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April 24, 2020 by Jennifer Kennedy

Insurance — Breach of contract — Summary judgment — Error to grant final summary judgment in favor of insurer on grounds that suit was premature where insurer admitted coverage under the policy

45 Fla. L. Weekly D907a

Insurance — Breach of contract — Summary judgment — Error to grant final summary judgment in favor of insurer on grounds that suit was premature where insurer admitted coverage under the policy

PATRICIA SKENE a/k/a TRICIA SKENE, Appellant, v. AVATAR PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY as successor in interest to ELEMENTS PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. 2nd District. Case No. 2D18-3954. April 17, 2020. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pasco County; Kimberly Sharpe Byrd, Judge. Counsel: Aaron S. Kling of Kling Law, P.A., Tampa; and Grant Krapf of Krapf Legal, P.A., Dunedin, for Appellant. Carol M. Rooney of Butler Weihmuller Katz Craig, LLP, Tampa, for Appellee.

(ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, Judge.) Patricia Skene, the plaintiff in an insurance breach-of-contract action, appeals from an order granting final summary judgment in favor of the insurer, Avatar Property and Casualty Insurance Company. Because the record establishes that Avatar, despite its assertions on appeal to the contrary, admitted coverage under the policy, the trial court erred in granting final summary judgment on the ground that Skene’s suit was premature. See Curtis v. Tower Hill Prime Ins. Co., 154 So. 3d 1193, 1196 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (“[E]ven when an insurance suit is filed prematurely, final summary judgment would not be the appropriate remedy where, as here, the insurance company has admitted coverage.”). Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded. (KHOUZAM, C.J., and SMITH, J., Concur.)

* * *

Filed Under: Uncategorized

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