41 Fla. L. Weekly S91aTop of Form
Torts
— Premises liability — Appeals — Limitation on appellate court’s review when
determining whether a complaint states a cause of action — Sufficiency of a
complaint to state a cause of action must be determined solely by examination
of the complaint and its related attachments — In reversing trial court’s
denial of defendant’s motion to set aside a default on ground that complaint
failed to state a cause of action because property on which plaintiff was
injured was not owned by defendant at time of accident, appellate court
erroneously examined a separate consolidated complaint to determine that the
property in question was not owned by defendant at time of accident — Trial
court properly denied motion to set aside default upon finding that defendant
did not establish excusable neglect
— Premises liability — Appeals — Limitation on appellate court’s review when
determining whether a complaint states a cause of action — Sufficiency of a
complaint to state a cause of action must be determined solely by examination
of the complaint and its related attachments — In reversing trial court’s
denial of defendant’s motion to set aside a default on ground that complaint
failed to state a cause of action because property on which plaintiff was
injured was not owned by defendant at time of accident, appellate court
erroneously examined a separate consolidated complaint to determine that the
property in question was not owned by defendant at time of accident — Trial
court properly denied motion to set aside default upon finding that defendant
did not establish excusable neglect
ANAMARIA SANTIAGO, Petitioner, v. MAUNA LOA INVESTMENTS,
LLC, Respondent. Supreme Court of Florida. Case No. SC13-2194. March 17, 2016.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Direct
Conflict of Decisions. Third District – Case No. 3D12-1825 (Miami-Dade County).
Counsel: Gregory Alan Moore of Gregory A. Moore, P.A., Miami; Carlos Cruanes of
the Law Offices of Carlos Cruanes, P.A., Miami; and Celene Harrell Humphries,
Tracy Sue Carlin, and Sarah C. Pellenbarg of Brannock & Humphries, Tampa,
for Petitioner. Dorothy Frances Easley of Easley Appellate Practice, PLLC,
Miami, for Respondent.
LLC, Respondent. Supreme Court of Florida. Case No. SC13-2194. March 17, 2016.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Direct
Conflict of Decisions. Third District – Case No. 3D12-1825 (Miami-Dade County).
Counsel: Gregory Alan Moore of Gregory A. Moore, P.A., Miami; Carlos Cruanes of
the Law Offices of Carlos Cruanes, P.A., Miami; and Celene Harrell Humphries,
Tracy Sue Carlin, and Sarah C. Pellenbarg of Brannock & Humphries, Tampa,
for Petitioner. Dorothy Frances Easley of Easley Appellate Practice, PLLC,
Miami, for Respondent.
(CANADY, J.) In this case, Petitioner Anamaria Santiago
seeks review of the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Mauna Loa Investments, LLC v. Santiago, 122
So. 3d 520, 521 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013), a premises liability case. Petitioner
correctly contends that the district court’s decision expressly and directly
conflicts with decisions of this Court and other district courts of appeal
regarding the limitations on a court’s review when determining whether a
complaint states a cause of action. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, §
3(b)(3), Fla. Const. The district court held that Santiago’s complaint failed
to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted and reversed. Mauna
Loa Inv., 122 So. 3d at 521. Because the district court improperly
considered documents outside the complaint in determining the complaint’s
sufficiency to state a cause of action, we quash the Third District’s decision.
seeks review of the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Mauna Loa Investments, LLC v. Santiago, 122
So. 3d 520, 521 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013), a premises liability case. Petitioner
correctly contends that the district court’s decision expressly and directly
conflicts with decisions of this Court and other district courts of appeal
regarding the limitations on a court’s review when determining whether a
complaint states a cause of action. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, §
3(b)(3), Fla. Const. The district court held that Santiago’s complaint failed
to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted and reversed. Mauna
Loa Inv., 122 So. 3d at 521. Because the district court improperly
considered documents outside the complaint in determining the complaint’s
sufficiency to state a cause of action, we quash the Third District’s decision.
BACKGROUND
The relevant facts of this case are as follows:
[Petitioner]
Santiago leased space for her business in a commercial warehouse property
located at 9325 Okeechobee Road, Hialeah Gardens (the “property”). In February
2010, Santiago filed suit against Mauna [Loa Investments, LLC], alleging that
she was injured on July 2, 2008, when she tripped and fell on the property “due
to the walkway surface being in an unsafe condition; specifically that the
concrete walkway was allowed to be in a condition of disrepair wherein holes
and uneven areas where [sic] created and caused the Plaintiff to lose her
footing and fall.” Santiago alleged that [at all times] Mauna owned, maintained
and/or controlled the property on the date of her injury. The complaint was
served on Mauna’s registered agent, Mawanphy Gil (“Gil”). Although Gil gave the
complaint to Mauna’s attorney, Mauna’s attorney never filed an answer or
response. Santiago filed a motion for entry of default on May 5, 2010, and the
trial court entered a default against Mauna on May 13, 2010.
Santiago leased space for her business in a commercial warehouse property
located at 9325 Okeechobee Road, Hialeah Gardens (the “property”). In February
2010, Santiago filed suit against Mauna [Loa Investments, LLC], alleging that
she was injured on July 2, 2008, when she tripped and fell on the property “due
to the walkway surface being in an unsafe condition; specifically that the
concrete walkway was allowed to be in a condition of disrepair wherein holes
and uneven areas where [sic] created and caused the Plaintiff to lose her
footing and fall.” Santiago alleged that [at all times] Mauna owned, maintained
and/or controlled the property on the date of her injury. The complaint was
served on Mauna’s registered agent, Mawanphy Gil (“Gil”). Although Gil gave the
complaint to Mauna’s attorney, Mauna’s attorney never filed an answer or
response. Santiago filed a motion for entry of default on May 5, 2010, and the
trial court entered a default against Mauna on May 13, 2010.
Id. at 521. Mauna Loa Investments, LLC
(Mauna) sought a number of times to vacate the default entered on Santiago’s
Mauna Complaint but was denied each time.
(Mauna) sought a number of times to vacate the default entered on Santiago’s
Mauna Complaint but was denied each time.
In June 2011, Santiago filed a complaint in a separate
action against Iberia, NV, LLC, in which she sought damages for the same injury
occurring on the same property. Santiago alleged three counts of negligence and
a fourth count of fraudulent transfer of the property. The complaint (Iberia
Complaint) asserted that Iberia, and others, owned, maintained, and/or
controlled the property at the time of the injury. The complaint acknowledged
that ownership of the warehouse property was not conveyed to Mauna by special
warranty deed until October 6, 2008, three months after Santiago’s fall and
injury and the three counts for negligence in the Iberia Complaint did not
include Mauna. A copy of the warranty deed was attached to the complaint.
Santiago’s Iberia case was subsequently consolidated with Santiago’s suit
against Mauna in September 2011.
action against Iberia, NV, LLC, in which she sought damages for the same injury
occurring on the same property. Santiago alleged three counts of negligence and
a fourth count of fraudulent transfer of the property. The complaint (Iberia
Complaint) asserted that Iberia, and others, owned, maintained, and/or
controlled the property at the time of the injury. The complaint acknowledged
that ownership of the warehouse property was not conveyed to Mauna by special
warranty deed until October 6, 2008, three months after Santiago’s fall and
injury and the three counts for negligence in the Iberia Complaint did not
include Mauna. A copy of the warranty deed was attached to the complaint.
Santiago’s Iberia case was subsequently consolidated with Santiago’s suit
against Mauna in September 2011.
In November 2011, Mauna once again filed an amended motion
to set aside the 2010 default on the Mauna Complaint. Mauna attached to its
motion Santiago’s Iberia Complaint with its attached special warranty deed. The
set-aside motion alleged that Santiago’s previously filed Mauna Complaint
misrepresented that Mauna owned, maintained and/or controlled the warehouse
property, and that the later filed Iberia Complaint thus constituted Santiago’s
admission that her prior allegations in the Mauna Complaint were false. Mauna
contended that Santiago made knowing misrepresentations that provided Mauna
with a meritorious defense and grounds for setting aside the default. Santiago
subsequently voluntarily dismissed without prejudice the Iberia Complaint.
Ultimately, the circuit court denied Mauna’s motion and prohibited Mauna from
filing further pleadings to vacate the default.
to set aside the 2010 default on the Mauna Complaint. Mauna attached to its
motion Santiago’s Iberia Complaint with its attached special warranty deed. The
set-aside motion alleged that Santiago’s previously filed Mauna Complaint
misrepresented that Mauna owned, maintained and/or controlled the warehouse
property, and that the later filed Iberia Complaint thus constituted Santiago’s
admission that her prior allegations in the Mauna Complaint were false. Mauna
contended that Santiago made knowing misrepresentations that provided Mauna
with a meritorious defense and grounds for setting aside the default. Santiago
subsequently voluntarily dismissed without prejudice the Iberia Complaint.
Ultimately, the circuit court denied Mauna’s motion and prohibited Mauna from
filing further pleadings to vacate the default.
In January 2012, Mauna moved for summary judgment, alleging two
bases: (1) that a default order is void when a default is entered on a premises
liability claim based on a trip and fall for failing to maintain a walkway over
which the corporation has no control; and (2) that Santiago’s complaint
incorrectly alleged her injuries resulted from a trip and fall. Mauna alleged
the injuries actually resulted from a statue that Santiago was transporting
falling on her in a common area outside her business. The new trial judge
denied that motion and another of Mauna’s motions to set aside the default
judgment. The court also prohibited Mauna from filing further motions to vacate
the default judgment. After a trial solely on damages, the jury found for
Santiago. Accordingly, in June 2012, the trial court entered final judgment
against Mauna for $1,099,874.48 and denied Mauna’s remaining motions.
bases: (1) that a default order is void when a default is entered on a premises
liability claim based on a trip and fall for failing to maintain a walkway over
which the corporation has no control; and (2) that Santiago’s complaint
incorrectly alleged her injuries resulted from a trip and fall. Mauna alleged
the injuries actually resulted from a statue that Santiago was transporting
falling on her in a common area outside her business. The new trial judge
denied that motion and another of Mauna’s motions to set aside the default
judgment. The court also prohibited Mauna from filing further motions to vacate
the default judgment. After a trial solely on damages, the jury found for
Santiago. Accordingly, in June 2012, the trial court entered final judgment
against Mauna for $1,099,874.48 and denied Mauna’s remaining motions.
On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal addressed the
trial court’s denial of Mauna’s amended motion to set aside the default. In
that motion, Mauna argued that it did not own, control, or maintain the
property on the date of Santiago’s injury. The argument relied on Santiago’s
voluntarily dismissed Iberia Complaint and the special warranty deed, both of
which were attached to Mauna’s motion to dismiss. On Santiago’s motion for rehearing,
the Third District explained its reversal of the circuit court’s order on the
ground that Santiago’s Mauna Complaint failed to state a cause of action as
follows:
trial court’s denial of Mauna’s amended motion to set aside the default. In
that motion, Mauna argued that it did not own, control, or maintain the
property on the date of Santiago’s injury. The argument relied on Santiago’s
voluntarily dismissed Iberia Complaint and the special warranty deed, both of
which were attached to Mauna’s motion to dismiss. On Santiago’s motion for rehearing,
the Third District explained its reversal of the circuit court’s order on the
ground that Santiago’s Mauna Complaint failed to state a cause of action as
follows:
At
the time Mauna filed the Amended Motion, the trial court had before it the
special warranty deed, which was attached to the consolidated Iberia Complaint.
The special warranty deed established that Mauna did not own the property on
the date of Santiago’s injury. Santiago also admitted that Iberia owned,
controlled and maintained the property at that time. These facts precluded a
claim for relief against Mauna relating to the property based on the alleged
injury on that date. As the record before the trial court established that
Santiago failed to state a claim for relief against Mauna, the trial court had
no discretion but to grant the Amended Motion and set aside the default as
void. Accordingly, because the final judgment was based upon the prior invalid
default, the trial court erred in failing to grant Mauna’s motion to vacate the
judgment as void.
the time Mauna filed the Amended Motion, the trial court had before it the
special warranty deed, which was attached to the consolidated Iberia Complaint.
The special warranty deed established that Mauna did not own the property on
the date of Santiago’s injury. Santiago also admitted that Iberia owned,
controlled and maintained the property at that time. These facts precluded a
claim for relief against Mauna relating to the property based on the alleged
injury on that date. As the record before the trial court established that
Santiago failed to state a claim for relief against Mauna, the trial court had
no discretion but to grant the Amended Motion and set aside the default as
void. Accordingly, because the final judgment was based upon the prior invalid
default, the trial court erred in failing to grant Mauna’s motion to vacate the
judgment as void.
For
the reasons stated, we reverse the order denying Mauna’s motion to vacate the
judgment as void, and remand with directions to vacate the default and the
final judgment and to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
the reasons stated, we reverse the order denying Mauna’s motion to vacate the
judgment as void, and remand with directions to vacate the default and the
final judgment and to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
Mauna Loa Inv., 122 So. 3d at 522-23
(footnote and citations omitted).
(footnote and citations omitted).
ANALYSIS
In the instant case, the Third District Court of Appeal
reversed the judgment and vacated the default upon holding that Santiago’s
Mauna Complaint failed to state a cause of action. Id. at 523. As
explained above, the district court reached this conclusion based on its
consideration of the complaint in the Iberia case, which for a time was
consolidated with the Mauna case. We granted review to resolve a conflict
between the Third District’s decision in this case and decisions from this
Court and other district courts of appeal regarding the limitations on a
court’s review of the pleadings in determining the sufficiency of a complaint
to state a cause of action. We resolve the conflict issue presented and
reaffirm the longstanding limitations on determining the sufficiency of a
complaint. We have jurisdiction to address the conflict issue and any
additional issues raised in light of our grant of review in this case. Cf.
Fulton Cty. Adm’r v. Sullivan, 753 So. 2d 549, 553 at n.3 (Fla. 1999)
(“Given our jurisdiction on the basis of the certified question, we have
jurisdiction over all of the issues raised in this case.”). We thus conclude
that the district court erred in holding that the Mauna Complaint failed to
state a cause of action. We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in determining that Santiago failed to establish excusable
neglect.
reversed the judgment and vacated the default upon holding that Santiago’s
Mauna Complaint failed to state a cause of action. Id. at 523. As
explained above, the district court reached this conclusion based on its
consideration of the complaint in the Iberia case, which for a time was
consolidated with the Mauna case. We granted review to resolve a conflict
between the Third District’s decision in this case and decisions from this
Court and other district courts of appeal regarding the limitations on a
court’s review of the pleadings in determining the sufficiency of a complaint
to state a cause of action. We resolve the conflict issue presented and
reaffirm the longstanding limitations on determining the sufficiency of a
complaint. We have jurisdiction to address the conflict issue and any
additional issues raised in light of our grant of review in this case. Cf.
Fulton Cty. Adm’r v. Sullivan, 753 So. 2d 549, 553 at n.3 (Fla. 1999)
(“Given our jurisdiction on the basis of the certified question, we have
jurisdiction over all of the issues raised in this case.”). We thus conclude
that the district court erred in holding that the Mauna Complaint failed to
state a cause of action. We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in determining that Santiago failed to establish excusable
neglect.
Before we turn to a discussion of these two issues, we also
note that the district court erred in concluding that a judgment based on a
complaint that fails to state a cause of action is void rather than voidable. See
Bank of N. Y. Mellon v. Condo. Ass’n of La Mer Estates, Inc., 175 So. 3d
282, 285 (Fla. 2015).1
note that the district court erred in concluding that a judgment based on a
complaint that fails to state a cause of action is void rather than voidable. See
Bank of N. Y. Mellon v. Condo. Ass’n of La Mer Estates, Inc., 175 So. 3d
282, 285 (Fla. 2015).1
Sufficiency
to State a Cause of Action
to State a Cause of Action
When a court determines the sufficiency of a complaint to
state a cause of action, it applies the so-called “four corners rule” in the
analysis. Under this rule, the court’s review is limited to an examination
solely of the complaint and its attachments. The conflict decisions in this
case illustrate the application of this rule. In Pizzi v. Central Bank &
Trust Co., 250 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 1971), we examined a complaint de novo to
determine whether it satisfied the requirements of Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.110 to state a cause of action. In our review, we applied the standard
of “[w]hether, if the factual allegations of the complaint are established by
proof or otherwise, the plaintiff will be legally or equitably entitled to the
claimed relief against the defendant.” Pizzi, 250 So. 2d at 896 (quoting
Hankins v. Title & Trust Co., 169 So. 2d 526, 528 (Fla. 1st DCA
1964)). In making the determination, we “ ‘confine[d] [our review] strictly to
the allegations within the four corners of the complaint.’ ” Id. at 897
(quoting Kest v. Nathanson, 216 So. 2d 233, 235 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968)); see
McWhirter, Reeves, McGothlin, Davidson, Rief & Bakas, P.A., 704 So. 2d
214, 215 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (“[I]n ruling on a motion to dismiss a complaint
for failure to state a cause of action, the trial court must confine itself
strictly to the allegations within the four corners of the complaint.”).
Because the court had not so limited its review in Pizzi, we quashed the
district court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. 250 So. 2d at
897.
state a cause of action, it applies the so-called “four corners rule” in the
analysis. Under this rule, the court’s review is limited to an examination
solely of the complaint and its attachments. The conflict decisions in this
case illustrate the application of this rule. In Pizzi v. Central Bank &
Trust Co., 250 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 1971), we examined a complaint de novo to
determine whether it satisfied the requirements of Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.110 to state a cause of action. In our review, we applied the standard
of “[w]hether, if the factual allegations of the complaint are established by
proof or otherwise, the plaintiff will be legally or equitably entitled to the
claimed relief against the defendant.” Pizzi, 250 So. 2d at 896 (quoting
Hankins v. Title & Trust Co., 169 So. 2d 526, 528 (Fla. 1st DCA
1964)). In making the determination, we “ ‘confine[d] [our review] strictly to
the allegations within the four corners of the complaint.’ ” Id. at 897
(quoting Kest v. Nathanson, 216 So. 2d 233, 235 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968)); see
McWhirter, Reeves, McGothlin, Davidson, Rief & Bakas, P.A., 704 So. 2d
214, 215 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (“[I]n ruling on a motion to dismiss a complaint
for failure to state a cause of action, the trial court must confine itself
strictly to the allegations within the four corners of the complaint.”).
Because the court had not so limited its review in Pizzi, we quashed the
district court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. 250 So. 2d at
897.
Similarly, in Rhodes v. O. Turner & Co., 117 So. 3d
872, 874 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013), receded from on other grounds in Condominium
Ass’n of La Mer Estates, Inc. v. Bank of N. Y. Mellon Corp., 137 So. 3d 396
(Fla. 4th DCA 2014), Rhodes filed a complaint for civil theft, fraud, and
breach of fiduciary duty, and a default was entered when the defendants did not
answer. The trial court, however, vacated the default judgment after finding
the complaint did not state a cause of action. Rhodes, 117 So. 3d at
874. On appeal, the Fourth District Court examined “the four corners of the
complaint” and found that the circuit court committed a gross abuse of
discretion by incorrectly determining that one of the counts in the complaint
failed to state a cause of action. Id. at 877. Accordingly, the district
court reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the final judgment on that
count.
872, 874 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013), receded from on other grounds in Condominium
Ass’n of La Mer Estates, Inc. v. Bank of N. Y. Mellon Corp., 137 So. 3d 396
(Fla. 4th DCA 2014), Rhodes filed a complaint for civil theft, fraud, and
breach of fiduciary duty, and a default was entered when the defendants did not
answer. The trial court, however, vacated the default judgment after finding
the complaint did not state a cause of action. Rhodes, 117 So. 3d at
874. On appeal, the Fourth District Court examined “the four corners of the
complaint” and found that the circuit court committed a gross abuse of
discretion by incorrectly determining that one of the counts in the complaint
failed to state a cause of action. Id. at 877. Accordingly, the district
court reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the final judgment on that
count.
Although the “four-corners rule” limits a court’s review in
determining the complaint’s sufficiency, it does not limit it only to the body
of the written complaint. Rule 1.130(b), provides that “[a]ny exhibit attached
to a pleading shall be considered a part thereof for all purposes.” See
Ginsberg v. Lennar Fla. Holdings, Inc., 645 So. 2d 490, 494 (Fla. 3d DCA
1994) (“When a party attaches exhibits to the complaint[,] those exhibits
become part of the pleading[,] and the court will review those exhibits
accordingly.”). In Paladin Properties v. Family Investment Enterp., 952
So. 2d 560, 563-64 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), the district court explained as follows:
determining the complaint’s sufficiency, it does not limit it only to the body
of the written complaint. Rule 1.130(b), provides that “[a]ny exhibit attached
to a pleading shall be considered a part thereof for all purposes.” See
Ginsberg v. Lennar Fla. Holdings, Inc., 645 So. 2d 490, 494 (Fla. 3d DCA
1994) (“When a party attaches exhibits to the complaint[,] those exhibits
become part of the pleading[,] and the court will review those exhibits
accordingly.”). In Paladin Properties v. Family Investment Enterp., 952
So. 2d 560, 563-64 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), the district court explained as follows:
It
is true that exhibits attached to a complaint become part of the complaint and
will be considered together with it. It is also true that exhibits attached to
a complaint control over the allegations of the complaint when the two
contradict each other. However, the alleged contradiction must be apparent from
the face of the complaint and the exhibits. Moreover, for exhibits to serve as
a basis for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the
exhibits must actually negate the cause of action — not simply raise possible
defenses to it.
is true that exhibits attached to a complaint become part of the complaint and
will be considered together with it. It is also true that exhibits attached to
a complaint control over the allegations of the complaint when the two
contradict each other. However, the alleged contradiction must be apparent from
the face of the complaint and the exhibits. Moreover, for exhibits to serve as
a basis for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the
exhibits must actually negate the cause of action — not simply raise possible
defenses to it.
(Citations omitted.) Thus, review for the sufficiency of a
complaint to state a cause of action is limited solely to the complaint at
issue and its attachments.
complaint to state a cause of action is limited solely to the complaint at
issue and its attachments.
In this case, the Iberia Complaint with its warranty deed
attachment was in no wise a part of the Mauna Complaint. The two complaints
were filed separately under different case numbers. They were, for a time,
consolidated in the trial court, and apparently for this reason, the district
court in review did not limit its determination of the sufficiency of the Mauna
Complaint to state a cause of action solely to a review of that complaint.
Instead, the district court at the same time examined the separate Iberia
Complaint and its attached warranty deed and found the claims conflicted with
the wholly separate Mauna Complaint. The district court concluded that Santiago
admitted in the Iberia Complaint “that Iberia owned, controlled[,] and
maintained the property at [the relevant] time,” thus “preclud[ing] a claim for
relief against Mauna [in the Mauna Complaint] relating to the property based on
the alleged injury on that date.” Mauna Loa Inv., 122 So. 3d at 523.
attachment was in no wise a part of the Mauna Complaint. The two complaints
were filed separately under different case numbers. They were, for a time,
consolidated in the trial court, and apparently for this reason, the district
court in review did not limit its determination of the sufficiency of the Mauna
Complaint to state a cause of action solely to a review of that complaint.
Instead, the district court at the same time examined the separate Iberia
Complaint and its attached warranty deed and found the claims conflicted with
the wholly separate Mauna Complaint. The district court concluded that Santiago
admitted in the Iberia Complaint “that Iberia owned, controlled[,] and
maintained the property at [the relevant] time,” thus “preclud[ing] a claim for
relief against Mauna [in the Mauna Complaint] relating to the property based on
the alleged injury on that date.” Mauna Loa Inv., 122 So. 3d at 523.
The district court’s examination of one complaint and its
attachments to determine the sufficiency of a separate complaint to state a
cause of action clearly contravenes the longstanding four-corners rule
explained above. And to the extent that the district court reached this
conclusion based on the consolidation of the cases, the district court also
improperly merged the Mauna and Iberia Complaints. “Consolidation does not
merge suits into a single cause or change the rights of the parties, or make
those who are parties in one suit parties in another. Rather, each suit
maintains its independent status with respect to the rights of the parties
involved.” Shores Supply Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 524 So. 2d
722, 725 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (quoting Wagner v. Nova Univ., Inc., 397 So.
2d 375, 377 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)). The separate complaints were no more than an
instance of alternative pleading, a routine practice under the civil rules of
procedure. See, e.g., Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b) (providing that “[r]elief
in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded”); Fla. R.
Civ. P. 1.110(g) (“A pleader may set up in the same action as many claims or
causes of action or defenses in the same right as the pleader has, and claims
for relief may be stated in the alternative if separate items make up the cause
or action, or if 2 or more causes of action are joined. . . . A party may also
state as many separate claims or defenses as that party has, regardless of
consistency[.]” (emphasis added)).
attachments to determine the sufficiency of a separate complaint to state a
cause of action clearly contravenes the longstanding four-corners rule
explained above. And to the extent that the district court reached this
conclusion based on the consolidation of the cases, the district court also
improperly merged the Mauna and Iberia Complaints. “Consolidation does not
merge suits into a single cause or change the rights of the parties, or make
those who are parties in one suit parties in another. Rather, each suit
maintains its independent status with respect to the rights of the parties
involved.” Shores Supply Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 524 So. 2d
722, 725 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (quoting Wagner v. Nova Univ., Inc., 397 So.
2d 375, 377 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)). The separate complaints were no more than an
instance of alternative pleading, a routine practice under the civil rules of
procedure. See, e.g., Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b) (providing that “[r]elief
in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded”); Fla. R.
Civ. P. 1.110(g) (“A pleader may set up in the same action as many claims or
causes of action or defenses in the same right as the pleader has, and claims
for relief may be stated in the alternative if separate items make up the cause
or action, or if 2 or more causes of action are joined. . . . A party may also
state as many separate claims or defenses as that party has, regardless of
consistency[.]” (emphasis added)).
Moreover, as the district court acknowledged, Santiago
dismissed the Iberia Complaint before the circuit court’s hearing on Mauna’s
motion to dismiss the Mauna Complaint was held. Mauna Loa Inv., 122 So.
3d at 523 n.4 (“The fact that Santiago dismissed the Iberia Complaint pursuant
to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(a)(1) (2011) immediately prior to the
hearing on Mauna’s Amended Motion does not affect our analysis.”). Thus, the
district court determined the sufficiency of the Mauna Complaint by looking
outside the four corners of the complaint at issue to consider a separate
complaint that was dismissed before the trial court ruled on the Mauna
Complaint. See id.
dismissed the Iberia Complaint before the circuit court’s hearing on Mauna’s
motion to dismiss the Mauna Complaint was held. Mauna Loa Inv., 122 So.
3d at 523 n.4 (“The fact that Santiago dismissed the Iberia Complaint pursuant
to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(a)(1) (2011) immediately prior to the
hearing on Mauna’s Amended Motion does not affect our analysis.”). Thus, the
district court determined the sufficiency of the Mauna Complaint by looking
outside the four corners of the complaint at issue to consider a separate
complaint that was dismissed before the trial court ruled on the Mauna
Complaint. See id.
Within the four corners of the Mauna Complaint, Santiago
clearly stated a cause of action for premises liability against Mauna. And the
well pleaded allegations of that complaint were admitted by Mauna’s default. See
Henry J. Trawick, Trawick’s Florida Practice and Procedure. § 25:4
(2015-2016 ed.). Indeed, Mauna did not challenge the sufficiency of Santiago’s
complaint to state a cause of action in the trial court, and such an error must
be preserved for appellate review. See Tillman v. State, 471 So. 2d 32,
35 (Fla. 1985) (“In order to be preserved for further review by a higher court,
an issue must be presented to the lower court and the specific legal argument
or ground to be argued on appeal or review must be part of that presentation if
it is to be considered preserved.”). Accordingly, the district court erred in
addressing this issue.
clearly stated a cause of action for premises liability against Mauna. And the
well pleaded allegations of that complaint were admitted by Mauna’s default. See
Henry J. Trawick, Trawick’s Florida Practice and Procedure. § 25:4
(2015-2016 ed.). Indeed, Mauna did not challenge the sufficiency of Santiago’s
complaint to state a cause of action in the trial court, and such an error must
be preserved for appellate review. See Tillman v. State, 471 So. 2d 32,
35 (Fla. 1985) (“In order to be preserved for further review by a higher court,
an issue must be presented to the lower court and the specific legal argument
or ground to be argued on appeal or review must be part of that presentation if
it is to be considered preserved.”). Accordingly, the district court erred in
addressing this issue.
Setting
Aside the Default
Aside the Default
In this case, the trial court denied Mauna’s motion to set
aside the default judgment entered against it when Mauna failed to respond to
Petitioner Santiago’s complaint. The district court’s reversal of the trial
court was predicated on the district court’s determination that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action, that the judgment based on the default was
therefore void, and consequently that a showing of excusable neglect need not
be made to justify setting aside the default. For reasons that the foregoing
analysis makes clear, this line of reasoning collapses. Santiago argues here
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mauna’s motion to
set aside the default and that the trial court’s decision should be upheld. We
agree.
aside the default judgment entered against it when Mauna failed to respond to
Petitioner Santiago’s complaint. The district court’s reversal of the trial
court was predicated on the district court’s determination that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action, that the judgment based on the default was
therefore void, and consequently that a showing of excusable neglect need not
be made to justify setting aside the default. For reasons that the foregoing
analysis makes clear, this line of reasoning collapses. Santiago argues here
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mauna’s motion to
set aside the default and that the trial court’s decision should be upheld. We
agree.
A court has discretion to set aside a default judgment if
the moving party demonstrates: (1) excusable neglect in failing timely to file
a response; (2) a meritorious defense; and (3) due diligence in requesting
relief after discovery of the default. See Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fam.
Servs. v. P.E., 14 So. 3d 228, 236 (Fla. 2009); see also Philip J.
Padovano, Florida Civil Practice § 9:4 (2015). Failure to satisfy any of
the three elements results in denial of the motion to vacate. As we have
explained, the district court failed to apply this standard when it reversed
the trial court’s order denying Mauna’s motion to vacate.
the moving party demonstrates: (1) excusable neglect in failing timely to file
a response; (2) a meritorious defense; and (3) due diligence in requesting
relief after discovery of the default. See Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fam.
Servs. v. P.E., 14 So. 3d 228, 236 (Fla. 2009); see also Philip J.
Padovano, Florida Civil Practice § 9:4 (2015). Failure to satisfy any of
the three elements results in denial of the motion to vacate. As we have
explained, the district court failed to apply this standard when it reversed
the trial court’s order denying Mauna’s motion to vacate.
The Mauna Complaint was filed on February 4, 2010, and
served on Mauna’s president — who was Mauna’s registered agent — on February
17, 2010. Mauna’s president promptly delivered the complaint to counsel and
subsequently called his office regarding the motion and was assured by a
secretary that the matter was being handled. Nevertheless, Mauna’s attorney did
not file a response, and Mauna’s president never followed up to assure the
filing was indeed made. Finally, on May 5, 2010, Santiago filed a motion for
entry of a default, and the default was entered five days later.
served on Mauna’s president — who was Mauna’s registered agent — on February
17, 2010. Mauna’s president promptly delivered the complaint to counsel and
subsequently called his office regarding the motion and was assured by a
secretary that the matter was being handled. Nevertheless, Mauna’s attorney did
not file a response, and Mauna’s president never followed up to assure the
filing was indeed made. Finally, on May 5, 2010, Santiago filed a motion for
entry of a default, and the default was entered five days later.
The facts of the instant case are not unlike the situation
in Abel, Tony and Aldo Creative Group, Inc. v. Friday Night Investors, Inc.,
(“Abel, Tony & Aldo”) 419 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). There, the
district court reversed an order vacating a default, stating that “[t]he
affidavit of the defendant’s president that he had referred the complaint to an
attorney whom he ‘thought’ had responded was insufficient to demonstrate
excusable neglect, particularly since the plaintiff subsequently gave notice,
which was not responded to, of its intention to seek a default because no
answer had been filed.” Abel, Tony & Aldo, 419 So. 2d at 1135-36; see
Scherer v. The Club, Inc., 328 So. 2d 532, 533 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
(“[N]either an affidavit [n]or other proof appear in the record to show
excusable neglect by an officer or agent of the defendant nor was it made to
appear that the defendant had a meritorious defense.”). Here, under similar
circumstances, Mauna did not establish excusable neglect for failing timely to
respond to the complaint. After one call to her attorney’s office, the
company’s president took no further action to assure a timely response to the
complaint was filed. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by entering a default.
in Abel, Tony and Aldo Creative Group, Inc. v. Friday Night Investors, Inc.,
(“Abel, Tony & Aldo”) 419 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). There, the
district court reversed an order vacating a default, stating that “[t]he
affidavit of the defendant’s president that he had referred the complaint to an
attorney whom he ‘thought’ had responded was insufficient to demonstrate
excusable neglect, particularly since the plaintiff subsequently gave notice,
which was not responded to, of its intention to seek a default because no
answer had been filed.” Abel, Tony & Aldo, 419 So. 2d at 1135-36; see
Scherer v. The Club, Inc., 328 So. 2d 532, 533 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
(“[N]either an affidavit [n]or other proof appear in the record to show
excusable neglect by an officer or agent of the defendant nor was it made to
appear that the defendant had a meritorious defense.”). Here, under similar
circumstances, Mauna did not establish excusable neglect for failing timely to
respond to the complaint. After one call to her attorney’s office, the
company’s president took no further action to assure a timely response to the
complaint was filed. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by entering a default.
Conclusion
Having resolved the conflict regarding the scope of review in
determining the sufficiency of a complaint to state a cause of action, we
reaffirm our longstanding rule that the sufficiency of a complaint to state a
cause of action must be determined solely by examination of the complaint and
its related attachments, if any. Here, the district court’s scope of review
erroneously included a separate complaint, which was outside the “four corners”
scope. We also hold that because there was no showing of excusable neglect the
trial court properly denied the motion to set aside the default. Accordingly,
we quash the district court’s decision in its entirety.
determining the sufficiency of a complaint to state a cause of action, we
reaffirm our longstanding rule that the sufficiency of a complaint to state a
cause of action must be determined solely by examination of the complaint and
its related attachments, if any. Here, the district court’s scope of review
erroneously included a separate complaint, which was outside the “four corners”
scope. We also hold that because there was no showing of excusable neglect the
trial court properly denied the motion to set aside the default. Accordingly,
we quash the district court’s decision in its entirety.
It is so ordered. (LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS,
QUINCE, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., concur.)
QUINCE, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., concur.)
__________________
1The parties have raised various
other issues that we decline to discuss.
other issues that we decline to discuss.
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