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April 29, 2016 by Tom

Insurance — Assignment of benefits — Assignment of insurance benefits transferred to assignee standing to litigate coverage issue raised by insurer when it denied claim

41
Fla. L. Weekly D998c
Top of Form

Insurance
— Assignment of benefits — Where assignment of benefits from insured to
plaintiff was clear and unambiguous, it was error to allow introduction of
extrinsic evidence to determine meaning of agreement — Assignment of insurance
benefits transferred to assignee standing to litigate coverage issue raised by
insurer when it denied claim

RESTORATION 1 CFL A/A/O I. JOY WHITE, Appellant, v. STATE
FARM FLORIDA INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. 5th District. Case No. 5D15-1049.
Opinion filed April 22, 2016. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County,
Janet C. Thorpe, Judge. Counsel: Susan W. Fox and Gray R. Proctor, of Fox &
Loquasto, P.A., Orlando, and T. Paul Zeniewicz, of Cohen Battisti Grossman,
Winter Park, for Appellant. Scot E. Samis, of Traub, Lieberman, Straus &
Shrewsberry LLP, St. Petersburg, for Appellee.

(PER CURIAM.) Restoration 1 CFL (“Restoration”), a/a/o I.
Joy White (“White”), appeals the trial court’s order granting final summary
judgment on behalf of State Farm Florida Insurance Company (“State Farm”).
State Farm contends that the assignment of benefits from White to Restoration
transferred the right to collect benefits but not the right to participate in a
suit to determine coverage under the policy regarding those benefits. The trial
court determined that the assignment was not valid because White intended to
retain control of her rights, basing its conclusion largely upon statements
made by White during a deposition. For the following reasons, we reverse.

First, we conclude that the assignment of benefits from
White to Restoration is clear and unambiguous. Therefore, it was error to allow
introduction of extrinsic evidence to determine the meaning of the agreement. See,
e.g., King v. Bray,
867 So. 2d 1224, 1226 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (“[T]he party
seeking to introduce parol evidence must establish that the document is
ambiguous and in need of interpretation.”). Accordingly, White’s deposition
testimony regarding her interpretation of the assignment should not have been
considered by the trial court.

We further conclude that the assignment of insurance
benefits transferred to the assignee, Restoration, standing to litigate the
coverage issue raised by State Farm when it denied the claim. See Bioscience
W., Inc. v. Gulfstream Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,
185 So. 3d 638, 641 (Fla.
2d DCA 2016); United Water Restoration Grp., Inc. v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co.,
173 So. 3d 1025, 1026 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). Because Restoration had standing to
participate in the suit to determine coverage under the policy for the benefits
assigned, it was error for the trial court to grant State Farm’s motion for
summary judgment. We therefore reverse and remand this case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED
and REMANDED. (SAWAYA, COHEN and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.)

* *
*

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