Appellate Court of Illinois,

First District,

FIRST DIVISION.

Guiseppina DIFRANCO and Eugenio DiFranco,
Plaintiffs–Appellants,

v.

Constance
KUSAR, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 1–16–0533

November 6, 2017

Appeal from the
Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 13 L 6288, The Honorable Edward S. Harmening,
Judge Presiding.

OPINION

PRESIDING JUSTICE PIERCE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

*1 ¶ 1 Guiseppina DiFranco sued Constance
Kusar to recover for injuries that plaintiff sustained in a motor vehicle
accident.1 At the jury trial, defendant
admitted negligence, and thus the only issues at trial were whether defendant’s
negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries and the amount of
damages, if any. The jury entered a verdict in favor of plaintiff, and awarded
her $1000 for the reasonable expense of necessary medical care, treatment, and
services received; $0 for the loss of normal life; and $0 for pain and
suffering. The circuit court denied plaintiff’s posttrial motion for a new
trial. The circuit court also granted in part and denied in part plaintiff’s
posttrial motion for costs. On appeal, plaintiff contends that: (1) the jury’s
damages award is against the manifest weight of the evidence; (2) the circuit
court erred in denying her motion for a new trial; and (3) the circuit court
erred in denying in part her posttrial motion for costs. We find no error and
affirm.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The following
facts were presented at trial.

¶ 4 On June 9, 2011, plaintiff
was driving in stop-and-go traffic, and while stopped, her vehicle was struck
from behind by a vehicle operated by defendant. The collision caused
plaintiff’s vehicle to hit the vehicle in front of hers. It also caused her
body to move forward and backward, and her knees struck the dashboard.
Immediately following the collision, she experienced pain in her neck, back,
and arm. She was taken by ambulance to GlenOaks Hospital (GlenOaks). She
testified that while she was in the emergency room, her pain was a 9 on a scale
of 1 to 10. At GlenOaks, she was examined and instructed to follow up with her
family physician, Edwin W. Anderson, M.D. On June 13, 2011, plaintiff followed
up with Dr. Anderson.

¶ 5 Dr. Anderson’s
evidence deposition was admitted into evidence at trial. He testified that
plaintiff told him that she had pain in her arm, neck, and back related to the
June 9 collision. Dr. Anderson examined plaintiff and found tenderness in her
lower back, a normal range of motion of the neck,
a normal shoulder exam, a normal elbow exam, and tenderness in the right pelvis
area. He stated that plaintiff reported she felt “moderate pain.” He concluded
that she sustained a cervical strain, an arm strain, a forearm strain, and
a back strain. Dr. Anderson recommended that plaintiff undergo physical therapy
and take over-the-counter pain relievers. According to plaintiff, she performed
her physical therapy at GlenOaks.

¶ 6 Dr. Anderson examined plaintiff
again on July 15, 2011. He stated that she complained of pain radiating down
from her neck into her right arm and lower back. Dr. Anderson determined that
this new complaint was related to the June 9 collision and that plaintiff
sustained an injury to her lower back and neck from the collision. He
recommended that she continue with her physical therapy and gave her prednisonefor
her inflammation and swelling. He also referred her
to Dr. Lawrence Frank, a nonsurgical back doctor, because her condition was
“worsening with physical therapy and not improving.”

*2 ¶ 7 According to plaintiff, Dr. Frank
recommended that she undergo physical therapy at GlenOaks, which she did for
four months. After completing the physical therapy, Dr. Franks told plaintiff
to follow up with Dr. Anderson if her pain continued. Plaintiff testified that
she was still experiencing pain after January 12, 2012, and that her pain got
worse.

¶ 8 Dr. Anderson examined plaintiff again on August 9, 2012, when
she came in complaining of right arm and hand numbness. Dr. Anderson concluded
that the pain was possibly nerve related, “either carpel tunnel or cervical
radiculopathy,” and his “working assumption” was that this was related to the
June 9 collision. He recommended that plaintiff get an electromyelogram (EMG),
which was performed at Alexian Brothers Medical Center. Based on the results of
the EMG, Dr. Anderson concluded that plaintiff had “a pinched nerve in
the cervical area as well as a right carpal tunnel syndrome” and that
the pinched nerve was due to the June 9 collision.

¶ 9 On August 20, 2012, Dr. Anderson
recommended that plaintiff undergo an MRI, the results of which demonstrated “multiple
abnormalities in the cervical spine.” Dr. Anderson stated that, based on
his education and examinations of plaintiff, the
course of treatment he recommended was necessary as a result of the June 9
collision.

¶ 10 Plaintiff
testified that Dr. Anderson referred her to Dr. Rosenblatt, whom plaintiff
described as a “bone specialist.” Dr. Rosenblatt prescribed physical therapy,
which plaintiff underwent at Athletico.

¶ 11 At trial, plaintiff
offered into evidence bills she had received for treatment following the June
9, 2011, collision. In total, she was billed $29,331.88, which included amounts
billed for the emergency room visit on June 9, 2011, her follow-up visits with
doctors Anderson, Frank, and Rosenblatt, her physical therapy, all of her
diagnostic testing, and her prescriptions.

¶ 12 Julie Johnson, a
customer service supervisor from Adventist Midwest Health, with which GlenOaks
is affiliated, testified that GlenOaks’s bills reflected reasonable and
customary charges for services rendered in the GlenOaks emergency room, as well
as for X-rays, labs, and physical therapy. On cross-examination, Johnson stated
that she did not know how much other hospitals charged for similar services.
She acknowledged that GlenOaks uses current procedural terminology (CPT) codes,
which were developed by the American Medical Association and which are used by
all medical providers to mean the same thing for a geographical location.
Johnson acknowledged that she would not know whether the CPT codes used on a
GlenOaks bill accurately reflected the actual clinical services provided.
Plaintiff’s emergency room bills reflected that she was billed twice for
X-rays, and was billed under CPT code 99284, which designates a level 4 severe
condition. Johnson also could not say why plaintiff was charged under CPT code
99288 for “direct advanced life support,” and acknowledged that she could not
say that such a charge was usual or customary under the circumstances.

¶ 13 Defendant
presented the evidence deposition of Dr. Richard Rabinowitz, an orthopedic
surgeon, as her expert witness. Dr. Rabinowitz testified that he had reviewed
plaintiff’s medical records from both before and after the collision.
Plaintiff’s records showed documented complaints dating back to 2003 that were
similar to the complaints plaintiff had after the collision. In 2003, she was
diagnosed with cervical brachial syndrome, brachial
neuralgia, myofacial pain, and cervical region pain, which Dr. Rabinowitz
described as “pain about the neck and referred pain into the shoulder and arm.”
Plaintiff also had pain between her shoulder blades, as well as some finger
numbness. In 2005, plaintiff presented to Dr. Anderson with complaints of
“numbness and pain and tingling in the right arm into the right hand and
wrist,” which resulted in plaintiff being restricted from repetitive motion
activities. In February 2009, plaintiff was seen by a Dr. Goldberg. Plaintiff
presented with a collection of complaints, including numbness in her right hand
and pain in her thumb, index finger, and middle finger and pain in her right
shoulder, with no suggestion of trauma. Dr. Goldberg diagnosed plaintiff with
carpel tunnel syndrome. In October 2009, Dr. Anderson had a series of phone
conversations with plaintiff about an X-ray of her shoulder. He noted that she had neck pain near where her shoulder and
neck meet but in a different area than what was reflected on the X-ray. In Dr.
Rabinowitz’s opinion, plaintiff’s complaints from 2003 forward were part of the
same continuum of symptoms. In November 2009, plaintiff again complained of
pain in her neck and upper arm. Between June and August 2010, she again
complained of pain in the neck and radiating into the shoulder, and in August
2010, she still had symptoms in those areas. Dr. Rabinowitz described
plaintiff’s pain in her neck, shoulder, and arm as “chronic.”

*3 ¶ 14 Furthermore, on June 9, 2011,
before the accident giving rise to the claims here, plaintiff called Dr.
Anderson’s office complaining about her right arm and hand falling asleep and
having a burning sensation that would wake her up while sleeping, accompanied
by numbness and tingling. Dr. Anderson’s office called her back later that day saying that it sounded like a pinched nerve.

¶ 15 Dr. Rabinowitz also reviewed
plaintiff’s medical records from after the accident. In the emergency room,
plaintiff complained of pain in the back of her neck that radiated into her
right shoulder. The emergency room records did not reflect any prior history of
neck, shoulder, or arm pain. The records stated that plaintiff was alert with
no acute distress. An examination suggested a full range of motion in the upper
extremities without pain or tenderness. An X-ray showed no acute injury,
although it did show some degenerative change. Dr. Rabinowitz acknowledged that
plaintiff was diagnosed in the emergency room as having a cervical strain and
added that “the most troubling part is that there aren’t the typical physical
findings that we would see for [a cervical strain], but given her
complaints and her continuum of care, I felt it was reasonable to assume based
on her subjective complaints that she had a cervical strain.” He explained
that “there was no evidence of tenderness or spasm or significant restricted
motion. There was no evidence of contusion.” He agreed that “the treatment that
she received relating to this cervical strain was appropriate and
fair from the time of the automobile collision through her release from Dr.
Frank in January of 2012.” Dr. Rabinowitz did not state that the treatment
plaintiff received was necessary.

¶ 16 On September 25, 2015, the jury
found in favor of plaintiff and against defendant. The jury awarded plaintiff
$1000 for “the reasonable expenses of necessary medical care, treatment, and
services rendered.” The jury awarded plaintiff $0 for “pain and suffering experienced as a result of the
injuries,” and $0 for “loss of a normal life experienced.” Also on
September 25, 2015, the circuit court entered a judgment in favor plaintiff on
the jury’s verdict.

¶ 17 Plaintiff filed a
timely motion for a new trial, arguing that the jury’s verdict was against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Plaintiff also filed a motion for costs. On
January 20, 2016, the circuit court denied the motion for a new trial and
granted in part and denied in part plaintiff’s motion for costs. The circuit
court awarded plaintiff $2264 in costs ($567 in filing fees, $60 for service
fees, and $1637 for the evidence deposition of Dr. Anderson) but did not award
plaintiff an additional $243.67 in requested “witness fees.” Plaintiff filed a
timely notice of appeal from the jury’s verdict, the denial of her motion for a
new trial, and the partial denial of her motion for costs.

¶ 18 ANALYSIS

¶ 19 On appeal,
plaintiff argues that the jury’s verdict was against the manifest weight of the
evidence because the jury ignored “proven elements of damages.” She also argues
that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying her motion for a new
trial. We address these arguments together. She also argues that the circuit
court abused its discretion by denying in part her posttrial motion for costs.
We address this argument in turn.

¶ 20 Plaintiff’s first
argument on appeal is that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying
her motion for a new trial because the jury’s verdict was against the manifest
weight of the evidence. She contends that the jury ignored “proven elements of
damages” because Dr. Rabinowitz testified that the medical treatment she
received from the date of the accident to her discharge by Dr. Frank, totaling $15,770.88,
was “necessary and reasonable.” According to plaintiff, Dr. Rabinowitz
testified that the treatment “was necessitated by the collision and was
reasonable and customary for the injuries she sustained.” She argues that Dr.
Rabinowitz testified that plaintiff sustained an “objective injury” as a result
of the collision, specifically tenderness in her back, and that the treatment
she received in the emergency room at GlenOaks was reasonable and necessary.
She further contends that she received a medical bill from the emergency room
totaling $3742.75, and therefore, the jury ignored a proven element of damages
when it awarded her only $1000. Additionally, she argues that the jury’s award
of $0 for pain and suffering was against the manifest weight of the evidence
because it was “uncontroverted” that she suffered an injury, and that the
medical treatment she received for that injury was “reasonable, customary, and
necessary.”

*4 ¶ 21 When ruling on a motion for a new
trial, the circuit court weighs the evidence and determines if the jury’s
verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Lawlor v. North American Corp. of Illinois,
2012 IL 112530, ¶ 38, 368 Ill.Dec. 1, 983 N.E.2d 414. “A verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence only where
the opposite result is clearly evident or where the jury’s findings are unreasonable,
arbitrary and not based upon any of the evidence.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Young v. Alden Gardens of Waterford, LLC, 2015 IL App
(1st) 131887, ¶ 46, 391 Ill.Dec. 361, 30 N.E.3d 631. We will only reverse the
circuit court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial where the moving party
affirmatively shows the circuit court abused its discretion. Velarde v.
Illinois Central R.R. Co., 354 Ill.App.3d 523, 537–38, 289 Ill.Dec. 529,
820 N.E.2d 37 (2004). “In determining whether the trial court abused its
discretion, the reviewing court should consider whether the jury’s verdict was
supported by the evidence and whether the losing party was denied a fair
trial.” Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill.2d 445, 455, 177 Ill.Dec. 438,
603 N.E.2d 508 (1992).

¶ 22 The standard for an award of
compensatory damages under Illinois law is whether a reasonable jury could have
awarded the damages it did. People ex rel. Department of Transportation
v. Smith, 258 Ill.App.3d 710, 715–16, 197 Ill.Dec. 263, 631 N.E.2d 266
(1994). A reviewing court will overturn a jury verdict when damages are
manifestly inadequate because the proven elements of damages were ignored, or
if the amount awarded bears no reasonable relationship to the loss suffered by
the plaintiff. Id. Illinois courts have repeatedly held that the
amount of damages to be assessed is peculiarly a question of fact for the jury
and that great weight must be given to the jury’s decision. Snelson v.
Kamm, 204 Ill.2d 1, 36–37, 272 Ill.Dec. 610, 787 N.E.2d 796 (2003). “The
mere fact that the verdict is less than the claimed damages does not
necessarily mean the award is inadequate *** since the jury is free to
determine the credibility of the witnesses and to assess the weight accorded to
their testimony.” Montgomery v. City of Chicago, 134 Ill.App.3d
499, 502, 89 Ill.Dec. 698, 481 N.E.2d 50 (1985).

¶ 23 We conclude that
the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff’s motion
for a new trial because the jury’s verdict was not against the manifest weight
of the evidence, since a reasonable jury could conclude that not all of the
treatment plaintiff received was reasonable and necessary, and that she was not
entitled to compensation for the full amount of the services for which she was
billed. First, plaintiff’s argument that the jury ignored “proven damages” is
unfounded because the issues of whether the accident was the proximate cause of
her injuries and whether the treatment she received was necessary were disputed.
She repeatedly asserts that Dr. Rabinowitz testified that her treatment was
“necessary,” but her assertion is not supported by the record. Dr. Rabinowitz
testified that, based on plaintiff’s subjective complaints, he assumed that she
suffered a cervical strain, although he
qualified that assumption by stating that the physical findings in the
emergency room records were not typical of a cervical strain. He further
explained that GlenOaks’s emergency room records contained no evidence of the
typical signs associated with cervical strain, which include tenderness,
spasm, significant restricted motion, and contusion. Dr. Rabinowitz
acknowledged that the treatment plaintiff received from the time she went to
the emergency room on the date of the accident to the time she was discharged
by Dr. Frank was appropriate, but he never agreed that it was necessary. The
questions of whether defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of
plaintiff’s injuries and whether the treatment she received for those injuries
was reasonable and necessary were disputed at trial. We therefore reject
plaintiff’s claim that the jury ignored “proven damages.”

*5 ¶ 24 Furthermore, the jury heard testimony from which
it could conclude that plaintiff lacked credibility. The jury heard that
plaintiff did not provide the GlenOaks emergency room physicians with a history
of her neck, back, and shoulder pain, including the numbness she experienced
immediately prior to the accident. Plaintiff testified that she experienced
“minor aches and pains” before the accident. But the jury also heard that
plaintiff repeatedly sought treatment for pain in those areas since 2003.
Plaintiff testified that when she was in the emergency room at GlenOaks, her
pain was a 9 out of 10, but the GlenOaks emergency room records stated that she
was not in any acute distress following the accident. Here, the jury heard all
of the evidence and determined that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for
some but not all of the treatment she received for the injury she sustained in
the accident.

¶ 25 Plaintiff relies on Anderson
v. Zamir, 402 Ill.App.3d 362, 341 Ill.Dec. 800, 931 N.E.2d 697 (2010), to
support her argument that she is entitled to a new trial. Anderson is
distinguishable. There, the plaintiff sued to
recover for injuries she sustained to her neck and shoulder in a car accident.
The defendants admitted liability for the injury to plaintiff’s neck but
contested liability as to the plaintiff’s shoulder injury. Id. at
364–65, 341 Ill.Dec. 800, 931 N.E.2d 697. At trial, the plaintiff’s physicians
testified that the plaintiff’s shoulder injury was caused by the
accident. Id. at 365–67, 341 Ill.Dec. 800, 931 N.E.2d 697. The
defendants presented no evidence to contradict the plaintiff’s evidence. Id. at
368, 341 Ill.Dec. 800, 931 N.E.2d 697. Despite the uncontested evidence related
to causation and uncontested evidence that the plaintiff’s nearly $29,000 in
medical bills were necessary and reasonable, the jury awarded the plaintiff
only $5000 in damages. Id. We
reversed and remanded for a new trial on the issues of damages, finding that
“the jury’s verdict simply bears no reasonable relationship to the injuries
established by [the plaintiff] at the trial, and accordingly, the damages award
must be reversed.” Id. Here,
defendant presented contrary evidence from which the jury could conclude that
plaintiff had preexisting pain in her neck, shoulder, and back and that the
accident was not the cause of all of plaintiff’s injuries. Furthermore, the
jury heard testimony that called into doubt whether all of the emergency room
charges were necessary or reasonable. We find that Anderson is
factually distinguishable and therefore does not control the outcome here.

¶ 26 We also find unpersuasive
plaintiff’s reliance on Tipsword v. Johnson, 59 Ill.App.3d 834, 17
Ill.Dec. 192, 376 N.E.2d 85 (1978). There, plaintiffs sued to recover for injuries
sustained in an automobile accident. The plaintiffs went to the emergency room,
where they were diagnosed as having suffered “inertia strain of the
neck.” Id. at 835, 17 Ill.Dec. 192, 376 N.E.2d 85. The jury
found that the defendants were liable for plaintiff’s injuries but awarded the
plaintiff $0 in damages. Id. We
reversed because there was no dispute that the plaintiffs had suffered injuries
and incurred medical expenses as a result, and therefore the jury’s award of no
damages was erroneous. Id. at 837, 17 Ill.Dec. 192, 376 N.E.2d
85. Tipsword is distinguishable because there, the jury
awarded $0 in damages despite there being no dispute that the plaintiffs were injured and incurred some medical
expenses that were indisputably related to their injuries. Here, the jury
awarded plaintiff $1000 in damages for medical expenses, which suggests that
the jury believed that plaintiff incurred some medical expenses for injuries
caused by defendant, but that plaintiff was not entitled to the full measure of
damages that she sought.

¶ 27 We also reject
plaintiff’s argument that the jury’s verdict was against the manifest weight of
the evidence because she was awarded damages that were less than the emergency
room bill she received. The jury heard testimony from Julie Johnson that called
into doubt whether plaintiff was accurately billed for the emergency room
services she received. There was evidence that plaintiff may have been billed
twice for X-rays, and that the coding of the medical services did not
objectively correspond to plaintiff’s condition as reflected in the emergency
room records. A reasonable jury could conclude that not all of the emergency
room services for which plaintiff was billed were necessary or reasonable.

*6 ¶ 28 Next, plaintiff argues that the
jury’s award of $0 for pain and suffering is against the manifest weight of the
evidence because the jury ignored “proven elements damages” related to pain and
suffering. She contends that there was no evidence to contradict Dr. Anderson’s
testimony that plaintiff suffered pain as a result of the injuries she sustained in the collision, or Dr. Rabinowitz’s
testimony that she suffered a cervical strain. But as discussed, Dr.
Rabinowitz testified that there were no objective signs of cervical strain,
and that he assumed, based on plaintiff’s subjective complaints, that plaintiff
suffered a cervical strain. Our supreme court has explained that “[a]n
award for pain and suffering is especially difficult to quantify.” Snover
v. McGraw, 172 Ill.2d 438, 448, 217 Ill.Dec. 734, 667 N.E.2d 1310 (1996).
We are to consider the distinction between subjective complaints of pain and
objective symptoms. Id. at 449, 217 Ill.Dec. 734, 667 N.E.2d
1310. The court explained:

“In cases in which a
plaintiff’s evidence of injury is primarily subjective in nature and not
accompanied by objective symptoms, the jury may choose to disbelieve the
plaintiff’s testimony as to pain. In such a circumstance,
the jury may reasonably find the plaintiff’s evidence of pain and suffering to
be unconvincing.” Id.

¶ 29 Here, we find
that the jury could reasonably conclude that plaintiff’s complaints of pain and
suffering were unconvincing and that she was not entitled to any damages for
pain and suffering. All of her complaints of pain were subjective. In June
2011, Dr. Anderson concluded that plaintiff sustained a cervical strain, arm strain, forearm strain, and back strain
based on his evaluation of her as well as her subjective complaints of moderate
pain. Likewise, Dr. Rabinowitz testified that GlenOaks’s medical records on the
date of the accident reflected no objective findings of cervical strain and
stated that plaintiff was in no acute distress. The jury heard conflicting
evidence regarding the amount of pain plaintiff was in when she went to the
GlenOaks emergency room on June 11, and could reasonably conclude that
plaintiff’s trial testimony regarding her pain level affected her credibility
regarding the amount of pain she experienced. Furthermore, the jury heard
testimony that plaintiff had a history of pain in her neck, shoulder, and back,
and could reasonably conclude that any pain she experienced following the
accident was not caused by the accident itself. We find that the jury did not
ignore any proven elements of damages, as defendant presented some evidence
challenging the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries, and the jury was free
to make credibility determinations regarding whether plaintiff was entitled to
compensatory damages for her subjective complaints of pain.

¶ 30 In sum, we find that there was
at least some evidence from which the jury could conclude that not all of the
medical treatment that plaintiff received was necessary and related to the
accident, and that not all of the bills for the medical treatment she received
were for services that that were necessary or reasonable. Furthermore, the jury
was free to consider and reject plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain and
suffering when determining whether to award compensatory damages for pain and
suffering. The jury did not ignore any proven elements of damages, and
therefore we conclude that the jury’s verdict awarding plaintiff $1000 in
damages was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. And, by default,
the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff’s motion
for a new trial.

¶ 31 Finally, we consider whether
the circuit court abused its discretion by denying in part plaintiff’s
posttrial motion for costs. Plaintiff contends that the circuit court
disallowed $243.67 in “witness fees,” which she argues are recoverable
under section 5–108 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) ( 735
ILCS 5/5–108 (West 2014)). She argues that these costs were for record requests
for medical bills and that “because the records were introduced at trial and
are witness fees, the trial court abused its discretion when it denied [her]
request for [costs] pursuant to [section 5–108 of
the Code].” We disagree.

*7 ¶ 32 Section 5–108 of
the Code provides:

“If any person sues in
any court of this state in any action for damages personal to the plaintiff,
and recovers in such action, then judgment shall be entered in favor of the
plaintiff to recover costs against the defendant, to be taxed, and the same shall
be recovered and enforced as other judgments for the payment of money, except in the cases hereinafter provided.” Id.

Although this provision entitling a
plaintiff to costs is mandatory, the statutory mandate is to be narrowly
construed because statutes permitting recovery of costs are in derogation of
the common law. Moller v. Lipov, 368 Ill.App.3d 333, 346–47, 305
Ill.Dec. 859, 856 N.E.2d 664 (2006). Our supreme court has previously
distinguished between taxable “court costs” and nontaxable “litigation
costs.” Vicencio v. Lincoln–Way Builders, Inc., 204 Ill.2d 295,
302, 273 Ill.Dec. 390, 789 N.E.2d 290 (2003). “Court costs” are those “charges
or fees taxed by the court, such as filing fees, jury fees, courthouse fees,
and reporter fees,” whereas “litigation costs” are “the expenses of litigation,
prosecution, or other legal transaction, esp[ecially] those allowed in favor of
one party against the other.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Section
5–108 of the Code “mandates the taxing of costs commonly understood to be
‘court costs,’ such as filing fees, subpoena fees, and statutory witness fees,
to the losing party.” Id. Statutory
witness fees include the “fees and mileage allowance provided by statute for
witnesses attending courts in this State.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id. at 304, 273 Ill.Dec. 390, 789 N.E.2d 290.
However, generally, a successful litigant is not entitled to recover the ordinary
expenses of litigation. Wiegman v. Hitch–Inn Post of Libertyville, Inc.,
308 Ill.App.3d 789, 804, 242 Ill.Dec. 335, 721 N.E.2d 614 (1999).

¶ 33 The “witness fees” here are
nontaxable litigation costs. Plaintiff fails to
acknowledge the distinction between a taxable court cost and a nontaxable
litigation cost. She cites no authority to support her claim that the costs she
incurred to secure medical bills that were then introduced as exhibits at trial
constitute “court costs.” She makes no argument that the “witness fees” were
for statutory witness costs for transportation or attendance at court, as
described in Vicencio. Instead, the “witness fees” appear to be
nothing more than the costs to secure medical bills, which are costs that more
closely resemble nontaxable litigation costs under section 5–108 of
the Code. Construing the statute narrowly, as we must, we decline to find that
“witness fees” consisting of record requests for medical bills later introduced
as exhibits at trial amount to taxable court costs.
The circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to award these
expenses as costs to plaintiff.

¶ 34 CONCLUSION

¶ 35 For the foregoing
reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

¶ 36 Affirmed.