GUNTHER FLAIG in a representative capacity on behalf of and in the right of
PALMCREST HOMES OF TAMPA BAY, LLC, a Florida limited liability company,
Petitioner, v. CHRIS SULLIVAN; ALEXANDER SULLIVAN; ADAM SCHOENBAUM; JILL
CREAGER; PROVIDENCE FAMILY OFFICES, LLC; SAB INVESTORS, LLC; A&S PROPERTIES
OF FLORIDA, LLC; and CTS EQUITIES, LP, Respondents. 2nd District. Case No.
2D13-5380. Opinion filed July 18, 2014. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Paul L. Huey, Judge. Counsel: Kurt E.
Davis of The Davis Law Firm, Tampa, and Russell A. Wade, III, of Russell A.
Wade, III, P.A., Lake Butler, for Petitioner. Marie Tomassi, Charles M. Harris,
Jr., and Amanda E. Taylor of Trenam, Kemker, Scharf, Barkin, Frye, O’Neill &
Mullis, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Respondents.

(NORTHCUTT, Judge.) Gunter Flaig filed a derivative lawsuit on behalf of
Palmcrest Homes of Tampa Bay, LLC, against the respondents in this case. Similar
claims to those underlying the five counts in the derivative suit were at issue
in two other pending lawsuits. The parties in the three lawsuits, although
somewhat overlapping, were not identical. After a hearing on a number of motions
in this suit, the circuit court stated that “the claims being brought by Mr.
Flaig are duplicative of other pending litigation. As long as that litigation is
being prosecuted, this action is abated.” Flaig petitioned for certiorari review
of the court’s order abating the suit. We deny the petition.

Flaig correctly points out that abatement pending resolution of other
lawsuits is proper only if the identities of the parties in the lawsuits are
identical. See Relinger v. Fox, 55 So. 3d 638, 640 (Fla. 2d DCA
2011). But it is apparent to us that the court below intended to stay the
instant suit, not to abate it.

An important difference between abating a suit and staying it is that the
former terminates the action, necessitating a refiling of it, whereas the latter
merely pauses proceedings in the stayed suit until the happening of a
contingency. See Perry v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 379 So. 2d 429,
430 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (describing difference between abatement and stay). Here,
the circuit court’s order on this point states: “Should those other actions be
dismissed without a resolution of the issues underlying this case, Mr. Flaig can
move forward to prosecute this action. Until then, all litigation, including all
discovery, in this case is STAYED.” (Emphasis in original.) Accordingly, we
treat this order as a stay of the proceedings below. See Perry,
379 So. 2d at 430 (treating order ostensibly abating suit as a stay order based
on the apparent intent of the order); see also Dep’t of Children &
Families v. L.D., 840 So. 2d 432, 434 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (same).

Although we may review a stay order under our certiorari jurisdiction,
see art. V, § 4(b)(3), Fla. Const.; Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(2)(A);
Perry, 379 So. 2d at 429, we deny the petition in this case. The order
staying the proceedings properly provides that the derivative suit may go
forward if the issues raised therein are not decided in other litigation. Any
resulting delay or inconvenience to the parties would not suffice as the
irreparable harm that would permit us to issue a writ of certiorari. See
Cruz v. Cooperativa de Seguros Multiples de Puerto Rico, Inc., 76 So. 3d
394, 398 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), review denied, 97 So. 3d 823 (Fla. 2012).

Petition denied. (DAVIS, C.J., and CASANUEVA, J., Concur.)