41 Fla. L. Weekly D381aTop of Form
Insurance
— Trial court erred in dismissing insureds’ breach of contract action against
insurer on basis of counsel’s failure to appear at case management conference
without findings that counsel’s failure to appear was flagrant, willful,
persistent, or aggravated
— Trial court erred in dismissing insureds’ breach of contract action against
insurer on basis of counsel’s failure to appear at case management conference
without findings that counsel’s failure to appear was flagrant, willful,
persistent, or aggravated
DONNA MARIE JENKINS and RAYMOND MURDOCK, Appellants, v.
ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and ALLSTATE INSURANCE
COMPANY, Appellees. 2nd District. Case No. 2D15-1729. Opinion filed February
10, 2016. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Highlands County; Peter F. Estrada,
Judge. Counsel: Alan Medof of Alan Medof & Assoc., PA, Miami, for Appellants.
Ronald L. Arend of Arend & Sisk, P.A., Fort Myers, for Appellees.
ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and ALLSTATE INSURANCE
COMPANY, Appellees. 2nd District. Case No. 2D15-1729. Opinion filed February
10, 2016. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Highlands County; Peter F. Estrada,
Judge. Counsel: Alan Medof of Alan Medof & Assoc., PA, Miami, for Appellants.
Ronald L. Arend of Arend & Sisk, P.A., Fort Myers, for Appellees.
(SALARIO, Judge.) Donna Marie Jenkins and Raymond Murdock
appeal from an order dismissing without prejudice their complaint for breach of
an insurance contract against Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company
and Allstate Insurance Company. The dismissal was based on the failure of
Jenkins’ and Murdock’s counsel to appear at a case management conference
convened pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.200 and, because a
subsequent action would be barred by the statute of limitations, was
effectively a dismissal with prejudice. Because the trial court failed to make
the legally required findings that counsel’s failure to attend the conference
was flagrant, willful, persistent, or aggravated, we reverse and remand for
further proceedings.
appeal from an order dismissing without prejudice their complaint for breach of
an insurance contract against Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company
and Allstate Insurance Company. The dismissal was based on the failure of
Jenkins’ and Murdock’s counsel to appear at a case management conference
convened pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.200 and, because a
subsequent action would be barred by the statute of limitations, was
effectively a dismissal with prejudice. Because the trial court failed to make
the legally required findings that counsel’s failure to attend the conference
was flagrant, willful, persistent, or aggravated, we reverse and remand for
further proceedings.
Jenkins and Murdock were involved in a car accident on June
21, 2005, and sought coverage under an insurance policy with Allstate. On July
8, 2005, Allstate informed Jenkins and Murdock that it was denying their claim
for coverage. On July 1, 2010, Jenkins and Murdock filed a complaint for breach
of contract against Allstate, just days before the five-year statute of
limitations on that contract claim would have run. See § 95.11(2), Fla.
Stat. (2005) (providing five-year statute of limitations on claims for breach
of contract). The complaint was followed by several years of litigation.
21, 2005, and sought coverage under an insurance policy with Allstate. On July
8, 2005, Allstate informed Jenkins and Murdock that it was denying their claim
for coverage. On July 1, 2010, Jenkins and Murdock filed a complaint for breach
of contract against Allstate, just days before the five-year statute of
limitations on that contract claim would have run. See § 95.11(2), Fla.
Stat. (2005) (providing five-year statute of limitations on claims for breach
of contract). The complaint was followed by several years of litigation.
The record is at a minimum susceptible of the inference that
the litigation was characterized by a lack of diligence by counsel for Jenkins
and Murdock. Counsel served, but did not file, an amended complaint on February
23, 2011. On July 13, 2011, the trial court dismissed that complaint and
granted Jenkins and Murdock twenty days to amend. Counsel missed that deadline
and, without leave of court, failed to file a second amended complaint until
August 20, 2011. In response to a motion to dismiss based on the untimely
filing, counsel filed an affidavit from his paralegal alleging that the failure
to timely respond to the court’s order occurred because the paralegal, whose
wife had recently passed away, had neglected to open mail addressed to counsel.
the litigation was characterized by a lack of diligence by counsel for Jenkins
and Murdock. Counsel served, but did not file, an amended complaint on February
23, 2011. On July 13, 2011, the trial court dismissed that complaint and
granted Jenkins and Murdock twenty days to amend. Counsel missed that deadline
and, without leave of court, failed to file a second amended complaint until
August 20, 2011. In response to a motion to dismiss based on the untimely
filing, counsel filed an affidavit from his paralegal alleging that the failure
to timely respond to the court’s order occurred because the paralegal, whose
wife had recently passed away, had neglected to open mail addressed to counsel.
On January 19, 2012, Jenkins’ and Murdock’s counsel was
suspended from The Florida Bar for sixty days. The record does not reflect why.
On June 20, 2012, after a hearing on Allstate’s motion to dismiss the second
amended complaint, the trial court entered an order finding that although all
parties had notice of the hearing, counsel for Jenkins and Murdock failed to disclose
his suspension and resultant inability to appear in court. The trial court
sanctioned counsel for the failure.
suspended from The Florida Bar for sixty days. The record does not reflect why.
On June 20, 2012, after a hearing on Allstate’s motion to dismiss the second
amended complaint, the trial court entered an order finding that although all
parties had notice of the hearing, counsel for Jenkins and Murdock failed to disclose
his suspension and resultant inability to appear in court. The trial court
sanctioned counsel for the failure.
On August 28, 2013, Allstate filed a motion to compel
long-overdue answers and objections to interrogatories and responses to
requests for production of documents served on Jenkins and Murdock months
earlier on April 12, 2013. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.340(a) (providing that
answers and objections to interrogatories be filed within thirty days after
service); 1.350(b) (providing same for responses to requests for production).
On October 7, 2013, the trial court entered an agreed order granting the motion
and providing Jenkins and Murdock ten additional days to respond. The extent to
which counsel complied with the order is unclear from the record.
long-overdue answers and objections to interrogatories and responses to
requests for production of documents served on Jenkins and Murdock months
earlier on April 12, 2013. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.340(a) (providing that
answers and objections to interrogatories be filed within thirty days after
service); 1.350(b) (providing same for responses to requests for production).
On October 7, 2013, the trial court entered an agreed order granting the motion
and providing Jenkins and Murdock ten additional days to respond. The extent to
which counsel complied with the order is unclear from the record.
On June 2, 2014, the trial court entered a form order
setting a case management conference for July 9, 2014. It stated that “failure
to appear will result in dismissal of the case.” Counsel for Jenkins and
Murdock failed to appear at the conference. Following the case management
conference, the trial court entered a form order that contained a section
providing for dismissal. The trial court checked a box reading that “Defendant
appeared; however, Plaintiff failed to appear. The above styled case is hereby
dismissed without prejudice.” The order contained no other findings.
setting a case management conference for July 9, 2014. It stated that “failure
to appear will result in dismissal of the case.” Counsel for Jenkins and
Murdock failed to appear at the conference. Following the case management
conference, the trial court entered a form order that contained a section
providing for dismissal. The trial court checked a box reading that “Defendant
appeared; however, Plaintiff failed to appear. The above styled case is hereby
dismissed without prejudice.” The order contained no other findings.
Counsel filed a verified motion for rehearing, an unverified
motion to vacate the judgment, and a verified motion to vacate the judgment. He
alleged that he had not received notice of the case management conference and
that had he received such notice, he would have appeared as required. Counsel
asked the trial court to issue sanctions against him rather than dismissing the
case as to his clients, because his clients had not been responsible for
counsel’s failure to appear at the case management conference. The trial court
denied all three motions.
motion to vacate the judgment, and a verified motion to vacate the judgment. He
alleged that he had not received notice of the case management conference and
that had he received such notice, he would have appeared as required. Counsel
asked the trial court to issue sanctions against him rather than dismissing the
case as to his clients, because his clients had not been responsible for
counsel’s failure to appear at the case management conference. The trial court
denied all three motions.
Rule 1.200(c) authorizes a trial court to order a case
management conference and to dismiss an action where a party fails to attend
such a conference. However, where a trial court dismisses a suit for failure to
attend a case management conference, its order must “contain findings that the
party’s actions were flagrant, willful, persistent, or otherwise aggravated.” Drakeford
v. Barnett Bank of Tampa, 694 So. 2d 822, 824 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (citing Clark
v. Sturks, 668 So. 2d 1106, 1107 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)); see also Commonwealth
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Tubero, 569 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1990). A trial
court’s failure to comply with that requirement takes on special significance
where, as here, the expiration of the statute of limitations makes the
dismissal a dismissal with prejudice “for all practical purposes.” See Anthony
v. Schmidtt, 557 So. 2d 656, 662 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); see also Martinez
v. Collier Cty. Pub. Sch., 804 So. 2d 559, 560 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).
management conference and to dismiss an action where a party fails to attend
such a conference. However, where a trial court dismisses a suit for failure to
attend a case management conference, its order must “contain findings that the
party’s actions were flagrant, willful, persistent, or otherwise aggravated.” Drakeford
v. Barnett Bank of Tampa, 694 So. 2d 822, 824 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (citing Clark
v. Sturks, 668 So. 2d 1106, 1107 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)); see also Commonwealth
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Tubero, 569 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1990). A trial
court’s failure to comply with that requirement takes on special significance
where, as here, the expiration of the statute of limitations makes the
dismissal a dismissal with prejudice “for all practical purposes.” See Anthony
v. Schmidtt, 557 So. 2d 656, 662 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); see also Martinez
v. Collier Cty. Pub. Sch., 804 So. 2d 559, 560 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).
Although the transcript of the hearing on the motion to
vacate reflects understandable skepticism on the part of the trial court about
counsel’s explanation for his failure to attend the case management conference,
neither the trial court’s form order of dismissal, nor its orders denying
Jenkins’ and Murdock’s postdismissal motions, nor the relevant transcripts
contain findings that the failure to attend was willful, flagrant, persistent,
or otherwise aggravated. Accordingly, we are required to reverse the order
dismissing the case and remand for further proceedings. See Anthony,
557 So. 2d at 662. Our reversal renders Jenkins’ and Murdock’s contention that
they were denied due process moot, and we do not address it.
vacate reflects understandable skepticism on the part of the trial court about
counsel’s explanation for his failure to attend the case management conference,
neither the trial court’s form order of dismissal, nor its orders denying
Jenkins’ and Murdock’s postdismissal motions, nor the relevant transcripts
contain findings that the failure to attend was willful, flagrant, persistent,
or otherwise aggravated. Accordingly, we are required to reverse the order
dismissing the case and remand for further proceedings. See Anthony,
557 So. 2d at 662. Our reversal renders Jenkins’ and Murdock’s contention that
they were denied due process moot, and we do not address it.
On remand, the trial court is free to conduct such
proceedings with respect to counsel’s failure to attend the case management
conference, if any, as it sees fit. We express no judgment as to whether the
facts of record or those that might be adduced in proceedings on remand warrant
a dismissal of the action. We note, however, that absent evidence of client
consent to or participation in the attorney’s misconduct, it is typically more
appropriate to sanction an attorney for his failings than to require his
clients to suffer the pains of the attorney’s errors or omissions. See id.
proceedings with respect to counsel’s failure to attend the case management
conference, if any, as it sees fit. We express no judgment as to whether the
facts of record or those that might be adduced in proceedings on remand warrant
a dismissal of the action. We note, however, that absent evidence of client
consent to or participation in the attorney’s misconduct, it is typically more
appropriate to sanction an attorney for his failings than to require his
clients to suffer the pains of the attorney’s errors or omissions. See id.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. (ALTENBERND
and KELLY, JJ., Concur.)
and KELLY, JJ., Concur.)
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