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February 7, 2020 by Jennifer Kennedy

Insurance — Homeowners — Appraisal — Trial court properly ordered parties to submit to appraisal where insurer elected to repair covered loss and parties failed to agree on amount of loss, including scope of repairs — Appeals — Non-final orders — Court lacks jurisdiction to review portions of non-final order other than that ordering parties to submit to appraisal

45 Fla. L. Weekly D259a

Insurance — Homeowners — Appraisal — Trial court properly ordered parties to submit to appraisal where insurer elected to repair covered loss and parties failed to agree on amount of loss, including scope of repairs — Appeals — Non-final orders — Court lacks jurisdiction to review portions of non-final order other than that ordering parties to submit to appraisal

ERICK BAPTISTE and KENOL BAPTISTE, Appellants, v. PEOPLE’S TRUST INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. 3rd District. Case No. 3D19-1462. L.T. Case No. 19-1383. Opinion filed February 5, 2020. An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Antonio Arzola, Judge. Counsel: The Diener Firm, P.A., and Warren Diener (Plantation); Greenspoon Marder LLP, and John H. Pelzer (Fort Lauderdale), for appellants. Beck Law, P.A., and Joshua S. Beck (Boca Raton); Brett R. Frankel, Jonathan Sabghir and Robert B. Gertzman (Deerfield Beach), for appellee.

(Before FERNANDEZ, LOGUE and SCALES, JJ.)

(SCALES, J.) Erick and Kenol Baptiste, the plaintiffs below, seek review of the trial court’s June 27, 2019 non-final order that, among other things, granted defendant below People’s Trust Insurance Company’s (“People’s Trust”) motion to compel an appraisal under a homeowner’s insurance policy. For the reasons that follow, we affirm that portion of the challenged order requiring the parties to submit to appraisal and, for lack of jurisdiction, we dismiss the appeal as to the remainder of the challenged order.

The record reflects that, after sustaining a loss as a result of Hurricane Irma, the Baptistes filed a homeowner’s insurance policy claim with People’s Trust, their insurer. People’s Trust inspected the Baptistes’ home and, on April 30, 2018, sent the Baptistes a notice letter that: (i) acknowledged the loss was covered; (ii) elected, pursuant to the subject policy’s Preferred Contractor Endorsement, to repair the damaged property; (iii) advised the Baptistes that “our assessment of your damages is that the cost of repair does not exceed your deductible”; and (iv) requested that, if the Baptistes disagreed with People’s Trust’s estimate and scope of repairs, the Baptistes submit a sworn proof of loss form detailing what the Baptistes believed were the proper cost and scope of repairs for this covered loss.

In response to the April 30, 2018 notice letter, the Baptistes provided People’s Trust with a sworn proof of loss form asserting that the damages to their home well exceeded the subject policy’s deductible. People’s Trust thereafter wrote to the Baptistes acknowledging receipt of their sworn proof of loss form and, pursuant to the appraisal provision contained within the policy’s Preferred Contractor Endorsement, demanded an appraisal.

Instead of going to appraisal, the Baptistes filed the instant two-count declaratory judgment action. In their lawsuit, the Baptistes seek, among other things: (i) a declaration that People’s Trust’s notice of election to repair their property was invalid; (ii) a declaration that the policy’s appraisal provision contained within the Preferred Contractor Endorsement does not apply; and (iii) a general determination of “the rights and duties of the parties under said insurance policy.”

In response to the Baptistes’ complaint, People’s Trust filed an omnibus motion seeking, among other things, an order compelling appraisal, dismissing the Baptistes’ complaint, enforcing People Trust’s right to repair the subject property, and requiring the Baptistes to pay the policy deductible to the contractor People’s Trust had authorized to make the repairs. On June 27, 2019, after conducting a hearing on People’s Trust’s motion, the trial court entered the challenged order.

Our careful review of the June 27, 2019 non-final order indicates that we have jurisdiction only to review that portion of the order that compels the parties to submit to the appraisal process outlined in the subject policy’s Preferred Contractor Endorsement. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv) (permitting review of non-final orders that determine entitlement to an appraisal under an insurance policy); Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Calonge, 246 So. 3d 447, 449 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (“Our appellate jurisdiction to review non-final orders is limited to only those orders specifically scheduled in rule 9.130(a)(3).”). The relevant language of the governing provision1 requires appraisal where People’s Trust elects to repair a covered loss and, as occurred here, the parties fail to agree on the amount of loss, including the scope of repairs. Finding no error, we affirm that portion of the June 27, 2019 non-final order that compelled the parties to participate in the appraisal process. See People’s Trust Ins. Co. v. Garcia, 263 So. 3d 231 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019).

We lack jurisdiction to review, and express no opinion as to, the remaining portions of the trial court’s June 27, 2019 non-final order. See Saidin v. Korecki, 202 So. 3d 468, 470 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (recognizing that the district court’s jurisdiction to review certain aspects of a non-final order under rule 9.130(a) “does not extend to afford review of certain other matters the non-final order addresses”). Hence, we dismiss without prejudice the appeal as to the other portions of the subject order.

Dismissed in part, affirmed in part.

__________________

1The appraisal provision provides, in relevant part:

Where “we” elect to repair:

1. If “you” and “we” fail to agree on the amount of loss, which includes the scope of repairs, either may demand an appraisal as to the amount of loss and the scope of repairs. In this event, each party will choose a competent appraiser within 20 days after receiving a written request from the other. The two appraisers will choose an umpire. If they cannot agree upon an umpire within 15 days, “you” or “we” may request that the choice be made by a judge of a court of record in the state where the “residence premises” is located. The appraisers will separately set the amount of loss and scope of repairs. If the appraisers submit a written report of an agreement to “us”, the amount of loss and scope of repairs agreed upon will be the amount of loss and scope of repairs. If they fail to agree, they will submit their differences to the umpire. A decision agreed to by any two will set the amount of loss and the scope of repairs. Each party will pay its own appraiser, and bear the other expenses of the appraisal and umpire equally.

* * *

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