39 Fla. L. Weekly D814b
Torts — Premises liability — Failure to maintain premises
in reasonably safe condition and to warn of dangerous condition — Action by
invitee who was injured when she fell through floor of attic in defendant’s home
and landed on garage floor below — Error to enter summary judgment in favor of
defendant where disputed issues of fact remain unresolved as to whether
plaintiff knew of danger, whether danger was open and obvious, and whether
defendant knew or should have known of danger and breached duty to maintain
premises in reasonably safe condition and warn invited guest of danger before
she entered attic
in reasonably safe condition and to warn of dangerous condition — Action by
invitee who was injured when she fell through floor of attic in defendant’s home
and landed on garage floor below — Error to enter summary judgment in favor of
defendant where disputed issues of fact remain unresolved as to whether
plaintiff knew of danger, whether danger was open and obvious, and whether
defendant knew or should have known of danger and breached duty to maintain
premises in reasonably safe condition and warn invited guest of danger before
she entered attic
MARIE MINOR, Appellant, v. STEVELYN YOUNG, Appellee. 5th District. Case No.
5D12-4219. Opinion filed April 17, 2014. Appeal from the Circuit Court for
Orange County, Walter Komanski, Judge. Counsel: Micah J. Longo, of Cornell &
Associates, P.A., Weston, for Appellant. Derek J. Angell and Matthew J. Haftel,
of O’Connor & O’Connor, LLC, Winter Park, for Appellee.
5D12-4219. Opinion filed April 17, 2014. Appeal from the Circuit Court for
Orange County, Walter Komanski, Judge. Counsel: Micah J. Longo, of Cornell &
Associates, P.A., Weston, for Appellant. Derek J. Angell and Matthew J. Haftel,
of O’Connor & O’Connor, LLC, Winter Park, for Appellee.
(PER CURIAM.) Marie Minor was injured when she fell through an unfinished
attic floor on premises owned by her aunt, appellee Stevelyn Young. Minor, a
party guest in Young’s home, had gone to the attic to retrieve an item for
Minor’s grandmother. After taking only a few steps in the direction indicated by
Young, Minor fell through the attic floor and landed on the garage floor below,
injuring her ankle. Minor sued Young for negligently failing to maintain her
premises in a reasonably safe condition and for failing to warn Minor of the
dangerous condition.
attic floor on premises owned by her aunt, appellee Stevelyn Young. Minor, a
party guest in Young’s home, had gone to the attic to retrieve an item for
Minor’s grandmother. After taking only a few steps in the direction indicated by
Young, Minor fell through the attic floor and landed on the garage floor below,
injuring her ankle. Minor sued Young for negligently failing to maintain her
premises in a reasonably safe condition and for failing to warn Minor of the
dangerous condition.
We reverse the summary judgment rendered in favor of Young, concluding, based
on the record before us, that disputed issues of fact remain unresolved as to
whether Minor knew of the danger, whether the danger was open and obvious, and
whether Young knew, or should have known, of the danger and breached the duty to
maintain her premises in a reasonably safe condition and warn her invited guest
of the danger before she entered the attic. See Moore v. Morris, 475 So.
2d 666, 668 (Fla. 1985) (“Summary judgments should be cautiously granted in
negligence and malpractice suits.”); Ciolli v. City of Palm Bay, 59 So.
3d 295, 297 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (“The party moving for summary judgment has the
burden of proving the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”); Lomack v. Mowrey,
14 So. 3d 1090, 1092 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (“[A]n invitee’s knowledge of a
danger is normally not a complete bar to recovery, but rather only triggers the
application of comparative negligence principles.”); Aaron v. Palatka Mall,
L.L.C., 908 So. 2d 574, 577 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (“[T]he obvious danger
doctrine does not apply when negligence is predicated on breach of the duty to
maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition.” (footnote omitted));
Lawrence v. Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack, Inc., 842 So. 2d 303, 305
(Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (“[W]e must view the evidence contained in the record,
including any properly asserted supporting affidavits, in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, and if the slightest doubt exists, the
summary judgment must be reversed.”). We remand this case to the trial court for
further proceedings.
on the record before us, that disputed issues of fact remain unresolved as to
whether Minor knew of the danger, whether the danger was open and obvious, and
whether Young knew, or should have known, of the danger and breached the duty to
maintain her premises in a reasonably safe condition and warn her invited guest
of the danger before she entered the attic. See Moore v. Morris, 475 So.
2d 666, 668 (Fla. 1985) (“Summary judgments should be cautiously granted in
negligence and malpractice suits.”); Ciolli v. City of Palm Bay, 59 So.
3d 295, 297 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (“The party moving for summary judgment has the
burden of proving the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”); Lomack v. Mowrey,
14 So. 3d 1090, 1092 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (“[A]n invitee’s knowledge of a
danger is normally not a complete bar to recovery, but rather only triggers the
application of comparative negligence principles.”); Aaron v. Palatka Mall,
L.L.C., 908 So. 2d 574, 577 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (“[T]he obvious danger
doctrine does not apply when negligence is predicated on breach of the duty to
maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition.” (footnote omitted));
Lawrence v. Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack, Inc., 842 So. 2d 303, 305
(Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (“[W]e must view the evidence contained in the record,
including any properly asserted supporting affidavits, in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, and if the slightest doubt exists, the
summary judgment must be reversed.”). We remand this case to the trial court for
further proceedings.
REVERSED and REMANDED. (SAWAYA, ORFINGER, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.)
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