Counties
— School boards — Whistleblowers — Administrative procedure adopted by
school board qualifies as an ordinance under public-sector Whistleblower’s Act

HOLLY JULIAN, Appellant, v. BAY COUNTY DISTRICT SCHOOL
BOARD, Appellee. 1st District. Case No. 1D15-3072. Opinion filed April 14,
2016. An appeal from the Circuit Court for Bay County. Michael C. Overstreet,
Judge. Counsel: Cecile M. Scoon of Peters & Scoon, Panama City, for
Appellant. Gwendolyn P. Adkins and Scott J. Seagle of Coppins Monroe Adkins
& Dincman, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellee.

(PER CURIAM.) Appellant, Holly Julian, appeals the final
summary judgment entered against her and in favor of Appellee, the Bay County
District School Board, on her whistleblower (Count I) and negligent retention (Count
II) claims, raising three issues. We affirm the summary judgment as to both
counts and write only to address the disputed issue of whether Appellee created
administrative procedures by “ordinance” under section 112.3187(8)(b), Florida
Statutes (2011), through its adoption of a school board policy.

Section 112.3187(8)(b), Florida Statutes (2011), the
“Remedies” portion of Florida’s public-sector Whistleblower’s Act, provides in
pertinent part:

Within
60 days after the action prohibited by this section, any local public employee
protected by this section may file a complaint with the appropriate local
governmental authority, if that authority has established by ordinance
an administrative procedure for handling such complaints or has contracted with
the Division of Administrative Hearings under s. 120.65 to conduct hearings
under this section.

(Emphasis added.) The term “ordinance” is not defined in the
statute, or anywhere else in the Act, and neither the parties nor we located
any case law interpreting that term in the context of section 112.3187(8)(b).
As such, we must look to the word’s plain and ordinary meaning. See Dudley
v. State, 139 So. 3d 273, 279 (Fla. 2014) (“ ‘When considering the meaning
of terms used in a statute, this Court looks first to the terms’ ordinary
definitions[, which] . . . may be derived from dictionaries.’ ”) (Internal
citation omitted); W. Fla. Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. See, 79 So. 3d 1, 9
(Fla. 2012). “Ordinance” is defined as “[a]n authoritative law or decree;
specif., a municipal regulation, esp. one that forbids or restricts an
activity.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); see also American
Heritage Dictionary (5th ed. 2015) (defining “ordinance” in part as “[a]n
authoritative command or order” or “[a] statute or regulation, especially one
enacted by a municipal government”); Merriam-Webster Dictionary (defining
“ordinance” in part as “an authoritative decree or direction: order,” “a law
set forth by a governmental authority; specifically: a municipal
regulation,” or “prescribed usage, practice, or ceremony”).

In a 1993 advisory opinion, the Office of the Attorney
General concluded that a school board “has the authority to adopt an
‘ordinance,’ that is, take official legislative action of a general and
permanent nature . . . .” Fla. Att’y Gen. Op. 93-43 (1993). The Attorney
General reasoned in part that “ordinance” “has been generally defined as a
‘rule established by authority; a permanent rule of action,’ or as ‘an
authoritative decree or direction . . . a public enactment, rule, or law.’ ” Id.
(internal citations omitted). Indeed, section 166.041, Florida Statutes (2011),
which governs municipalities, defines “ordinance” as “an official legislative
action of a governing body, which action is a regulation of a general and
permanent nature and enforceable as a local law.” School boards are authorized
to take such legislative type actions “for the more orderly and efficient
operation of the district school system.” Fla. Att’y Gen. Op. 93-43.

Based on the foregoing authorities, we agree with the trial
court that the school board policy Appellee had adopted qualifies as an
ordinance under section 112.3187(8)(b), which specifically defines “local
governmental authority” to include school districts. Therefore, we affirm the
final summary judgment.

AFFIRMED. (LEWIS, OSTERHAUS, and KELSEY, JJ., CONCUR.)

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