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Fla. L. Weekly D1526aTop of Form
Fla. L. Weekly D1526aTop of Form
Mortgage
foreclosure — Discovery — Requests for admissions — Trial court erred in
entering summary judgment for defendants in mortgage foreclosure action on
basis of technical admissions resulting from plaintiff’s failure to timely
respond to requests for admissions where record evidence contradicted the
admissions, plaintiff filed motion for relief from the admissions before
defendants moved for summary judgment, and defendants would not be prejudiced
by granting relief from admissions
foreclosure — Discovery — Requests for admissions — Trial court erred in
entering summary judgment for defendants in mortgage foreclosure action on
basis of technical admissions resulting from plaintiff’s failure to timely
respond to requests for admissions where record evidence contradicted the
admissions, plaintiff filed motion for relief from the admissions before
defendants moved for summary judgment, and defendants would not be prejudiced
by granting relief from admissions
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Appellant,
v. CINDY SHELTON and HOWARD SHELTON, Appellees. 5th District. Case No.
5D15-3283. Opinion filed July 7, 2017. Appeal from the Circuit Court for
Brevard County, Charles G. Crawford, Judge. Counsel: Sara F. Holladay-Tobias,
Emily Y. Rottmann, and C. H. Houston, III, of McGuireWoods LLP, Jacksonville,
for Appellant. Richard S. Shuster and Purvi S. Patel, of Shuster & Saben,
LLC, Satellite Beach, for Appellees.
v. CINDY SHELTON and HOWARD SHELTON, Appellees. 5th District. Case No.
5D15-3283. Opinion filed July 7, 2017. Appeal from the Circuit Court for
Brevard County, Charles G. Crawford, Judge. Counsel: Sara F. Holladay-Tobias,
Emily Y. Rottmann, and C. H. Houston, III, of McGuireWoods LLP, Jacksonville,
for Appellant. Richard S. Shuster and Purvi S. Patel, of Shuster & Saben,
LLC, Satellite Beach, for Appellees.
(COHEN, C.J.) This appeal stems from
the trial court’s reluctance to grant relief from technical admissions due to
counsel’s lack of diligence in pursuing relief. The attorney for Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”) failed to timely respond to the Sheltons’ request
for admissions.1 The allegations were then deemed
admitted, resulting in the entry of summary judgment in favor of the Sheltons
based on the technical admissions. However, because the pleadings and other
record evidence contradicted those admissions and the Sheltons did not
demonstrate prejudice, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
the trial court’s reluctance to grant relief from technical admissions due to
counsel’s lack of diligence in pursuing relief. The attorney for Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”) failed to timely respond to the Sheltons’ request
for admissions.1 The allegations were then deemed
admitted, resulting in the entry of summary judgment in favor of the Sheltons
based on the technical admissions. However, because the pleadings and other
record evidence contradicted those admissions and the Sheltons did not
demonstrate prejudice, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Wells Fargo filed a foreclosure
complaint against the Sheltons in 2013. A copy of the note executed by the
Sheltons was attached to the complaint, which indicated that Wells Fargo was
the original lender on the note. A copy of the mortgage was also attached to
the complaint. The parties engaged in discovery, during which the Sheltons sent
Wells Fargo a request for admissions. The request sought to have Wells Fargo
admit, among other things, that (1) it was not the original lender; (2) it was
not the current holder of the note; (3) it was not the current owner of the
note; (4) the original lender did not transfer possession to Wells Fargo; (5)
Wells Fargo did not possess the note or mortgage; and (6) the copy of the note
attached to the complaint was not a true and correct copy of the original.
complaint against the Sheltons in 2013. A copy of the note executed by the
Sheltons was attached to the complaint, which indicated that Wells Fargo was
the original lender on the note. A copy of the mortgage was also attached to
the complaint. The parties engaged in discovery, during which the Sheltons sent
Wells Fargo a request for admissions. The request sought to have Wells Fargo
admit, among other things, that (1) it was not the original lender; (2) it was
not the current holder of the note; (3) it was not the current owner of the
note; (4) the original lender did not transfer possession to Wells Fargo; (5)
Wells Fargo did not possess the note or mortgage; and (6) the copy of the note
attached to the complaint was not a true and correct copy of the original.
Wells Fargo did not timely respond
to the request for admissions. Approximately a year and a half after the
response was due, Wells Fargo moved for leave to file a belated response,
asserting excusable neglect based on a calendaring error and lack of prejudice
to the Sheltons. Wells Fargo had complied with the Sheltons’ other discovery
requests, albeit after being given several extensions of time. Despite having
obtained technical admissions under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.370, the
Sheltons did not move for summary judgment but instead continued to engage in
discovery. The trial court denied Wells Fargo’s motion to file a belated response
to the request for admissions. After the motion was denied, the Sheltons moved
for summary judgment.
to the request for admissions. Approximately a year and a half after the
response was due, Wells Fargo moved for leave to file a belated response,
asserting excusable neglect based on a calendaring error and lack of prejudice
to the Sheltons. Wells Fargo had complied with the Sheltons’ other discovery
requests, albeit after being given several extensions of time. Despite having
obtained technical admissions under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.370, the
Sheltons did not move for summary judgment but instead continued to engage in
discovery. The trial court denied Wells Fargo’s motion to file a belated response
to the request for admissions. After the motion was denied, the Sheltons moved
for summary judgment.
In support of their motion, the
Sheltons asserted that the technical admissions conclusively established that
Wells Fargo lacked standing to foreclose. Wells Fargo responded that because
the verified complaint included a copy of the blank-indorsed note, the note
demonstrated that Wells Fargo was the original lender, the complaint alleged
that it was a holder, and Wells Fargo had the note in its possession, summary
judgment would be improper because the technical admissions would not negate
this other record evidence. Despite characterizing the Sheltons’ defense tactic
as a “parlor trick,” the trial court granted final summary judgment in their
favor.
Sheltons asserted that the technical admissions conclusively established that
Wells Fargo lacked standing to foreclose. Wells Fargo responded that because
the verified complaint included a copy of the blank-indorsed note, the note
demonstrated that Wells Fargo was the original lender, the complaint alleged
that it was a holder, and Wells Fargo had the note in its possession, summary
judgment would be improper because the technical admissions would not negate
this other record evidence. Despite characterizing the Sheltons’ defense tactic
as a “parlor trick,” the trial court granted final summary judgment in their
favor.
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.370 governs requests for admissions. The rule provides that if a party fails
to respond to a request for admissions within thirty days of service of the
request, the matter is deemed admitted. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.370(a). “Any matter
admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion
permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.370(b).
The court may allow a party to withdraw an admission “when the presentation of
the merits of the action will be subserved by it and the party who obtained the
admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will
prejudice that party in maintaining an action or defense on the merits.” Id.
1.370 governs requests for admissions. The rule provides that if a party fails
to respond to a request for admissions within thirty days of service of the
request, the matter is deemed admitted. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.370(a). “Any matter
admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion
permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.370(b).
The court may allow a party to withdraw an admission “when the presentation of
the merits of the action will be subserved by it and the party who obtained the
admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will
prejudice that party in maintaining an action or defense on the merits.” Id.
Rule 1.370 has been liberally
interpreted, and there is a “strong preference that genuinely disputed claims
be decided upon their merits rather than technical rules of default.” Wells
Fargo Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Voorhees, 194 So. 3d 448, 451 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)
(citing PennyMac Corp. v. Labeau, 180 So. 3d 1216, 1219 (Fla. 3d DCA
2015)); see also Melody Tours, Inc. v. Granville Mkt. Letter, Inc., 413
So. 2d 450, 451 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). In addition, “[w]hile it is normally
within the trial court’s discretion to use a technically deemed admission to
support a summary judgment, it is error if the record contains evidence to the
contrary of the admission.” In re Forfeiture of 1982 Ford Mustang, Vehicle
ID No. ABP16F6CF190433, 725 So. 2d 382, 385 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); see also
HSBC Bank USA v. Parodi, 193 So. 3d 65, 66 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (“[I]t is
reversible error to involuntarily dismiss an action or grant summary judgment
based solely on the failure to timely respond to a request for admissions where
the pleadings and/or the record evidence contradicts the technical admissions
and no prejudice has been demonstrated.”).
interpreted, and there is a “strong preference that genuinely disputed claims
be decided upon their merits rather than technical rules of default.” Wells
Fargo Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Voorhees, 194 So. 3d 448, 451 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)
(citing PennyMac Corp. v. Labeau, 180 So. 3d 1216, 1219 (Fla. 3d DCA
2015)); see also Melody Tours, Inc. v. Granville Mkt. Letter, Inc., 413
So. 2d 450, 451 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). In addition, “[w]hile it is normally
within the trial court’s discretion to use a technically deemed admission to
support a summary judgment, it is error if the record contains evidence to the
contrary of the admission.” In re Forfeiture of 1982 Ford Mustang, Vehicle
ID No. ABP16F6CF190433, 725 So. 2d 382, 385 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); see also
HSBC Bank USA v. Parodi, 193 So. 3d 65, 66 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (“[I]t is
reversible error to involuntarily dismiss an action or grant summary judgment
based solely on the failure to timely respond to a request for admissions where
the pleadings and/or the record evidence contradicts the technical admissions
and no prejudice has been demonstrated.”).
We find that the trial court erred
in granting summary judgment in this case. Two factors weigh heavily in our
decision. First, Wells Fargo filed the motion for relief from the technical
admissions before the Sheltons moved for summary judgment or relied on the
technical admissions in any other demonstrable way. Second, the pleadings and
other record evidence in this case contradicted the admissions.2 Wells Fargo had filed a verified
complaint alleging that it was the holder of the note; it also attached copies
of the note and mortgage to the complaint. In addition, both in other discovery
responses and at the summary judgment hearing, Wells Fargo indicated that it
had the note in its possession and intended to file the original with the trial
court.3
in granting summary judgment in this case. Two factors weigh heavily in our
decision. First, Wells Fargo filed the motion for relief from the technical
admissions before the Sheltons moved for summary judgment or relied on the
technical admissions in any other demonstrable way. Second, the pleadings and
other record evidence in this case contradicted the admissions.2 Wells Fargo had filed a verified
complaint alleging that it was the holder of the note; it also attached copies
of the note and mortgage to the complaint. In addition, both in other discovery
responses and at the summary judgment hearing, Wells Fargo indicated that it
had the note in its possession and intended to file the original with the trial
court.3
Moreover, the Sheltons did not
demonstrate that they would have been prejudiced by granting Wells Fargo relief
from the technical admissions. Merely alleging reliance on the court’s previous
denials of relief from technical admissions or having to proceed to trial on
the merits is insufficient to warrant denial of relief under the rule. See,
e.g., Voorhees, 194 So. 3d at 451; cf. Melody Tours, Inc., 413 So.
2d at 451. While Wells Fargo took over a year to recognize that it missed the
discovery deadline, the Sheltons continued to pursue discovery during that
time, suggesting a lack of reliance on those technical admissions.
demonstrate that they would have been prejudiced by granting Wells Fargo relief
from the technical admissions. Merely alleging reliance on the court’s previous
denials of relief from technical admissions or having to proceed to trial on
the merits is insufficient to warrant denial of relief under the rule. See,
e.g., Voorhees, 194 So. 3d at 451; cf. Melody Tours, Inc., 413 So.
2d at 451. While Wells Fargo took over a year to recognize that it missed the
discovery deadline, the Sheltons continued to pursue discovery during that
time, suggesting a lack of reliance on those technical admissions.
In sum, the trial court erred in
entering summary judgment based on the technical admissions because there was
record evidence contradicting the admissions. In addition, the Sheltons failed
to make a sufficient showing of how granting relief from the admissions would
have caused prejudice. Accordingly, we reverse the order granting summary
judgment and remand for further proceedings.
entering summary judgment based on the technical admissions because there was
record evidence contradicting the admissions. In addition, the Sheltons failed
to make a sufficient showing of how granting relief from the admissions would
have caused prejudice. Accordingly, we reverse the order granting summary
judgment and remand for further proceedings.
REVERSED and REMANDED. (PALMER and
SAWAYA, JJ., concur.)
SAWAYA, JJ., concur.)
__________________
2These
factors render the Sheltons’ reliance on Asset Management Consultants of
Virginia Inc. v. City of Tamarac, 913 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005),
inapposite. In that case, the appellant did not move to file belated answers
until after the hearing on the summary judgment motion, and no record evidence
contradicted the admissions. 913 So. 2d at 1181.
factors render the Sheltons’ reliance on Asset Management Consultants of
Virginia Inc. v. City of Tamarac, 913 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005),
inapposite. In that case, the appellant did not move to file belated answers
until after the hearing on the summary judgment motion, and no record evidence
contradicted the admissions. 913 So. 2d at 1181.
3Additionally,
in Wells Fargo’s verified motion for leave to file the belated response, it
claimed that the failure to respond was due to a calendaring error. Cf. Al
Hendrickson Toyota, Inc. v. Yampolsky, 695 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
(finding trial court erred in denying motion for relief from technical
admissions based on calendaring error because “the established case law deems
that calendaring errors are regarded as excusable neglect”); see also Melody
Tours, Inc., 413 So. 2d at 451 (finding mere inadvertence justified
allowing relief from technical admissions under liberal application of rule
1.370).
in Wells Fargo’s verified motion for leave to file the belated response, it
claimed that the failure to respond was due to a calendaring error. Cf. Al
Hendrickson Toyota, Inc. v. Yampolsky, 695 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
(finding trial court erred in denying motion for relief from technical
admissions based on calendaring error because “the established case law deems
that calendaring errors are regarded as excusable neglect”); see also Melody
Tours, Inc., 413 So. 2d at 451 (finding mere inadvertence justified
allowing relief from technical admissions under liberal application of rule
1.370).
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