Insurance — Automobile — Liability — Policy issued to Boy
Scouts of America which covered its registered volunteers, but only when
volunteers were “participating in an Official Scout Activity and in the scope of
their duties as such” — Volunteer whose responsibility was to encourage scouts
to advance by completing requirements for whatever badge level they were working
toward was acting within scope of his duties at time of collision where he had
been assisting scout in completing Eagle Scout project at cemetery, had driven
home for sole purpose of retrieving camera to photograph completed project, and
was involved in collision as he was returning home after having made photographs
— Excess endorsement to policy did not exclude coverage because vehicle was not
in “actual use of a Scouting Unit” when the accident occurred — When vehicle is
used by registered volunteer while volunteer is participating in official scout
activity and acting within the scope of his duties, it is in the “actual use of
the Scouting Unit,” as that phrase is intended in policy

CHRIS G. HUBNER AND ALAN NORTON, Appellants, v. OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE
COMPANY, ET AL., Appellees. 5th District. Case No. 5D13-1350. Opinion filed May
9, 2014. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Citrus County, Patricia V. Thomas,
Judge. Counsel: Mark D. Tinker of Banker Lopez Gassler P.A., St. Petersburg, for
Appellant Chris Hubner. David L. Holbrook of Holbrook Law Firm, Orlando, for
Appellant Alan Norton. Shelley H. Leinicke of Wicker, Smith, O’Hara, McCoy &
Ford, P.A., Ft. Lauderdale, for Appellee Old Republic Insurance Company. Kevin
D. Franz of Lane, Reese, Summers, Ennis & Perdomo, P.A., Coral Gables, for
Appellee Boy Scouts of America.

(TORPY, C.J.) The question in this case is whether Appellant, Alan Norton,
was an “insured” under a liability policy issued by Appellee, Old Republic
Insurance Company, at the time Norton was involved in a motor vehicle collision
resulting in injuries to Appellant Chris Hubner. The policy was issued to
Appellee, Boy Scouts of America, and covered its Registered Volunteers but only
while “participating in an Official Scout Activity and in the scope of their
duties as such.” The trial court granted summary judgment in a declaratory
judgment action initiated by Old Republic, declaring that Norton was not an
insured because, although a Registered Volunteer, he was not participating in an
official scout activity at the time of the collision. We reverse.

At the time of the automobile collision, Norton was the Director of
Advancement and Leadership Training for Boy Scouts of America, Troop 370. His
responsibility was to encourage scouts to advance by completing the requirements
for whatever badge level they were working toward. Of relevance here, Norton was
assisting a scout in completing an Eagle Scout project, which was to clean up a
cemetery that had become overgrown by trees and debris. The cleanup took several
weeks to complete. Throughout the course of the project, Norton visited the
cemetery approximately eight times. On the final day of the project, the cleanup
ended around noon. Norton was the last person to leave. As he was leaving, he
realized that he did not recall seeing the scout take pictures of the completed
project. Norton then drove home to obtain his camera, returned to the cemetery
and photographed the completed project with his camera. On the way home after
taking the photographs, Norton’s car struck Hubner’s car head-on, seriously
injuring himself and Hubner. Norton testified that the sole purpose for the trip
was to photograph the cemetery for the scout’s project workbook. He made no
other stops during the trip.

The insurance policy issued to Boy Scouts of America names as insureds the
“Registered Volunteers of Boy Scouts of America, but only while participating in
an Official Scouting Activity and in the scope of their duties as such.” The
policy defines Official Scouting Activity very broadly to include an activity
that is “consistent with the values, Charter and Bylaws and Rules and
Regulations of Boy Scouts of America.” Appellees concede that Norton was a
Registered Volunteer at all material times. They argue nevertheless that Norton
was not participating in an Official Scouting Activity at the time of the
collision. Specifically, Appellees urge that, because the collision occurred
after the conclusion of the cleanup project, Norton’s participation in that
activity ended prior to the accident. The trial judge accepted this argument. We
disagree because Appellees’ argument focuses on the wrong “Activity.” The
“Activity” in which Norton was participating was broader than the cleanup of the
cemetery. He was providing assistance and encouragement to the scout towards the
completion of his Eagle Scout requirement. The physical cleanup of the cemetery
was only a part of the activity. The submission of an official workbook
documenting the event was also an essential prerequisite. Norton testified that
his purpose in returning to the project was to take photographs for the official
project workbook. The promulgated form of notebook includes spaces for before
and after photographs. Norton testified that, in his fifty-five years as an
adult volunteer for Boy Scouts of America, he had “never seen an Eagle Scout
project without photographs.” Had he not been seriously injured, Norton asserted
that he would have developed the photographs and delivered them to the scout for
inclusion in the workbook. Accordingly, at the time of the collision, Norton was
participating in the activity of assisting the scout in meeting the Eagle Scout
requirement.

Appellees also argue that Norton was acting outside the scope of his duties
when he returned to the cemetery to take the pictures because scout rules
required the scout to direct the work himself, and the scout did not direct
Norton to photograph the cemetery cleanup. Again, we disagree. Even assuming
that Norton was overzealous in his efforts to “assist” the scout, his purpose
was, nevertheless, to provide that assistance, not to further some personal
purpose. It is only when an employee or agent “steps aside from his employment
to . . . accomplish some purpose of his own” that the act is said to be outside
the scope of employment. City of Miami v. Simpson, 172 So. 2d 435, 437
(Fla. 1965).

As an alternative basis for upholding the trial judge’s conclusion, Appellees
argue that the Excess Endorsement to the policy excludes coverage because
Norton’s vehicle was not in the “actual use of a Scouting Unit” when the
accident occurred. Appellees seem to suggest that coverage is not available
unless the vehicle is being used for an activity in which all of the scouts in
the unit are participating. We think Appellees’ proffered construction is too
narrow. Rather, we conclude that, when a vehicle is used by a Registered
Volunteer while participating in an Official Scout Activity, acting within the
scope of his duties, it is in the “actual use of the Scouting Unit,” as that
phrase is intended in the policy.

REVERSED AND REMANDED. (GRIFFIN and ORFINGER, JJ., concur.)