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Fla. L. Weekly D2279bTop of Form
Fla. L. Weekly D2279bTop of Form
Torts
— Automobile accident — Damages — Jury award of zero damages — Trial court
erred in granting plaintiff a new trial after jury awarded no damages on basis
of general rule that plaintiff is entitled to at least the medical expenses
incurred for any diagnostic testing reasonably necessary to determine whether
the accident caused injury — Exception to general rule was applicable where
plaintiff lacked candor with her treating physicians and failed to inform them
of other accidents — Further, plaintiff did not object to verdict form that
invited jury to return a verdict on an all-or-nothing basis
— Automobile accident — Damages — Jury award of zero damages — Trial court
erred in granting plaintiff a new trial after jury awarded no damages on basis
of general rule that plaintiff is entitled to at least the medical expenses
incurred for any diagnostic testing reasonably necessary to determine whether
the accident caused injury — Exception to general rule was applicable where
plaintiff lacked candor with her treating physicians and failed to inform them
of other accidents — Further, plaintiff did not object to verdict form that
invited jury to return a verdict on an all-or-nothing basis
EVAN
FINKEL and JULIE FINKEL, Appellants, vs. YARIELSI BATISTA and RODNEY SANCHEZ,
Appellees. 3rd District. Case No. 3D15-2509. L.T. Case No. 12-10550. Opinion
filed October 5, 2016. An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court
for Miami-Dade County, Gisela Cardonne Ely, Judge. Counsel: Cole, Scott &
Kissane, P.A., and Scott A. Cole, for appellants. Feiler & Leach, P.L., and
Martin E. Leach, for appellees.
FINKEL and JULIE FINKEL, Appellants, vs. YARIELSI BATISTA and RODNEY SANCHEZ,
Appellees. 3rd District. Case No. 3D15-2509. L.T. Case No. 12-10550. Opinion
filed October 5, 2016. An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court
for Miami-Dade County, Gisela Cardonne Ely, Judge. Counsel: Cole, Scott &
Kissane, P.A., and Scott A. Cole, for appellants. Feiler & Leach, P.L., and
Martin E. Leach, for appellees.
(Before
WELLS, LOGUE, and SCALES, JJ.)
WELLS, LOGUE, and SCALES, JJ.)
(LOGUE,
J.) Evan Finkel and Julie Finkel, the defendants in the underlying lawsuit,
appeal the order granting Yarielsi Batista and Rodney Sanchez, the plaintiffs,
a new trial after the jury awarded the plaintiffs no damages. The trial court
based its decision on the general rule that a plaintiff is entitled to recover
at least the medical expenses incurred for any diagnostic testing reasonably
necessary to determine whether an accident caused injury. See Sparks-Book
v. Sports Authority, Inc., 699 So. 2d 767, 768 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). We reverse
because exceptions to this general rule apply, sufficient evidence supported
the jury’s verdict, and the plaintiffs failed to object to the verdict form
that invited the jury to return a verdict on an “all-or-nothing” basis.
J.) Evan Finkel and Julie Finkel, the defendants in the underlying lawsuit,
appeal the order granting Yarielsi Batista and Rodney Sanchez, the plaintiffs,
a new trial after the jury awarded the plaintiffs no damages. The trial court
based its decision on the general rule that a plaintiff is entitled to recover
at least the medical expenses incurred for any diagnostic testing reasonably
necessary to determine whether an accident caused injury. See Sparks-Book
v. Sports Authority, Inc., 699 So. 2d 767, 768 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). We reverse
because exceptions to this general rule apply, sufficient evidence supported
the jury’s verdict, and the plaintiffs failed to object to the verdict form
that invited the jury to return a verdict on an “all-or-nothing” basis.
FACTS
AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mr.
Finkel and Ms. Batista were involved in a minor fender-bender car accident. Ms.
Batista and her husband, Mr. Sanchez, brought suit against Mr. Finkel and his
mother, Julie Finkel, who owned the vehicle driven by Mr. Finkel. The trial
court bifurcated the trial between liability and causation and damages.
Following the liability trial, the jury found Mr. Finkel 100% liable for the
accident. The trial court then held a trial on whether the accident caused
loss, injury, or damage to Ms. Batista. Both parties presented expert medical
opinions in their favor.
Finkel and Ms. Batista were involved in a minor fender-bender car accident. Ms.
Batista and her husband, Mr. Sanchez, brought suit against Mr. Finkel and his
mother, Julie Finkel, who owned the vehicle driven by Mr. Finkel. The trial
court bifurcated the trial between liability and causation and damages.
Following the liability trial, the jury found Mr. Finkel 100% liable for the
accident. The trial court then held a trial on whether the accident caused
loss, injury, or damage to Ms. Batista. Both parties presented expert medical
opinions in their favor.
Ms.
Batista’s crucial witness, her treating orthopedic surgeon, explained why he
concluded that the accident at issue caused a partial, permanent injury to her
lower back. On cross examination, however, he admitted that Ms. Batista failed
to disclose other accidents. After the accident at issue, and before the
orthopedic surgeon diagnosed Ms. Batista, she had been involved in another car
accident and a slip-and-fall incident. Those undisclosed incidents led to
hospital visits to treat back pain. Ms. Batista’s orthopedic surgeon admitted
that had he been aware of those undisclosed incidents, he may have changed his
opinion regarding whether the accident at issue caused Ms. Batista’s back pain.
Other evidence at trial indicated that the minor fender-bender car accident did
not cause Ms. Batista injury.
Batista’s crucial witness, her treating orthopedic surgeon, explained why he
concluded that the accident at issue caused a partial, permanent injury to her
lower back. On cross examination, however, he admitted that Ms. Batista failed
to disclose other accidents. After the accident at issue, and before the
orthopedic surgeon diagnosed Ms. Batista, she had been involved in another car
accident and a slip-and-fall incident. Those undisclosed incidents led to
hospital visits to treat back pain. Ms. Batista’s orthopedic surgeon admitted
that had he been aware of those undisclosed incidents, he may have changed his
opinion regarding whether the accident at issue caused Ms. Batista’s back pain.
Other evidence at trial indicated that the minor fender-bender car accident did
not cause Ms. Batista injury.
The
parties also presented expert testimony on the diagnostic tests performed on
Ms. Batista shortly after the car accident at issue. The defendants’ expert
witness testified that certain diagnostic testing was reasonably necessary to
determine whether the accident caused injury. But he offered this testimony
with an important caveat. He predicated his opinion on the assumption that Ms.
Batista’s complaints about pain were truthful:
parties also presented expert testimony on the diagnostic tests performed on
Ms. Batista shortly after the car accident at issue. The defendants’ expert
witness testified that certain diagnostic testing was reasonably necessary to
determine whether the accident caused injury. But he offered this testimony
with an important caveat. He predicated his opinion on the assumption that Ms.
Batista’s complaints about pain were truthful:
Q. Did you reach the opinion
within a medical probability as to what, if any, medical care or treatment Ms.
Batista has incurred since the . . . car accident is reasonable, relatedness to
that accident?
within a medical probability as to what, if any, medical care or treatment Ms.
Batista has incurred since the . . . car accident is reasonable, relatedness to
that accident?
A. Yes, sir. So I guess I do
have to point out I would say as a — giving Ms. Batista the benefit of the
doubt that she was having complaints of pain after the accident, which I assume
to be true, I would say the treatment up until the time when she had the
first MRI . . . would have been reasonable.
have to point out I would say as a — giving Ms. Batista the benefit of the
doubt that she was having complaints of pain after the accident, which I assume
to be true, I would say the treatment up until the time when she had the
first MRI . . . would have been reasonable.
Q. Why?
A. Well . . . [i]f someone
says that they are having pain you assume that they are having pain, but that
is a subjective complaint. . . . So once giving her again the benefit of the
doubt, justified her complaints of treatment for some therapy as well as
the MRI that would have been, I think, reasonable.
says that they are having pain you assume that they are having pain, but that
is a subjective complaint. . . . So once giving her again the benefit of the
doubt, justified her complaints of treatment for some therapy as well as
the MRI that would have been, I think, reasonable.
(emphasis
added).
added).
At
the conclusion of the damages trial, the trial court presented the jury with a
verdict form similar to the one in Sparks-Book. The plaintiffs did not
object to this verdict form. It provided, in pertinent part:
the conclusion of the damages trial, the trial court presented the jury with a
verdict form similar to the one in Sparks-Book. The plaintiffs did not
object to this verdict form. It provided, in pertinent part:
1. Evan Finkel was negligent.
Was such negligence the legal cause of loss, injury or damage to the Plaintiff,
Yarielsi Batista?
Was such negligence the legal cause of loss, injury or damage to the Plaintiff,
Yarielsi Batista?
Yes_______
No_______
No_______
If you answered “NO” to
Question 1, your verdict is for the Defendant, Evan Finkel and you should not
proceed further except to date and sign this verdict form and return it to the
courtroom. If you answered “YES” to Question 1, please answer Questions 2 and
3.
Question 1, your verdict is for the Defendant, Evan Finkel and you should not
proceed further except to date and sign this verdict form and return it to the
courtroom. If you answered “YES” to Question 1, please answer Questions 2 and
3.
The
jury answered the first question in the negative, finding that the accident was
not the legal cause of loss, injury, or damage to Ms. Batista. Consistent with
verdict form’s instructions, the jury answered no further questions and awarded
no damages.
jury answered the first question in the negative, finding that the accident was
not the legal cause of loss, injury, or damage to Ms. Batista. Consistent with
verdict form’s instructions, the jury answered no further questions and awarded
no damages.
The
plaintiffs then moved for a new trial, citing to the general rule that a
plaintiff is entitled to recover medical expenses incurred for any diagnostic
testing reasonably necessary to determine whether the accident caused injury.
The defendants countered by contending that exceptions to this general rule
applied, specifically, lack of candor with treating physicians and conflicting
medical opinions on whether the accident caused any injury. Citing to Sparks-Book,
the trial court granted a new trial based on the sole reason that Ms. Batista
was “entitled to recover the medical bills incurred for the diagnostic testing
after the accident.” This appeal followed.1
plaintiffs then moved for a new trial, citing to the general rule that a
plaintiff is entitled to recover medical expenses incurred for any diagnostic
testing reasonably necessary to determine whether the accident caused injury.
The defendants countered by contending that exceptions to this general rule
applied, specifically, lack of candor with treating physicians and conflicting
medical opinions on whether the accident caused any injury. Citing to Sparks-Book,
the trial court granted a new trial based on the sole reason that Ms. Batista
was “entitled to recover the medical bills incurred for the diagnostic testing
after the accident.” This appeal followed.1
ANALYSIS
In Sparks-Book,
this court acknowledged the general rule that a plaintiff is “entitled to
recover for those medical expenses incurred for any diagnostic testing which
was reasonably necessary to determine whether the accident caused her
injuries.” 699 So. 2d at 768. But there are exceptions to this general rule. See
Hernandez v. Gonzalez, 124 So. 3d 988, 991-92 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)
(providing a non-exhaustive list of exceptions). Examples of such exceptions
include lack of candor with treating physicians and conflicting medical
opinions on whether the accident caused any injury. See Plana v.
Sainz, 990 So. 2d 554, 556-57 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (distinguishing Sparks-Book
and recognizing these exceptions, among others).
this court acknowledged the general rule that a plaintiff is “entitled to
recover for those medical expenses incurred for any diagnostic testing which
was reasonably necessary to determine whether the accident caused her
injuries.” 699 So. 2d at 768. But there are exceptions to this general rule. See
Hernandez v. Gonzalez, 124 So. 3d 988, 991-92 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)
(providing a non-exhaustive list of exceptions). Examples of such exceptions
include lack of candor with treating physicians and conflicting medical
opinions on whether the accident caused any injury. See Plana v.
Sainz, 990 So. 2d 554, 556-57 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (distinguishing Sparks-Book
and recognizing these exceptions, among others).
In
this case, the parties presented conflicting expert medical opinions on
causation. The evidence presented by both parties, including the testimony from
Ms. Batista’s treating orthopedic surgeon, also demonstrated that Ms. Batista
lacked candor with her treating physicians. After the car accident at issue,
Ms. Batista had been involved in another car accident and a slip-and-fall
incident. Both the slip-and-fall incident and the second car accident led to
hospital visits to treat back pain. Ms. Batista’s treating orthopedic surgeon
admitted that he was unaware of those incidents when he diagnosed her with back
pain requiring extensive treatment. He further admitted that had he been aware
of those undisclosed incidents, he may have changed his opinion regarding
whether the accident at issue caused Ms. Batista back pain. This testimony
undermined Ms. Batista’s credibility on the issue of whether she suffered from
back pain as a result of the car accident at issue.
this case, the parties presented conflicting expert medical opinions on
causation. The evidence presented by both parties, including the testimony from
Ms. Batista’s treating orthopedic surgeon, also demonstrated that Ms. Batista
lacked candor with her treating physicians. After the car accident at issue,
Ms. Batista had been involved in another car accident and a slip-and-fall
incident. Both the slip-and-fall incident and the second car accident led to
hospital visits to treat back pain. Ms. Batista’s treating orthopedic surgeon
admitted that he was unaware of those incidents when he diagnosed her with back
pain requiring extensive treatment. He further admitted that had he been aware
of those undisclosed incidents, he may have changed his opinion regarding
whether the accident at issue caused Ms. Batista back pain. This testimony
undermined Ms. Batista’s credibility on the issue of whether she suffered from
back pain as a result of the car accident at issue.
Admittedly,
the defendants’ expert witness testified that certain diagnostic testing was reasonably
necessary to determine whether the car accident caused injury. But he properly
predicated this opinion on the assumption that Ms. Batista’s complaints about
pain were truthful. It was within the province of the jury to find that Ms.
Batista was not truthful, especially given her lack of candor with treating
physicians. Such a finding, along with other evidence presented at trial,
supported the jury’s verdict that the accident at issue caused no injury to Ms.
Batista.
the defendants’ expert witness testified that certain diagnostic testing was reasonably
necessary to determine whether the car accident caused injury. But he properly
predicated this opinion on the assumption that Ms. Batista’s complaints about
pain were truthful. It was within the province of the jury to find that Ms.
Batista was not truthful, especially given her lack of candor with treating
physicians. Such a finding, along with other evidence presented at trial,
supported the jury’s verdict that the accident at issue caused no injury to Ms.
Batista.
The
trial court did not make any finding that this verdict was against the manifest
weight of the evidence. See Brown v. Estate of Stuckey, 749 So.
2d 490, 497 (Fla. 1999) (“[T]he trial judge has broad discretion in ruling on a
motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary to the
manifest weight of the evidence. . . . When a trial judge grants the motion for
a new trial, he or she must articulate the reasons for the new trial in the
order.”). Instead, it felt compelled to grant a new trial based on Sparks-Book.
As explained above, however, Sparks-Book merely recognized a general
rule. Several exceptions to this rule apply here.
trial court did not make any finding that this verdict was against the manifest
weight of the evidence. See Brown v. Estate of Stuckey, 749 So.
2d 490, 497 (Fla. 1999) (“[T]he trial judge has broad discretion in ruling on a
motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary to the
manifest weight of the evidence. . . . When a trial judge grants the motion for
a new trial, he or she must articulate the reasons for the new trial in the
order.”). Instead, it felt compelled to grant a new trial based on Sparks-Book.
As explained above, however, Sparks-Book merely recognized a general
rule. Several exceptions to this rule apply here.
Moreover,
like the plaintiffs in Plana and Hernandez, the plaintiffs here
did not object to the verdict form that invited the jury to return a verdict on
an “all-or-nothing” basis. The jury answered the first question presented to it
in the negative, finding that the accident was not the legal cause of loss,
injury, or damage to Ms. Batista. Consistent with verdict form’s instructions,
the jury answered no further questions and awarded no damages. It is
well-settled law that “the jury cannot be faulted for doing exactly what it was
instructed to do” in these circumstances. Plana, 990 So. 2d at 557; Hernandez,
124 So. 3d at 992. For these reasons, we reverse the order granting a new
trial.
like the plaintiffs in Plana and Hernandez, the plaintiffs here
did not object to the verdict form that invited the jury to return a verdict on
an “all-or-nothing” basis. The jury answered the first question presented to it
in the negative, finding that the accident was not the legal cause of loss,
injury, or damage to Ms. Batista. Consistent with verdict form’s instructions,
the jury answered no further questions and awarded no damages. It is
well-settled law that “the jury cannot be faulted for doing exactly what it was
instructed to do” in these circumstances. Plana, 990 So. 2d at 557; Hernandez,
124 So. 3d at 992. For these reasons, we reverse the order granting a new
trial.
The
next question we must resolve is the proper remedy for the trial court’s legal
error. “If the appellate court cannot determine whether the trial court would
have granted a new trial but for the error of law . . . then the proper remedy
is to remand the case to the trial court for reconsideration in light of the
correct legal principles.” Van v. Schmidt, 122 So. 3d 243, 260 (Fla.
2013). By contrast, “if the only way that the trial court could have reached
the result of granting a new trial was based on the legal error, then the
appellate court could properly reverse the trial court’s order and remand for
reinstatement of the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 260-61.
next question we must resolve is the proper remedy for the trial court’s legal
error. “If the appellate court cannot determine whether the trial court would
have granted a new trial but for the error of law . . . then the proper remedy
is to remand the case to the trial court for reconsideration in light of the
correct legal principles.” Van v. Schmidt, 122 So. 3d 243, 260 (Fla.
2013). By contrast, “if the only way that the trial court could have reached
the result of granting a new trial was based on the legal error, then the
appellate court could properly reverse the trial court’s order and remand for
reinstatement of the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 260-61.
Given
our review of the order on appeal and the entire record, we conclude that the
only way the trial court could have reached the result of granting a new trial
was based on the legal error. We therefore remand for reinstatement of the
jury’s verdict. See Schwartz v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 155 So. 3d
471, 473-74 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (reversing an order granting a new trial and
remanding for reinstatement of the jury’s verdict in similar circumstances).
our review of the order on appeal and the entire record, we conclude that the
only way the trial court could have reached the result of granting a new trial
was based on the legal error. We therefore remand for reinstatement of the
jury’s verdict. See Schwartz v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 155 So. 3d
471, 473-74 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (reversing an order granting a new trial and
remanding for reinstatement of the jury’s verdict in similar circumstances).
Reversed
and remanded for reinstatement of the jury’s verdict.
and remanded for reinstatement of the jury’s verdict.
__________________
1An
order granting a new trial is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See
Van v. Schmidt, 122 So. 3d 243, 252-53 (Fla. 2013). An erroneous view of
the law can constitute an abuse of discretion. Buitrago v. Feaster, 157
So. 3d 318, 320 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). Moreover, appellate courts apply a de novo
standard of review to a trial court’s legal conclusions in an order granting a
new trial. See Van, 122 So. 3d at 246 (“[A]n appellate court
properly applies a de novo standard of review to a trial court’s conclusions of
law in an order granting a new trial based on the manifest weight of the
evidence, giving no deference to the trial court’s legal conclusions.”).
order granting a new trial is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See
Van v. Schmidt, 122 So. 3d 243, 252-53 (Fla. 2013). An erroneous view of
the law can constitute an abuse of discretion. Buitrago v. Feaster, 157
So. 3d 318, 320 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). Moreover, appellate courts apply a de novo
standard of review to a trial court’s legal conclusions in an order granting a
new trial. See Van, 122 So. 3d at 246 (“[A]n appellate court
properly applies a de novo standard of review to a trial court’s conclusions of
law in an order granting a new trial based on the manifest weight of the
evidence, giving no deference to the trial court’s legal conclusions.”).
Under
either the abuse of discretion or de novo standard of review, we would reverse
the order here because it is based on an erroneous view of the law. We
therefore find it unnecessary to resolve the question of which standard of
review applies here. Cf. Schwartz v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 155
So. 3d 471, 473 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (applying the de novo standard of review to
an order granting a new trial where the motion for new trial addressed only
issues of law).
either the abuse of discretion or de novo standard of review, we would reverse
the order here because it is based on an erroneous view of the law. We
therefore find it unnecessary to resolve the question of which standard of
review applies here. Cf. Schwartz v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 155
So. 3d 471, 473 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (applying the de novo standard of review to
an order granting a new trial where the motion for new trial addressed only
issues of law).
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