39 Fla. L. Weekly S214a
Wrongful death — Automobile accident — Vicarious liability
— Dangerous instrumentality doctrine — Beneficial ownership exception — A
person whose name is on the certificate of title of a vehicle as co-owner cannot
avoid vicarious liability under the “beneficial ownership” or “naked legal
title” exception to vicarious liability under the dangerous instrumentality
doctrine
— Dangerous instrumentality doctrine — Beneficial ownership exception — A
person whose name is on the certificate of title of a vehicle as co-owner cannot
avoid vicarious liability under the “beneficial ownership” or “naked legal
title” exception to vicarious liability under the dangerous instrumentality
doctrine
ROBERT L. CHRISTENSEN, Petitioner, vs. MARY JO BOWEN, et al., Respondents.
Supreme Court of Florida. Case No. SC12-2078. April 10, 2014. Application for
Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Certified Great Public
Importance. Fifth District – Case No. 5D09-3888 (Brevard County). Counsel: Raoul
G. Cantero, III, David P. Draigh and Jesse Luke Green of White & Case LLP,
Miami; Warren B. Kwavnick of Cooney Trybus Kwavnick Peets, Fort Lauderdale;
George Alexander Vaka of Vaka Law Group, P.L., Tampa; and Dennis Richard
O’Connor of O’Connor & O’Connor, LLC, Winter Park, for Petitioner. Stephen
John Pajcic, III and Thomas Fitzpatrick Slater of Pajcic & Pajcic, P.A.,
Jacksonville; William A. Bald of Dale, Bald, Showalter, Mercier & Green,
P.A., Jacksonville; and S. Sammy Cacciatore, Jr. of Nance, Cacciatore, Hamilton,
Berger, Nance & Cacciatore, Melbourne, for Respondent
Supreme Court of Florida. Case No. SC12-2078. April 10, 2014. Application for
Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Certified Great Public
Importance. Fifth District – Case No. 5D09-3888 (Brevard County). Counsel: Raoul
G. Cantero, III, David P. Draigh and Jesse Luke Green of White & Case LLP,
Miami; Warren B. Kwavnick of Cooney Trybus Kwavnick Peets, Fort Lauderdale;
George Alexander Vaka of Vaka Law Group, P.L., Tampa; and Dennis Richard
O’Connor of O’Connor & O’Connor, LLC, Winter Park, for Petitioner. Stephen
John Pajcic, III and Thomas Fitzpatrick Slater of Pajcic & Pajcic, P.A.,
Jacksonville; William A. Bald of Dale, Bald, Showalter, Mercier & Green,
P.A., Jacksonville; and S. Sammy Cacciatore, Jr. of Nance, Cacciatore, Hamilton,
Berger, Nance & Cacciatore, Melbourne, for Respondent
(LEWIS, J.) This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the
Fifth District Court of Appeal in Bowen
v. Taylor-Christensen, 98 So. 3d 136 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). In its
decision, the district court ruled upon the following question, which it
certified to be of great public importance:
Fifth District Court of Appeal in Bowen
v. Taylor-Christensen, 98 So. 3d 136 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). In its
decision, the district court ruled upon the following question, which it
certified to be of great public importance:
MAY A PERSON WHO INTENTIONALLY DIRECTS THAT TITLE BE ISSUED IN HIS
NAME AS CO-OWNER, BY COMPLETING A SWORN APPLICATION FOR TITLE IN CONJUNCTION
WITH THE PURCHASE OF A VEHICLE, AVOID LIABILITY UNDER THE DANGEROUS
INSTRUMENTALITY DOCTRINE BY CLAIMING THAT HE NEVER INTENDED TO BE THE OWNER OF
THE VEHICLE AND FURTHER CLAIMING THAT HE RELINQUISHED CONTROL TO A CO-OWNER OF
THE VEHICLE?
Id. at 145. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla.
Const. We rephrase the certified question as follows:
Const. We rephrase the certified question as follows:
MAY A PERSON WHOSE NAME IS ON THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE OF A VEHICLE
AS CO-OWNER AVOID VICARIOUS LIABILITY UNDER AN EXCEPTION TO THE DANGEROUS
INSTRUMENTALITY DOCTRINE BY ASSERTING THAT HE NEVER INTENDED TO BE THE OWNER OF
THE VEHICLE AND FURTHER CLAIMING THAT HE RELINQUISHED CONTROL TO A CO-OWNER OF
THE VEHICLE?
We answer this question in the negative and hold that a person whose name is
on the certificate of title as co-owner is a beneficial owner with the right to
control the vehicle.
on the certificate of title as co-owner is a beneficial owner with the right to
control the vehicle.
BACKGROUND
Robert Christensen paid the purchase price for a Chrysler PT Cruiser on April
29, 2003, and the certificate of title was placed in the name of both Mary
Taylor-Christensen and Robert Christensen as co-owners. They were married at the
time, but were involved in dissolution of marriage proceedings. Both Christensen
and his then wife Taylor-Christensen signed the application for certificate of
title, under penalty of perjury, to have the title issued to them jointly as
“owner” and “co-owner.” Christensen did not receive the certificate of title
because it was mailed to the wife’s address, but the certificate of title was
issued in the name of both Christensen and his wife, as “Mary G.
Taylor-Christensen or Robert L. Christensen.” Although Christensen did not have
a key to the vehicle or use the vehicle, and did not reside with
Taylor-Christensen or have access to her garage where the vehicle was kept, the
title to the vehicle was in his name as co-owner.
29, 2003, and the certificate of title was placed in the name of both Mary
Taylor-Christensen and Robert Christensen as co-owners. They were married at the
time, but were involved in dissolution of marriage proceedings. Both Christensen
and his then wife Taylor-Christensen signed the application for certificate of
title, under penalty of perjury, to have the title issued to them jointly as
“owner” and “co-owner.” Christensen did not receive the certificate of title
because it was mailed to the wife’s address, but the certificate of title was
issued in the name of both Christensen and his wife, as “Mary G.
Taylor-Christensen or Robert L. Christensen.” Although Christensen did not have
a key to the vehicle or use the vehicle, and did not reside with
Taylor-Christensen or have access to her garage where the vehicle was kept, the
title to the vehicle was in his name as co-owner.
Approximately twenty-two months after the vehicle was purchased,
Taylor-Christensen negligently struck and killed Thomas Bowen while driving the
vehicle. At the time of the accident, the title remained in the names of both
Taylor-Christensen and Christensen and the vehicle was being operated with his
consent. After the accident, Mary Jo Bowen, as executor of her husband’s estate,
filed an action for wrongful death against both Taylor-Christensen and
Christensen. Bowen alleged that Christensen, as an owner of the vehicle, was
vicariously liable for Taylor-Christensen’s negligence under the dangerous
instrumentality doctrine. Christensen, however, contended that he was not
vicariously liable under the beneficial ownership exception to the dangerous
instrumentality doctrine. He testified during trial that his intent was to
purchase the vehicle as a gift for his wife and that he had no involvement with
the vehicle after it was purchased.
Taylor-Christensen negligently struck and killed Thomas Bowen while driving the
vehicle. At the time of the accident, the title remained in the names of both
Taylor-Christensen and Christensen and the vehicle was being operated with his
consent. After the accident, Mary Jo Bowen, as executor of her husband’s estate,
filed an action for wrongful death against both Taylor-Christensen and
Christensen. Bowen alleged that Christensen, as an owner of the vehicle, was
vicariously liable for Taylor-Christensen’s negligence under the dangerous
instrumentality doctrine. Christensen, however, contended that he was not
vicariously liable under the beneficial ownership exception to the dangerous
instrumentality doctrine. He testified during trial that his intent was to
purchase the vehicle as a gift for his wife and that he had no involvement with
the vehicle after it was purchased.
Bowen moved for a directed verdict on the issue of ownership, but the trial
court denied the motion. The jury was instructed that “[a]n owner of a vehicle
is one who has legal title to the vehicle and who has a beneficial ownership
with the right of control and authority over its use.” The jury subsequently
found that Christensen was not an owner of the vehicle. Bowen appealed the
denial of the motion for directed verdict to the Fifth District, and the
district court, on rehearing, reversed the trial court’s ruling. The Fifth
District held that Christensen was liable under the dangerous instrumentality
doctrine because he retained an identifiable property interest in the vehicle
for himself by having his name placed on the title as co-owner, and that his
subjective intent in signing the purchase and title documents was insufficient
to defeat vicarious liability of a titleholder. The district court then
certified to this Court the previously quoted question, and this review
followed.
court denied the motion. The jury was instructed that “[a]n owner of a vehicle
is one who has legal title to the vehicle and who has a beneficial ownership
with the right of control and authority over its use.” The jury subsequently
found that Christensen was not an owner of the vehicle. Bowen appealed the
denial of the motion for directed verdict to the Fifth District, and the
district court, on rehearing, reversed the trial court’s ruling. The Fifth
District held that Christensen was liable under the dangerous instrumentality
doctrine because he retained an identifiable property interest in the vehicle
for himself by having his name placed on the title as co-owner, and that his
subjective intent in signing the purchase and title documents was insufficient
to defeat vicarious liability of a titleholder. The district court then
certified to this Court the previously quoted question, and this review
followed.
ANALYSIS
Standard of Review
The rephrased certified question presents a pure question of law, which is
reviewed de novo. Rando v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 39 So. 3d 244, 247 (Fla.
2010). Further, the issue in this case concerns an order entered on a motion for
directed verdict, which is also reviewed de novo. Meruelo v. Mark Andrew of
Palm Beaches, Ltd., 12 So. 3d 247, 250 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). When reviewing a
trial court’s ruling on a motion for directed verdict, this Court views the
evidence and all inferences of fact in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Id.
reviewed de novo. Rando v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 39 So. 3d 244, 247 (Fla.
2010). Further, the issue in this case concerns an order entered on a motion for
directed verdict, which is also reviewed de novo. Meruelo v. Mark Andrew of
Palm Beaches, Ltd., 12 So. 3d 247, 250 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). When reviewing a
trial court’s ruling on a motion for directed verdict, this Court views the
evidence and all inferences of fact in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Id.
The Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine
and Beneficial Ownership Exception
The dangerous instrumentality doctrine serves to ensure financial recourse to
members of the public who are injured by the negligent operation of a motor
vehicle by imposing strict vicarious liability on those with an identifiable
property ownership interest in the vehicle. See Kraemer v. Gen. Motors
Acceptance Corp., 572 So. 2d 1363, 1365 (Fla. 1990). The underlying
rationale of the doctrine is that if a vehicle owner, who has control over the
use of the vehicle, exercises his or her control by granting custody of the
vehicle to another, the owner commits himself or herself to the judgment of that
driver and accepts the potential liability for his or her torts. S. Cotton
Oil Co. v. Anderson, 86 So. 629, 634 (Fla. 1920) (quoting Barmore v.
Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry. Co., 38 So. 210, 215 (Miss. 1905)).
members of the public who are injured by the negligent operation of a motor
vehicle by imposing strict vicarious liability on those with an identifiable
property ownership interest in the vehicle. See Kraemer v. Gen. Motors
Acceptance Corp., 572 So. 2d 1363, 1365 (Fla. 1990). The underlying
rationale of the doctrine is that if a vehicle owner, who has control over the
use of the vehicle, exercises his or her control by granting custody of the
vehicle to another, the owner commits himself or herself to the judgment of that
driver and accepts the potential liability for his or her torts. S. Cotton
Oil Co. v. Anderson, 86 So. 629, 634 (Fla. 1920) (quoting Barmore v.
Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry. Co., 38 So. 210, 215 (Miss. 1905)).
A narrow exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine has been
recognized in cases where the titleholder lacks the beneficial ownership of a
vehicle. See Aurbach
v. Gallina, 753 So. 2d 60, 64 (Fla. 2000) (“In Metzel v.
Robinson, 102 So. 2d 385, 385-86 (Fla. 1958), the Court made it clear that,
absent a conditional sales agreement, the circumstances where an entity or
individual who possessed legal title would not be vicariously liable under the
dangerous instrumentality doctrine were extremely limited.”). Under this
“beneficial ownership” or “bare legal title” exception, a titleholder may avoid
vicarious liability if the titleholder demonstrates that he or she does not have
the authority to exert any dominion or control over the vehicle and therefore is
not a beneficial owner of the vehicle. Id. at 63-65. In such
circumstances, this Court has held that the titleholder holds only “naked legal
title” in the vehicle. See Palmer v. R. S. Evans, Jacksonville,
Inc., 81 So. 2d 635, 637 (Fla. 1955).
recognized in cases where the titleholder lacks the beneficial ownership of a
vehicle. See Aurbach
v. Gallina, 753 So. 2d 60, 64 (Fla. 2000) (“In Metzel v.
Robinson, 102 So. 2d 385, 385-86 (Fla. 1958), the Court made it clear that,
absent a conditional sales agreement, the circumstances where an entity or
individual who possessed legal title would not be vicariously liable under the
dangerous instrumentality doctrine were extremely limited.”). Under this
“beneficial ownership” or “bare legal title” exception, a titleholder may avoid
vicarious liability if the titleholder demonstrates that he or she does not have
the authority to exert any dominion or control over the vehicle and therefore is
not a beneficial owner of the vehicle. Id. at 63-65. In such
circumstances, this Court has held that the titleholder holds only “naked legal
title” in the vehicle. See Palmer v. R. S. Evans, Jacksonville,
Inc., 81 So. 2d 635, 637 (Fla. 1955).
The beneficial ownership exception was first recognized in Palmer
nearly sixty years ago. In Palmer, a car dealership held title to a
vehicle that was involved in an accident. Id. at 636. At the time of the
accident, the driver of the vehicle had already submitted the down payment,
signed a conditional sales contract for the vehicle, and taken possession of the
vehicle, but “bare” legal paper title remained with the dealership. Id.
This Court held that the dealership possessed only naked legal title in the
vehicle as security for payment of the full purchase price, and no longer had
any authority over the use of the vehicle (i.e., beneficial ownership of the
vehicle). Id. The Court further explained that the rationale for imposing
vicarious liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine did not apply
because the dealership could no longer exercise control over the use of the
vehicle. As a result, the dealership was not an owner of the vehicle and was not
liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Id. Thus, under
Palmer, a person or entity who holds bare paper title in a vehicle solely
under a conditional sales agreement is exempted from vicarious liability under
the dangerous instrumentality doctrine.
nearly sixty years ago. In Palmer, a car dealership held title to a
vehicle that was involved in an accident. Id. at 636. At the time of the
accident, the driver of the vehicle had already submitted the down payment,
signed a conditional sales contract for the vehicle, and taken possession of the
vehicle, but “bare” legal paper title remained with the dealership. Id.
This Court held that the dealership possessed only naked legal title in the
vehicle as security for payment of the full purchase price, and no longer had
any authority over the use of the vehicle (i.e., beneficial ownership of the
vehicle). Id. The Court further explained that the rationale for imposing
vicarious liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine did not apply
because the dealership could no longer exercise control over the use of the
vehicle. As a result, the dealership was not an owner of the vehicle and was not
liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Id. Thus, under
Palmer, a person or entity who holds bare paper title in a vehicle solely
under a conditional sales agreement is exempted from vicarious liability under
the dangerous instrumentality doctrine.
Subsequently, this Court extended the beneficial ownership exception
recognized in Palmer to prohibit vicarious liability in the situation
where an actual common law sale of a vehicle had occurred but formal title had
not yet been transferred. See McAfee v. Killingsworth, 98 So. 2d
738, 740 (Fla. 1957). In McAfee, the titleholder left the vehicle with
the operator of a filling station to sell. Id. at 739. A prospective
buyer test drove the vehicle, gave the filling station operator less than the
full purchase price, and departed in the vehicle. Id. The buyer collided
with another vehicle before speaking with the titleholder regarding the sale.
Id. This Court held that sufficient evidence existed to satisfy the
common law prerequisites for a sale and applied Palmer to conclude that
the titleholder had transferred beneficial ownership of the vehicle to the
buyer. Id. at 740.
recognized in Palmer to prohibit vicarious liability in the situation
where an actual common law sale of a vehicle had occurred but formal title had
not yet been transferred. See McAfee v. Killingsworth, 98 So. 2d
738, 740 (Fla. 1957). In McAfee, the titleholder left the vehicle with
the operator of a filling station to sell. Id. at 739. A prospective
buyer test drove the vehicle, gave the filling station operator less than the
full purchase price, and departed in the vehicle. Id. The buyer collided
with another vehicle before speaking with the titleholder regarding the sale.
Id. This Court held that sufficient evidence existed to satisfy the
common law prerequisites for a sale and applied Palmer to conclude that
the titleholder had transferred beneficial ownership of the vehicle to the
buyer. Id. at 740.
However, shortly after deciding McAfee, this Court declined to further
extend the exception. See Metzel, 102 So. 2d at 386. In
Metzel, the titleholder had title issued in her name for a vehicle that
was purchased by her nephew because the seller objected to an eighteen-year-old
signing the financing paperwork. Id. at 385. The nephew lived with the
aunt and the aunt insured the vehicle. Id. Between the time that title
was issued and the time of the accident, the aunt took no action to remove her
name from the title, but she also had no further involvement with the vehicle.
Id. This Court held that the aunt was still in a position to exert some
dominion and control over the vehicle, and therefore she held an ownership
interest as a matter of law. Id. at 386. Thus, the relevant
inquiry after Metzel for beneficial ownership is whether a titleholder is
in a position to exercise any dominion and control over a vehicle, and the use
or non-use of the vehicle by the titleholder is insufficient to establish a lack
of beneficial ownership.
extend the exception. See Metzel, 102 So. 2d at 386. In
Metzel, the titleholder had title issued in her name for a vehicle that
was purchased by her nephew because the seller objected to an eighteen-year-old
signing the financing paperwork. Id. at 385. The nephew lived with the
aunt and the aunt insured the vehicle. Id. Between the time that title
was issued and the time of the accident, the aunt took no action to remove her
name from the title, but she also had no further involvement with the vehicle.
Id. This Court held that the aunt was still in a position to exert some
dominion and control over the vehicle, and therefore she held an ownership
interest as a matter of law. Id. at 386. Thus, the relevant
inquiry after Metzel for beneficial ownership is whether a titleholder is
in a position to exercise any dominion and control over a vehicle, and the use
or non-use of the vehicle by the titleholder is insufficient to establish a lack
of beneficial ownership.
More recently, in Aurbach, this Court addressed whether a person’s
ability to exert dominion and control over a vehicle alone was sufficient to
impose vicarious liability, even absent title ownership. 753 So. 2d at 65. In
Aurbach, a married couple purchased and maintained a vehicle with joint
funds, but with the intention that one of their daughters be the primary driver.
Id. at 61. The vehicle was titled in the wife’s name. Id. The
daughter negligently operated the vehicle and caused an accident. A person
injured in the accident sought to hold the father liable on the basis that he
was in a position to exert dominion and control over the vehicle. Id. The
jury specifically found that the father exercised control over the vehicle. This
Court recognized that in the past it had consistently required a person to have
an identifiable property interest in the vehicle involved in the accident for
vicarious liability to be imposed. Id. at 62. Accordingly, this Court
held that the ability of the father to exert some dominion and control over the
vehicle did not constitute a basis for vicarious liability under the dangerous
instrumentality doctrine. Id. at 65.
ability to exert dominion and control over a vehicle alone was sufficient to
impose vicarious liability, even absent title ownership. 753 So. 2d at 65. In
Aurbach, a married couple purchased and maintained a vehicle with joint
funds, but with the intention that one of their daughters be the primary driver.
Id. at 61. The vehicle was titled in the wife’s name. Id. The
daughter negligently operated the vehicle and caused an accident. A person
injured in the accident sought to hold the father liable on the basis that he
was in a position to exert dominion and control over the vehicle. Id. The
jury specifically found that the father exercised control over the vehicle. This
Court recognized that in the past it had consistently required a person to have
an identifiable property interest in the vehicle involved in the accident for
vicarious liability to be imposed. Id. at 62. Accordingly, this Court
held that the ability of the father to exert some dominion and control over the
vehicle did not constitute a basis for vicarious liability under the dangerous
instrumentality doctrine. Id. at 65.
This precedent demonstrates that vicarious liability arises from an
identifiable property interest in a vehicle possessed by the person held to be
vicariously liable which creates the right to exert some dominion and control
over the vehicle. See, e.g., id. at 62-63. The precedent further
establishes that the beneficial ownership exception is narrow and applies only
where the titleholder holds title under a conditional sales agreement or has
sold the vehicle and transferred possession. In such cases, the underlying
rationale of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine — that the titleholder has
committed himself or herself to the driver’s judgment — does not apply.
However, in the absence of evidence that the titleholder holds only naked legal
title under a conditional sales contract or a faulty incomplete transfer,
precedent demonstrates that the certificate titleholder is a beneficial owner as
a matter of law and is liable for the permissive use of the vehicle by another
person.
identifiable property interest in a vehicle possessed by the person held to be
vicariously liable which creates the right to exert some dominion and control
over the vehicle. See, e.g., id. at 62-63. The precedent further
establishes that the beneficial ownership exception is narrow and applies only
where the titleholder holds title under a conditional sales agreement or has
sold the vehicle and transferred possession. In such cases, the underlying
rationale of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine — that the titleholder has
committed himself or herself to the driver’s judgment — does not apply.
However, in the absence of evidence that the titleholder holds only naked legal
title under a conditional sales contract or a faulty incomplete transfer,
precedent demonstrates that the certificate titleholder is a beneficial owner as
a matter of law and is liable for the permissive use of the vehicle by another
person.
Certified Question
The rephrased certified question relates to the scope of the beneficial
ownership exception that was first recognized in Palmer. Specifically,
the question presented is whether the beneficial ownership exception applies to
an individual who applied for title to be issued in his or her name, but who
neither used nor had physical access to the vehicle. We hold that under these
circumstances, a joint titleholder who has not divested himself or herself of
the ownership interest is an owner as a matter of law.
ownership exception that was first recognized in Palmer. Specifically,
the question presented is whether the beneficial ownership exception applies to
an individual who applied for title to be issued in his or her name, but who
neither used nor had physical access to the vehicle. We hold that under these
circumstances, a joint titleholder who has not divested himself or herself of
the ownership interest is an owner as a matter of law.
A joint titleholder holds a joint tenancy interest in the vehicle and,
accordingly, has the right to possess and use the vehicle. See §
319.22(2)(a)(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013) (“When a motor vehicle . . . is registered
in the names of two or more persons as coowners in the alternative by the use of
the word ‘or,’ such vehicle shall be held in joint tenancy.”). Each joint
titleholder has statutorily conferred legal rights in the vehicle. Id.
Each titleholder enjoys a right of survivorship in the vehicle. Id.
Additionally, where the names of joint titleholders are separated by the word
“or” on the title documentation, as in the instant case, either may
unilaterally encumber or sell the vehicle. Id. Each of these
rights places a joint titleholder in a position to exercise authority or control
over the vehicle.
accordingly, has the right to possess and use the vehicle. See §
319.22(2)(a)(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013) (“When a motor vehicle . . . is registered
in the names of two or more persons as coowners in the alternative by the use of
the word ‘or,’ such vehicle shall be held in joint tenancy.”). Each joint
titleholder has statutorily conferred legal rights in the vehicle. Id.
Each titleholder enjoys a right of survivorship in the vehicle. Id.
Additionally, where the names of joint titleholders are separated by the word
“or” on the title documentation, as in the instant case, either may
unilaterally encumber or sell the vehicle. Id. Each of these
rights places a joint titleholder in a position to exercise authority or control
over the vehicle.
The legal rights of a titleholder exist regardless of whether they are
actually exercised. The failure of a titleholder to use the vehicle, or
otherwise exercise his or her legal rights, does not eliminate these rights.
Consequently, the exclusive use of the vehicle by one titleholder does not
destroy the beneficial ownership of another titleholder. Beneficial ownership
continues to exist with regard to the non-using titleholder because he or she
remains in a legal position to exert dominion or control over the vehicle.
actually exercised. The failure of a titleholder to use the vehicle, or
otherwise exercise his or her legal rights, does not eliminate these rights.
Consequently, the exclusive use of the vehicle by one titleholder does not
destroy the beneficial ownership of another titleholder. Beneficial ownership
continues to exist with regard to the non-using titleholder because he or she
remains in a legal position to exert dominion or control over the vehicle.
Further, we hold that an assertion by a joint titleholder that he or she
never subjectively intended to be a titleholder is irrelevant to beneficial
ownership of a vehicle. See Johnson v. Deangelo, 448 So. 2d 581,
582 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (holding that the subjective intent of a titleholder in
placing her name on a title certificate was legally immaterial and insufficient
as a matter of law to rebut title ownership and stating that the titleholder
“intentionally caused her name to be placed on the title certificate, it did not
happen by accident or without her knowledge and consent, nor did she hold her
formal ownership interest in the vehicle as a mere security device or because
she had made a good faith but ineffectual attempt or effort to transfer her
title interest.”). Upon purchasing a vehicle, an owner (or owners) must apply to
the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles to have title issued
in his or her name. § 319.23(1), Fla. Stat. (2013). The application must be
attested to by the applicant(s) under penalty of perjury. Fla. Dept. of Highway
Safety & Motor Vehicles, Application for Certificate of Title
with/without Registration 2 (2012), available at
http://www.flhsmv.gov/dmv/forms/BTR/82040.pdf (last visited Dec. 8, 2013) Download Adobe Reader. If
more than one person applies for title, the co-owners must apply on the same
form. Id. Thus, each applicant knowingly enters into joint title
ownership. When two individuals submit an application for joint ownership, each
co-owner commits himself or herself to the judgment of the other and is subject
to vicarious liability for the other’s negligent use of the vehicle. Should a
titleholder never intend to use a vehicle and wish to avoid vicarious liability,
then the titleholder must divest himself or herself of any interest in the
vehicle. See Horne v. Vic Potamkin Chevrolet, Inc., 533 So. 2d
261, 262 (Fla. 1988) (“It is clear . . . that under existing law there is no
liability on the part of the seller of a motor vehicle where beneficial
ownership or legal title, together with possession, have been transferred to a
purchaser and injuries occur because of the negligence of the purchaser in
operating the vehicle. In short, transfer of ownership cuts off liability on the
part of the former owner.”).
never subjectively intended to be a titleholder is irrelevant to beneficial
ownership of a vehicle. See Johnson v. Deangelo, 448 So. 2d 581,
582 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (holding that the subjective intent of a titleholder in
placing her name on a title certificate was legally immaterial and insufficient
as a matter of law to rebut title ownership and stating that the titleholder
“intentionally caused her name to be placed on the title certificate, it did not
happen by accident or without her knowledge and consent, nor did she hold her
formal ownership interest in the vehicle as a mere security device or because
she had made a good faith but ineffectual attempt or effort to transfer her
title interest.”). Upon purchasing a vehicle, an owner (or owners) must apply to
the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles to have title issued
in his or her name. § 319.23(1), Fla. Stat. (2013). The application must be
attested to by the applicant(s) under penalty of perjury. Fla. Dept. of Highway
Safety & Motor Vehicles, Application for Certificate of Title
with/without Registration 2 (2012), available at
http://www.flhsmv.gov/dmv/forms/BTR/82040.pdf (last visited Dec. 8, 2013) Download Adobe Reader. If
more than one person applies for title, the co-owners must apply on the same
form. Id. Thus, each applicant knowingly enters into joint title
ownership. When two individuals submit an application for joint ownership, each
co-owner commits himself or herself to the judgment of the other and is subject
to vicarious liability for the other’s negligent use of the vehicle. Should a
titleholder never intend to use a vehicle and wish to avoid vicarious liability,
then the titleholder must divest himself or herself of any interest in the
vehicle. See Horne v. Vic Potamkin Chevrolet, Inc., 533 So. 2d
261, 262 (Fla. 1988) (“It is clear . . . that under existing law there is no
liability on the part of the seller of a motor vehicle where beneficial
ownership or legal title, together with possession, have been transferred to a
purchaser and injuries occur because of the negligence of the purchaser in
operating the vehicle. In short, transfer of ownership cuts off liability on the
part of the former owner.”).
Therefore, we conclude that beneficial ownership is unrelated to physical
access to a vehicle, past use of a vehicle, or intent to use or not use a
vehicle. Rather, beneficial ownership arises from legal rights that allow an
individual to exert some dominion and control over the use of the vehicle. Thus,
because a titleholder has legal rights in the vehicle and is in a position to
exert some dominion and control over the vehicle, he or she is a beneficial
owner. The injection of theories of subjective intent would destabilize the law
with regard to motor vehicles in Florida.
access to a vehicle, past use of a vehicle, or intent to use or not use a
vehicle. Rather, beneficial ownership arises from legal rights that allow an
individual to exert some dominion and control over the use of the vehicle. Thus,
because a titleholder has legal rights in the vehicle and is in a position to
exert some dominion and control over the vehicle, he or she is a beneficial
owner. The injection of theories of subjective intent would destabilize the law
with regard to motor vehicles in Florida.
This construction of beneficial ownership is consistent with Palmer as
it was construed in Metzel and McAfee. In these cases, the
analysis centered on the objective steps taken by a titleholder to transfer his
or her interest in the vehicle, and whether that transfer prevented the
titleholder from being able to control the use of the vehicle. Palmer, 81
So. 2d at 637; Metzel, 102 So. 2d at 386; McAfee, 98 So. 2d at
740. In these cases, any subjective intent of the titleholder with regard to
placement of his or her name on the title is not relevant to the beneficial
ownership analysis.
it was construed in Metzel and McAfee. In these cases, the
analysis centered on the objective steps taken by a titleholder to transfer his
or her interest in the vehicle, and whether that transfer prevented the
titleholder from being able to control the use of the vehicle. Palmer, 81
So. 2d at 637; Metzel, 102 So. 2d at 386; McAfee, 98 So. 2d at
740. In these cases, any subjective intent of the titleholder with regard to
placement of his or her name on the title is not relevant to the beneficial
ownership analysis.
Furthermore, the irrelevance of subjective intent is consistent with
Florida’s statutory scheme, in that vehicle ownership is determined through
legal title. Title XXIII of the Florida Statutes, which governs motor vehicles,
defines “owner” in several chapters, and, in all but one chapter, the owner is
defined as the titleholder, subject to exceptions for conditional vendees,
lessors, and mortgagees.1 Thus, the
Legislature has developed a system whereby the rights and responsibilities of
owners of motor vehicles are both assigned and dependent upon the existence of
legal title. In reaching this conclusion, we note that title is a clear and
simple method of determining ownership. If title ownership were subject to
attack based on the subjective intent of a titleholder, then all types of cases
that involve motor vehicles would become subject to litigation on ownership
issued. The better and more efficient and consistent rule is that title
determines ownership, and ownership can only be disproven by objective evidence
of a conditional sale or incomplete faulty transfer.
Florida’s statutory scheme, in that vehicle ownership is determined through
legal title. Title XXIII of the Florida Statutes, which governs motor vehicles,
defines “owner” in several chapters, and, in all but one chapter, the owner is
defined as the titleholder, subject to exceptions for conditional vendees,
lessors, and mortgagees.1 Thus, the
Legislature has developed a system whereby the rights and responsibilities of
owners of motor vehicles are both assigned and dependent upon the existence of
legal title. In reaching this conclusion, we note that title is a clear and
simple method of determining ownership. If title ownership were subject to
attack based on the subjective intent of a titleholder, then all types of cases
that involve motor vehicles would become subject to litigation on ownership
issued. The better and more efficient and consistent rule is that title
determines ownership, and ownership can only be disproven by objective evidence
of a conditional sale or incomplete faulty transfer.
To the extent Christensen asserts that the district courts have interpreted
the beneficial ownership exception to be applicable where exclusive use and
possession reside in a person other than the titleholder, we find these cases to
be fully distinguishable. See Wummer v. Lowary, 441 So. 2d 1151,
1151-52 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (applying beneficial ownership exception where
employer refinanced the vehicle for employee and held title as
refinancer); see also Carrasquero
v. Ethan’s Auto Express, Inc., 949 So. 2d 223, 224 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)
(applying beneficial ownership exception where titleholder “agreed to take title
in its name only as a tax-delaying convenience to [the beneficial owner].”)
(footnote omitted); Plattenburg
v. Dykes, 798 So. 2d 915, 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (applying beneficial
ownership exception where defendant had presented sufficient evidence that he
gifted his entire interest in the vehicle, and the donee simply had not
yet completed the paperwork to transfer the title at the time of the accident).
Unlike the instant case, these cases involved either a financial transaction to
benefit the beneficial owner of the vehicle or an incomplete transfer of the
vehicle. Exclusive possession in those cases simply demonstrated that the
titleholder had no legal rights with regard to the subject vehicles.
the beneficial ownership exception to be applicable where exclusive use and
possession reside in a person other than the titleholder, we find these cases to
be fully distinguishable. See Wummer v. Lowary, 441 So. 2d 1151,
1151-52 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (applying beneficial ownership exception where
employer refinanced the vehicle for employee and held title as
refinancer); see also Carrasquero
v. Ethan’s Auto Express, Inc., 949 So. 2d 223, 224 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)
(applying beneficial ownership exception where titleholder “agreed to take title
in its name only as a tax-delaying convenience to [the beneficial owner].”)
(footnote omitted); Plattenburg
v. Dykes, 798 So. 2d 915, 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (applying beneficial
ownership exception where defendant had presented sufficient evidence that he
gifted his entire interest in the vehicle, and the donee simply had not
yet completed the paperwork to transfer the title at the time of the accident).
Unlike the instant case, these cases involved either a financial transaction to
benefit the beneficial owner of the vehicle or an incomplete transfer of the
vehicle. Exclusive possession in those cases simply demonstrated that the
titleholder had no legal rights with regard to the subject vehicles.
Instead, the instant case is more closely aligned with Hertz Corp. v.
Dixon, 193 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966), and Pennsylvania National
Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Ritz, 284 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), in
which the titleholders were held liable despite having no involvement with the
vehicles in question. In Hertz and Ritz, although all indicia of
ownership resided in the negligent driver, the titleholder had enabled the
driver to acquire the vehicle by having title placed in his name, and the driver
possessed and drove the vehicle with the titleholder’s knowledge and consent.
Hertz, 193 So. 2d at 177 (“Here, not only was [the non-driving joint
titleholder] one of the record title holders, but in fact had put in motion and
made possible the operation of the automobile by [the driver], who, as a minor,
could not have bought the automobile. Not only did [the driver] operate the car
as a co-owner, but with the knowledge, consent and direct participation by [the
non-driving joint titleholder] in the acquisition of title.”); Ritz, 284
So. 2d at 477. The beneficial ownership exception was not applied and the
titleholders, because title was placed in their names and they consented to the
use of the vehicle by another, were determined to be vicariously liable.
Dixon, 193 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966), and Pennsylvania National
Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Ritz, 284 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), in
which the titleholders were held liable despite having no involvement with the
vehicles in question. In Hertz and Ritz, although all indicia of
ownership resided in the negligent driver, the titleholder had enabled the
driver to acquire the vehicle by having title placed in his name, and the driver
possessed and drove the vehicle with the titleholder’s knowledge and consent.
Hertz, 193 So. 2d at 177 (“Here, not only was [the non-driving joint
titleholder] one of the record title holders, but in fact had put in motion and
made possible the operation of the automobile by [the driver], who, as a minor,
could not have bought the automobile. Not only did [the driver] operate the car
as a co-owner, but with the knowledge, consent and direct participation by [the
non-driving joint titleholder] in the acquisition of title.”); Ritz, 284
So. 2d at 477. The beneficial ownership exception was not applied and the
titleholders, because title was placed in their names and they consented to the
use of the vehicle by another, were determined to be vicariously liable.
Based on the foregoing, we answer the rephrased certified question in the
negative and hold that a person whose name is on the certificate of title of a
vehicle as co-owner cannot avoid vicarious liability under the “beneficial
ownership” or “naked legal title” exception to vicarious liability under the
dangerous instrumentality doctrine.
negative and hold that a person whose name is on the certificate of title of a
vehicle as co-owner cannot avoid vicarious liability under the “beneficial
ownership” or “naked legal title” exception to vicarious liability under the
dangerous instrumentality doctrine.
This Case
It is undisputed that Christensen was named on the title as a co-owner of the
vehicle. The title objectively reflects that Christensen gave only a
co-ownership interest to Taylor-Christensen while retaining a co-ownership
interest for himself. Therefore, to divest himself of his co-ownership interest,
and relieve himself from the possibility of vicarious liability, Christensen
should have transferred his interest at some point after the purchase of the
vehicle. Christensen presented no relevant evidence that, in the twenty-two
months between the time that he had title placed in his name as co-owner and the
accident, he transferred his co-ownership interest in the vehicle.
vehicle. The title objectively reflects that Christensen gave only a
co-ownership interest to Taylor-Christensen while retaining a co-ownership
interest for himself. Therefore, to divest himself of his co-ownership interest,
and relieve himself from the possibility of vicarious liability, Christensen
should have transferred his interest at some point after the purchase of the
vehicle. Christensen presented no relevant evidence that, in the twenty-two
months between the time that he had title placed in his name as co-owner and the
accident, he transferred his co-ownership interest in the vehicle.
The only evidence presented by Christensen to establish he no longer owned
the vehicle was that: (1) he did not use the vehicle; (2) he was not in a
position to use the vehicle because he did not live with Taylor-Christensen, he
could not access the garage where she kept the vehicle, and he did not possess
keys to the vehicle; and (3) he subjectively intended to gift the vehicle to
Taylor-Christensen when he purchased it. We conclude that this evidence was
insufficient as a matter of law to rebut the legal principle that Christensen
was a beneficial owner.
the vehicle was that: (1) he did not use the vehicle; (2) he was not in a
position to use the vehicle because he did not live with Taylor-Christensen, he
could not access the garage where she kept the vehicle, and he did not possess
keys to the vehicle; and (3) he subjectively intended to gift the vehicle to
Taylor-Christensen when he purchased it. We conclude that this evidence was
insufficient as a matter of law to rebut the legal principle that Christensen
was a beneficial owner.
Christensen’s non-use of the vehicle does not demonstrate that he transferred
his interest in the vehicle to Taylor-Christensen, or that he was not the
beneficial owner. As previously discussed, this Court established in
Metzel that the simple failure to exercise control does not demonstrate
that a titleholder is not in a position to exert some dominion and control over
the vehicle. Metzel, 102 So. 2d at 386. Rather, the existence of the
legal right to exercise control and the actual exercise of control
are separate concepts, and the legal right to exercise control is the
relevant inquiry for beneficial ownership.
his interest in the vehicle to Taylor-Christensen, or that he was not the
beneficial owner. As previously discussed, this Court established in
Metzel that the simple failure to exercise control does not demonstrate
that a titleholder is not in a position to exert some dominion and control over
the vehicle. Metzel, 102 So. 2d at 386. Rather, the existence of the
legal right to exercise control and the actual exercise of control
are separate concepts, and the legal right to exercise control is the
relevant inquiry for beneficial ownership.
Christensen, as a joint titleholder, had a legal right to encumber, sell, or
take possession of the vehicle. Had he wished, Christensen could have done any
of the above, and the mere fact that he did not act on these legal rights does
not alter or diminish their existence. Further, had Taylor-Christensen died,
Christensen would have inherited the vehicle because of his joint ownership
interest. See § 319.22(2)(a)(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013). Therefore, he
indisputably was in a position to exercise dominion and control over the vehicle
and was a beneficial owner of the vehicle.
take possession of the vehicle. Had he wished, Christensen could have done any
of the above, and the mere fact that he did not act on these legal rights does
not alter or diminish their existence. Further, had Taylor-Christensen died,
Christensen would have inherited the vehicle because of his joint ownership
interest. See § 319.22(2)(a)(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013). Therefore, he
indisputably was in a position to exercise dominion and control over the vehicle
and was a beneficial owner of the vehicle.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we answer the rephrased certified question in the
negative. We hold that Christensen was an owner of the vehicle as a matter of
law and approve the decision of the Fifth District reversing the trial court’s
ruling on the motion for directed verdict.
negative. We hold that Christensen was an owner of the vehicle as a matter of
law and approve the decision of the Fifth District reversing the trial court’s
ruling on the motion for directed verdict.
It is so ordered. (POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE CANADY, LABARGA, and
PERRY, JJ., concur.)
PERRY, JJ., concur.)
__________________
1For example, Chapter 324, “Financial
Responsibility,” provides:
Responsibility,” provides:
Owner. — A person who holds the legal title of a motor
vehicle; or, in the event a motor vehicle is the subject of an agreement for the
conditional sale or lease thereof with the right of purchase upon performance of
the conditions stated in the agreement and with an immediate right of possession
vested in the conditional vendee or lessee, or in the event a mortgagor of a
vehicle is entitled to possession, then such conditional vendee or lessee or
mortgagor shall be deemed the owner for the purpose of this
chapter.
§ 324.021(9)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013). Similarly, Chapter 316, “State Uniform
Traffic Control,” provides:
Traffic Control,” provides:
OWNER. — A person who holds the legal title of a vehicle, or, in
the event a vehicle is the subject of an agreement for the conditional sale or
lease thereof with the right of purchase upon performance of the conditions
stated in the agreement and with an immediate right of possession vested in the
conditional vendee or lessee, or in the event a mortgagor of a vehicle is
entitled to possession, then such conditional vendee, or lessee, or mortgagor
shall be deemed the owner, for the purposes of this chapter.
§ 316.003(26), Fla. Stat. (2013). Additionally, Chapter 322, “Driver’s
Licenses,” provides:
Licenses,” provides:
“Owner” means the person who holds the legal title to a vehicle.
However, if a vehicle is the subject of an agreement for the conditional sale or
lease thereof with the right of purchase upon performance of the conditions
stated in the agreement and with an immediate right of possession vested in the
conditional vendee or lessee, or if a mortgagor of a vehicle is entitled to
possession, such conditional vendee, lessee, or mortgagor is the owner for the
purpose of this chapter.
§ 322.01(31), Fla. Stat. (2013). These statutory definitions in 2005, when
the accident in this case occurred, contained identical language. §§
316.003(26), 322.01(30), 324.021(9)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005).
the accident in this case occurred, contained identical language. §§
316.003(26), 322.01(30), 324.021(9)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005).
* * *