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Fla. L. Weekly D534aTop of Form
Fla. L. Weekly D534aTop of Form
Torts
— Automobile accident — Damages — Successive accidents — Trial court
improperly directed verdict on amount of past medical expenses claimed in
action seeking damages attributable to first of two unrelated accidents where
conflicting record evidence existed at trial regarding proper attribution of
some medical bills and whether bills were attributable to first or second
accident — Remand for new trial on damages — Because plaintiff argued to jury
that future medical expenses and pain and suffering expenses should all be
attributed to first accident based upon court’s directed verdict, amount of
these damages must also be reconsidered by jury at new trial
— Automobile accident — Damages — Successive accidents — Trial court
improperly directed verdict on amount of past medical expenses claimed in
action seeking damages attributable to first of two unrelated accidents where
conflicting record evidence existed at trial regarding proper attribution of
some medical bills and whether bills were attributable to first or second
accident — Remand for new trial on damages — Because plaintiff argued to jury
that future medical expenses and pain and suffering expenses should all be
attributed to first accident based upon court’s directed verdict, amount of
these damages must also be reconsidered by jury at new trial
BRITTANY
HANEY, Appellant, v. LESLIE SLOAN, Appellee. 1st District. Case No. 1D15-3905.
Opinion filed March 3, 2017. An appeal from the Circuit Court for Bay County.
Stewart E. Parsons, Judge. Counsel: Caryn L. Bellus and Bretton C. Albrecht of
Kubicki Draper, P.A., Miami, for Appellant. Dennis R. Schutt and Cindy K.
Kinslow-Coats of Schutt, Schmidt & Noey, Jacksonville, for Appellee.
HANEY, Appellant, v. LESLIE SLOAN, Appellee. 1st District. Case No. 1D15-3905.
Opinion filed March 3, 2017. An appeal from the Circuit Court for Bay County.
Stewart E. Parsons, Judge. Counsel: Caryn L. Bellus and Bretton C. Albrecht of
Kubicki Draper, P.A., Miami, for Appellant. Dennis R. Schutt and Cindy K.
Kinslow-Coats of Schutt, Schmidt & Noey, Jacksonville, for Appellee.
(PER
CURIAM.) This appeal arises from a car accident and Leslie Sloan’s personal
injury lawsuit against Brittany Haney, which resulted in a $1.6 million
verdict. Because the trial court improperly directed a verdict on the amount of
past medical expenses when conflicting record evidence existed at trial, we
reverse and remand for a new damages trial.
CURIAM.) This appeal arises from a car accident and Leslie Sloan’s personal
injury lawsuit against Brittany Haney, which resulted in a $1.6 million
verdict. Because the trial court improperly directed a verdict on the amount of
past medical expenses when conflicting record evidence existed at trial, we
reverse and remand for a new damages trial.
I.
Ms.
Sloan (Plaintiff) and Ms. Haney (Defendant) were involved in a car accident in
March 2012 that injured Plaintiff. After the accident, she received
chiropractic and pain management care and had a spinal fusion on her neck.
After her medical interventions and appointments substantially subsided,
Plaintiff was involved in an unrelated accident. After this December 2013
accident, Plaintiff also sought medical help. She had many treatments with her
chiropractor and pain management doctors and was diagnosed as having a
temporomandibular joint (TMJ) condition.
Sloan (Plaintiff) and Ms. Haney (Defendant) were involved in a car accident in
March 2012 that injured Plaintiff. After the accident, she received
chiropractic and pain management care and had a spinal fusion on her neck.
After her medical interventions and appointments substantially subsided,
Plaintiff was involved in an unrelated accident. After this December 2013
accident, Plaintiff also sought medical help. She had many treatments with her
chiropractor and pain management doctors and was diagnosed as having a
temporomandibular joint (TMJ) condition.
Plaintiff
then sued Defendant to recover from the first accident. Defendant admitted
liability as to Plaintiff’s neck injury, but disputed fault for Plaintiff’s
other injuries and TMJ condition. Defendant ascribed Plaintiff’s other medical
problems primarily to the second accident. After the parties presented their
evidence, Plaintiff moved for a directed verdict as to all of her past medical
expenses, incurred both before and after the second accident. She argued that a
jury could not differentiate between her injuries caused by the two accidents
based on the evidence presented, and therefore must attribute all of Plaintiff’s
injuries to the initial accident. Over Defendant’s objection, the trial court
granted the motion and informed the jury that all of Plaintiff’s past medical
expenses, some $130,577.18, were legally attributable to the first accident and
caused by Defendant. Plaintiff then argued at closing that the jury should
consider its award of future medical expenses and pain and suffering expenses
based on the premise that Defendant had solely caused all of Plaintiff’s
injuries. The jury then returned a verdict for Plaintiff in the amount of
$1,630,577.18.
then sued Defendant to recover from the first accident. Defendant admitted
liability as to Plaintiff’s neck injury, but disputed fault for Plaintiff’s
other injuries and TMJ condition. Defendant ascribed Plaintiff’s other medical
problems primarily to the second accident. After the parties presented their
evidence, Plaintiff moved for a directed verdict as to all of her past medical
expenses, incurred both before and after the second accident. She argued that a
jury could not differentiate between her injuries caused by the two accidents
based on the evidence presented, and therefore must attribute all of Plaintiff’s
injuries to the initial accident. Over Defendant’s objection, the trial court
granted the motion and informed the jury that all of Plaintiff’s past medical
expenses, some $130,577.18, were legally attributable to the first accident and
caused by Defendant. Plaintiff then argued at closing that the jury should
consider its award of future medical expenses and pain and suffering expenses
based on the premise that Defendant had solely caused all of Plaintiff’s
injuries. The jury then returned a verdict for Plaintiff in the amount of
$1,630,577.18.
II.
A.
Where
a plaintiff has been involved in successive accidents but sues just one of the
tortfeasors causing her injuries, it is the jury’s role to determine whether
the plaintiff’s injuries can be apportioned between the first and second
accident. See Gross v. Lyons, 763 So. 2d 276, 279 (Fla. 2000); In
re Standard Jury Instructions In Civil Cases — Report No. 13-02, 135 So.
3d 281, 282 (Fla. 2014). If the injuries cannot be apportioned, then the jury
is to find the prior tortfeasor responsible for all of the injuries. Gross,
763 So. 2d at 279. A trial court should proceed with “extreme caution” in
deciding to remove a case from the jury’s purview and grant a directed verdict
motion. Houghton v. Bond, 680 So. 2d 514, 522 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). It is
reversible error to grant a motion for directed verdict when conflicting
evidence exists regarding the causation of injuries and the attribution of
expenses between them. See Pugliese v. Terek, 117 So. 3d 1230
(Fla. 3d DCA 2013); Moore v. Perry, 944 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006);
Gross v. Lyons, 721 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), approved, 763
So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2000).
a plaintiff has been involved in successive accidents but sues just one of the
tortfeasors causing her injuries, it is the jury’s role to determine whether
the plaintiff’s injuries can be apportioned between the first and second
accident. See Gross v. Lyons, 763 So. 2d 276, 279 (Fla. 2000); In
re Standard Jury Instructions In Civil Cases — Report No. 13-02, 135 So.
3d 281, 282 (Fla. 2014). If the injuries cannot be apportioned, then the jury
is to find the prior tortfeasor responsible for all of the injuries. Gross,
763 So. 2d at 279. A trial court should proceed with “extreme caution” in
deciding to remove a case from the jury’s purview and grant a directed verdict
motion. Houghton v. Bond, 680 So. 2d 514, 522 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). It is
reversible error to grant a motion for directed verdict when conflicting
evidence exists regarding the causation of injuries and the attribution of
expenses between them. See Pugliese v. Terek, 117 So. 3d 1230
(Fla. 3d DCA 2013); Moore v. Perry, 944 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006);
Gross v. Lyons, 721 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), approved, 763
So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2000).
B.
In
the instant case, the trial court attributed all of Plaintiff’s past medical
bills — including bills incurred after the second accident — to the first
accident and granted a directed verdict. It is undisputed that the neck injury
arose from the initial car accident. The source of Plaintiff’s other injuries
(and resulting medical bills), however, is disputed. Plaintiff presented expert
testimony from her chiropractor and her pain management specialist that her
lower back injury, TMJ condition, and pain primarily arose from the initial
accident. But Plaintiff’s experts also acknowledged, as did Defendant’s expert,
that some of her pain and treatment, at least temporarily, arose from the
second accident.
the instant case, the trial court attributed all of Plaintiff’s past medical
bills — including bills incurred after the second accident — to the first
accident and granted a directed verdict. It is undisputed that the neck injury
arose from the initial car accident. The source of Plaintiff’s other injuries
(and resulting medical bills), however, is disputed. Plaintiff presented expert
testimony from her chiropractor and her pain management specialist that her
lower back injury, TMJ condition, and pain primarily arose from the initial
accident. But Plaintiff’s experts also acknowledged, as did Defendant’s expert,
that some of her pain and treatment, at least temporarily, arose from the
second accident.
There
was conflicting evidence about the proper attribution of some of the medical
bills and whether they were attributable to the first accident or the second.
Whereas Plaintiff argued that a jury could not segregate bills between the
injuries caused by the two accidents, some evidence suggests that certain bills
could indeed be differentiated. Plaintiff’s pain management doctor stated, for
instance, that he was unaware that Plaintiff had even been involved in a
subsequent accident. He hadn’t reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records from the
second accident, but conceded that it could have caused her spine, TMJ, and
lower back problems. In other words, there was a basis for the jury to agree
with the Defendant that Plaintiff’s post-December 2013 bills arose from the
second accident.
was conflicting evidence about the proper attribution of some of the medical
bills and whether they were attributable to the first accident or the second.
Whereas Plaintiff argued that a jury could not segregate bills between the
injuries caused by the two accidents, some evidence suggests that certain bills
could indeed be differentiated. Plaintiff’s pain management doctor stated, for
instance, that he was unaware that Plaintiff had even been involved in a
subsequent accident. He hadn’t reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records from the
second accident, but conceded that it could have caused her spine, TMJ, and
lower back problems. In other words, there was a basis for the jury to agree
with the Defendant that Plaintiff’s post-December 2013 bills arose from the
second accident.
With
respect to other bills, Defendant’s medical expert testified based on
Plaintiff’s own statements of his belief that certain chiropractic treatments
in Georgia did not stem from the first accident, but from a sleeping-related
problem. Here again, the jury had a basis for attributing some of Plaintiff’s
medical bills to causes other than the first accident.
respect to other bills, Defendant’s medical expert testified based on
Plaintiff’s own statements of his belief that certain chiropractic treatments
in Georgia did not stem from the first accident, but from a sleeping-related
problem. Here again, the jury had a basis for attributing some of Plaintiff’s
medical bills to causes other than the first accident.
Finally,
Plaintiff’s chiropractor admitted to keeping two separate files for Plaintiff
based on each accident. He apparently billed Plaintiff’s insurance company
separately for treatments she received after the subsequent accident. The
attribution of at least some of Plaintiff’s medical costs to the second
accident is supported by the examination report he completed a week after the
second accident, which described that accident as follows:
Plaintiff’s chiropractor admitted to keeping two separate files for Plaintiff
based on each accident. He apparently billed Plaintiff’s insurance company
separately for treatments she received after the subsequent accident. The
attribution of at least some of Plaintiff’s medical costs to the second
accident is supported by the examination report he completed a week after the
second accident, which described that accident as follows:
Mrs. Sloan . . . stated the impact was severe, she was
jolted back and forth in her car “pretty hard” and she felt immediate pain in
her lower back, neck and head. . . . [After treatment at the hospital, she was]
released with prescription medications. Since the day of the accident she has
been taking valium and hydrocodone for pain management.
jolted back and forth in her car “pretty hard” and she felt immediate pain in
her lower back, neck and head. . . . [After treatment at the hospital, she was]
released with prescription medications. Since the day of the accident she has
been taking valium and hydrocodone for pain management.
With
respect to that same chiropractic visit, Plaintiff’s case/patient history form
stated her reason for treatment arose solely from the second accident. She
reported her “present illness” as being the second motor vehicle accident —
“MVA on 12/27/13.” She also listed the date her symptoms appeared as being the
date of the second accident; that she’d first noticed her major symptom
(“predominantly lower back pain with neck pain”) on the date of the second
accident; and that her major symptom “originally occurred” on the date of the
second accident. Here again, the jury had a basis for apportioning at least
some of Plaintiff’s chiropractic expenses to the second motor vehicle accident,
and not Defendant.
respect to that same chiropractic visit, Plaintiff’s case/patient history form
stated her reason for treatment arose solely from the second accident. She
reported her “present illness” as being the second motor vehicle accident —
“MVA on 12/27/13.” She also listed the date her symptoms appeared as being the
date of the second accident; that she’d first noticed her major symptom
(“predominantly lower back pain with neck pain”) on the date of the second
accident; and that her major symptom “originally occurred” on the date of the
second accident. Here again, the jury had a basis for apportioning at least
some of Plaintiff’s chiropractic expenses to the second motor vehicle accident,
and not Defendant.
Because
evidence from conflicting witness testimony existed upon which the jury could
have attributed at least some of Plaintiff’s past medical expenses to the
second car accident, the trial court incorrectly directed a verdict. We thus
reverse the final judgment so that a jury can resolve conflicts in the evidence
and decide the distribution of damages issue. See Van v. Schmidt,
122 So. 3d 243, 259 (Fla. 2013) (recognizing that a jury may reject any
testimony, including testimony of experts). Because Plaintiff argued to the
jury that her future medical expenses and pain and suffering expenses should
all be attributed to the first accident based upon the court’s directed
verdict, the amount of these damages must also be reconsidered by the jury at
the new trial. See Special v. W. Boca Med. Ctr., 160 So. 3d 1251,
1256-57 (Fla. 2014) (unless the benefitted party proves no reasonable
possibility that the error contributed to the verdict, the error must be
considered harmful).
evidence from conflicting witness testimony existed upon which the jury could
have attributed at least some of Plaintiff’s past medical expenses to the
second car accident, the trial court incorrectly directed a verdict. We thus
reverse the final judgment so that a jury can resolve conflicts in the evidence
and decide the distribution of damages issue. See Van v. Schmidt,
122 So. 3d 243, 259 (Fla. 2013) (recognizing that a jury may reject any
testimony, including testimony of experts). Because Plaintiff argued to the
jury that her future medical expenses and pain and suffering expenses should
all be attributed to the first accident based upon the court’s directed
verdict, the amount of these damages must also be reconsidered by the jury at
the new trial. See Special v. W. Boca Med. Ctr., 160 So. 3d 1251,
1256-57 (Fla. 2014) (unless the benefitted party proves no reasonable
possibility that the error contributed to the verdict, the error must be
considered harmful).
III.
We
REVERSE the final judgment and REMAND for a new trial on damages. (B.L. THOMAS,
OSTERHAUS, and BILBREY, JJ., CONCUR.)
REVERSE the final judgment and REMAND for a new trial on damages. (B.L. THOMAS,
OSTERHAUS, and BILBREY, JJ., CONCUR.)
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