Labor
relations — Fair Labor Standards Act — Overtime — Former hourly-paid,
full-time paralegals, on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated
employees who were not paid overtime wages, filed complaint against employer
law firm for violations of FLSA, unjust enrichment, and violations of Florida
Whistleblower’s Act — Unjust enrichment — FLSA does not preempt alternatively
pled unjust enrichment claim, where claim for unjust enrichment is intended to
proceed only in the scenario that the FLSA claim fails — Federal Rules permit
a party to plead alternative theory for recovery — Plaintiff is not prevented
from asserting equitable cause of action merely because plaintiff also alleged
an adequate legal remedy; rather, it is the existence of a legal remedy that
bars an equitable cause of action — Florida Rule of Professional Conduct
4-5.4(a), which prohibits lawyers from sharing legal fees with a nonlawyers,
does not prohibit imposition of requested equitable remedy for plaintiffs’
unjust enrichment claim — Rule 4-5.4(a) permits bonuses paid to nonlawyer
employees based on their extraordinary efforts on a particular case or over a
specified time period, and plaintiffs have only asked for imposition of an
equitable construct on defendant’s profits in order to insure that they receive
payment based on their efforts from particular cases in which they assisted —
Unjust enrichment claim survives defendant’s motion to dismiss

VROLET BOTTING, and MELISSA BIEBER, for and on behalf of
themselves and other employees similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CINDY A.
GOLDSTEIN, P.A., Defendant. U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida.
Case No. 15-cv-62113-BLOOM/Valle. December 21, 2015. Beth Bloom, Judge.
Counsel: Michael Gulisano, Law Offices of Michael Gulisano, Coral Springs, for
Plaintiffs. Gina Marie Cadogan, Cadogan Law, Plantation, for Defendant.

ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss, ECF No. [27] (“Motion”), Count II of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended
Complaint, ECF No. [21] (“Amended Complaint”). The Court has carefully reviewed
the Motion, all supporting and opposing filings, including Plaintiffs’
Response, ECF No. [29] (“Response”), and Defendant’s Reply, ECF No. [42]
(“Reply”), as well as the record in this case. For the reasons set forth below,
the Motion is DENIED.

I. Background

On November 10, 2015, Plaintiffs Vrolet Botting and Melissa
Bieber (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”), for and on behalf of themselves and
other employees similarly situated,1 filed their Amended Complaint against
Defendant Cindy A. Goldstein, P.A. (“Defendant,” a law firm), for violations of
the Fair Labor Standards Act (the “FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq.,
and related state law claims. Plaintiff Botting was employed by the Defendant
from approximately August 28, 2012 to February 26, 2015 (Botting’s “Covered
Period”), and Plaintiff Bieber was employed by the Defendant from approximately
October 2012 to January 4, 2014 (Bieber’s “Covered Period”). Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14-15.
Throughout their respective Covered Periods, Plaintiffs worked for Defendant as
hourly-paid, full-time paralegals. Id. ¶¶ 16-18. Defendant scheduled the
Plaintiffs to work five eight-hour shifts or forty (40) total hours per week —
however, Plaintiffs’ shifts for the Defendant usually totaled more than forty
(40) hours per week. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. Throughout the applicable Covered
Periods, Botting worked approximately six hundred (600) hours of overtime and
Bieber worked approximately two hundred (200) hours of overtime — but neither
was compensated for any of this overtime work. Id. ¶¶ 21-23.
Additionally, throughout the Covered Period, Botting accrued twelve (12) days
or ninety-six (96) hours of paid-time-off, which the Defendant did not credit
to her. Id. ¶ 33. Because Botting “should have been able to take those
days off and receive payment, the effect is that the Plaintiff worked without
compensation for ninety-six (96) hours.” Id. ¶¶ 34-35. Accordingly,
Botting is owed approximately $16,752.72, and Bieber is owed approximately
$3,900, not including liquidated damages. Id. ¶¶ 36-37.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant knew or should have known
that employees, like the Plaintiffs, routinely were required to work overtime
in order to accomplish their assigned tasks. Id. ¶ 24. “However, the
Defendant attempted to disclaim any liability for overtime pay, and thus its
obligations under Federal and State law, by including a disclaimer to that
effect in employee handbooks.” Id. ¶ 25. When another employee of Defendant
made FLSA or similar labor-related violations against Defendant during the
Covered Periods, Defendant instituted a mandatory policy requiring all
employees to sign weekly timesheets “certifying” that they had only worked
forty (40) hours, even if they had not. Id. ¶¶ 26-28. Defendant
threatened that any employee who did not adhere to this new policy would be
terminated. Id. ¶ 27. Through this new policy, “Defendant hoped to
manufacture evidence to mask future violations of the FLSA, and to intimidate other
employees against seeking to enforce their legal rights.” Id. ¶ 29.

“Plaintiffs protested against this manifestly unjust
practice by manually writing on the timesheet the overtime they had worked for
that week and adding sarcastic remarks. In response, Goldstein ordered the
Plaintiffs, one at a time, into her office and behind closed door subjected
each Plaintiff to a verbally abusive tirade.” Id. ¶¶ 30-31. Defendant’s
“diatribe included threats of termination if the Plaintiffs ever sought payment
for overtime again or questioned the Defendant’s otherwise questionable
tactics.” Id. ¶ 32.

The Complaint alleges three counts for violations of the
FLSA (Count I)2, unjust enrichment (Count II), and
violations of the Florida Whistleblower’s Act, Fla. Stat. §§ 448.401 et seq.
(Count III). Defendant’s Motion seeks dismissal of Count II, Plaintiffs’
claim for unjust enrichment. Under this Count, Plaintiffs allege that “[u]nless
the Defendant concedes the existence of express contracts covering the labor
they performed, the Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law.” Id. ¶
51. The Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs conferred numerous benefits on the
Defendant — as specified herein, Botting provided the Defendant with 600 hours
of uncompensated overtime labor, and 96 hours of additional uncompensated labor
from vacation time, and Bieber provided the Defendant with 200 hours of uncompensated
overtime labor. Id. ¶ 52. Defendant had knowledge of these benefits,
which conferred a total of $3,000,000.00 in profits, and she voluntarily
accepted and retained them. Id. ¶¶ 53-55. For this reason, Plaintiffs
request that the Court award compensatory damages as well as impose a
constructive trust and an equitable lien on the unfairly-retained profits. Id.
¶ 56.

II. Legal Standard

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules requires a pleading to contain
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although a complaint “does not need
detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007) [20 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S267a]; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
[21 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S853a] (explaining that Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading
standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation”). In the same vein, a complaint may not rest on “ ‘naked
assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (alteration in original)).
These elements are required to survive a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requests dismissal for “failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”

When reviewing a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court, as a
general rule, must accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true and evaluate all
plausible inferences derived from those facts in favor of the plaintiff. See
Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333,
1337 (11th Cir. 2012) [23 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C1508a]; Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. S. Everglades
Restoration Alliance, 304 F.3d 1076, 1084 (11th Cir. 2002) [15
Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C976a]; AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Infinity Fin. Grp., LLC,
608 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2009) [21 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D629a] (“On
a motion to dismiss, the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party, and all facts alleged by the non-moving party are
accepted as true.”). Accordingly, a court considering a Rule 12(b) motion is
generally limited to the facts contained in the complaint and attached
exhibits, including documents referred to in the complaint that are central to
the claim. See Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d
949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009) [21 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C1395a]. However, although a
court is required to accept all of the allegations contained in the complaint
and exhibits attached to the pleadings as true, this tenet is inapplicable to
legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Thaeter v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Office,
449 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir. 2006) [19 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C561a]. The
Supreme Court was clear that courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Through this lens, the Court addresses the instant Motion.

III. Discussion

Defendant presents two bases for dismissal of Plaintiffs’
ancillary state law claim for unjust enrichment: first, the FLSA provides an
adequate remedy at law for the violations alleged and, thus, preempts Count II;
and second, Florida Rule of Professional Conduct 4-5.4(a) prohibits Plaintiffs
from seeking imposition of a constructive trust and equitable lien on the
firm’s profits, because they are nonlawyers.3 Plaintiffs counter that they have
appropriately pled unjust enrichment in the alternative. Moreover, they argue
that the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct are inapplicable to their
requested equitable remedies.

A.
The FLSA does not preempt alternatively pled unjust enrichment claim

“At the core of the law of restitution and unjust enrichment
is the principle that a party who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of
another is required to make restitution to the other.” City of Miami v. Bank of America Corp., 800
F.3d 1262, 1287 (11th Cir. Sept. 1, 2015) [25 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C1551a]
(quoting Gonzalez v. Eagle Ins. Co., 948 So.2d 1, 3
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) [31 Fla. L. Weekly D2287a]). “There are three
elements of an unjust enrichment claim under Florida law: first, the plaintiff
has conferred a benefit on the defendant; second, the defendant voluntarily
accepted and retained that benefit; and, finally, the circumstances are such
that it would be inequitable for the defendants to retain the benefit without
paying for it.” Id.

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs cannot maintain a claim for
unjust enrichment because an adequate legal remedy in this case stems from the
FLSA. Section 216(b) of the FLSA, which authorizes private causes of action
against employers for violations of the FLSA, affords remedies to a successful
plaintiff:

Any
employer who violates the provisions of section . . . 207 . . . shall be liable
to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum
wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an
additional equal amount as liquidated damages. . . . The court in such action
shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs,
allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the
action.

29 U.S.C. § 216(b); see Snapp v. Unlimited Concepts, Inc.,
208 F.3d 928, 930-31 (11th Cir. April 5, 2000). Although some cases support
Defendant’s position, others hold that an unjust enrichment claim is barred
only where the plaintiff has a contractual legal remedy. Compare Bule
v. Garda CL Southeast, Inc., 2014 WL 3501546, at *2 (S.D. Fla. July 14,
2014) (“[U]njust enrichment is only available when there is no adequate remedy
at law.”), and Matthews v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 2012 WL 2520675,
at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 6, 2012) (same), with State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Physicians Injury Care Ctr., Inc., 427 Fed. App’x 714, 722 (11th Cir.
2011) (“It is generally true that equitable remedies are not available under
Florida law when adequate legal remedies exist. However, that rule does not
apply to unjust enrichment claims. It is only upon a showing that an express
contract exists . . . that the unjust enrichment . . . count fails.”)
(citations omitted), and Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dade Cnty. Esoil Mgmt. Co.,
982 F. Supp. 873, 880 (S.D. Fla.1997) (same).

“At this time, the Court need not attempt to reconcile these
views,” Muzuco v. Re$ubmitIt, LLC, 2012 WL 3242013, at *8 (S.D. Fla.
Aug. 7, 2012), because the Federal Rules permit a party to plead alternative
theories for recovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(3) (relief sought “may
include relief in the alternative or different types of relief”); Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(d) (3) (“A party may state as many separate claims or defenses as it has,
regardless of consistency”). Thus, “while a plaintiff may not recover under
both legal and equitable theories, there is no basis for dispensing with
Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim at the motion to dismiss stage.” Muzuco,
2012 WL 3242013, at *8; see, e.g., Wiand v. EFG Bank, 2012 WL
750447, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2012) (denying motion to dismiss unjust
enrichment claim because “alternative pleading is permitted by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure”); Adelphia Cable Partners, Inc. v. E & A
Beepers Corp., 188 F.R.D. 662, 666 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (King, J.) (“Although
equitable relief ultimately may not be awarded where there exists an adequate
remedy at law, Plaintiff certainly may plead alternative equitable relief.”).
In other words, “[a] plaintiff is not prevented from asserting an equitable
cause of action merely because the plaintiff also alleged an adequate legal
remedy. Rather, it is the existence of a legal remedy that bars an equitable
cause of action.” Intercoastal Realty, Inc. v. Tracy, 706 F. Supp. 2d
1325, 1331 (S.D. Fla. 2010). Therefore, until or unless an adequate remedy at
law is proved, dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claim is premature. See Karhu v.
Vital Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2013 WL 4047016, at *8-9 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 9,
2013) (finding that plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim survived defendant’s
motion to dismiss because no express contract had yet been proven); Mobil
Oil Corp., 982 F. Supp. at 880; ThunderWave, Inc. v. Carnival Corp.,
954 F. Supp. 1562, 1566 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 1997); cf. Avery v. City of
Talladega, Ala., 24 F.3d 1337, 1348 (11th Cir. 1994) (addressing question
of whether the FLSA preempts a state law contract claim where the contract in
question explicitly provides that employees will be paid overtime in accordance
with the FLSA).

Defendant relies almost exclusively on Bule, which is
easily distinguishable from the instant facts as it involved a plaintiff who
attempted to maintain three state law claims, including a claim for unjust
enrichment, in addition to an FLSA claim, all with the same underlying
allegations. 2014 WL 3501546, at *2. In contrast, here, Plaintiffs bring a
claim for unjust enrichment in the alternative to their FLSA claim, to proceed
only in the scenario that the FLSA claim fails. Thus, the Court has none of the
same policy considerations in attempting to prevent an “end-run” around the
claims and procedures set forth in the FLSA, which would result in double
recovery. Id. (finding that unjust enrichment claim must be dismissed
where it was “predicated on defendant’s alleged failure to compensate
[plaintiff] for hours worked in excess of 40 hours; a requirement imposed by
the FLSA and the FLSA provides the exclusive remedy for violation of its
mandates”) (quoting Botello v. COI Telecom, LLC, 2010 WL 3784202, at *4
(W.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2010)) (alterations adopted). Indeed, Plaintiffs in this
action intend to avail themselves of the FLSA statutory framework, should their
allegations prove sufficient.

Other courts in the Eleventh Circuit that have found FLSA
preclusion of a state law claim have done so at a later stage in the
litigation, faced with proof rather than allegations. See Alexander v. Vesta
Ins. Grp., Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1240-41 (N.D. Ala. 2001) (on summary
judgment, holding that the FLSA preempted plaintiffs’ fraud claim, because
plaintiffs were merely recasting their FLSA claims as state law claims in order
to obtain additional damages); Tombrello v. USX Corp., 763 F. Supp. 541,
545 (N.D. Ala. 1991) (on summary judgment, holding that the FLSA preempted
plaintiff’s wage and invasion of privacy claims); cf. Healthcare Appraisers,
Inc. v. Healthcare FMV Advisors, LLC, 2011 WL 4591960, at *10 (S.D. Fla.
Sept. 30, 2011) (“Again, the Court agrees with the Plaintiff that this argument
is premature. If it is determined at a later time that there are no trade
secrets, than it would follow that the unjust enrichment claim would not be
based on a misappropriation of trade secrets and should not be displaced.
Therefore, this argument is more properly asserted at summary judgment.
Dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim at this juncture is denied.”); Court-appointed
Receiver of Lancer Management Group LLC v. Lauer, 2008 WL 906274, *6 (S.D.
Fla. 2008) (“Until an express contract is proven, a motion to dismiss a claim
for unjust enrichment on these grounds is premature”). But see Herazo v.
Whole Foods Market, Inc., 2015 WL 4514510, at *2-3 (S.D. Fla. July 24,
2015) (dismissing unjust enrichment claim at pleading stage because plaintiffs’
purchase of defendant’s products formed the basis of an undisputed contract,
and “[a]n unjust enrichment claim can only be pled in the alternative if one or
more of the parties contest the existence or validity of an express contract
governing the subject of the dispute”).

However, it is important to note that, although a plaintiff
may allege inconsistent theories in the alternative, this practice may pose a
jurisdictional issue where one of the alternative theories would not confer
jurisdiction standing alone. If Plaintiffs’ FLSA claim fails, federal question
jurisdiction would be removed from this action, and the Court would be left
with two in-state parties litigating two state law claims. In such a situation,
the factors set forth by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) would likely counsel against the
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.4 See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v.
Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988) (“When federal law claims have dropped
out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the
federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing the
case without prejudice.”); Ameritox v. Millenium Laboratories, Inc., 803
F.3d, 518, 541 (11th Cir. Sept. 3, 2015) [25 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C1570a]
(quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351 (1988))
(“The doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction is ‘designed to enable courts to
handle cases involving state-law claims in the way that will best accommodate
the values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity’ and to allow ‘the
Judicial Branch . . . to shape and apply the doctrine in that light.’ ”); United
Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“Needless
decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to
promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed
reading of applicable law.”); Baggett v. First Nat. Bank of Gainesville,
117 F.3d 1342, 1353 (11th Cir. 1997) (“State courts, not federal courts, should
be the final arbiters of state law.”). Nevertheless, at this juncture, the
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction remains unaffected.

B.
Florida Rule of Professional Conduct 4-5.4(a) does not prohibit imposition of
equitable remedies

Defendant argues that Florida Rule of Professional Conduct
4-5.4(a) prohibits Plaintiffs’ requested remedy for their unjust enrichment
claim, as it prohibits lawyers from sharing legal fees with nonlawyers. See Am.
Compl. at 7 (requesting that the Court enter judgment by “(a) impressing a
constructive trust on the proceeds received from each settlement the Plaintiffs
worked on; (b) imposing an equitable lien on the proceeds received from each
settlement the Plaintiffs worked on; and (c) subrogating the Defendant’s
interest in the proceeds received from each settlement the Plaintiffs worked on
to the rights of the Plaintiffs as obligees or lien holders in those proceeds,”
in addition to awarding compensatory damages and costs). Rule 4-5.4(a),
entitled Professional Independence of a Lawyer, dictates that “[a] lawyer or
law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer.” Fla. R. Prof. Cond.
4-5.4(a). However, Plaintiffs argue that one of the exceptions incorporated
into this Rule applies under the present facts. See id. Rule 4-5.4(a)(4)
states that “bonuses may be paid to nonlawyer employees for work performed, and
may be based on their extraordinary efforts on a particular case or over a
specified time period,” but may not be based on “cases or clients brought to
the lawyer or law firm by the actions of the nonlawyer” and may not be
“calculated as a percentage of legal fees received by the lawyer or law firm.” Id.

Defendant responds that because it never agreed to pay a
bonus to either Plaintiff, application of the exception set forth in Rule
4-5.4(a)(4) would, “essentially, devise an agreement which never existed.”
Reply at 5. However, the only case that Defendant sets forth in support
of this argument is inapposite. See In re Block, 496 So.2d 133, 135
(Fla. 1986) (finding violation of the code of professional responsibility where
Judge paid employees of his law practice a percentage of fees that he had
earned). Plaintiffs have not requested bonuses based on cases or clients that
they brought to the firm themselves, nor have they requested that any relief be
calculated as a percentage of legal fees received by Defendant. Rather, they
have asked for imposition of an equitable construct on Defendant’s profits in
order to ensure that they receive payment based on their efforts from
particular cases in which they assisted. As articulated above, Rule 4-5.1(a)(4)
permits bonuses paid to nonlawyer employees “based on their extraordinary
efforts on a particular case or over a specified time period.” Fla. R. Prof.
Cond. 4-5.4(a). For this reason, Defendant’s argument must be rejected.5 However, the Court notes that,
although Defendant presents no valid arguments for dismissal, further analysis
of these remedies will be required if Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim
withstands additional stages of the litigation.

IV. Conclusion

As Defendant has failed to provide any other argument for
dismissal, Count II of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint survives Defendant’s
Motion. Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss, ECF No. [27], is DENIED. Defendant is directed to respond to
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, ECF No. [21], no later than January 8,
2015.

__________________

1Plaintiffs bring the instant action
for and on behalf of themselves and other employees similarly situated (the
“Proposed Collective”). Am. Compl. ¶ 38. The Proposed Collective consists of
paralegals employed by the Defendant between 2012 and the present and who were
not paid overtime wages as a result of the Defendant’s policies, described
below. Id. ¶ 39.

2Count I seeks relief in the form of
Plaintiffs’ unpaid “overtime compensation, liquidated damages, reasonable
attorney’s fees, and the costs of this action.” Id. ¶ 49.

3Defendant actually seeks sanctions
as punishment for Plaintiffs’ inclusion of this “preposterous” allegation.
Motion at 4. Because the Court finds that Defendant’s request in this regard is
equally preposterous — and unsupported — it is denied.

4Determining whether the Court has
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims “entails a two-step inquiry
where the Court must first determine whether it can exercise its supplemental
jurisdiction and then whether it should exercise that jurisdiction.” Woodard
v. Town of Oakman, Ala., 970 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1275 (S.D. Ala. 2013)
(citing Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper Fund, Inc. v. City of
Atlanta, 701 F.3d 669, 679 n.7 (11th Cir. 2012) [23 Fla. L.
Weekly Fed. C1689a]) (emphasis added). Under §1367(c), the Court has
“discretion not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction . . . in four
situations.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). These include whether: “(1) the claim raises
a novel or complex issue of state law; (2) the claim substantially predominates
over the claim or claims over which the district court has original
jurisdiction; (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction; or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other
compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” Id. “Any one of the
§1367(c) factors is sufficient to give the district court discretion to dismiss
a case’s supplemental state law claims.” Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 468
F.3d 733, 743 (11th Cir. 2006) [20 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C60a].

5Nevertheless, the Court notes that
imposition of a constructive trust, which gives a plaintiff title to an asset
— as opposed to imposition of an equitable lien, which merely gives a
plaintiff a lien on an asset — is likely inappropriate under the circumstances
presented in this case.

* *
*