to exist
and be available to insurers that are defending statutory bad faith claims.
See, e.g., State Farm Fla. Ins. Co. v. Seville Place Condo. Ass’n,
74 So. 3d 105, 112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); State Farm Fla. Ins. Co. v. Puig,
62 So. 3d 23, 26 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); Progressive Express Ins. Co. v.
Scoma, 975 So. 2d 461, 465 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.
v. Bennett, 939 So. 2d 1113, 1114 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); XL Specialty Ins.
Co. v. Aircraft Holdings, LLC, 929 So. 2d 578, 583 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006);
see also Coulter v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No.
4:12cv577-WS/CAS, 2013 WL 6511560 (N.D. Fla. May 9, 2013); Trujillo v. USAA
Cas. Ins. Co., No. 11-80320-CIV, 2012 WL 3516511 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2012).
1064 (Fla. 2011), a first-party bad faith case, the Florida Supreme Court
considered whether Ruiz also allowed discovery of attorney-client
privileged communications in the same circumstances. Genovese determined
that, based on the differences between the work product doctrine and the
attorney-client privilege and the justification for permitting the discovery of
work product in the bad faith context, attorney-client communications were not
discoverable. Specifically, the supreme court reasoned:
[T]he attorney-client privilege, unlike the work-product doctrine,
is not concerned with the litigation needs of the opposing party. See Quarles
& Brady, LLP v. Birdsall, 802 So. 2d 1205, 1206 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)
(“[U]ndue hardship is not an exception, nor is disclosure permitted because the
opposing party claims that the privileged information is necessary to prove
their case.”) (citation omitted); see also West Bend Mutual Ins. Co.
v. Higgins, 9 So. 3d 655, 658 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009). Instead, the purpose of
the privilege is to “encourage full and frank communication” between the
attorney and the client. Id. at 657 (quoting Am. Tobacco v. State,
697 So. 2d 1249, 1252 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)). This significant goal of the
privilege would be severely hampered if an insurer were aware that its
communications with its attorney, which were not intended to be disclosed, could
be revealed upon request by the insured. Moreover, we note that there is no
exception provided under section 90.502 that allows the discovery of
attorney-client privileged communications where the requesting party has
demonstrated need and undue hardship.
Therefore, although we held in Ruiz that attorney work
product in first-party bad faith actions was discoverable, this holding does not
extend to attorney-client privileged communications. Consequently, when an
insured party brings a bad faith claim against its insurer, the insured may not
discover those privileged communications that occurred between the insurer and
its counsel during the underlying action.
Although we conclude that the attorney-client privilege applies, we
recognize that cases may arise where an insurer has hired an attorney to both
investigate the underlying claim and render legal advice. Thus, the
materials requested by the opposing party may implicate both the work product
doctrine and the attorney-client privilege. Where a claim of privilege is
asserted, the trial court should conduct an in-camera inspection to determine
whether the sought-after materials are truly protected by the attorney-client
privilege. If the trial court determines that the investigation performed by the
attorney resulted in the preparation of materials that are required to be
disclosed pursuant to Ruiz and did not involve the rendering of legal
advice, then that material is discoverable.
Moreover, our opinion in this case is not intended to undermine any
statutory or judicially created waiver or exception to the privilege.
Specifically, we note that under the “at issue” doctrine, the discovery of
attorney-client privileged communications between an insurer and its counsel is
permitted where the insurer raises the advice of its counsel as a defense in the
action and the communication is necessary to establish the defense. See
Coates v. Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, P.A., 940 So. 2d 504, 510 (Fla.
2d DCA 2006); see also Savino v. Luciano, 92 So. 2d 817, 819 (Fla. 1957)
(“[W]hen a party has filed a claim, based upon a matter ordinarily privileged,
the proof of which will necessarily require that the privileged matter be
offered in evidence, we think that he has waived his right to insist, in
pretrial discovery proceedings, that the matter is privileged.”). Thus, we
acknowledge that the attorney-client privilege may also be overcome in
first-party bad faith actions in limited circumstances, although we emphasize
that attorney-client privileged communications are not the discoverable
materials discussed by our opinion in Ruiz.
question it addressed, a question remains, at least in this district, regarding
the effect of that holding on discovery requests in third-party bad faith
proceedings involving the attorney-client privilege as presented here. Somewhat
presciently, prior to the supreme court’s decision in Genovese, the
second district examined a closely-related issue in Scoma, 975 So. 2d
461. There, the personal representative of the deceased victim filed a
third-party bad faith action against the insurer based on the insurer’s
purported bad faith in failing to settle the insurance claim made against its
insured. The insured did not assign any bad faith claim that he might have had
against the insurer to the personal representative. Id. at 463-64. Still,
arguing that she stood in the shoes of the insured for purposes of the
third-party bad faith action, the personal representative sought discovery of
all documents in the possession of the insurer, Progressive, related to the
initial claim. She further contended that the attorney-client privilege did not
apply to any confidential communications between the insured, Progressive, and
their respective counsel in the underlying tort litigation. Id. at 464.
district’s holding in Aqua Jet, concluded that the attorney-client
privilege did not protect confidential communications made by the insurer and
the insured with their counsel during the underlying tort suit from discovery.
On certiorari review, the second district quashed the order, holding that
communications between the insurer and its counsel were protected by the
attorney-client privilege. Id. at 465, 467. The court explained that:
There are two separate claims of attorney-client privilege at issue.
First, [the insurer] seeks to protect its confidential communications with its
counsel regarding [the personal representative]’s wrongful death suit. Second,
[the insurer] seeks to protect [the insured]’s confidential communications with
the attorney who represented him in the wrongful death suit. From our limited
record, it appears that there is only one attorney who may have had confidential
communications with both [the insurer] and [the insured]. It is at least
possible, however, that [the insurer] may have had individual counsel at some
point during the wrongful death proceedings and may have had confidential
communications with that counsel.
We conclude that any communications between [the insurer] and its
personal counsel are clearly protected by the attorney-client privilege.
Moreover, we conclude that although [the personal representative] may “stand in
the shoes” of [the insured] for the purposes of standing to bring a bad faith
action, that position does not permit her access to otherwise privileged
communications between [the insured] and his counsel in the wrongful death
action, at least in the absence of a waiver of the privilege by [the insured] or
his written assignment of the bad faith claim. A person does not waive or
otherwise lose an attorney-client privilege merely because a third party is
authorized to file a lawsuit against the person’s insurance
2013), the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
faced a similar issue when a plaintiff in a third-party bad faith action sought
discovery of the insurer’s claim file and the insurer objected to the discovery
based on the attorney-client privilege. The magistrate judge summarized the
issue as follows:
The Florida Supreme Court in Genovese v. Provident Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 74 So. 3d 1064 (Fla. 2011), held that attorney-client
privileged communications are not discoverable in first-party bad faith actions.
The instant case is a third-party bad faith action. In their supplemental
memoranda, the parties disagree as to whether the Genovese decision
applies in the third-party bad faith context as well. As there is no dispute
that the case at hand is a third-party bad faith case, this Court must determine
whether the legal analysis in Genovese should apply to the facts of this
applied, allowing attorney-client privilege in third-party bad faith actions,
Based on the Florida Supreme Court’s language in Ruiz and the
rationale in Genovese, this Court determines that the holding in
Genovese, which protects attorney-client privileged documents in an
insurer’s claim file in a first-party bad faith action, should be equally
applicable in a third-party bad faith action. The Court is cognizant of the fact
that the express language of Genovese limits its holding to the
first-party bad faith context, but the Court sees no reason why the legal
analysis utilized in Genovese regarding the application of the
attorney-client privilege to the insurer’s claims file would not be equally
relevant in a third-party bad faith case. In fact, it would seem incongruous to
uphold the attorney-client privilege in a first-party bad faith action and
eviscerate it in a third-party bad faith action. The Florida Supreme Court
itself diminished, if not eliminated, the distinction for discovery purposes
between the two types of cases in Ruiz.
Additionally, in Justice Pariente’s specially concurring opinion in
Genovese, in which Justices Lewis, Labarga, and Perry concurred, she
cited the following language from the Ruiz opinion:
The insurers’ duties set forth in section 624.155 to act “fairly and
honestly toward [their] insured and with due regard for her or his interests”
imposes a statutory obligation in first-party claims that is identical to the
common law duty of good faith imposed on insurers in third-party claims. This
was the essence of our holding in Allstate Indemnity Co. v. Ruiz, 899 So.
2d 1121 (Fla. 2005), which recognized the critical role that discovery of the
claims file played in bad faith claims and held that there should not be
“artificial and disparate discovery rules between first- and third-party bad
faith claims [sic].” Id. at 1129. “There simply is no basis upon which to
distinguish between first- and third-party cases with regard to the rationale of
the discoverability of the claim file type material.” Id.
Genovese, 74 So. 3d 1064, 1069. Later in her special
concurrence, Justice Pariente also asserted, “[y]et, while we strived in
Ruiz to level the playing field in the critical area of discovery between
first- and third-party bad faith cases, we must acknowledge that we do not have
the independent authority to abrogate the attorney-client privilege, even in the
context of bad faith claims.” Id. at 1070. The special concurrence gives
further weight to this Court’s determination that Genovese should apply
in a third-party bad faith case so as to protect attorney-client privileged
materials in an insurer’s claim file. Based on the above, the communications
between the insured, Junie Telfort, and her counsel, Kubicki Draper, are clearly
protected by the attorney-client privilege.
Florida Supreme Court’s determinations in Ruiz and Genovese, and
the second district’s holding in Scoma. Thus, we believe that we should
adopt the holdings of Scoma and Maharaj and recede from
Dunn to the extent it allows the unqualified discovery of attorney-client
protected material.4 The fact that Stalley
may stand in Boozer’s shoes, or have an independent right to bring a bad faith
action under section 627.155, does not mean that Boozer gave up her statutory
attorney-client privilege, codified in section 90.502, Florida Statutes (2009).
There is no indication that Stalley obtained an assignment from Boozer, and it
is clear that their interests are adverse.5
following question to the Florida Supreme Court:
DO THE DECISIONS IN ALLSTATE INDEMNITY CO. V. RUIZ, 899 SO.
2D 1121 (FLA. 2005), AND GENOVESE V. PROVIDENT LIFE & ACCIDENT INSURANCE
CO., 74 SO. 3D 1064 (FLA. 2011), SHIELD ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATIONS FROM DISCOVERY IN THIRD-PARTY BAD FAITH LITIGATION?
EVANDER, COHEN, BERGER, WALLIS and LAMBERT, JJ. concur.)
court favorably cited this Court’s holding in Dunn (as well as it’s prior
opinion in Jennings and the third district’s holdings in Gutierrez
and Aqua Jet), for the principal that “discovery of the insurer’s
underlying claim file type material is permitted over the objections of work
product protection,” 899 So. 2d at 1126, and concluded that an insurer’s work
product objection to discovery of the insurer’s claim file in a bad faith action
“does not automatically operate to protect such documents from discovery,”
id. at 1131. The court explained that
in connection with evaluating the obligation to process claims in
good faith under section 624.155, all materials, including documents, memoranda,
and letters, contained in the underlying claim and related litigation file
material that was created up to and including the date of resolution of the
underlying disputed matter and pertain in any way to coverage, benefits,
liability, or damages, should also be produced in a first-party bad faith
action. Further, all such materials prepared after the resolution of the
underlying disputed matter and initiation of the bad faith action may be subject
to production upon a showing of good cause or pursuant to an order of the court
following an in-camera inspection.
attempting to obtain attorney-client material from the insurer’s own attorney,
not the attorney retained by the insurer to represent the insured.
judge’s order in Maharaj in an unreported order. See Maharaj v. GEICO
Cas. Co., No. 12-80582-CIV, 2013 WL 1934075 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 5, 2013).
West Virginia expressly disagreed with this Court’s holding in Dunn.
See State ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gaughan, 508 S.E.2d 75, 88
(W. Va. 1998). Referring to this Court’s position in Dunn as the
“minority view,” the court in Gaughan stated as follows:
We do not hesitate in rejecting the minority approach to the issue
of whether an insurer has standing to invoke the attorney-client privilege and
work product rule in an attempt to prevent disclosure of the contents of an
insured’s file in a third-party bad faith action. The minority position is
unsound. It seriously undermines the relationship between an insured and
insurer. By overemphasizing a party’s right to obtain disclosure of evidence to
prove a third party claim of bad faith, the minority neglects the importance of
“full and frank consultation between a client and a legal advisor [without] the
fear of compelled disclosure of information.” State ex rel. USF & G v.
Canady, 194 W. Va.  438, 460 S.E.2d [677,] 684 [(W. Va.
and its separate counsel do not appear to be at issue here and would not be
discoverable. Scoma, 975 So. 2d at 467; West Bend, 9 So. 3d at
658. Neither can we determine from the limited record before us if Wright
represented solely Boozer or Boozer and Allstate or shared confidential
information with Allstate in which event the “common interests” or “pooled
information” exception to the waiver doctrine would need to be considered.
See, e.g., MapleWood Partners, L.P. v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 295
F.R.D. 550, 594 (S.D. Fla. 2013); Cone v. Culverhouse, 687 So. 2d 888
(Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Visual Scene, Inc. v. Pilkington Bros. plc., 508 So.
2d 437 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
* * *