2016
IL App (1st) 153517
IL App (1st) 153517
NOTICE:
THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE PERMANENT LAW
REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.
THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE PERMANENT LAW
REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.
Appellate
Court of Illinois,
Court of Illinois,
First
District,
District,
SECOND
DIVISION.
DIVISION.
Betty
Wing, Plaintiff-Appellant,
Wing, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Chicago
Transit Authority, Defendant-Appellee.
Transit Authority, Defendant-Appellee.
1-15-3517
December
29, 2016
29, 2016
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County.
No. 14 M1 30194.
Honorable Mary R.
Minella, Judge Presiding.
Minella, Judge Presiding.
OPINION
JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
opinion.
*1 ¶ 1 Plaintiff Betty Wing filed a complaint against the Chicago
Transit Authority (CTA) alleging that she was a passenger on a CTA bus on
September 21, 2013, when the bus driver “[f]ailed to keep the bus’s wheelchair
lift under proper control,” resulting in injuries to her foot. Wing was
represented by counsel in the trial court, and the jury returned a verdict in
favor of the CTA. In this pro se appeal, Wing contends, “The jury voted
in favor of the defense after all the shady conspiracy took place,” and she
objects to a variety of incidents related to the two-day trial. Wing takes
issue with the jury selection, the lengthy amount of time the bus driver spent
in the hallway after testifying, the court’s rulings during Wing’s testimony,
defense counsel’s closing argument, and defense counsel’s failure to obey the
court’s instruction to remain in the courtroom until the jury was fully
dismissed. We affirm because Wing did not preserve any issues for review by
filing a posttrial motion, and we cannot conduct a meaningful review of her
contentions without a transcript of the trial proceeding.
Transit Authority (CTA) alleging that she was a passenger on a CTA bus on
September 21, 2013, when the bus driver “[f]ailed to keep the bus’s wheelchair
lift under proper control,” resulting in injuries to her foot. Wing was
represented by counsel in the trial court, and the jury returned a verdict in
favor of the CTA. In this pro se appeal, Wing contends, “The jury voted
in favor of the defense after all the shady conspiracy took place,” and she
objects to a variety of incidents related to the two-day trial. Wing takes
issue with the jury selection, the lengthy amount of time the bus driver spent
in the hallway after testifying, the court’s rulings during Wing’s testimony,
defense counsel’s closing argument, and defense counsel’s failure to obey the
court’s instruction to remain in the courtroom until the jury was fully
dismissed. We affirm because Wing did not preserve any issues for review by
filing a posttrial motion, and we cannot conduct a meaningful review of her
contentions without a transcript of the trial proceeding.
¶ 2 Wing’s opening brief contains two letters, which are
dated more than two weeks prior to the notice of appeal, but are addressed to
this court. In the letters, Wing narrates some of the events of the trial.
dated more than two weeks prior to the notice of appeal, but are addressed to
this court. In the letters, Wing narrates some of the events of the trial.
Wing’s opening brief also includes an unaddressed letter
dated September 23, 2013, which describes the incident; a deposition transcript
from doctor Thomas Albert; documents from the Chicago police and fire
departments relating to the incident; medical bills and records; and a
complaint Wing filed against her trial attorney with the Attorney Registration
and Disciplinary Commission on January 4, 2016. The record on appeal does not
contain these documents, a transcript of the trial, or the video shown to the
jury.
dated September 23, 2013, which describes the incident; a deposition transcript
from doctor Thomas Albert; documents from the Chicago police and fire
departments relating to the incident; medical bills and records; and a
complaint Wing filed against her trial attorney with the Attorney Registration
and Disciplinary Commission on January 4, 2016. The record on appeal does not
contain these documents, a transcript of the trial, or the video shown to the
jury.
¶ 3 After the verdict in favor of the CTA, Wing timely filed
her notice of appeal pro se.
her notice of appeal pro se.
¶ 4 On appeal, Wing states, “I am asking that everything
should be reviewed and an upright decision to [sic] made, because it did
not happen that day, and I feel that the judge and shady action of the defense
attorneys played a major part in it.” Wing questions the court’s “motive for
allowing this,” and asks why the court did “not say anything at all to this
defense attorney and allow him so much leeway and allow him to go into the
hall,” over the court’s express order.
should be reviewed and an upright decision to [sic] made, because it did
not happen that day, and I feel that the judge and shady action of the defense
attorneys played a major part in it.” Wing questions the court’s “motive for
allowing this,” and asks why the court did “not say anything at all to this
defense attorney and allow him so much leeway and allow him to go into the
hall,” over the court’s express order.
¶ 5 The CTA maintains that appellate review on the merits of
Wing’s claim would be improper for three reasons which are subsequently
discussed. In the alternative, if we review the merits, the CTA contends that Wing
did not provide any substantive basis for reversal of the jury’s verdict.
Wing’s claim would be improper for three reasons which are subsequently
discussed. In the alternative, if we review the merits, the CTA contends that Wing
did not provide any substantive basis for reversal of the jury’s verdict.
¶ 6 First, the CTA argues that Wing did not preserve any
matters for appellate review because she did not file a posttrial motion in the
trial court. We agree. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366(b)(2) (eff. Feb. 1,
1994) governs appeals after a civil jury trial. Under Rule 366(b)(2)(iii), a
party may “not urge as error on review of the ruling on the party’s post-trial
motion any point, ground, or relief not specified” in the party’s posttrial
motion. See Arient v. Shaik, 2015 IL App (1st) 133969, ¶ 32, 393
Ill.Dec. 725, 35 N.E.3d 117. Where a party does not file a posttrial motion in
a jury case, this court has held that the party fails to preserve any “point,
ground, or relief” for review on appeal. See id.; see also In re
Parentage of Kimble, 204 Ill.App.3d 914, 916–17, 150 Ill.Dec. 138, 562
N.E.2d 668 (1990). Here, Wing timely filed her notice of appeal, but she did
not file a posttrial motion after the court entered the judgment on the jury
verdict in favor of the CTA. Therefore, Wing did not preserve any matters for
appellate review (see In re Parentage of Kimble, 204 Ill.App.3d at
916–17, 150 Ill.Dec. 138, 562 N.E.2d 668), and we affirm the judgment of the
trial court. See Arient, 2015 IL App (1st) 133969, ¶¶ 34, 41, 393
Ill.Dec. 725, 35 N.E.3d 117.
matters for appellate review because she did not file a posttrial motion in the
trial court. We agree. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366(b)(2) (eff. Feb. 1,
1994) governs appeals after a civil jury trial. Under Rule 366(b)(2)(iii), a
party may “not urge as error on review of the ruling on the party’s post-trial
motion any point, ground, or relief not specified” in the party’s posttrial
motion. See Arient v. Shaik, 2015 IL App (1st) 133969, ¶ 32, 393
Ill.Dec. 725, 35 N.E.3d 117. Where a party does not file a posttrial motion in
a jury case, this court has held that the party fails to preserve any “point,
ground, or relief” for review on appeal. See id.; see also In re
Parentage of Kimble, 204 Ill.App.3d 914, 916–17, 150 Ill.Dec. 138, 562
N.E.2d 668 (1990). Here, Wing timely filed her notice of appeal, but she did
not file a posttrial motion after the court entered the judgment on the jury
verdict in favor of the CTA. Therefore, Wing did not preserve any matters for
appellate review (see In re Parentage of Kimble, 204 Ill.App.3d at
916–17, 150 Ill.Dec. 138, 562 N.E.2d 668), and we affirm the judgment of the
trial court. See Arient, 2015 IL App (1st) 133969, ¶¶ 34, 41, 393
Ill.Dec. 725, 35 N.E.3d 117.
*2 ¶ 7 Second, the CTA contends that the record is
insufficient for us to conduct a meaningful review of the judgment below
because it does not contain a transcript of the trial proceedings. Again, we
agree. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 608(a)(8) (eff. Apr. 8, 2013) provides that
the record on appeal must contain the report of proceedings. Where the issue on
appeal relates to the conduct of a proceeding, a court cannot review the issue
without a report or record of the relevant proceeding. Webster v. Hartman,
195 Ill.2d 426, 432, 255 Ill.Dec. 476, 749 N.E.2d 958 (2001) (citing Foutch
v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill.2d 389, 391–92, 76 Ill.Dec. 823, 459 N.E.2d 958
(1984)). The burden falls on the appellant, as the party seeking relief from
the judgment below, to present a sufficient record. Corral v. Mervis
Industries, Inc., 217 Ill.2d 144, 156, 298 Ill.Dec. 201, 839 N.E.2d 524
(2005). An appellant’s pro se status does not alleviate the duty to
comply with our supreme court’s rules governing appellate procedure. Twardowski
v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc., 321 Ill.App.3d 509, 511, 254
Ill.Dec. 776, 748 N.E.2d 222 (2001); Rock Island County v. Boalbey, 242
Ill.App.3d 461, 462, 182 Ill.Dec. 900, 610 N.E.2d 769 (1993).
insufficient for us to conduct a meaningful review of the judgment below
because it does not contain a transcript of the trial proceedings. Again, we
agree. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 608(a)(8) (eff. Apr. 8, 2013) provides that
the record on appeal must contain the report of proceedings. Where the issue on
appeal relates to the conduct of a proceeding, a court cannot review the issue
without a report or record of the relevant proceeding. Webster v. Hartman,
195 Ill.2d 426, 432, 255 Ill.Dec. 476, 749 N.E.2d 958 (2001) (citing Foutch
v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill.2d 389, 391–92, 76 Ill.Dec. 823, 459 N.E.2d 958
(1984)). The burden falls on the appellant, as the party seeking relief from
the judgment below, to present a sufficient record. Corral v. Mervis
Industries, Inc., 217 Ill.2d 144, 156, 298 Ill.Dec. 201, 839 N.E.2d 524
(2005). An appellant’s pro se status does not alleviate the duty to
comply with our supreme court’s rules governing appellate procedure. Twardowski
v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc., 321 Ill.App.3d 509, 511, 254
Ill.Dec. 776, 748 N.E.2d 222 (2001); Rock Island County v. Boalbey, 242
Ill.App.3d 461, 462, 182 Ill.Dec. 900, 610 N.E.2d 769 (1993).
¶ 8 In her letters to this court, Wing describes incidents
that allegedly took place during the pendency of the trial. However, without a
record of the proceedings, we cannot determine what happened and if it would
amount to legal error. Although Wing attached her treating physician’s
deposition transcript to her opening brief, it is not in the record on appeal,
and we have no way of knowing what his testimony was at trial. Therefore, Wing
has not met her burden of providing a sufficient record to review her
contentions of error.
that allegedly took place during the pendency of the trial. However, without a
record of the proceedings, we cannot determine what happened and if it would
amount to legal error. Although Wing attached her treating physician’s
deposition transcript to her opening brief, it is not in the record on appeal,
and we have no way of knowing what his testimony was at trial. Therefore, Wing
has not met her burden of providing a sufficient record to review her
contentions of error.
¶ 9 Absent a sufficient record, a reviewing court presumes
that the trial court’s order conformed to the law and had a sufficient factual
basis. Foutch, 99 Ill.2d at 392, 76 Ill.Dec. 823, 459 N.E.2d 958. Doubts
arising from an incomplete record are resolved against the appellant. Corral,
217 Ill.2d at 157, 298 Ill.Dec. 201, 839 N.E.2d 524. Without any basis to
evaluate the merits of the claimed error, Wing cannot overcome the presumption
that the court’s orders at trial complied with the law and that a sufficient
factual basis supported the judgment on the verdict. Therefore, we must affirm
the judgment of the circuit court. See id. (affirming where the
deficient factual record was insufficient to overcome the presumption that the
trial court’s order complied with the law and had a sufficient factual basis).
that the trial court’s order conformed to the law and had a sufficient factual
basis. Foutch, 99 Ill.2d at 392, 76 Ill.Dec. 823, 459 N.E.2d 958. Doubts
arising from an incomplete record are resolved against the appellant. Corral,
217 Ill.2d at 157, 298 Ill.Dec. 201, 839 N.E.2d 524. Without any basis to
evaluate the merits of the claimed error, Wing cannot overcome the presumption
that the court’s orders at trial complied with the law and that a sufficient
factual basis supported the judgment on the verdict. Therefore, we must affirm
the judgment of the circuit court. See id. (affirming where the
deficient factual record was insufficient to overcome the presumption that the
trial court’s order complied with the law and had a sufficient factual basis).
¶ 10 Third, the CTA points out procedural deficiencies in Wing’s
opening brief under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013), and
requests that we strike her brief and dismiss the appeal. The CTA is correct
that Wing’s brief is deficient because it lacks a statement of the issue
presented for review, a statement of jurisdiction, and a statement of facts
with citations to the record as required by Rule 341(h)(3), (4), (6). Further,
as the CTA notes, Wing’s argument does not pass muster under Rule 341(h)(7),
which provides that an appellant’s brief must contain contentions and the
reasons therefor, with citation to the authorities upon which the appellant
relies. Although we agree with the substance of the CTA’s argument, we find
that the appropriate remedy is to affirm the judgment, not to dismiss the
appeal.
opening brief under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013), and
requests that we strike her brief and dismiss the appeal. The CTA is correct
that Wing’s brief is deficient because it lacks a statement of the issue
presented for review, a statement of jurisdiction, and a statement of facts
with citations to the record as required by Rule 341(h)(3), (4), (6). Further,
as the CTA notes, Wing’s argument does not pass muster under Rule 341(h)(7),
which provides that an appellant’s brief must contain contentions and the
reasons therefor, with citation to the authorities upon which the appellant
relies. Although we agree with the substance of the CTA’s argument, we find
that the appropriate remedy is to affirm the judgment, not to dismiss the
appeal.
¶ 11 A reviewing court is entitled to the benefit of clearly
defined issues with pertinent authority cited and a cohesive legal argument. Walters
v. Rodriguez, 2011 IL App (1st) 103488, ¶ 5, 356 Ill.Dec. 103, 960 N.E.2d
1226. The appellate court is not a depository in which an appellant may dump
the entire matter of argument and research. Thrall Car Manufacturing Co. v.
Lindquist, 145 Ill.App.3d 712, 719, 99 Ill.Dec. 397, 495 N.E.2d 1132
(1986). Arguments that are not supported by citations to authority do not meet
the requirements of Rule 341(h)(7) and are procedurally defaulted. Lewis v.
Heartland Food Corp., 2014 IL App (1st) 123303, ¶ 5, 384 Ill.Dec. 646, 17
N.E.3d 219. Although a pro se appellant’s deficient brief does not
affect our jurisdiction to consider the appeal (Twardowski, 321
Ill.App.3d at 511, 254 Ill.Dec. 776, 748 N.E.2d 222), “the rules of procedure
for appellate briefs are rules, not mere suggestions.” Longo Realty v.
Menard, Inc., 2016 IL App (1st) 151231, ¶ 18, 405 Ill.Dec. 708, 59 N.E.3d
1. When the procedural violations interfere with our review of the issue, we
may exercise our discretion and strike a brief for failure to comply with the
rules. Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v. Korzen, 2013 IL App (1st) 130380,
¶ 10, 377 Ill.Dec. 771, 2 N.E.3d 1052.
defined issues with pertinent authority cited and a cohesive legal argument. Walters
v. Rodriguez, 2011 IL App (1st) 103488, ¶ 5, 356 Ill.Dec. 103, 960 N.E.2d
1226. The appellate court is not a depository in which an appellant may dump
the entire matter of argument and research. Thrall Car Manufacturing Co. v.
Lindquist, 145 Ill.App.3d 712, 719, 99 Ill.Dec. 397, 495 N.E.2d 1132
(1986). Arguments that are not supported by citations to authority do not meet
the requirements of Rule 341(h)(7) and are procedurally defaulted. Lewis v.
Heartland Food Corp., 2014 IL App (1st) 123303, ¶ 5, 384 Ill.Dec. 646, 17
N.E.3d 219. Although a pro se appellant’s deficient brief does not
affect our jurisdiction to consider the appeal (Twardowski, 321
Ill.App.3d at 511, 254 Ill.Dec. 776, 748 N.E.2d 222), “the rules of procedure
for appellate briefs are rules, not mere suggestions.” Longo Realty v.
Menard, Inc., 2016 IL App (1st) 151231, ¶ 18, 405 Ill.Dec. 708, 59 N.E.3d
1. When the procedural violations interfere with our review of the issue, we
may exercise our discretion and strike a brief for failure to comply with the
rules. Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v. Korzen, 2013 IL App (1st) 130380,
¶ 10, 377 Ill.Dec. 771, 2 N.E.3d 1052.
*3 ¶ 12 Here, the lack of a cohesive legal argument, a
reasoned basis for Wing’s contentions, or any citation to the record or
supporting authority, combined with the deficient record discussed above,
interferes with our review. Thus, the opening brief’s procedural deficiencies
under Rule 341(h) provide an additional basis to disregard the unsupported
facts and consider the arguments in this appeal waived. See Walters,
2011 IL App (1st) 103488, ¶ 8, 356 Ill.Dec. 103, 960 N.E.2d 1226 (disregarding
the facts and arguments in the plaintiff’s opening brief due to procedural
deficiencies under Rule 341(h)).
reasoned basis for Wing’s contentions, or any citation to the record or
supporting authority, combined with the deficient record discussed above,
interferes with our review. Thus, the opening brief’s procedural deficiencies
under Rule 341(h) provide an additional basis to disregard the unsupported
facts and consider the arguments in this appeal waived. See Walters,
2011 IL App (1st) 103488, ¶ 8, 356 Ill.Dec. 103, 960 N.E.2d 1226 (disregarding
the facts and arguments in the plaintiff’s opening brief due to procedural
deficiencies under Rule 341(h)).
¶ 13 In sum, Wing forfeited appellate review of any issues
because she did not file a posttrial motion. See Arient, 2015 IL App
(1st) 133969, ¶ 32, 393 Ill.Dec. 725, 35 N.E.3d 117. Based on this record, we
cannot determine whether Wing’s factual assertions have any merit, and we must
presume that the trial court’s orders were consistent with the law and
supported by sufficient facts. See Corral, 217 Ill.2d at 157, 298
Ill.Dec. 201, 839 N.E.2d 524. The procedural deficiencies in her opening brief
combined with the insufficient record further support our conclusion that we
cannot review Wing’s claims on the merits. See Walters, 2011 IL App
(1st) 103488, ¶ 8, 356 Ill.Dec. 103, 960 N.E.2d 1226. Therefore, we need not
address the CTA’s alternative argument that Wing did not provide any
substantive basis for reversal of the jury’s verdict.
because she did not file a posttrial motion. See Arient, 2015 IL App
(1st) 133969, ¶ 32, 393 Ill.Dec. 725, 35 N.E.3d 117. Based on this record, we
cannot determine whether Wing’s factual assertions have any merit, and we must
presume that the trial court’s orders were consistent with the law and
supported by sufficient facts. See Corral, 217 Ill.2d at 157, 298
Ill.Dec. 201, 839 N.E.2d 524. The procedural deficiencies in her opening brief
combined with the insufficient record further support our conclusion that we
cannot review Wing’s claims on the merits. See Walters, 2011 IL App
(1st) 103488, ¶ 8, 356 Ill.Dec. 103, 960 N.E.2d 1226. Therefore, we need not
address the CTA’s alternative argument that Wing did not provide any
substantive basis for reversal of the jury’s verdict.
¶ 14 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit
court of Cook County.
court of Cook County.
¶ 15 Affirmed.
Presiding Justice Hyman specially concurred, with opinion.
Justice Mason specially concurred, with opinion.
¶ 16 PRESIDING JUSTICE HYMAN, specially concurring.
¶ 17 I fully concur in the reasoning and result. That said, Wing’s
sincere impression of what happened at the trial deserves closer scrutiny.
After waiting more than two years to present her case before a jury, Wing
writes, “I was not treated fairly.” Her pro se appellate brief reveals a
possible reason for her feeling this way. Although represented by counsel
throughout the case, Wing has hardly any understanding of how a trial works.
When people do not understand something, they tend to take a negative view of
it and assume the worst. Thus, Wing’s “I was not treated fairly” is a natural
response to a lack of understanding of what transpired at the trial.
sincere impression of what happened at the trial deserves closer scrutiny.
After waiting more than two years to present her case before a jury, Wing
writes, “I was not treated fairly.” Her pro se appellate brief reveals a
possible reason for her feeling this way. Although represented by counsel
throughout the case, Wing has hardly any understanding of how a trial works.
When people do not understand something, they tend to take a negative view of
it and assume the worst. Thus, Wing’s “I was not treated fairly” is a natural
response to a lack of understanding of what transpired at the trial.
¶ 18 Among Wing’s complaints are these:
• “The jurors were chosen
rather quickly, which was very unfair. During the questioning of the jurors,
especially when it came to the kind of work they did and a brief of their
history [ ], a few should have automatically been excluded…”
rather quickly, which was very unfair. During the questioning of the jurors,
especially when it came to the kind of work they did and a brief of their
history [ ], a few should have automatically been excluded…”
• “The attorneys and the
judge went to the back through a door behind the judge’s chair and trial began
shortly after the completion of jury selection.”
judge went to the back through a door behind the judge’s chair and trial began
shortly after the completion of jury selection.”
• “As my testimony was going
forth, the judge stopped my attorney from asking me questions that were
relevant to my case.”
forth, the judge stopped my attorney from asking me questions that were
relevant to my case.”
• “[T]he defense attorney was
given the opportunity to question me [and h]e began badgering me while the
judge said nothing. The defense attorney continued repeating [sic]
trying to get me to say what he wanted me to.”
given the opportunity to question me [and h]e began badgering me while the
judge said nothing. The defense attorney continued repeating [sic]
trying to get me to say what he wanted me to.”
¶ 19 What Wing describes may be strange and unsettling to
her but are familiar and common occurrences for lawyers on trial.
her but are familiar and common occurrences for lawyers on trial.
¶ 20 One incident troubled Wing more than the others.
According to Wing, before the judge excused the jury at the end of the first
day, the judge “gave direct orders to me and my attorney, as well as the
defense attorney not to leave the courtroom for any reasons until all the
jurors were completely dismissed. And she would inform us when to leave.”
According to Wing, “immediately” after this order, “the defense attorney fled
into the hall, while the jury was still in the process of being dismissed.” Wing
“looked at the judge and told my attorney that the judge is not even saying
anything.” After “a few minutes” the defense attorney “returned to the
courtroom as [if] nothing [ ] happened.” A couple minutes later, the defense
attorney went back into the hallway, then returned to the courtroom, got his coat,
and left. Wing wanted her attorney to bring to the judge’s attention that the
defense attorney had twice gone into the hall without permission, but he
refused to say anything.
According to Wing, before the judge excused the jury at the end of the first
day, the judge “gave direct orders to me and my attorney, as well as the
defense attorney not to leave the courtroom for any reasons until all the
jurors were completely dismissed. And she would inform us when to leave.”
According to Wing, “immediately” after this order, “the defense attorney fled
into the hall, while the jury was still in the process of being dismissed.” Wing
“looked at the judge and told my attorney that the judge is not even saying
anything.” After “a few minutes” the defense attorney “returned to the
courtroom as [if] nothing [ ] happened.” A couple minutes later, the defense
attorney went back into the hallway, then returned to the courtroom, got his coat,
and left. Wing wanted her attorney to bring to the judge’s attention that the
defense attorney had twice gone into the hall without permission, but he
refused to say anything.
*4 ¶ 21 Again, Wing felt confused by her counsel’s inaction
which, by its nature, is not a part of the record but which exacerbated her
belief that she was not treated fairly. It does not appear that her counsel
took the time to account to Wing for his having stood mute despite the defense
attorney’s apparent violations of the judge’s instruction.
which, by its nature, is not a part of the record but which exacerbated her
belief that she was not treated fairly. It does not appear that her counsel
took the time to account to Wing for his having stood mute despite the defense
attorney’s apparent violations of the judge’s instruction.
¶ 22 How clients perceive “fairness” depends on more than a
trial’s outcome. It depends on the process, and if a client does not understand
the trial process, fairness gets the blame. Litigants whose counsel keeps them
informed and educated will place greater confidence in the outcome. See Clark
D. Cunningham, What Do Clients Want From Their Lawyers?, 2013 J. Disp.
Resol. 143, 146, 149 (2013) (stating that most frequent problems in
attorney-client relationship were not related to outcome but to attorney’s
failure to listen to client, ask appropriate questions, and explain relevant
aspects of case and “how the system works”); Greg Berman & Emily Gold, Procedural
Justice From the Bench, Judges’ J., Spring 2012, at 20 (explaining that
judge’s management of the courtroom promotes perceptions of fairness).
trial’s outcome. It depends on the process, and if a client does not understand
the trial process, fairness gets the blame. Litigants whose counsel keeps them
informed and educated will place greater confidence in the outcome. See Clark
D. Cunningham, What Do Clients Want From Their Lawyers?, 2013 J. Disp.
Resol. 143, 146, 149 (2013) (stating that most frequent problems in
attorney-client relationship were not related to outcome but to attorney’s
failure to listen to client, ask appropriate questions, and explain relevant
aspects of case and “how the system works”); Greg Berman & Emily Gold, Procedural
Justice From the Bench, Judges’ J., Spring 2012, at 20 (explaining that
judge’s management of the courtroom promotes perceptions of fairness).
¶ 23 If some good is to emerge from this appeal, it is
this—lawyers must keep their clients informed about what is taking place at
every step of a trial. This means communicating with clients in nontechnical
terms about strategy and objectives, and the trial process itself, court
procedures, Rules of Evidence, and judicial pronouncements and rulings. And it
means listening to and understanding the client’s prospective. While
communications in the midst of a trial may not always be practicable, the
lawyer must nonetheless act reasonably to inform the client of actions the
lawyer has taken on the client’s behalf. See Ill. R. Prof’l Conduct (2010) R.
1.4 cmt. 3 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016). Well-informed clients are in a better position
to assess the trial’s progress, measure risks, and make choices. Clients also
will be less inclined to feel they were treated unfairly, which usually leaves
the clients satisfied with their representation.
this—lawyers must keep their clients informed about what is taking place at
every step of a trial. This means communicating with clients in nontechnical
terms about strategy and objectives, and the trial process itself, court
procedures, Rules of Evidence, and judicial pronouncements and rulings. And it
means listening to and understanding the client’s prospective. While
communications in the midst of a trial may not always be practicable, the
lawyer must nonetheless act reasonably to inform the client of actions the
lawyer has taken on the client’s behalf. See Ill. R. Prof’l Conduct (2010) R.
1.4 cmt. 3 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016). Well-informed clients are in a better position
to assess the trial’s progress, measure risks, and make choices. Clients also
will be less inclined to feel they were treated unfairly, which usually leaves
the clients satisfied with their representation.
¶ 24 We cannot say whether Wing’s attorney ever discussed
these issues with her because discussions between attorney and client are, of
course, confidential. Moreover, it is not for us to decide whether his conduct
met the standards set forth in the Rules of Professional Conduct. (For that
reason, I opted not to mention Wing’s complaint with the Attorney Registration
and Disciplinary Commission.) But the concerns Wing raises in her brief
illustrate how a lack of understanding shapes many participants’ view of the
legal system. Although Justice Mason asserts that this case is an
“inappropriate vehicle” for addressing these issues (infra ¶ 30), I would
contend that Wing’s pro se status is more, not less, of a reason to
address her complaints. We should be sensitive to the reality of a pro se
appellant who, having lost a case she thought she should have won, cannot
afford or attract an attorney to represent her on appeal. To ignore the
intangibles and merely offer a legal analysis of the issues is more likely to
further her belief that she has not been treated fairly. A short explanation
addressing her concerns and assuring her that nothing appears, on its face, to
be improper, and reminding lawyers of the importance of communicating with
their clients throughout a case, might avoid other litigants from feeling that
they did not get a fair shake from the legal system.
these issues with her because discussions between attorney and client are, of
course, confidential. Moreover, it is not for us to decide whether his conduct
met the standards set forth in the Rules of Professional Conduct. (For that
reason, I opted not to mention Wing’s complaint with the Attorney Registration
and Disciplinary Commission.) But the concerns Wing raises in her brief
illustrate how a lack of understanding shapes many participants’ view of the
legal system. Although Justice Mason asserts that this case is an
“inappropriate vehicle” for addressing these issues (infra ¶ 30), I would
contend that Wing’s pro se status is more, not less, of a reason to
address her complaints. We should be sensitive to the reality of a pro se
appellant who, having lost a case she thought she should have won, cannot
afford or attract an attorney to represent her on appeal. To ignore the
intangibles and merely offer a legal analysis of the issues is more likely to
further her belief that she has not been treated fairly. A short explanation
addressing her concerns and assuring her that nothing appears, on its face, to
be improper, and reminding lawyers of the importance of communicating with
their clients throughout a case, might avoid other litigants from feeling that
they did not get a fair shake from the legal system.
*5 ¶ 25 In the words of a lawyer who abandoned law for a
career as a writer, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe: “And what we understand we
cannot blame.” Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Torquato Tasso, act 2, sc. 1.
career as a writer, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe: “And what we understand we
cannot blame.” Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Torquato Tasso, act 2, sc. 1.
¶ 26 JUSTICE MASON, specially concurring.
¶ 27 I fully concur with the reasoning and result in this
case. Having provided us with no record of the proceedings below, and a brief
on appeal consisting of a series of letters addressed to this court and various
documents not certified by the clerk, it is impossible to address the merits of
any issues raised by Wing. Further, we do know from this limited record that Wing
failed to file a posttrial motion and thus has forfeited all issues on appeal.
See Garcia v. Seneca Nursing Home, 2011 IL App (1st) 103085, ¶ 17, 353
Ill.Dec. 877, 956 N.E.2d 1005 (quoting Thornton v. Garcini, 237 Ill.2d
100, 106, 340 Ill.Dec. 557, 928 N.E.2d 804 (2009)) (“Ordinarily, an appealing
party forfeits review of an issue unless the party both ‘object[ed] to an error
at trial and includ[ed] it in a written posttrial motion.’ ”).
case. Having provided us with no record of the proceedings below, and a brief
on appeal consisting of a series of letters addressed to this court and various
documents not certified by the clerk, it is impossible to address the merits of
any issues raised by Wing. Further, we do know from this limited record that Wing
failed to file a posttrial motion and thus has forfeited all issues on appeal.
See Garcia v. Seneca Nursing Home, 2011 IL App (1st) 103085, ¶ 17, 353
Ill.Dec. 877, 956 N.E.2d 1005 (quoting Thornton v. Garcini, 237 Ill.2d
100, 106, 340 Ill.Dec. 557, 928 N.E.2d 804 (2009)) (“Ordinarily, an appealing
party forfeits review of an issue unless the party both ‘object[ed] to an error
at trial and includ[ed] it in a written posttrial motion.’ ”).
¶ 28 I write separately to address Justice Hyman’s special
concurrence in which he opines that matters raised by Wing in her letters to
the court deserve “closer scrutiny.” They do not. We routinely refuse to
consider matters outside the record (see Bank of New York Mellon v.
Karbowski, 2014 IL App (1st) 130112, ¶ 24, 382 Ill.Dec. 513, 12 N.E.3d
792), and we do not relax that rule in cases involving self-represented
litigants.
concurrence in which he opines that matters raised by Wing in her letters to
the court deserve “closer scrutiny.” They do not. We routinely refuse to
consider matters outside the record (see Bank of New York Mellon v.
Karbowski, 2014 IL App (1st) 130112, ¶ 24, 382 Ill.Dec. 513, 12 N.E.3d
792), and we do not relax that rule in cases involving self-represented
litigants.
Wing’s unsupported complaints range from the speed with
which the jury was selected (“very unfair,” according to Wing) to the trial
judge sustaining objections to questions that (again, in Wing’s view) “were
relevant to my case.”
which the jury was selected (“very unfair,” according to Wing) to the trial
judge sustaining objections to questions that (again, in Wing’s view) “were
relevant to my case.”
¶ 29 In particular, Justice Hyman addresses Wing’s claim
regarding an instruction by the trial court at the end of the first day of
trial that the litigants and their attorneys were to remain in the courtroom
until after all jurors left.
regarding an instruction by the trial court at the end of the first day of
trial that the litigants and their attorneys were to remain in the courtroom
until after all jurors left.
In one of her letters, Wing claims that defense counsel
disobeyed the court’s order and neither the trial court nor Wing’s counsel did
or said anything. Justice Hyman observes that Wing “felt confused” by her
lawyer’s inaction, which, in turn, contributed to her belief that “she was not
treated fairly.” He states: “It does not appear that [Wing’s] counsel took the
time to account to Wing for his having stood mute despite the defense
attorney’s apparent violation of the judge’s instruction.” Supra ¶ 21.
Justice Hyman then goes on to exhort lawyers to “keep their clients informed
about what is taking place at every step of a trial.” Supra ¶ 23.
disobeyed the court’s order and neither the trial court nor Wing’s counsel did
or said anything. Justice Hyman observes that Wing “felt confused” by her
lawyer’s inaction, which, in turn, contributed to her belief that “she was not
treated fairly.” He states: “It does not appear that [Wing’s] counsel took the
time to account to Wing for his having stood mute despite the defense
attorney’s apparent violation of the judge’s instruction.” Supra ¶ 21.
Justice Hyman then goes on to exhort lawyers to “keep their clients informed
about what is taking place at every step of a trial.” Supra ¶ 23.
¶ 30 This case is a singularly inappropriate vehicle for
these observations and assumptions given the lack of any record supporting
them. And using this case as an opportunity to criticize a lawyer for failing
to communicate with his client as he is obligated to do (see Ill. R. Prof’l
Conduct (2010) R. 1.4 (eff. Jan. 1, 2010)) does a disservice to trial counsel
who is not here to defend himself and against whom Wing has filed a complaint
with the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (also attached to
her brief).
these observations and assumptions given the lack of any record supporting
them. And using this case as an opportunity to criticize a lawyer for failing
to communicate with his client as he is obligated to do (see Ill. R. Prof’l
Conduct (2010) R. 1.4 (eff. Jan. 1, 2010)) does a disservice to trial counsel
who is not here to defend himself and against whom Wing has filed a complaint
with the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (also attached to
her brief).