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Fla. L. Weekly D2715aTop of Form
Fla. L. Weekly D2715aTop of Form
Insurance
— Uninsured motorist — Damages — Award of damages for future medical
expenses was excessive, and court should have granted motion for remittitur —
Because treating physician testified as to insured’s yearly cost of future
medical expenses, but there was no testimony regarding insured’s life
expectancy, case is remanded for new trial solely on issue of insured’s life
expectancy
— Uninsured motorist — Damages — Award of damages for future medical
expenses was excessive, and court should have granted motion for remittitur —
Because treating physician testified as to insured’s yearly cost of future
medical expenses, but there was no testimony regarding insured’s life
expectancy, case is remanded for new trial solely on issue of insured’s life
expectancy
GENERAL
EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY a/k/a GEICO, Appellant, v. LAURI ISAACS, Appellee.
4th District. Case No. 4D15-2263. December 7, 2016. Appeal from the Circuit
Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Carol-Lisa
Phillips, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE 10-21549-18. Counsel: Sharon C. Degnan of
Kubicki Draper, Orlando, for appellant. Kenneth D. Cooper, Fort Lauderdale, for
appellee.
EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY a/k/a GEICO, Appellant, v. LAURI ISAACS, Appellee.
4th District. Case No. 4D15-2263. December 7, 2016. Appeal from the Circuit
Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Carol-Lisa
Phillips, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE 10-21549-18. Counsel: Sharon C. Degnan of
Kubicki Draper, Orlando, for appellant. Kenneth D. Cooper, Fort Lauderdale, for
appellee.
(KLINGENSMITH,
J.) Lauri Isaacs suffered injuries due to a car accident. She filed suit
against GEICO, her uninsured motorist carrier, seeking compensation for past
and future medical expenses as well as pain and suffering. At trial, Isaacs was
awarded a total of $750,000 for medical expenses and pain and suffering. After
a reduction of $60,000 in collateral source setoffs, judgment was entered for
$690,000. This amount included an award for future medical expenses of
$360,000. GEICO moved post-trial for remittitur and for a new trial, arguing
the jury’s award for future medical expenses was excessive and belied by the
manifest weight of the evidence. Based on our review of the record, the motion
for remittitur as to the award for future medical expenses should have been
granted.
J.) Lauri Isaacs suffered injuries due to a car accident. She filed suit
against GEICO, her uninsured motorist carrier, seeking compensation for past
and future medical expenses as well as pain and suffering. At trial, Isaacs was
awarded a total of $750,000 for medical expenses and pain and suffering. After
a reduction of $60,000 in collateral source setoffs, judgment was entered for
$690,000. This amount included an award for future medical expenses of
$360,000. GEICO moved post-trial for remittitur and for a new trial, arguing
the jury’s award for future medical expenses was excessive and belied by the
manifest weight of the evidence. Based on our review of the record, the motion
for remittitur as to the award for future medical expenses should have been
granted.
“The
standard of review for an order denying a motion for new trial or denying a
remittitur is abuse of discretion.” Whitney v. Milien, 125 So. 3d 817,
819 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). While most personal injury verdicts involve an element
of speculation subject to jury discretion, a court may review their discretion
and reduce the award if “shown to be clearly arbitrary.” Arnold v. Sec.
Nat’l Ins. Co., 174 So. 3d 1082, 1084 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (quoting Sproule
v. Nelson, 81 So. 2d 478, 481 (Fla. 1955)). In that regard, “[a] court
cannot allow a jury to award a greater amount of damages than what is
reasonably supported by the evidence at trial.” Festival Fun Parks, LLC v.
Bellamy, 123 So. 3d 684, 685-86 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (quoting Truelove v.
Blount, 954 So. 2d 1284, 1287 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)).
standard of review for an order denying a motion for new trial or denying a
remittitur is abuse of discretion.” Whitney v. Milien, 125 So. 3d 817,
819 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). While most personal injury verdicts involve an element
of speculation subject to jury discretion, a court may review their discretion
and reduce the award if “shown to be clearly arbitrary.” Arnold v. Sec.
Nat’l Ins. Co., 174 So. 3d 1082, 1084 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (quoting Sproule
v. Nelson, 81 So. 2d 478, 481 (Fla. 1955)). In that regard, “[a] court
cannot allow a jury to award a greater amount of damages than what is
reasonably supported by the evidence at trial.” Festival Fun Parks, LLC v.
Bellamy, 123 So. 3d 684, 685-86 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (quoting Truelove v.
Blount, 954 So. 2d 1284, 1287 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)).
“[O]nly
medical expenses that are reasonably certain to be incurred in the future are
recoverable.” Vazquez v. Martinez, 175 So. 3d 372, 374 (Fla. 5th DCA
2015); accord GEICO Indem. Co. v. DeGrandchamp, 102 So. 3d 685, 686
(Fla. 2d DCA 2012). Further, “[t]here must also be an evidentiary basis upon
which the jury can, with reasonable certainty, determine the amount of those
expenses.” Vazquez, 175 So. 3d at 374; see also GEICO, 102 So. 3d
at 686 (holding that “[w]hile DeGrandechamp [sic] established that she was
reasonably certain to incur at least some medical expenses in the future, we
can find no evidentiary basis to support the amount of the jury’s award in this
case”). Testimony or evidence that certain treatments might possibly be
obtained in the future cannot merit an award of future medical expenses. Vazquez,
175 So. 3d at 374 (citing Fasani v. Kowalski, 43 So. 3d 805, 812 (Fla.
3d DCA 2010); Truelove, 954 So. 2d at 1288).
medical expenses that are reasonably certain to be incurred in the future are
recoverable.” Vazquez v. Martinez, 175 So. 3d 372, 374 (Fla. 5th DCA
2015); accord GEICO Indem. Co. v. DeGrandchamp, 102 So. 3d 685, 686
(Fla. 2d DCA 2012). Further, “[t]here must also be an evidentiary basis upon
which the jury can, with reasonable certainty, determine the amount of those
expenses.” Vazquez, 175 So. 3d at 374; see also GEICO, 102 So. 3d
at 686 (holding that “[w]hile DeGrandechamp [sic] established that she was
reasonably certain to incur at least some medical expenses in the future, we
can find no evidentiary basis to support the amount of the jury’s award in this
case”). Testimony or evidence that certain treatments might possibly be
obtained in the future cannot merit an award of future medical expenses. Vazquez,
175 So. 3d at 374 (citing Fasani v. Kowalski, 43 So. 3d 805, 812 (Fla.
3d DCA 2010); Truelove, 954 So. 2d at 1288).
At
trial, one of Isaacs’ treating physicians opined that she would incur up to
$2,000 in future medical expenses per year, and also recommended that she
undergo shoulder surgery that he estimated would cost $40,000-$50,000. This was
the only competent, substantial evidence presented on which the award for
future medical expenses could be based. However, as to his opinion regarding
the future annual medical expenses, no testimony about life expectancy was
presented to the jury.
trial, one of Isaacs’ treating physicians opined that she would incur up to
$2,000 in future medical expenses per year, and also recommended that she
undergo shoulder surgery that he estimated would cost $40,000-$50,000. This was
the only competent, substantial evidence presented on which the award for
future medical expenses could be based. However, as to his opinion regarding
the future annual medical expenses, no testimony about life expectancy was
presented to the jury.
Due
to the lack of evidence relating to Isaacs’ life expectancy, in addition to the
fact that the amount awarded for future medical expenses far exceeded what the
evidence supported, we remand this case to the trial court for a new trial
solely on the issue of Isaacs’ life expectancy relating to the $2,000 per year
for future medical expenses. We therefore affirm only the portions of the final
award for future medical expenses covering $50,000 for the appellee’s future
shoulder surgery, and her projected annual expenses of $2,000 (with the
ultimate total of those annual expenses subject to the trial court’s
life-expectancy findings on remand). We affirm all other amounts of the final
award, and on all other issues raised on appeal.
to the lack of evidence relating to Isaacs’ life expectancy, in addition to the
fact that the amount awarded for future medical expenses far exceeded what the
evidence supported, we remand this case to the trial court for a new trial
solely on the issue of Isaacs’ life expectancy relating to the $2,000 per year
for future medical expenses. We therefore affirm only the portions of the final
award for future medical expenses covering $50,000 for the appellee’s future
shoulder surgery, and her projected annual expenses of $2,000 (with the
ultimate total of those annual expenses subject to the trial court’s
life-expectancy findings on remand). We affirm all other amounts of the final
award, and on all other issues raised on appeal.
Affirmed
in part, Reversed in part and Remanded with instructions. (TAYLOR
and FORST, JJ., concur.)
in part, Reversed in part and Remanded with instructions. (TAYLOR
and FORST, JJ., concur.)
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