Appellate Court of Illinois,
First District,
SECOND DIVISION.
ALLSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Wojciech BOCHENEK, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 1-17-0277
Opinion filed September 29, 2017
Appeal from the Circuit Court of
Cook County. No. 16 CH 10462, Honorable Kathleen M. Pantle, Judge, presiding.
Cook County. No. 16 CH 10462, Honorable Kathleen M. Pantle, Judge, presiding.
OPINION
JUSTICE HYMAN delivered
the judgment of the court, with opinion.
the judgment of the court, with opinion.
*1 ¶ 1 Wojciech Bochenek was crossing the street
with his wife, Barbara, and daughter when Barbara was struck and seriously
injured by a hit and run driver. Barbara filed a claim with her insurer,
Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, which paid her $100,000, the
limit on her uninsured motorist coverage. Wojciech, who was fortunate to
avoid being hit, also filed a claim under the policy for post-traumatic
stress disorder and its physical manifestations, which he experienced
after the accident. Allstate filed a declaratory judgment action against
Wojciech seeking a declaration that he was not entitled to uninsured motorist
benefits because he was not physically contacted by the hit and run vehicle,
the $100,000 per person policy limit payable under the policy’s uninsured
motorist provision had been met, and he did not qualify as an insured person
for medical payments coverage under the policy. The parties filed
cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted Allstate’s motion
and denied Wojciech’s motion.
with his wife, Barbara, and daughter when Barbara was struck and seriously
injured by a hit and run driver. Barbara filed a claim with her insurer,
Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, which paid her $100,000, the
limit on her uninsured motorist coverage. Wojciech, who was fortunate to
avoid being hit, also filed a claim under the policy for post-traumatic
stress disorder and its physical manifestations, which he experienced
after the accident. Allstate filed a declaratory judgment action against
Wojciech seeking a declaration that he was not entitled to uninsured motorist
benefits because he was not physically contacted by the hit and run vehicle,
the $100,000 per person policy limit payable under the policy’s uninsured
motorist provision had been met, and he did not qualify as an insured person
for medical payments coverage under the policy. The parties filed
cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted Allstate’s motion
and denied Wojciech’s motion.
¶ 2 Wojciech has appealed the trial
court’s entry of summary judgment against him. We conclude that the trial court
correctly found that the absence of physical contact between Wojciech and the
hit and run vehicle precluded his recovery under the uninsured motorist
provision of the policy, and affirm on that basis.
court’s entry of summary judgment against him. We conclude that the trial court
correctly found that the absence of physical contact between Wojciech and the
hit and run vehicle precluded his recovery under the uninsured motorist
provision of the policy, and affirm on that basis.
¶ 3 Background
¶ 4 On the evening of February 24,
2015, Wojciech Bochenek, his wife Barbara Bochenek, and their daughter were
crossing Harlem Avenue in Chicago. Barbara entered the intersection first and
was struck by a hit and run driver traveling at a high rate of speed. Barbara
was thrown into the air and landed on the sidewalk. Wojciech, walking behind
Barbara, was not struck and suffered no actual physical injury.
2015, Wojciech Bochenek, his wife Barbara Bochenek, and their daughter were
crossing Harlem Avenue in Chicago. Barbara entered the intersection first and
was struck by a hit and run driver traveling at a high rate of speed. Barbara
was thrown into the air and landed on the sidewalk. Wojciech, walking behind
Barbara, was not struck and suffered no actual physical injury.
¶ 5 Barbara filed an uninsured
motorist claim with Allstate, which paid her $100,000, the uninsured policy
limits for her claim. Wojciech also made a claim with Allstate seeking
uninsured motorist benefits and medical payments for the post-traumatic
stress disorder and accompanying symptoms, including shortness of breath, heart
palpitations, dizziness, and loss of sleep, he experienced after the accident.
motorist claim with Allstate, which paid her $100,000, the uninsured policy
limits for her claim. Wojciech also made a claim with Allstate seeking
uninsured motorist benefits and medical payments for the post-traumatic
stress disorder and accompanying symptoms, including shortness of breath, heart
palpitations, dizziness, and loss of sleep, he experienced after the accident.
¶ 6 At the time of the accident,
Barbara and the couple’s daughter had an automobile insurance policy with
Allstate. The policy included uninsured motorist coverage. Under the policy, an
uninsured auto included a hit and run vehicle that causes “bodily injury to an
insured person by physical contact with the insured person or with a vehicle
occupied by that person.” The policy defines an insured person as the
policyholder, a “resident relative” of the policy holder, and any person who is
legally entitled to recover because of bodily injury to the policyholder, a
resident relative, or an occupant of the insured auto with permission. Allstate
concedes Wojciech was an insured person under the policy.
Barbara and the couple’s daughter had an automobile insurance policy with
Allstate. The policy included uninsured motorist coverage. Under the policy, an
uninsured auto included a hit and run vehicle that causes “bodily injury to an
insured person by physical contact with the insured person or with a vehicle
occupied by that person.” The policy defines an insured person as the
policyholder, a “resident relative” of the policy holder, and any person who is
legally entitled to recover because of bodily injury to the policyholder, a
resident relative, or an occupant of the insured auto with permission. Allstate
concedes Wojciech was an insured person under the policy.
¶ 7 Allstate, which denied it owed
Wojciech uninsured motorist benefits or medical payments under the policy,
filed a three count complaint for declaratory judgment. Allstate sought a
declaration that: (i) only Barbara sustained a bodily injury as a result of the
accident, that Wojciech’s emotional damages claim was derivative of his wife’s
bodily injury, and the $100,000 per person policy limit payable under the
policy’s uninsured motorist provision had been met (count I); (ii) Wojciech was
not entitled to uninsured motorist coverage under the policy because he was not
was physically contacted by the hit and run vehicle (count II); and (iii)
Wojciech did not qualify as an insured person for medical payments coverage
under the policy as he was not in, getting into or out, occupying, or operating
an automobile at the time of the accident and was not struck.
Wojciech uninsured motorist benefits or medical payments under the policy,
filed a three count complaint for declaratory judgment. Allstate sought a
declaration that: (i) only Barbara sustained a bodily injury as a result of the
accident, that Wojciech’s emotional damages claim was derivative of his wife’s
bodily injury, and the $100,000 per person policy limit payable under the
policy’s uninsured motorist provision had been met (count I); (ii) Wojciech was
not entitled to uninsured motorist coverage under the policy because he was not
was physically contacted by the hit and run vehicle (count II); and (iii)
Wojciech did not qualify as an insured person for medical payments coverage
under the policy as he was not in, getting into or out, occupying, or operating
an automobile at the time of the accident and was not struck.
*2 ¶ 8 The parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. The trial court entered summary judgment for Allstate and against
Wojciech, finding (i) the insurance policy to be clear and unambiguous; (ii)
Wojciech’s PTSD and accompanying physical symptoms did not fall within the
definition of “bodily injury” under the policy or Illinois law; (iii) the
insurance policy and Illinois law provides uninsured motorist compensation only
if the insured was physically contacted by the hit and run vehicle, and
Wojciech was not; and (iv) the uninsured motorist coverage for the accident
exhausted by the payment of the limits of the policy to Barbara. The trial
court also determined that Wojciech did not qualify as an insured person for
purposes of medical payments coverage under the policy. Wojciech has abandoned
this claim on appeal.
judgment. The trial court entered summary judgment for Allstate and against
Wojciech, finding (i) the insurance policy to be clear and unambiguous; (ii)
Wojciech’s PTSD and accompanying physical symptoms did not fall within the
definition of “bodily injury” under the policy or Illinois law; (iii) the
insurance policy and Illinois law provides uninsured motorist compensation only
if the insured was physically contacted by the hit and run vehicle, and
Wojciech was not; and (iv) the uninsured motorist coverage for the accident
exhausted by the payment of the limits of the policy to Barbara. The trial
court also determined that Wojciech did not qualify as an insured person for
purposes of medical payments coverage under the policy. Wojciech has abandoned
this claim on appeal.
¶ 9 Proceeding only on the issues
related to his uninsured motorist claim, Wojciech argues: (i) Illinois law does
not require physical contact between the insured and the uninsured vehicle in a
hit and run accident; (ii) the physical contact requirement is intended to
prevent fraudulent claims, which is not an issue because Barbara was hit by the
uninsured vehicle; (iii) his injuries were caused by indirect contact with the uninsured
vehicle, which is compensable under Illinois law; (iv) he was in the “zone of
danger” when his wife was hit and should be able to recover for his injuries;
and (iv) his injuries fall within the policy definition of “bodily injury.”
related to his uninsured motorist claim, Wojciech argues: (i) Illinois law does
not require physical contact between the insured and the uninsured vehicle in a
hit and run accident; (ii) the physical contact requirement is intended to
prevent fraudulent claims, which is not an issue because Barbara was hit by the
uninsured vehicle; (iii) his injuries were caused by indirect contact with the uninsured
vehicle, which is compensable under Illinois law; (iv) he was in the “zone of
danger” when his wife was hit and should be able to recover for his injuries;
and (iv) his injuries fall within the policy definition of “bodily injury.”
¶ 10 Analysis
¶ 11 Summary judgment is appropriate
when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Virginia Surety Co. v. Northern
Insurance Co. of New York, 224 Ill. 2d 550, 556, 310 Ill.Dec. 338, 866
N.E.2d 149 (2007). In an insurance coverage case, cross-motions for summary
judgment indicate the parties agree that no genuine of issues of material fact
exist, but dispute issues of law regarding the construction of the insurance
policy. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co., 363 Ill. App. 3d 335, 338-39, 299 Ill.Dec. 431, 842 N.E.2d
170 (2005). Our review is de novo. Virginia Surety Co.,
224 Ill. 2d at 556, 310 Ill.Dec. 338, 866 N.E.2d 149.
when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Virginia Surety Co. v. Northern
Insurance Co. of New York, 224 Ill. 2d 550, 556, 310 Ill.Dec. 338, 866
N.E.2d 149 (2007). In an insurance coverage case, cross-motions for summary
judgment indicate the parties agree that no genuine of issues of material fact
exist, but dispute issues of law regarding the construction of the insurance
policy. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co., 363 Ill. App. 3d 335, 338-39, 299 Ill.Dec. 431, 842 N.E.2d
170 (2005). Our review is de novo. Virginia Surety Co.,
224 Ill. 2d at 556, 310 Ill.Dec. 338, 866 N.E.2d 149.
¶ 12 In construing an insurance
policy, the primary function of the court is to ascertain and enforce the
intentions of the parties as expressed in the policy. Outboard Marine
Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 108, 180 Ill.Dec.
691, 607 N.E.2d 1204 (1992). A court must afford unambiguous words their plain,
ordinary, and popular meaning. Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Stringfield,
292 Ill. App. 3d 471, 473-74, 226 Ill.Dec. 525, 685 N.E.2d 980 (1997).
policy, the primary function of the court is to ascertain and enforce the
intentions of the parties as expressed in the policy. Outboard Marine
Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 108, 180 Ill.Dec.
691, 607 N.E.2d 1204 (1992). A court must afford unambiguous words their plain,
ordinary, and popular meaning. Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Stringfield,
292 Ill. App. 3d 471, 473-74, 226 Ill.Dec. 525, 685 N.E.2d 980 (1997).
¶ 13 Wojciech’s primary contention
is that Illinois law does not require physical contact between the insured and
the uninsured vehicle in a hit and run accident.
is that Illinois law does not require physical contact between the insured and
the uninsured vehicle in a hit and run accident.
¶ 14 Part 5 of the policy provides,
in pertinent part, “We will pay those damages an insured person is legally
entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured auto because of
bodily injury sustained by an injured person.” An uninsured auto under the
policy includes “a hit and run vehicle which causes bodily injury to an insured
person by physical contact with the insured person or with the vehicle occupied
by that person.”
in pertinent part, “We will pay those damages an insured person is legally
entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured auto because of
bodily injury sustained by an injured person.” An uninsured auto under the
policy includes “a hit and run vehicle which causes bodily injury to an insured
person by physical contact with the insured person or with the vehicle occupied
by that person.”
¶ 15 Wojciech does not contend that
the policy is ambiguous as to whether the uninsured motorist clause requires
physical contact, but argues that the Illinois Insurance Code (“Code”) does not
require physical impact between the uninsured vehicle and the insured and that
a physical contact requirement is against public policy. See 215 ILCS
5/143a (West 2016) (“Uninsured and hit and run motor vehicle coverage”).
In the seminal case, Ferega v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 58 Ill. 2d 109, 111, 317 N.E.2d 550
(1974), our supreme court held that physical contact was required
under the Code to collect uninsured motorist coverage. In Ferega,
while the plaintiff was driving at night on a two-lane highway, he turned his
vehicle to the right to avoid an oncoming vehicle in his own lane of travel and
struck a culvert. Id. at 110, 317 N.E.2d 550. Plaintiff tried to
collect for his injuries under his policy’s uninsured motorist clause, which
defined a “ ‘hit-and-run motor vehicle’ ” as a vehicle “ ‘which cause[d] bodily
injury to an insured arising out of physical contact of such vehicle with the
insured or with a vehicle which the insured [was] occupying at the time of the
accident.’ ” Id. The
lower courts denied recovery because there had been no physical contact between
the plaintiff’s vehicle and the unknown hit-and-run motor vehicle as required
under the policy.
the policy is ambiguous as to whether the uninsured motorist clause requires
physical contact, but argues that the Illinois Insurance Code (“Code”) does not
require physical impact between the uninsured vehicle and the insured and that
a physical contact requirement is against public policy. See 215 ILCS
5/143a (West 2016) (“Uninsured and hit and run motor vehicle coverage”).
In the seminal case, Ferega v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 58 Ill. 2d 109, 111, 317 N.E.2d 550
(1974), our supreme court held that physical contact was required
under the Code to collect uninsured motorist coverage. In Ferega,
while the plaintiff was driving at night on a two-lane highway, he turned his
vehicle to the right to avoid an oncoming vehicle in his own lane of travel and
struck a culvert. Id. at 110, 317 N.E.2d 550. Plaintiff tried to
collect for his injuries under his policy’s uninsured motorist clause, which
defined a “ ‘hit-and-run motor vehicle’ ” as a vehicle “ ‘which cause[d] bodily
injury to an insured arising out of physical contact of such vehicle with the
insured or with a vehicle which the insured [was] occupying at the time of the
accident.’ ” Id. The
lower courts denied recovery because there had been no physical contact between
the plaintiff’s vehicle and the unknown hit-and-run motor vehicle as required
under the policy.
*3 ¶ 16 In its ruling, the supreme court affirmed the
lower courts and denied plaintiff’s suggestion that the plain language of the
statute and the policy should be judicially modified by altering the meaning of
the word “hit” so that the element of physical contact was eliminated. Id.
at 111, 317 N.E.2d 550. In support, the supreme court cited the opinion
in Prosk v. Allstate Insurance Co., 82 Ill. App. 2d 457, 461, 226
N.E.2d 498 (1967), which stated that the Code “was not intended to include
unidentified cars that may be present at the scene of an occurrence of bodily
injury without a physical contact of the unidentified motor vehicle with the
insured or an automobile occupied by the insured.” Id. The
supreme court also observed that the statute was “aimed at the avoidance of
fraudulent claims.” Id.
lower courts and denied plaintiff’s suggestion that the plain language of the
statute and the policy should be judicially modified by altering the meaning of
the word “hit” so that the element of physical contact was eliminated. Id.
at 111, 317 N.E.2d 550. In support, the supreme court cited the opinion
in Prosk v. Allstate Insurance Co., 82 Ill. App. 2d 457, 461, 226
N.E.2d 498 (1967), which stated that the Code “was not intended to include
unidentified cars that may be present at the scene of an occurrence of bodily
injury without a physical contact of the unidentified motor vehicle with the
insured or an automobile occupied by the insured.” Id. The
supreme court also observed that the statute was “aimed at the avoidance of
fraudulent claims.” Id.
¶ 17 The supreme court
reaffirmed Ferega in Lemke
v. Kenilworth Insurance Co., 109 Ill. 2d 350, 354, 94 Ill.Dec. 66, 487
N.E.2d 943 (1985) (noting legislature had amended Section 143a eight times
since Ferega,
and thus, “legislative inaction subsequent to Ferega indicate[d]
approval of the reasoning and holding in that case”). But the appellate courts
in Illinois are divided about whether the supreme court intended a physical
contact requirement to be permissible in a policy or required by the Code
itself. For instance, in Illinois National Insurance Co. v. Palmer,
116 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1069, 72 Ill.Dec. 454, 452 N.E.2d 707 (1983), the First
District noted that “[i]t [was] well established in Illinois that an insured
cannot recover under the hit-and-run provision of the uninsured motorist
coverage unless there [was] a physical contact of the unidentified motor
vehicle with the insured or an automobile occupied by the insured” (internal
quotation marks omitted). Similarly, in Kannel v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co., 222 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 1016, 165 Ill.Dec. 361,
584 N.E.2d 540 (1991), the Second District determined that “our supreme court
ha[d] upheld the validity of insurance policies affording coverage for personal
injuries in accidents caused by hit-and-run drivers only where the unknown
vehicle makes physical contact with the insured or his vehicle.”
reaffirmed Ferega in Lemke
v. Kenilworth Insurance Co., 109 Ill. 2d 350, 354, 94 Ill.Dec. 66, 487
N.E.2d 943 (1985) (noting legislature had amended Section 143a eight times
since Ferega,
and thus, “legislative inaction subsequent to Ferega indicate[d]
approval of the reasoning and holding in that case”). But the appellate courts
in Illinois are divided about whether the supreme court intended a physical
contact requirement to be permissible in a policy or required by the Code
itself. For instance, in Illinois National Insurance Co. v. Palmer,
116 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1069, 72 Ill.Dec. 454, 452 N.E.2d 707 (1983), the First
District noted that “[i]t [was] well established in Illinois that an insured
cannot recover under the hit-and-run provision of the uninsured motorist
coverage unless there [was] a physical contact of the unidentified motor
vehicle with the insured or an automobile occupied by the insured” (internal
quotation marks omitted). Similarly, in Kannel v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co., 222 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 1016, 165 Ill.Dec. 361,
584 N.E.2d 540 (1991), the Second District determined that “our supreme court
ha[d] upheld the validity of insurance policies affording coverage for personal
injuries in accidents caused by hit-and-run drivers only where the unknown
vehicle makes physical contact with the insured or his vehicle.”
¶ 18 But, the Third District, as
Wojciech notes, has rejected the argument that an insured must be contacted by
the hit and run vehicle to recover uninsured motorists benefits. In Groshans
v. Dairyland Insurance Co., 311 Ill. App. 3d 876, 879, 244 Ill.Dec. 542,
726 N.E.2d 138 (2000), the Third District “found that Illinois law [did] not
require actual physical contact but merely permit[ted] an insurance policy to
require such contact.” See also Cincinnati v. Pritchett, 2015 IL
App (3d) 130809 ¶ 20, 391 Ill.Dec. 744, 31 N.E.3d 420(reaffirming Groshans and
noting that legislature amended the Code after Groshans was
issued and did not invalidate Groshans or
clarify that coverage applies only in cases of physical contact.).
Wojciech notes, has rejected the argument that an insured must be contacted by
the hit and run vehicle to recover uninsured motorists benefits. In Groshans
v. Dairyland Insurance Co., 311 Ill. App. 3d 876, 879, 244 Ill.Dec. 542,
726 N.E.2d 138 (2000), the Third District “found that Illinois law [did] not
require actual physical contact but merely permit[ted] an insurance policy to
require such contact.” See also Cincinnati v. Pritchett, 2015 IL
App (3d) 130809 ¶ 20, 391 Ill.Dec. 744, 31 N.E.3d 420(reaffirming Groshans and
noting that legislature amended the Code after Groshans was
issued and did not invalidate Groshans or
clarify that coverage applies only in cases of physical contact.).
¶ 19 Wojciech suggests Dairyland and Pritchett support
his argument that he may recover under the uninsured motorist provision of the
policy even though he was not physically contacted by the hit and run
automobile. The assertion is misplaced. Even if we were to adopt the rationale
of Dairyland and Pritchett (which
we do not), Wojciech still is not entitled to uninsured motorist benefits under
the policy—the policy explicitly requires physical contact between an insured
and the hit and run vehicle. While both Dairyland and Pritchett conclude
that Illinois law does not require actual physical contact,
they find that it is a permissible requirement in an insurance policy. Under
the plain and unambiguous language of the Allstate policy, an insured must have
been physically contacted by the hit and run vehicle. Wojciech was not and thus
may not recover.
his argument that he may recover under the uninsured motorist provision of the
policy even though he was not physically contacted by the hit and run
automobile. The assertion is misplaced. Even if we were to adopt the rationale
of Dairyland and Pritchett (which
we do not), Wojciech still is not entitled to uninsured motorist benefits under
the policy—the policy explicitly requires physical contact between an insured
and the hit and run vehicle. While both Dairyland and Pritchett conclude
that Illinois law does not require actual physical contact,
they find that it is a permissible requirement in an insurance policy. Under
the plain and unambiguous language of the Allstate policy, an insured must have
been physically contacted by the hit and run vehicle. Wojciech was not and thus
may not recover.
¶ 20 Wojciech argues that one of the
primary purposes of the physical contact requirement, as noted in Ferega,
is to prevent fraud, which is not an issue because it is undisputed that the
hit and run driver ran into his wife, causing serious injuries. We agree. But
that does not negate the policy’s express requirement that there be physical
contact to recover under the uninsured motorist provision.
primary purposes of the physical contact requirement, as noted in Ferega,
is to prevent fraud, which is not an issue because it is undisputed that the
hit and run driver ran into his wife, causing serious injuries. We agree. But
that does not negate the policy’s express requirement that there be physical
contact to recover under the uninsured motorist provision.
*4 ¶ 21 Wojciech also notes that Illinois courts allow
recovery for indirect physical contact when either an actual physical object
from the hit-and-run vehicle indirectly strikes the insured’s vehicle or the
indirect contact is a result of a chain of events. See Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co. v. LeJeune, 114 Ill. 2d 54, 59, 101 Ill.Dec.
876, 499 N.E.2d 464 (1986) (supreme court declined “to require
that the ‘hit’ be direct” when hit-and-run vehicle hit a third car, which then
hit the insured’s car); Illinois
National Insurance Co. v. Palmer, 116 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1071, 72
Ill.Dec. 454, 452 N.E.2d 707 (1983) (where physical contact
requirement was satisfied when lug nut flew off hit-and-run vehicle and hit
insured’s car). While Wojciech asks us to find his case analogous to Hartford and Palmer,
there simply was no contact, direct or indirect, between him and the hit and
run driver. Thus, he cannot recover under the uninsured motorist provision of
the policy.
recovery for indirect physical contact when either an actual physical object
from the hit-and-run vehicle indirectly strikes the insured’s vehicle or the
indirect contact is a result of a chain of events. See Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co. v. LeJeune, 114 Ill. 2d 54, 59, 101 Ill.Dec.
876, 499 N.E.2d 464 (1986) (supreme court declined “to require
that the ‘hit’ be direct” when hit-and-run vehicle hit a third car, which then
hit the insured’s car); Illinois
National Insurance Co. v. Palmer, 116 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1071, 72
Ill.Dec. 454, 452 N.E.2d 707 (1983) (where physical contact
requirement was satisfied when lug nut flew off hit-and-run vehicle and hit
insured’s car). While Wojciech asks us to find his case analogous to Hartford and Palmer,
there simply was no contact, direct or indirect, between him and the hit and
run driver. Thus, he cannot recover under the uninsured motorist provision of
the policy.
¶ 22 Because we find that Wojciech’s
claim is barred by the physical contact requirement of the policy, we need not
address his contention that his physical and emotional injuries after the
accident amount to “bodily injury” under the policy.
claim is barred by the physical contact requirement of the policy, we need not
address his contention that his physical and emotional injuries after the
accident amount to “bodily injury” under the policy.
¶ 23 Affirmed.
Presiding Justice Neville and
Justice Mason concurred
in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Mason concurred
in the judgment and opinion.