39 Fla. L. Weekly D289a
Torts — Automobile accident — Jurisdiction — Trial court
erred in denying New York state automobile dealers’ motions to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction regarding complaint that dealers had sold defendant a
defective automobile in New York which caused an accident in Florida four years
later — Minimum contacts with Florida have not been established to support
specific jurisdiction and no continuous or systematic business contacts with
Florida support general jurisdiction
erred in denying New York state automobile dealers’ motions to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction regarding complaint that dealers had sold defendant a
defective automobile in New York which caused an accident in Florida four years
later — Minimum contacts with Florida have not been established to support
specific jurisdiction and no continuous or systematic business contacts with
Florida support general jurisdiction
MARINA DODGE, INC., and WEBSTER AUTO BROKERS, INC., Appellants, v. KRISTINA
QUINN and CHARLES JOSEPH BARBERA, Appellees. 4th District. Case No. 4D13-10.
February 5, 2014. Appeal of a non-final order from the Circuit Court for the
Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Patti Englander Henning, Judge;
L.T. Case No. 10-25105 26. Counsel: Peter A. Miller & Associates, P.A.,
Coral Gables; Robert S. Glazier of Law Office of Robert S. Glazier, Miami; James
W. Sherman and Richard H. Sherman, Sr. of Law Offices of Richard A. Sherman,
P.A., Fort Lauderdale; for appellants. Robert M. Roselli of Roselli &
Associates, P.A., Fort Lauderdale; Todd Tracy of The Tracy Firm, Dallas, Texas;
and Erin E. Pogue of Wasson & Associates, Chartered, Miami; for appellee
Kristina Quinn.
QUINN and CHARLES JOSEPH BARBERA, Appellees. 4th District. Case No. 4D13-10.
February 5, 2014. Appeal of a non-final order from the Circuit Court for the
Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Patti Englander Henning, Judge;
L.T. Case No. 10-25105 26. Counsel: Peter A. Miller & Associates, P.A.,
Coral Gables; Robert S. Glazier of Law Office of Robert S. Glazier, Miami; James
W. Sherman and Richard H. Sherman, Sr. of Law Offices of Richard A. Sherman,
P.A., Fort Lauderdale; for appellants. Robert M. Roselli of Roselli &
Associates, P.A., Fort Lauderdale; Todd Tracy of The Tracy Firm, Dallas, Texas;
and Erin E. Pogue of Wasson & Associates, Chartered, Miami; for appellee
Kristina Quinn.
(FORST, J.) New York auto dealers Marina Dodge, Inc. and Webster Auto
Brokers, Inc. (“the Auto Dealers”) appeal the denial of their respective motions
to dismiss the personal injury suit filed against them in Broward County. The
Auto Dealers maintain that the trial court erred in rejecting their argument
that personal jurisdiction could not be exercised against them in Florida. We
agree and therefore reverse the trial court’s order.
Brokers, Inc. (“the Auto Dealers”) appeal the denial of their respective motions
to dismiss the personal injury suit filed against them in Broward County. The
Auto Dealers maintain that the trial court erred in rejecting their argument
that personal jurisdiction could not be exercised against them in Florida. We
agree and therefore reverse the trial court’s order.
The Complaint
In 2003, Plaintiff-Appellee Kristina Quinn (Appellee) purchased a vehicle
from the Auto Dealers, both New York corporations. The transaction took place in
New York. At the time of the purchase, Appellee was a resident of New York and,
in fact, subsequently was employed by one of the auto dealers in New York. She
later moved to Florida and, in 2007, was involved in an automobile accident with
another Florida resident, Defendant Charles Barbera, while driving that vehicle
in Broward County. Appellee sustained serious injuries as a result of the
collision.
from the Auto Dealers, both New York corporations. The transaction took place in
New York. At the time of the purchase, Appellee was a resident of New York and,
in fact, subsequently was employed by one of the auto dealers in New York. She
later moved to Florida and, in 2007, was involved in an automobile accident with
another Florida resident, Defendant Charles Barbera, while driving that vehicle
in Broward County. Appellee sustained serious injuries as a result of the
collision.
Appellee filed the operative complaint in Broward County, Florida, with
claims against the Auto Dealers, alleging that they sold her a defective vehicle
and it was a cause of the accident. The Auto Dealers moved to dismiss the
complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, attaching an affidavit by the Auto
Dealers’ president denying any contacts with Florida. The parties then engaged
in lengthy and prolonged discovery surrounding the issue of whether the Auto
Dealers had sufficient contacts with Florida.
claims against the Auto Dealers, alleging that they sold her a defective vehicle
and it was a cause of the accident. The Auto Dealers moved to dismiss the
complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, attaching an affidavit by the Auto
Dealers’ president denying any contacts with Florida. The parties then engaged
in lengthy and prolonged discovery surrounding the issue of whether the Auto
Dealers had sufficient contacts with Florida.
The Auto Dealers’ Activities in, and Contacts with, Florida
In support of her opposition to the Auto Dealers’ motions to dismiss,
Appellee submitted four affidavits regarding contacts Marina Dodge had with
Florida. None of these affidavits addressed contacts between Webster Auto
Brokers and Florida. In response, the Auto Dealers filed a new affidavit from
their president, admitting to several “contacts” with Florida on the part of
Marina Dodge.1 The following
contacts/activities were identified:
Appellee submitted four affidavits regarding contacts Marina Dodge had with
Florida. None of these affidavits addressed contacts between Webster Auto
Brokers and Florida. In response, the Auto Dealers filed a new affidavit from
their president, admitting to several “contacts” with Florida on the part of
Marina Dodge.1 The following
contacts/activities were identified:
· Marina Dodge was registered with ADESA Sarasota, a Florida
corporation which auctions automobiles; however, the Auto Dealers’ owner stated
that Marina Dodge did not purchase vehicles from, nor sell vehicles to,
ADESA.
· Marina Dodge purchased nine vehicles over the internet from
Manheim Orlando, a Florida corporation, between 2006 and 2009; the vehicles were
transported from Florida to New York by a North Carolina auto transport
company.
· Appellee contends that an additional ten vehicles were purchased
by Marina Dodge from Manheim Central Florida between 2006 and 2010; the Auto
Dealers’ president responded that these vehicles were not purchased by Marina
Dodge, but by a separate entity.
· Marina Dodge had five transactions between 2004 and 2011 with
customers that owned extended service warranties purchased from either Fidelity
Warranty Services or Century Warranty Services, both Florida companies; the
service on the automobiles was performed in New York.
· Marina Dodge entered into an agreement with Auction Direct, a
Delaware corporation, to assist Auction Direct in obtaining financing for
Auction Direct vehicle purchasers, and some of the financing involved vehicles
sold by Auction Direct in Florida; Marina Dodge received three checks, totaling
$7,500, from Auction Direct’s subsidiary in Jacksonville, Florida, for Marina
Dodge’s efforts with sales in Florida.
After a hearing on the Auto Dealers’ motions to dismiss, the trial court
concluded, “I do believe based on the affidavits that were presented to me, it
showed that there was indeed continuous contact that took place over years with
various entities sufficient to permit jurisdiction to lie in the State of
Florida . . . as to both [the Auto Dealers].” In responding to an inquiry as to
whether this denial would apply to both of the defendants’ motions, the trial
court responded, “Yes, as to both because of the representations — Webster is
using the same dealer number.” The trial court then entered an order denying
both motions to dismiss.
concluded, “I do believe based on the affidavits that were presented to me, it
showed that there was indeed continuous contact that took place over years with
various entities sufficient to permit jurisdiction to lie in the State of
Florida . . . as to both [the Auto Dealers].” In responding to an inquiry as to
whether this denial would apply to both of the defendants’ motions, the trial
court responded, “Yes, as to both because of the representations — Webster is
using the same dealer number.” The trial court then entered an order denying
both motions to dismiss.
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction de novo. Russo v. Fink, 87 So. 3d 815, 817 (Fla. 4th DCA
2012).
jurisdiction de novo. Russo v. Fink, 87 So. 3d 815, 817 (Fla. 4th DCA
2012).
Analytical Process for Determining Personal Jurisdiction
In Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499, 501-02 (Fla.
1989), the Florida Supreme Court approved of a two-step analytical process for
determining personal jurisdiction. The first step requires the trial court to
determine whether sufficient facts have been alleged to bring the action within
the ambit of Florida’s long-arm statute.2
Id. at 502 (quoting Unger v. Publisher Entry Serv., Inc., 513 So.
2d 674, 675 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), review denied, 520 So. 2d 586 (Fla.
1988)); Caiazzo v. Am. Royal Arts Corp., 73 So. 3d 245, 249-50 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2011). If the long-arm statute applies, the second step requires the trial
court to decide whether “minimum contacts” exist between the defendant and the
forum state to satisfy due process. Venetian Salami Co., 554 So. 2d at
502; Caiazzo, 73 So. 3d at 250. The due process analysis is “a more
restrictive requirement” than the “broad grant of jurisdiction” under the
long-arm statute and is governed by precedent from the Supreme Court of the
United States interpreting the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution. Caiazzo, 73 So. 3d at 250-51 (citations omitted).
1989), the Florida Supreme Court approved of a two-step analytical process for
determining personal jurisdiction. The first step requires the trial court to
determine whether sufficient facts have been alleged to bring the action within
the ambit of Florida’s long-arm statute.2
Id. at 502 (quoting Unger v. Publisher Entry Serv., Inc., 513 So.
2d 674, 675 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), review denied, 520 So. 2d 586 (Fla.
1988)); Caiazzo v. Am. Royal Arts Corp., 73 So. 3d 245, 249-50 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2011). If the long-arm statute applies, the second step requires the trial
court to decide whether “minimum contacts” exist between the defendant and the
forum state to satisfy due process. Venetian Salami Co., 554 So. 2d at
502; Caiazzo, 73 So. 3d at 250. The due process analysis is “a more
restrictive requirement” than the “broad grant of jurisdiction” under the
long-arm statute and is governed by precedent from the Supreme Court of the
United States interpreting the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution. Caiazzo, 73 So. 3d at 250-51 (citations omitted).
Personal jurisdiction can exist in two forms: “specific,” in which
the alleged activities or actions of the defendant are directly connected to the
forum state, and “general,” in which the defendant’s connection with the forum
state is so substantial that no specific or enumerated relationship between the
alleged wrongful actions and the state is necessary.
Id. at 250.
A. Specific Jurisdiction
In analyzing the issue of “specific” jurisdiction, a court must first
determine whether one of the acts set out in section 48.193(1) of the Florida
long-arm statute is applicable to the case at hand. In the instant case,
Appellee has identified two such acts: “[c]omitting a tortious act within this
state,” and “[c]ausing injury to persons or property within this state arising
out of an act or omission by the defendant outside this state . . . .” §
48.193(1)(a)2., 6., Fla. Stat. (2012).
determine whether one of the acts set out in section 48.193(1) of the Florida
long-arm statute is applicable to the case at hand. In the instant case,
Appellee has identified two such acts: “[c]omitting a tortious act within this
state,” and “[c]ausing injury to persons or property within this state arising
out of an act or omission by the defendant outside this state . . . .” §
48.193(1)(a)2., 6., Fla. Stat. (2012).
In the event that this first prong of examining specific jurisdiction is met,
a court must then address the due process prong. This court has comprehensively
discussed this standard:
a court must then address the due process prong. This court has comprehensively
discussed this standard:
The United States Supreme Court, in a handful of leading cases, laid
out the proper due process standard for cases involving specific jurisdiction.
First, in the interest of preserving “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice” a state may exercise specific jurisdiction only over a
defendant who has certain “minimum contacts” with the state. Int’l Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). This
so-called “minimum contacts” rule is the “constitutional touchstone” for such
jurisdiction. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474, 105
S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). The Court later clarified that the notion of
minimum contacts encompasses only situations in which the defendant has
“purposefully avail[ed] [himself or herself] of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of
its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d
1283 (1958); see also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-75, 105 S.Ct. 2174;
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559,
62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). Finally, the Court has stated that simply being able to
foresee a product’s arrival in the forum state will never by itself establish
minimum contacts over the seller of that product. World-Wide Volkswagen,
444 U.S. at 297, 100 S.Ct. 580. Instead, foreseeability is relevant only
when “the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that
he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” Id. This
is because an entity that purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum state “has clear notice that it is
subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome
litigation by procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to customers,
or, if the risks are too great, severing its connection with the State.”
Id.
Caiazzo, 73 So. 3d at 251; see also Metnick & Levy, P.A. v.
Seuling, 123 So. 3d 639, 644 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); Corporacion Aero
Angeles, S.A. v. Fernandez, 69 So. 3d 295, 299 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).
Seuling, 123 So. 3d 639, 644 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); Corporacion Aero
Angeles, S.A. v. Fernandez, 69 So. 3d 295, 299 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).
B. General Jurisdiction
General jurisdiction under the Florida long-arm statute applies to “[a]
defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this
state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is
subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the
claim arises from that activity.” § 48.193(2), Fla. Stat. (2012). As noted in
Caiazzo, the term “substantial and not isolated” has been construed by
Florida courts as meaning “continuous and systematic general business contact”
with Florida. Caiazzo, 73 So. 3d at 250. A similar standard applies in
determining whether the due process requirement for finding general jurisdiction
has been met. See, e.g., id. at 252 (“Because substantial, continuous,
and systematic business contacts is the standard for both subsection (2) of
Florida’s long-arm statute and the due process requirement for general
jurisdiction, a finding of substantial, continuous, and systematic business
contacts will satisfy both the long-arm statute and the due process requirements
of [Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408
(1984)].”). Therefore, if the plaintiff fails to meet the due process test of
specific jurisdiction, the test for general jurisdiction will rarely, if ever,
be met.
defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this
state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is
subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the
claim arises from that activity.” § 48.193(2), Fla. Stat. (2012). As noted in
Caiazzo, the term “substantial and not isolated” has been construed by
Florida courts as meaning “continuous and systematic general business contact”
with Florida. Caiazzo, 73 So. 3d at 250. A similar standard applies in
determining whether the due process requirement for finding general jurisdiction
has been met. See, e.g., id. at 252 (“Because substantial, continuous,
and systematic business contacts is the standard for both subsection (2) of
Florida’s long-arm statute and the due process requirement for general
jurisdiction, a finding of substantial, continuous, and systematic business
contacts will satisfy both the long-arm statute and the due process requirements
of [Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408
(1984)].”). Therefore, if the plaintiff fails to meet the due process test of
specific jurisdiction, the test for general jurisdiction will rarely, if ever,
be met.
Personal jurisdiction over these out-of-state
Auto Dealers does not lie in Florida
Although Florida’s long-arm statute allows for a broad grant of jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants (at least specific jurisdiction), personal
jurisdiction over the Auto Dealers in Florida substantially fails under the due
process requirement of personal jurisdiction. With Webster Auto Brokers, the
only contact alleged in all of the parties’ filings and affidavits is that
Webster Auto Brokers may have sold the vehicle to Appellee in New York and then
the vehicle became involved in an automobile accident years later in Florida.
This contact alone has been held to be insufficient to support an exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. See World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to show that
Webster Auto Brokers has purposefully availed itself of the privileges of
Florida or has engaged in systematic and continuous contacts evidencing a
general business relationship with Florida to satisfy due process.
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416; Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253. Finally,
to the extent that it is argued that jurisdiction lies over Webster Auto Brokers
because it is an alter ego of Marina Dodge, the rationale below for finding a
lack of jurisdiction over Marina Dodge would be applicable to Webster Auto
Brokers.
over nonresident defendants (at least specific jurisdiction), personal
jurisdiction over the Auto Dealers in Florida substantially fails under the due
process requirement of personal jurisdiction. With Webster Auto Brokers, the
only contact alleged in all of the parties’ filings and affidavits is that
Webster Auto Brokers may have sold the vehicle to Appellee in New York and then
the vehicle became involved in an automobile accident years later in Florida.
This contact alone has been held to be insufficient to support an exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. See World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to show that
Webster Auto Brokers has purposefully availed itself of the privileges of
Florida or has engaged in systematic and continuous contacts evidencing a
general business relationship with Florida to satisfy due process.
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416; Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253. Finally,
to the extent that it is argued that jurisdiction lies over Webster Auto Brokers
because it is an alter ego of Marina Dodge, the rationale below for finding a
lack of jurisdiction over Marina Dodge would be applicable to Webster Auto
Brokers.
A. Minimum contacts have not been established to support specific
jurisdiction
With respect to specific jurisdiction, the affidavits before the trial court
reveal very few contacts between Marina Dodge and the State of Florida. These
contacts evince only that, during the operative period of time, Marina Dodge
engaged in a handful of isolated transactions with various Florida companies,
the majority of which action occurred over the internet or in the State of New
York, without having targeted Florida for business as an automobile seller or
repair shop or otherwise.
reveal very few contacts between Marina Dodge and the State of Florida. These
contacts evince only that, during the operative period of time, Marina Dodge
engaged in a handful of isolated transactions with various Florida companies,
the majority of which action occurred over the internet or in the State of New
York, without having targeted Florida for business as an automobile seller or
repair shop or otherwise.
Marina Dodge purchased as many as 19 vehicles from one or two dealers in
Orlando, Florida, over a three-year span; however, the Auto Dealers contend that
Marina Dodge sold 3,678 vehicles during this time period, all such deals taking
place in New York. Nineteen vehicles out of 3,678 is not “minimum contacts” —
it is a pittance. It has not been established, nor even alleged, that the
purchases from Manheim were part of a program whereby the Auto Dealers
contracted with Manheim on a regular and/or frequent basis. The Auto Dealers
maintain that the automobile at issue in this case was not one of the cars
purchased from Florida, and Appellee has not stated otherwise. The Auto Dealers
do not have an office, property, employees, or agents in Florida, nor do they
sell vehicles to Florida dealers or customers unless such transactions occur in
New York. Thus, although it is likely that an occasional customer of the Auto
Dealers was a Florida resident visiting upstate New York, or a New York resident
who wintered in Florida, there is no evidence that the Auto Dealers specifically
marketed its vehicles to Floridians or that they otherwise solicited business in
Florida, or that any vehicles purchased from the Auto Dealers were transported
by them to Florida or serviced by them in Florida.
Orlando, Florida, over a three-year span; however, the Auto Dealers contend that
Marina Dodge sold 3,678 vehicles during this time period, all such deals taking
place in New York. Nineteen vehicles out of 3,678 is not “minimum contacts” —
it is a pittance. It has not been established, nor even alleged, that the
purchases from Manheim were part of a program whereby the Auto Dealers
contracted with Manheim on a regular and/or frequent basis. The Auto Dealers
maintain that the automobile at issue in this case was not one of the cars
purchased from Florida, and Appellee has not stated otherwise. The Auto Dealers
do not have an office, property, employees, or agents in Florida, nor do they
sell vehicles to Florida dealers or customers unless such transactions occur in
New York. Thus, although it is likely that an occasional customer of the Auto
Dealers was a Florida resident visiting upstate New York, or a New York resident
who wintered in Florida, there is no evidence that the Auto Dealers specifically
marketed its vehicles to Floridians or that they otherwise solicited business in
Florida, or that any vehicles purchased from the Auto Dealers were transported
by them to Florida or serviced by them in Florida.
The Auto Dealers did perform service, in New York, on five vehicles pursuant
to extended warranty agreements purchased from two Florida companies, but
otherwise did not engage in contracting with Florida companies with respect to
warranty and extended service contracts, nor did they solicit such work.
Similarly, the Auto Dealers’ receipt of $7,500 in payments from a Florida
subsidiary of a Delaware company was an attenuated contact with Florida, with
the financing agreement being between the Auto Dealers and the Delaware parent
company.
to extended warranty agreements purchased from two Florida companies, but
otherwise did not engage in contracting with Florida companies with respect to
warranty and extended service contracts, nor did they solicit such work.
Similarly, the Auto Dealers’ receipt of $7,500 in payments from a Florida
subsidiary of a Delaware company was an attenuated contact with Florida, with
the financing agreement being between the Auto Dealers and the Delaware parent
company.
Finally, although Marina Dodge was registered with ADESA Sarasota, a Florida
corporation, there is no evidence that the Auto Dealers ever purchased vehicles
from ADESA or sold vehicles to this company. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at
478 (holding that a contract alone cannot “automatically establish sufficient
minimum contacts” for the purpose of finding specific jurisdiction).
corporation, there is no evidence that the Auto Dealers ever purchased vehicles
from ADESA or sold vehicles to this company. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at
478 (holding that a contract alone cannot “automatically establish sufficient
minimum contacts” for the purpose of finding specific jurisdiction).
The cases cited by Appellee as support for finding personal jurisdiction are
easily distinguishable from the case at hand. In Garris v. Thomasville-Thomas
County Humane Society, Inc., 941 So. 2d 540, 547-48 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), the
court found general jurisdiction existed, noting the defendant directed
significant advertisement towards residents of Florida, “targeting the populous
Florida ‘market,’ ” solicited donations from Floridians, and had ongoing
relationship with several Florida animal aid organizations, including
arrangements under which it “systematically and continuously” transferred
animals to them for adoption in Florida. In Northwestern Aircraft Capital
Corp. v. Stewart, 842 So. 2d 190, 195 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003), the defendants, a
charter flight company, advertised and solicited business in Florida through
print advertising and the internet and “the defendants [had], and continue[d] to
conduct and derive revenue from, on-demand charter operations into and out of
Florida carrying Florida residents into and out of the state.” In Meier ex
rel. Meier v. Sun International Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1274 (11th Cir.
2002), the defendants maintained several bank accounts in Florida, paid for
advertising in Florida, maintained and staffed Florida telephone numbers, and
listed a Florida attorney as its “Authorized Representative in the United
States” and its “Agent for Service.” In Woods v. Nova Companies Belize Ltd.,
739 So. 2d 617, 620-21 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), this court found general
jurisdiction due to defendant “selling approximately eighteen percent of its
product to Florida importers, moving nearly all of its product through the
state, purchasing equipment and supplies from Florida suppliers, utilizing
storage facilities in Florida, and establishing essential business relationships
in this state, all within its ongoing commercial relationship with Florida . . .
.”
easily distinguishable from the case at hand. In Garris v. Thomasville-Thomas
County Humane Society, Inc., 941 So. 2d 540, 547-48 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), the
court found general jurisdiction existed, noting the defendant directed
significant advertisement towards residents of Florida, “targeting the populous
Florida ‘market,’ ” solicited donations from Floridians, and had ongoing
relationship with several Florida animal aid organizations, including
arrangements under which it “systematically and continuously” transferred
animals to them for adoption in Florida. In Northwestern Aircraft Capital
Corp. v. Stewart, 842 So. 2d 190, 195 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003), the defendants, a
charter flight company, advertised and solicited business in Florida through
print advertising and the internet and “the defendants [had], and continue[d] to
conduct and derive revenue from, on-demand charter operations into and out of
Florida carrying Florida residents into and out of the state.” In Meier ex
rel. Meier v. Sun International Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1274 (11th Cir.
2002), the defendants maintained several bank accounts in Florida, paid for
advertising in Florida, maintained and staffed Florida telephone numbers, and
listed a Florida attorney as its “Authorized Representative in the United
States” and its “Agent for Service.” In Woods v. Nova Companies Belize Ltd.,
739 So. 2d 617, 620-21 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), this court found general
jurisdiction due to defendant “selling approximately eighteen percent of its
product to Florida importers, moving nearly all of its product through the
state, purchasing equipment and supplies from Florida suppliers, utilizing
storage facilities in Florida, and establishing essential business relationships
in this state, all within its ongoing commercial relationship with Florida . . .
.”
These four cases involved far more than “minimum contacts” and, in fact, the
courts found general jurisdiction through continuous systematic contacts with
the state. By contrast, the Auto Dealers’ contacts with Florida were random,
attenuated, and “minimal” or “de minimus,” not “minimum.” Moreover, it was not
foreseeable that the automobile sold in New York by New York auto dealers to a
New York resident would be involved in an accident, four years later, in
Florida. Compare AVH Daily Rental Cars, Inc. v. Smith, 640 So. 2d 168
(Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (holding an out-of-state car rental agency lacked sufficient
minimum contacts to be required to appear in court in Florida where Florida
residents were involved in an accident in New Jersey while driving a vehicle
rented in Delaware that was to be returned to Delaware at the end of the rental
period), with Sierra v. A Betterway Rent-A-Car, Inc., 863 So. 2d 358, 360
(Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (finding it foreseeable that the defendant’s vehicles could
be involved in accidents in Florida where defendant was aware that its rental
car was going to Florida and defendant was “part of a global system of rental
agencies”).
courts found general jurisdiction through continuous systematic contacts with
the state. By contrast, the Auto Dealers’ contacts with Florida were random,
attenuated, and “minimal” or “de minimus,” not “minimum.” Moreover, it was not
foreseeable that the automobile sold in New York by New York auto dealers to a
New York resident would be involved in an accident, four years later, in
Florida. Compare AVH Daily Rental Cars, Inc. v. Smith, 640 So. 2d 168
(Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (holding an out-of-state car rental agency lacked sufficient
minimum contacts to be required to appear in court in Florida where Florida
residents were involved in an accident in New Jersey while driving a vehicle
rented in Delaware that was to be returned to Delaware at the end of the rental
period), with Sierra v. A Betterway Rent-A-Car, Inc., 863 So. 2d 358, 360
(Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (finding it foreseeable that the defendant’s vehicles could
be involved in accidents in Florida where defendant was aware that its rental
car was going to Florida and defendant was “part of a global system of rental
agencies”).
The minimum contacts test “is not formulaic or talismanic.” Radcliffe v.
Gyves, 902 So. 2d 968, 972 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), disapproved of on other
grounds by Kitroser v. Hurt, 85 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2012). The Auto Dealers
sold vehicles in New York only, with none sold in Florida. They serviced
vehicles in New York, not in Florida. They have no offices in Florida, are not
licensed to do business in Florida, employ no business agents in Florida, and
maintain no mailing address or telephone listing in Florida. Their contacts with
Florida entities were random, isolated and “tenuous.” See Oy v. Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc., 632 So. 2d 724, 726 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). We cannot
conclude that the Auto Dealers “purposefully directed” its activities at
consumers or businesses in Florida, see Keeton v. Hustler Magazine Inc.,
465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984), nor can we find that the personal injury
litigation “results from alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or relate to’ those
activities.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 (quoting Helicopteros,
466 U.S. at 414). Accordingly, we find the trial court lacked specific
jurisdiction over Marina Dodge and, hence, over Webster Auto Brokers as well.
Gyves, 902 So. 2d 968, 972 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), disapproved of on other
grounds by Kitroser v. Hurt, 85 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2012). The Auto Dealers
sold vehicles in New York only, with none sold in Florida. They serviced
vehicles in New York, not in Florida. They have no offices in Florida, are not
licensed to do business in Florida, employ no business agents in Florida, and
maintain no mailing address or telephone listing in Florida. Their contacts with
Florida entities were random, isolated and “tenuous.” See Oy v. Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc., 632 So. 2d 724, 726 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). We cannot
conclude that the Auto Dealers “purposefully directed” its activities at
consumers or businesses in Florida, see Keeton v. Hustler Magazine Inc.,
465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984), nor can we find that the personal injury
litigation “results from alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or relate to’ those
activities.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 (quoting Helicopteros,
466 U.S. at 414). Accordingly, we find the trial court lacked specific
jurisdiction over Marina Dodge and, hence, over Webster Auto Brokers as well.
B. No continuous and systematic business contacts support general
jurisdiction
Having found a lack of minimum contacts, it naturally follows that we find a
dearth of continuous and systematic general business contacts between the Auto
Dealers and Florida to give rise to general personal jurisdiction.
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416; Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253. “The
continuous and systematic general business contacts sufficient to confer general
jurisdiction present a much higher threshold than those contacts
necessary to support specific jurisdiction under section 48.193(1).” Trs. of
Columbia Univ. v. Ocean World, S.A., 12 So. 3d 788, 792 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)
(emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
dearth of continuous and systematic general business contacts between the Auto
Dealers and Florida to give rise to general personal jurisdiction.
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416; Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253. “The
continuous and systematic general business contacts sufficient to confer general
jurisdiction present a much higher threshold than those contacts
necessary to support specific jurisdiction under section 48.193(1).” Trs. of
Columbia Univ. v. Ocean World, S.A., 12 So. 3d 788, 792 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)
(emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In the instant case, the Auto Dealers did not have “continuing relationships
and obligations with citizens” of Florida. Travelers Health Ass’n v.
Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647 (1950). The Auto Dealers purchased between nine
and nineteen cars from a Florida auto auction over the space of three years,
during which time over 3,000 cars were purchased by the Auto Dealers, and these
purchases had no relationship to the Auto Dealers’ servicing five cars pursuant
to extended warranties or the other “contacts” alleged by Appellee. Rather than
continuous, substantial, and systematic, the level of activity
between the Auto Dealers and Florida is more properly characterized as
isolated, de minimus, and haphazard. The trial court clearly
lacked general jurisdiction over the Auto Dealers.
and obligations with citizens” of Florida. Travelers Health Ass’n v.
Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647 (1950). The Auto Dealers purchased between nine
and nineteen cars from a Florida auto auction over the space of three years,
during which time over 3,000 cars were purchased by the Auto Dealers, and these
purchases had no relationship to the Auto Dealers’ servicing five cars pursuant
to extended warranties or the other “contacts” alleged by Appellee. Rather than
continuous, substantial, and systematic, the level of activity
between the Auto Dealers and Florida is more properly characterized as
isolated, de minimus, and haphazard. The trial court clearly
lacked general jurisdiction over the Auto Dealers.
Conclusion
The trial court erred in denying the Auto Dealers’ motions to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction. It is improper for Florida to exercise personal
jurisdiction over either of the Auto Dealers in this action. Thus, we reverse
the order of denial as to both motions to dismiss and direct the trial court to
dismiss the action as against Marina Dodge and Webster Auto Brokers as
defendants.
lack of jurisdiction. It is improper for Florida to exercise personal
jurisdiction over either of the Auto Dealers in this action. Thus, we reverse
the order of denial as to both motions to dismiss and direct the trial court to
dismiss the action as against Marina Dodge and Webster Auto Brokers as
defendants.
Reversed and Remanded. (WARNER and CONNER, JJ., concur.)
__________________
1The Auto Dealers’ president’s affidavit
maintained that none of these contacts applied to Webster Auto Brokers.
maintained that none of these contacts applied to Webster Auto Brokers.
2Section 48.193, Fla. Stat. (2012).
* * *