Presiding Justice SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the
court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Plaintiff, Kathy Corbett, was seriously injured while
riding her bicycle on the Old Skokie Bike Path in Lake County.

She filed this action against defendants, the County of Lake
(County) and the City of Highland Park (City), alleging that they were liable
for defects in the path that caused her accident. The trial court granted both
defendants summary judgment (735 ILCS 5/2–1005(c) (West 2014)), based on the
Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Act) (745 ILCS
10/1–101 et seq. (West 2012)). Plaintiff appeals only the judgment in
favor of the City, arguing that the trial court erred in holding that the City
was immune from liability because, as a matter of law, the bicycle path was a
“riding trail” within the meaning of section 3–107(b) of the Act (745 ILCS
10/3–107(b) (West 2012)). We reverse the judgment in favor of the City, and we
remand.

 

 

¶ 2 We summarize the facts pertinent to this appeal.
Plaintiff’s complaint alleged as follows.

On August 21, 2013, and at all other pertinent times,
defendants controlled and maintained that part of the path within Highland Park
and specifically the section of the path running parallel to Skokie Valley Road
(U.S. Route 41) in between the intersections with Old Deerfield Road and Park
Avenue West. By agreement with the County, the City was responsible for routine
maintenance of the path, including repairing the pavement. Before August 21,
2013, defendants were on notice that weeds and other vegetation were growing
through the asphalt, making portions of the path broken, bumpy, and elevated.
Defendants were willfully and wantonly indifferent to the danger. On August 21,
2013, plaintiff, part of a group of cyclists riding together, rode her bicycle
over a defective area and was thrown off. She hit the ground and was severely
injured.

 
 

¶ 3 The City’s answer raised the affirmative defense of
immunity under section 3–107(b) of the Act, which reads, “Neither a local
public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury caused by a
condition of * * * [a]ny hiking, riding, fishing or hunting trail.” 745 ILCS
10/3–107(b) (West 2012). The City later moved for summary judgment, based on
section 3–107(b) of the Act. The City noted that this section provides absolute
immunity, even *92 as to willful and wanton conduct. The City then argued that,
under the limited case authority that exists on the meaning of “riding trail”
(which the Act does not define), the bike path was one. 
 

¶ 4 The City’s motion reasoned as follows. In Brown v.
Cook County Forest Preserve, 284 Ill.App.3d 1098, 1101, 220 Ill.Dec. 471,
673 N.E.2d 383 (1996), the First District held that the bicycle path on which
the plaintiff was injured was a “riding trail,” because it was commonly used by
cyclists and was “designed to provide access for bicyclists to the natural and
scenic wooded areas” around Saulk Lake. The court held that it made no
difference that the path was paved. Id. In McElroy v. Forest Preserve
District of Lake County, 384 Ill.App.3d 662, 323 Ill.Dec. 611, 894 N.E.2d
170 (2008), and Mull v. Kane County Forest Preserve District, 337
Ill.App.3d 589, 271 Ill.Dec. 978, 786 N.E.2d 236 (2003), this court held that
the bicycle paths at issue were riding trails per section 3–107(b). In McElroy,
this court emphasized (according to the City’s motion) that the path had been
built for the use of riders and enabled them to enjoy scenery and wildlife. McElroy,
384 Ill.App.3d at 669, 323 Ill.Dec. 611, 894 N.E.2d 170. In Mull, this
court stressed (according to the City’s motion) that, although the path ran
through some developed areas, it was surrounded by wild grasses and shrubs. Mull,
337 Ill.App.3d at 592, 271 Ill.Dec. 978, 786 N.E.2d 236.

 

 

 ¶ 5 Here, the City’s motion argued, the depositions of
plaintiff and other people established that the bike path was a “riding trail.”
It was intended for recreational bicycling; surrounded by shrubs, trees, and
wild grasses; separated from residences and commercial businesses; and set back
from the roadway. “Most compelling,” plaintiff and her fellow riders called it
“the ‘bunny trail’ because of the bunnies that were regularly present along the
route.”
 

¶ 6 The City’s motion attached several exhibits, the
pertinent parts of which we summarize. In her deposition, plaintiff testified
that the southern end of the part of the path at issue was the intersection
with Old Deerfield Road, which has two lanes. At the intersection, there is a
stop sign for bicyclists on the path but not for vehicles on the road. On
August 21, 2013, plaintiff was with a group with whom she regularly rode.

 

 

¶ 7 Plaintiff testified that, just before the accident, the
group was riding south toward the intersection. About one-tenth of a mile north
of the stop sign at the intersection, the person two places ahead of her,
Hassan Syed, hit a bump and lost control of his bicycle. Syed crashed, and his
bike was turned sideways. The rider immediately in front of plaintiff was able
to veer off. However, plaintiff had no place to go; she rode over Syed and his
bicycle. As a result, she was thrown off her bike, rose into the air, and fell
hard onto the paved surface. Plaintiff did not actually see Syed hit a bump,
but he or another rider told her about it later.

 

 

 ¶ 8 Opposing counsel asked plaintiff whether the area of the
accident was “surrounded by shrubs” and “wild grasses”; whether it was
“separated from residences” and “commercial businesses”; and whether it was
“set back from the highway.” Plaintiff answered each question, “Yes.” Plaintiff
also testified that her accident occurred “just north of Old Deerfield Road on
the bunny trail. The bike path. We call it the bunny trail because they have a
lot of bunnies on it.”

 

 

¶ 9 Yves Robaud, who was riding with plaintiff and the
others on August 21, 2013, testified in his deposition as follows. Trees line
both sides of the path. Asked whether the stretch where the accident *93
occurred was “separated * * * from residences and commercial businesses” and
“set back from the highway,” Robaud responded, “Yes.” The accident occurred
perhaps 200 yards north of the stop sign. Robaud’s description of the accident
was consistent with plaintiff’s; he had been in between Syed and plaintiff and
had seen Syed fall directly in front of him. Robaud rolled over Syed’s legs and
turned around to see plaintiff lying on the ground, in pain.
 

¶ 10 In his deposition, Syed testified consistently with
plaintiff and Robaud about the accident. He stated that there were shrubs on
both sides of the path. He also stated, as did plaintiff and Robaud, that the
area of the path where the accident occurred was separated from residences and
commercial businesses and set back from the highway. He added, “We call [the
area of the path where the accident occurred] a bunny path.” This was
“[b]ecause there are a lot of bunnies running around there,” although on the
day of the accident “there was no bunny.”

 

 

¶ 11 In his deposition, John Stevens, a member of
plaintiff’s group on the day of the accident, testified that the path was about
six feet wide, paved with asphalt, and lined with some type of growth most of
the way. The vegetation included hedges and bushes and a small amount of grass.
As far as he knew, the path was separated from commercial businesses and any
outside traffic (i.e., by those other than bikers and walkers).
 

 ¶ 12 Plaintiff responded to the City’s motion for summary
judgment. She argued that, under the case law, the stretch of the path at issue
cannot be considered a riding trail, as it runs through a developed area of
Highland Park, not through a forest or a mountainous region. The path is
sandwiched between U.S. Route 41 less than a block to the east and railroad
tracks less than a block to the west. There are commercial buildings on both
sides of the path, and many of the businesses have cyclone fences that abut the
path, with industrial materials stacked up immediately behind the fences. Also,
large utility poles for Commonwealth Edison, which owns the right-of-way, line
the entire length of the path, and numerous power lines are suspended overhead.
The path also bypasses Buckthorn Park, which the City owns. Further, the area
of the accident intersects with Old Deerfield Road, a busy city street.
 

 ¶ 13 Plaintiff’s response attached her affidavit. She stated
as follows. She was familiar with the bike path, including the accident scene.
The path does not go through a forest or a mountainous region. Some large
bushes and some grass line the path, but there are no trees in the area of the
accident. The path also passes by Buckthorn Park. Large utility poles line the
entire path, with multiple power lines overhead. There are areas where
businesses stack materials against fences to the side of the path. At the
location of the accident, business buildings butt up against the path and
several parking lots are nearby. In the area of the accident, a cyclone fence
abuts the east side of the path, and the highway and the railroad tracks are
less than a block from the path. 

 

 

¶ 14 Plaintiff’s affidavit attached photographs in support
of most of her statements about the path. The first is a Google aerial
photograph with “Buckthorn Park” printed adjacent to the path. The second is a
shot of a bicyclist riding on the path, with utility poles and overhead wires
on either side; shrubs are on one side of the path, while the other edge is
mostly grass. The third shows a stretch of the path with shrubbery and a
utility pole on one side, a cyclone fence with industrial pipe stacked up
behind it on the other side, and utility poles in the background. The *94
fourth photograph shows the intersection of Old Deerfield Road (which is
labeled) and the path; utility poles and wires stretch across the road and line
the path in the background. There are buildings a short distance to one side of
the path and a parking lot a few feet from the other side. The fifth photograph
is a Google aerial view labeled “1495 Old Deerfield Road”; it also identifies
the path and several business establishments that are located either between
the path and the railroad tracks or between the path and Old Skokie Valley
Road. The sixth photograph, also from Google and labeled “1452 Old Deerfield
Road,” identifies that road and shows what plaintiff’s affidavit identified as
parking lots located a few feet to the east of the path. The seventh
photograph, a Google aerial view of the general area, identifies numerous
business establishments on either side of the path. The final photograph shows
a sign identifying the path and a stretch of the path, including the grass
borders with intermittent shrubbery and utility poles on both sides.

 

 

 ¶ 15 Plaintiff’s response also attached the affidavit of
Angus Duthie, who stated as follows. He was familiar with the path and the area
of plaintiff’s accident, having himself hit a bump and crashed on July 9, 2013,
about 100 yards north of Old Deerfield Road. The path does not go through a
mountainous or wooded region. There are some large bushes and grass but no
trees in the area of his crash. In other respects, Duthie’s affidavit repeated
plaintiff’s statements about the path and the surrounding area and attached
copies of the same photographs. 
 

¶ 16 The City filed a reply to plaintiff’s response. The
reply discussed the case law that both parties had cited. The City stressed
that the decisions of neighboring landowners to develop their properties did
not dispose of whether the path was a “riding trail”; the focus, it maintained,
should be on the character of the path itself. The City thus contended that the
“ ‘[G]oogle images’ ” of the surrounding areas were of little evidentiary
value. It did not, however, contend that they were improper or would be
inadmissible as evidence.
 

 ¶ 17 The trial court granted both defendants summary
judgment. It held that the County was immune under section 3–106 of the Act
(745 ILCS 10/3–106 (West 2012)), which requires proof of willful and wanton
conduct to impose liability on a local public entity for injury caused by
conditions of public property that is used for recreational purposes. As noted,
plaintiff does not challenge this ruling. The court also held that the City was
immune, based on section 3–107(b). The court did not explain its ruling.
Plaintiff timely appealed.

 

 

¶ 18 On appeal, plaintiff argues that the grant of summary
judgment to the City was error, because the path is not a “riding trail” (see 745
ILCS 10/3–107(b) (West 2012)) as that term has been construed by Illinois
courts. Plaintiff reasons that several opinions have adopted a dictionary
definition of the term, under which the path, at least in the vicinity of her
accident, does not qualify as a trail. For the following reasons, we reverse
the grant of summary judgment to the City and remand the cause.
 

¶ 19 Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings,
depositions, affidavits, and other matters on file establish that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2–1005(c) (West 2014). Our review is de
novo. People ex rel. Director of Corrections v. Booth, 215 Ill.2d 416, 423,
294 Ill.Dec. 157, 830 N.E.2d 569 (2005).

 

 20 This appeal hinges on (1) the definition of the term
“riding trail” in section 3–107(b) of the Act; and (2) its application to this
case. The construction of a statute is, of course, a question of law, which we
review de novo. Hawes v. Luhr Brothers, Inc., 212 Ill.2d 93, 105, 287
Ill.Dec. 583, 816 N.E.2d 345 (2004). Because the Act does not define the term,
our appellate courts have taken up the task. We turn to what they have said.

 

 

¶ 21 In Goodwin v. Carbondale Park District, 268
Ill.App.3d 489, 205 Ill.Dec. 956, 644 N.E.2d 512 (1994), the plaintiff was
injured when his bicycle collided with a tree that had fallen across a paved
bike path that went through a city park. Id. at 490, 205 Ill.Dec. 956,
644 N.E.2d 512. The city of Carbondale owned the property and leased it to the
defendant, requiring that it be used “ ‘exclusively for playgrounds,
recreational, open space, non-autoways, and public park purposes.’ ” Id.
The city also agreed to “ ‘construct non-autoways for the use of pedestrians,
bicycles and wheelchairs on the property.’ ” Id. at 491, 205 Ill.Dec.
956, 644 N.E.2d 512. The plaintiff filed an action sounding in both negligence
and willful and wanton conduct. The trial court dismissed his complaint,
holding in part that the defendant was immune under section 3–107(b) of the Act
because the path was a riding trail. Id. at 490, 205 Ill.Dec. 956, 644
N.E.2d 512. 
 

¶ 22 The appellate court reversed the dismissal of the count
alleging willful and wanton conduct, holding that “the paved bike path located
in a developed city park” was not a riding trail. Id. at 492, 205
Ill.Dec. 956, 644 N.E.2d 512. The court held more broadly that section
3–107(b), which created absolute immunity, even for willful and wanton conduct,
was intended to apply to “unimproved property which is not maintained by the
local governmental body and which is in its natural condition with obvious
hazards as a result of that natural condition.” Id. at 493, 205 Ill.Dec.
956, 644 N.E.2d 512. The court continued:

“Included in section 3–107(b)
are unimproved hiking, riding, fishing or hunting trails in undeveloped
recreational areas that remain in their natural condition. Absolute immunity is
extended for injuries sustained on these types of property because of the
burden in both time and money if the local governmental entity were required to
maintain these types of property in a safe condition. Furthermore, requiring
such maintenance would defeat the very purpose of these types of recreational
areas, that is, the enjoyment of activities in a truly natural setting. We are
reminded that the Act is in derogation of the common law and must be strictly
construed against a finding of immunity.” Id. 

The court concluded that, given this reasoning, the
legislature did not intend section 3–107(b) to include a paved bike path within
a developed city park as a riding trail. Id. at 493–94, 205 Ill.Dec.
956, 644 N.E.2d 512.
 

¶ 23 In Brown, the appellate court affirmed a grant
of summary judgment based on a holding that section 3–107(b) immunized the
defendant from liability for an injury that the plaintiff suffered when he hit
a bump and fell off his bicycle while riding on a bicycle path in the Saulk
Trail Woods Forest Preserve. Brown, 284 Ill.App.3d at 1099, 220 Ill.Dec.
471, 673 N.E.2d 383. The court relied on a dictionary definition of “trail” as
“a ‘marked path through a forest or mountainous region.’ ” Id. at 1101,
220 Ill.Dec. 471, 673 N.E.2d 383 (quoting Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary 2423 (1981)). It concluded that the bike path on which the plaintiff
had been riding met this definition because, as he conceded, it was “designed
to provide access for bicyclists to the natural *96 and scenic wooded areas
around Saulk Lake.” Id. It was not consequential that the path happened
to have been paved. Id. Also, the court was not persuaded to hold for
the plaintiff merely because the path was adjacent to a highway. Id. at
1099, 220 Ill.Dec. 471, 673 N.E.2d 383.

 

 

¶ 24 The court distinguished Goodwin, explaining that
the Goodwin court had stressed that the bicycle path in question had
“traverse[d] developed city land.” Id. at 1101, 220 Ill.Dec. 471, 673
N.E.2d 383. In Brown, the area in which the plaintiff was injured was,
by his own description, “ ‘a forest,’ ” not the type of developed property that
had been at issue in Goodwin. Id.
 

¶ 25 In Mull, this court reversed a judgment for a
bicyclist who was injured when she fell while riding on a forest-preserve
bicycle path. The path traversed 17 miles of the forest preserve, and the area
of the plaintiff’s fall was about 50 yards west of a bridge. Mull, 337
Ill.App.3d at 589–90, 271 Ill.Dec. 978, 786 N.E.2d 236. This court adopted the
dictionary definition of “trail” that Brown had employed. Id. at
591–92, 271 Ill.Dec. 978, 786 N.E.2d 236. We then held that the case was
essentially similar to Brown; thus, that the bicycle path was adjacent
to a road was not dispositive. Id. at 592, 271 Ill.Dec. 978, 786 N.E.2d
236. Also, that the entrance to a subdivision was near the path was not
crucial: a preexisting immunity ought not be lost merely because “a neighboring
landowner decide[s] to develop his property.” Id. at 592–93, 271
Ill.Dec. 978, 786 N.E.2d 236. What was crucial was that the path was
“surrounded by wooded or undeveloped land and [ran] through a forest preserve.”
Id. at 592, 271 Ill.Dec. 978, 786 N.E.2d 236.
 

¶ 26 Finally, there is McElroy, in which this court
held that a path located within a 1225–acre forest preserve was a riding trail
per section 3–107(b). The path was 5 ½ miles long, had bridges and boardwalks,
and was open to hikers, bicyclists, and cross-country skiers. McElroy,
384 Ill.App.3d at 663, 323 Ill.Dec. 611, 894 N.E.2d 170. Ronald McElroy was
injured when he rode his bicycle from the gravel trail up a wooden ramp and onto
an elevated wooden bridge and fell off the other end of the bridge. Id.
This court’s opinion addressed, in part, a certified question: whether the
wooden bridge was part of a hiking or riding trail, per section 3–107(b). Id.
at 666, 323 Ill.Dec. 611, 894 N.E.2d 170.

 

 

 ¶ 27 Noting that the Act is in derogation of the common law
and must be construed strictly (id.), we nonetheless departed from Goodwin
insofar as it held that a path must be “ ‘unimproved’ ” to qualify as a “trail”
under section 3–107(b) (id. at 667, 323 Ill.Dec. 611, 894 N.E.2d 170
(quoting Goodwin, 268 Ill.App.3d at 493, 205 Ill.Dec. 956, 644 N.E.2d
512)). We reasoned that this qualification had no basis in the plain language
of the section. Id. Nonetheless, we endorsed the dictionary definition
of “trail” that was adopted in Brown and then Mull. We explained:

 

 

“[S]ection 3–107(b) excepts
certain ‘trails’ and does not require that they be strictly ‘unimproved’
trails. The plain and ordinary meaning of the word ‘trail’ is a ‘ “ ‘marked
path through a forest or mountainous region.’ ” ‘ [Citations.] As defendant
points out, rarely if ever is a ‘riding trail’ found in nature without any
improvements to make the trail accessible and safe to the public.” Id.

 

 

We noted that the plaintiffs did not dispute that the gravel
portions of the path were “in a natural area and were to be used for hiking and
riding.” Id. Thus, these portions, at least, qualified as a “trail”
under section 3–107(b). The contested issue was whether the manmade bridge was
part of the “trail.” Id. We held that it was. We *97 reiterated the
dictionary definition of “trail” employed in Brown and Mull. We
explained that the gravel path itself was a “trail” because it went through a
“natural area” (id. at 669, 323 Ill.Dec. 611, 894 N.E.2d 170), i.e.,
a “forest” (745 ILCS 5/3–107(b) (West 2004)). We noted that forests and
mountainous regions often include rivers, streams, or wetlands, making bridges
necessary to enable users to enjoy these natural areas. Id. Thus,
because the bridge was an integral part of a “trail,” McElroy’s injury was
allegedly caused by a defective condition that was subject to section 3–107(b).
Id.
 

¶ 28 We find the preceding opinions persuasive and
sensible. For that reason, and in the interest of stare decisis, we
follow them insofar as they are consistent. We adhere to our statement in McElroy
that a “trail” need not be wholly unimproved to qualify under section 3–107(b).
We also adhere to the statements that a path need not be unpaved to qualify as
a “trail” and that the character of a path as a “trail” is not automatically
defeated by the existence of any development in the surrounding area. To this
extent, we do not construe section 3–107(b) as narrowly as some have urged.
 

 ¶ 29 Nonetheless, the case law that we follow does
require that, to be within section 3–107(b), a path not only be used by
bicyclists (or hikers or both) but be located within a “ ‘forest or mountainous
region’ ” (Brown, 284 Ill.App.3d at 1101, 220 Ill.Dec. 471, 673 N.E.2d
383 (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2423 (1981)); see
also McElroy, 384 Ill.App.3d at 669, 323 Ill.Dec. 611, 894 N.E.2d 170; Mull,
337 Ill.App.3d at 592, 271 Ill.Dec. 978, 786 N.E.2d 236). As a matter of law,
this restriction defeats the City’s assertion that the path is a riding or
hiking trail. No contention has been made that the path is located in a
mountainous region (mountains being scarce in Lake County). No serious
contention can be made that the path is located in a forest; no reasonable person
who views the photographs of the path and its surroundings, or even reads their
descriptions by those who have seen them, would describe those surroundings as
a forest. The path is bordered by narrow bands of greenway that sport some
shrubs and a few trees; these narrow bands are surrounded by industrial
development, residential neighborhoods, parking lots, railroad tracks, and
major vehicular thoroughfares (to the east and south of the area of the
accident). The case for considering the path a riding trail would not succeed
even if utility poles could be considered trees with power lines for branches.

¶ 30 Although the presence of some development in the area
of a path does not per se mean that the path is not a “trail,” the
presence of industrial and residential development all around a path
negates any conclusion that it is located within a “natural and scenic wooded
area[ ]” (Brown, 284 Ill.App.3d at 1101, 220 Ill.Dec. 471, 673 N.E.2d
383) or that it is “surrounded by wooded or undeveloped land” (Mull, 337
Ill.App.3d at 592, 271 Ill.Dec. 978, 786 N.E.2d 236). A forest preserve is a
“forest,” even with a moderate degree of improvement within and without. An industrial/commercial/residential area is not a forest because it contains
narrow strips of green space on which a few trees stand. The location of the
path in this case is wholly different from the forest preserves in Brown,
Mull, and McElroy, which were vast areas that were for the most part
kept in their natural state for those who sought recreation in such a
relatively wild setting.
 

The path is in even less of a natural state than the city
park in Goodwin. The people who use the path are *98 interested in
recreation, but there is no reason to think that they use it to feel
reconnected with wild nature as they ride along and take in a vista of power
lines, parking lots, warehouses, cyclone fences, stacks of industrial pipes,
and utility poles, towers, and wires.
 

¶ 31 The frequent appearance of bunnies on the trail does
not, in our judgment, call the foregoing analysis into question.
 

¶ 32 We note further that, aside from the definitional
obstacles to calling the path a riding trail, the underlying purpose of section
3–107(b)’s grant of absolute immunity, even for willful and wanton conduct, is
not consistent with the trial court’s result here. We agree with the Goodwin
court that behind the categorical grant of immunity is the recognition of “the
burden in both time and money if the local governmental entity were required to
maintain these types of property in a safe condition” and that “requiring such
maintenance would defeat the very purpose of these types of recreational areas,
that is, the enjoyment of activities in a truly natural setting.” Goodwin,
268 Ill.App.3d at 493, 205 Ill.Dec. 956, 644 N.E.2d 512. These considerations
do not apply to a bicycle or hiking path in the midst of an easily accessible
developed area. Indeed, the City would not even be a party to this appeal had
it not found it manageable to take on the burden of maintaining the path in a
safe condition.
 

¶ 33 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court
erred in holding that the path is a riding trail, thus triggering the absolute
immunity provided by section 3–107(b) of the Act. The grant of summary judgment
for the City is reversed, and the cause is remanded. Of course, as plaintiff
has not appealed the grant of summary judgment for the County, that judgment
remains intact.
 

¶ 34 Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.
 

Justices HUTCHINSON and BURKE concurred in the judgment and
opinion.