Requests for admissions — Technical admissions — Trial court abused discretion by denying plaintiff relief from technical admissions where evidence contradicted the admissions and defendant would not be prejudiced by withdrawal of the admissions

Mortgage
foreclosure — Requests for admissions — Technical admissions of facts showing
that plaintiff had no standing to bring foreclosure suit — Trial court abused
discretion by denying plaintiff relief from technical admissions where evidence
contradicted the admissions and defendant would not be prejudiced by withdrawal
of the admissions — Order of involuntary dismissal reversed

WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as trustee for the
Certificateholders of SARM 2005-15, Appellant, v. SALLY L. VOORHEES a/k/a SALLY
L. VOORHEES-DURHAM a/k/a SALLY VOORHEES; BENT TREE VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC.;
CITIBANK, N.A.; UNKNOWN SPOUSE of SALLY L. VOORHEES a/k/a SALLY L.
VOORHEES-DURHAM a/k/a SALLY VOORHEES; unknown tenant(s) in possession of the
subject property, Appellees. 2nd District. Case No. 2D15-2055. Opinion filed
May 13, 2016. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sarasota County; Nancy K.
Donnellan, Senior Judge. Counsel: Nancy M. Wallace of Akerman LLP, Tallahassee;
William P. Heller of Akerman LLP, Fort Lauderdale; and Eric M. Levine of
Akerman LLP, West Palm Beach, for Appellant. C. Todd Chapman of Band Law Group,
P.L., Sarasota, for Appellee Sally L. Voorhees. No appearance for remaining
Appellees.

(CRENSHAW, Judge.) Wells Fargo Bank, National Association,
appeals the dismissal of its foreclosure action against Sally Voorhees. Because
the record is replete with evidence contradicting technical admissions and
Voorhees failed to show she would be prejudiced by their withdrawal, we
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant Wells
Fargo relief from technical admissions. We reverse and remand for a trial on
the merits.

Wells Fargo initiated a foreclosure action against Ms.
Voorhees in Sarasota County in June 2009. It filed a motion for summary
judgment with supporting affidavits in June 2013. After Voorhees failed to file
anything in the case, the clerk entered a default against Voorhees. Voorhees
filed a motion to set aside default which the trial court granted in August
2013. Voorhees then filed an answer, interrogatories, requests for production,
and requests for admissions in December 2013. The requests for admissions
requested that Wells Fargo admit facts showing it had no standing to bring the
foreclosure suit.

In April 2014, Voorhees filed a motion to compel discovery,
requesting that the admissions be deemed admitted. After a hearing on the
motion, a magistrate judge recommended that the trial court grant the motion
and deem all admissions admitted. The trial court adopted the recommended
order.

In August 2014, Voorhees filed a second motion to compel
discovery and to dismiss based on discovery violations. Specifically, Voorhees
noted that full responses to discovery were due on July 30, 2014, and Wells
Fargo failed to meet the deadline. That same day, Wells Fargo filed its
responses to Voorhees’ requests for admissions and production. It also filed a
motion for relief from technical admissions based on Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure 1.370(b) and 1.540(b)(1).

On August 27, 2014, the trial court summarily denied Wells
Fargo’s motion for relief from technical admissions. It ordered Wells Fargo to
answer in full without objections all requests for production and
interrogatories within thirty days. As a sanction, it ordered Wells Fargo to
pay defense counsel $500 within thirty days. And it noted that the case would
be dismissed if full and complete discovery responses were not served within
the thirty days. On September 17 and 19, 2014, Wells Fargo filed a response to
Voorhees’ request for production and sworn answers to interrogatories.

In October 2014, Wells Fargo filed a motion for reconsideration
of the court’s orders deeming all admissions as admitted and denying Wells
Fargo’s motion for relief. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the
motion.

At the April 2015 trial, the trial court again refused to
reconsider the technical admissions. At the beginning of trial, Voorhees’
counsel asked that the admissions remain admitted and that Wells Fargo be
prohibited from putting on evidence contrary to the admissions. In response,
counsel for Wells Fargo argued that the record was “replete with evidence
before [Voorhees] ever filed [the] request for admissions that showed [Wells
Fargo] was actually in possession of an original note, endorsed in blank at the
time of filing.” Counsel for Wells Fargo again cited rule 1.370(b) and asked
the court to withdraw the technical admissions and hear the case on the merits.
Counsel stated Wells Fargo was prepared to move forward at trial with a witness
who would testify to “the fact that plaintiff was in possession of the note,
endorsed in blank at the time of filing . . . the original note and mortgage,
which are already in the court file, the compilation of loan records that have
been turned into the payment history.”

Counsel for Wells Fargo also argued that Voorhees would not
be prejudiced by a trial on the merits. But in response, Voorhees’ counsel
argued: “I intentionally did not take depositions in this case that I was under
the impression that your rulings, your three previous rulings, were going to
stand. So it would be a severe prejudice for you to now allow evidence in which
has been deemed admitted on three different occasions.” Wells Fargo stated it
would agree to a continuance to allow Voorhees to take any depositions it may
need for trial; “to decide a case on a mere technicality is just improper.” The
court responded: “Well it’s going to stay improper. I hear you and I agree
with you, I think cases should be tried on the merits, but we’re too far into
this. You’ve had three prior rulings denying the motion related to admissions.”
It also stated that “it’s prejudicial to the defendant to have to gear up and
try a case on its merits.” Despite Wells Fargo’s repeated requests for
reconsideration, the trial court again denied relief.

At that point in the trial, counsel for Voorhees requested a
judgment in favor of the defense. Counsel for Wells Fargo agreed that if the
technical admissions remained, Wells Fargo could not prove its case. Counsel
also noted that such a ruling would be a dismissal with prejudice based on the
age of the case. Despite Wells Fargo’s continued objections, the trial court
concluded: “Well, it’s not as though you couldn’t bring it again, which you
can. I realize it probably is a statute of limitations problem, but I — I
really do have to — I feel that I am required to uphold the three prior
rulings in this area.” Counsel for Wells Fargo, to no avail, made a final
attempt to have the trial court reconsider its ruling.

That same day, the trial court entered a handwritten final
judgment of involuntary dismissal. It stated, “Upon consideration in open court
having heard the trial the Court makes these findings: Due to the Plaintiff’s
inability to overcome the technical admissions, the Plaintiff is unable to
sustain its burden of proof; the case is dismissed.” This appeal timely followed.

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.370(b) governs the
withdrawal of admissions:

Any
matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court on
motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission. Subject to rule 1.200
governing amendment of a pretrial order, the court may permit withdrawal or
amendment when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved
by it and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that
withdrawal or amendment will prejudice that party in maintaining an action or
defense on the merits.

This liberal standard for relief “reflects the strong
preference that genuinely disputed claims be decided upon their merits rather
than technical rules of default.” PennyMac Corp. v. Labeau, 180 So. 3d
1216, 1219 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (citing Sterling v. City of West Palm Beach,
595 So. 2d 284, 285 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)). “The use of admissions obtained
through a technicality should not form a basis to preclude adjudication of a
legitimate claim.” Sterling, 595 So. 2d at 285.

Denial of relief from technical admissions is an abuse of
discretion when the record contains evidence that contradicts the admissions
and the opposing party has not shown it would be prejudiced by the withdrawal
of the admissions. See PennyMac Corp., 180 So 3d at 1219-20; Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Donaldson, 165 So. 3d 40, 42 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015); Thomas
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 875 So. 2d 758, 760 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Love
v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 362 So. 2d 1037, 1038-39 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).

Here the admissions indicating that Wells Fargo lacked
standing are contrary to the facts of the case, and Voorhees failed to show
prejudice within the meaning of rule 1.370(b). By the time Voorhees served the
requests for admissions, Wells Fargo had already filed the original mortgage
and note endorsed in blank. It had also filed a motion for summary judgment
accompanied by a sworn affidavit claiming it was the possessor of the note. And
Wells Fargo indicated at trial that it was prepared to put on witness testimony
that would contradict the admissions. Voorhees’ sole allegation of prejudice —
that defense counsel relied on the prior rulings on the admissions when he
declined to depose any witnesses — could have easily been cured by a
continuance.

It appears the trial court was under the false impression
that it was required to uphold its three prior rulings denying Wells Fargo
relief from technical admissions. But rule 1.370(b) gives the court the
flexibility to change a ruling or permit a party to amend or withdraw
admissions. And because the record evidence here is contrary to those
admissions and Voorhees failed to show prejudice, we conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying Wells Fargo relief from technical admissions.
Accordingly, we reverse the final order of involuntary dismissal and remand for
a trial on the merits.

Reversed and remanded. (WALLACE and LaROSE, JJ., Concur.)