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Fla. L. Weekly D1038bTop of Form
Fla. L. Weekly D1038bTop of Form
Torts
— Automobile accident — Dangerous instrumentality doctrine — Conflict of
laws — Significant relationships test — Florida’s dangerous instrumentality
law is applicable to case of a motor vehicle accident that occurred in South
Carolina where the only two parties to the litigation are Florida residents —
Where defendant, a Florida resident, lent his vehicle to a resident of
Pennsylvania who was involved in an accident in South Carolina with another
Florida resident, Florida is the state with the most significant relationship
for the issue of vicarious liability
— Automobile accident — Dangerous instrumentality doctrine — Conflict of
laws — Significant relationships test — Florida’s dangerous instrumentality
law is applicable to case of a motor vehicle accident that occurred in South
Carolina where the only two parties to the litigation are Florida residents —
Where defendant, a Florida resident, lent his vehicle to a resident of
Pennsylvania who was involved in an accident in South Carolina with another
Florida resident, Florida is the state with the most significant relationship
for the issue of vicarious liability
LIA WARD, Appellant, v. KEITH M.
MORLOCK, Appellee. 5th District. Case No. 5D16-1641. Opinion filed May 5, 2017.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County, John Marshall Kest, Judge.
Counsel: Lindsey M. Tenberg, Lighthouse Point, for Appellant. Michael M. Brownlee,
of Fisher Rushmer, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee.
MORLOCK, Appellee. 5th District. Case No. 5D16-1641. Opinion filed May 5, 2017.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County, John Marshall Kest, Judge.
Counsel: Lindsey M. Tenberg, Lighthouse Point, for Appellant. Michael M. Brownlee,
of Fisher Rushmer, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee.
(LAMBERT, J.) The issue that we
address in this conflict of laws case is whether Florida’s dangerous
instrumentality law should apply to a case arising out of a motor vehicle
accident that occurred in South Carolina where the only two parties to the
litigation are Florida residents. The material facts of the case are not in
dispute. Appellee, Keith Morlock, and his family were vacationing in South
Carolina with his brother-in-law, Paul Behrens, and his family. Behrens’ son
needed a ride to a local airport, and Behrens asked Appellee if he could borrow
his vehicle. Appellee consented, and while on the way to the airport, Behrens
rear-ended the car that Appellant, Lia Ward, was driving at an intersection located
in Mt. Pleasant, South Carolina.
address in this conflict of laws case is whether Florida’s dangerous
instrumentality law should apply to a case arising out of a motor vehicle
accident that occurred in South Carolina where the only two parties to the
litigation are Florida residents. The material facts of the case are not in
dispute. Appellee, Keith Morlock, and his family were vacationing in South
Carolina with his brother-in-law, Paul Behrens, and his family. Behrens’ son
needed a ride to a local airport, and Behrens asked Appellee if he could borrow
his vehicle. Appellee consented, and while on the way to the airport, Behrens
rear-ended the car that Appellant, Lia Ward, was driving at an intersection located
in Mt. Pleasant, South Carolina.
Appellant filed a negligence suit
solely against Appellee, seeking damages under Florida’s dangerous
instrumentality doctrine, which provides that an owner of a motor vehicle is
generally liable for injuries that are caused by the vehicle’s negligent
operation. Michalek v. Shumate, 524 So. 2d 426, 427 (Fla. 1988).
Appellee answered the complaint, and after the parties conducted some
preliminary discovery, Appellee moved for final summary judgment. Appellee
argued that South Carolina law, rather than Florida law, governed and that
under South Carolina law, the mere ownership of a vehicle is, without more,
insufficient to establish the owner’s liability for the negligence of the
driver. See Thompson v. Michael, 433 S.E.2d 853, 855-56 (S.C. 1993).
Appellee argued that because there was no evidence that he negligently
entrusted his vehicle to his brother-in-law or that he would otherwise be
liable to Appellant under South Carolina’s “Family Purpose Doctrine,”1 final summary judgment was proper.
The trial court determined that South Carolina law, rather than Florida law,
applied and thereafter entered final summary judgment in favor of Appellee.
solely against Appellee, seeking damages under Florida’s dangerous
instrumentality doctrine, which provides that an owner of a motor vehicle is
generally liable for injuries that are caused by the vehicle’s negligent
operation. Michalek v. Shumate, 524 So. 2d 426, 427 (Fla. 1988).
Appellee answered the complaint, and after the parties conducted some
preliminary discovery, Appellee moved for final summary judgment. Appellee
argued that South Carolina law, rather than Florida law, governed and that
under South Carolina law, the mere ownership of a vehicle is, without more,
insufficient to establish the owner’s liability for the negligence of the
driver. See Thompson v. Michael, 433 S.E.2d 853, 855-56 (S.C. 1993).
Appellee argued that because there was no evidence that he negligently
entrusted his vehicle to his brother-in-law or that he would otherwise be
liable to Appellant under South Carolina’s “Family Purpose Doctrine,”1 final summary judgment was proper.
The trial court determined that South Carolina law, rather than Florida law,
applied and thereafter entered final summary judgment in favor of Appellee.
“The standard of review for
choice-of-law questions is de novo.” Higgins v. W. Bend Mutual Ins. Co.,
85 So. 3d 1156, 1157-58 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (citing Sosa v. Safeway Premium
Fin. Co., 73 So. 3d 91, 102 (Fla. 2011); Sigalas v. Lido Maritime, Inc.,
776 F.2d 1512, 1516 (11th Cir. 1985)). In determining which state’s law applies
in conflict of laws cases, Florida courts historically utilized the lex loci
delicti rule that made the substantive law of the state where the injury
occurred applicable to personal injury actions. See Hopkins v. Lockheed
Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 743, 745-46 (Fla. 1967). However, in 1980, the
Florida Supreme Court receded from this doctrine and adopted the “significant
relationships test” as set forth in sections 145-146 of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws (Am. Law. Inst. 1971), which it described as the
“more flexible, modern approach” in determining this issue. Bishop v. Fla.
Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 1980).
choice-of-law questions is de novo.” Higgins v. W. Bend Mutual Ins. Co.,
85 So. 3d 1156, 1157-58 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (citing Sosa v. Safeway Premium
Fin. Co., 73 So. 3d 91, 102 (Fla. 2011); Sigalas v. Lido Maritime, Inc.,
776 F.2d 1512, 1516 (11th Cir. 1985)). In determining which state’s law applies
in conflict of laws cases, Florida courts historically utilized the lex loci
delicti rule that made the substantive law of the state where the injury
occurred applicable to personal injury actions. See Hopkins v. Lockheed
Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 743, 745-46 (Fla. 1967). However, in 1980, the
Florida Supreme Court receded from this doctrine and adopted the “significant
relationships test” as set forth in sections 145-146 of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws (Am. Law. Inst. 1971), which it described as the
“more flexible, modern approach” in determining this issue. Bishop v. Fla.
Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 1980).
The cited sections of the
Restatement provide:
Restatement provide:
§ 145 The
General Principle.
General Principle.
(1) The
rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has
the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the
principles stated in § 6.
rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has
the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the
principles stated in § 6.
(2)
Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to
determine the law applicable to an issue include:
Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to
determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the
place where the injury occurred,
place where the injury occurred,
(b) the
place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the
domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business
of the parties, and
domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business
of the parties, and
(d) the
place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
These
contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance to the
particular issue.
contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance to the
particular issue.
§ 146
Personal Injuries
Personal Injuries
In an
action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury
occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with
respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant
relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the
parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.
action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury
occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with
respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant
relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the
parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.
Section 6(2) of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws sets forth the following choice of law principles
in assessing which state law is to be applied:
(Second) of Conflict of Laws sets forth the following choice of law principles
in assessing which state law is to be applied:
(a) the
needs of the interstate and international systems,
needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the
relevant policies of the forum,
relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the
relevant policies of the other interested states and the relative interests of
those states in the determination of the particular issue,
relevant policies of the other interested states and the relative interests of
those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the
protection of justified expectations,
protection of justified expectations,
(e) the
basic policies underlying the particular field of the law,
basic policies underlying the particular field of the law,
(f) certainty,
predictability and uniformity of result, and
predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease
in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
Pertinent to our resolution of this
appeal is the recognition that the “significant relationships test does not
require the court to evaluate the recited contacts with a view to determine
which state’s local law should be applied to all issues in the case as a
whole; rather, the contacts must be evaluated with respect to the particular issue
under consideration.” Stallworth v. Hosp. Rentals, Inc., 515 So. 2d
413, 415 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (citing Hertz v. Piccolo, 453 So. 2d 12
(Fla. 1984); Harris v. Berkowitz, 433 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)).
Thus, although two of the four contacts under section 145(2), the place where
both the injury and the conduct causing the injury occurred, favor South
Carolina,2 these contacts are evaluated
qualitatively, not quantitatively, according to their relative impact to the
particular issue. See Spence v. Glock, Ges.m.b.H., 227 F.3d 308, 312
(5th Cir. 2000).
appeal is the recognition that the “significant relationships test does not
require the court to evaluate the recited contacts with a view to determine
which state’s local law should be applied to all issues in the case as a
whole; rather, the contacts must be evaluated with respect to the particular issue
under consideration.” Stallworth v. Hosp. Rentals, Inc., 515 So. 2d
413, 415 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (citing Hertz v. Piccolo, 453 So. 2d 12
(Fla. 1984); Harris v. Berkowitz, 433 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)).
Thus, although two of the four contacts under section 145(2), the place where
both the injury and the conduct causing the injury occurred, favor South
Carolina,2 these contacts are evaluated
qualitatively, not quantitatively, according to their relative impact to the
particular issue. See Spence v. Glock, Ges.m.b.H., 227 F.3d 308, 312
(5th Cir. 2000).
As previously stated, the critical
legal issue in dispute is whether Appellee, as owner of the automobile, may be
held vicariously liable for Appellant’s injuries and damages under Florida’s
dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Comment a. to section 145 of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws recognizes that sections 156-174 of
the Restatement focus on specific issues in tort, providing that the best way
to bring more precision into the conflict of laws arena is by attempting to
provide special rules for particular issues in tort. On the precise issue of
vicarious liability, comment a. to section 174 of the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws directs the forum court to apply “the local law of the state
which has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties
with respect to the issue of vicarious liability” in deciding “whether one person
is liable for the tort of another.” See also Cates v. Creamer, 431 F.3d
456, 463 (5th Cir. 2005). Comment a. to section 174 further provides that the
state whose vicarious liability law is to be applied should be selected in
accordance with the choice-of-law principles stated in section 6 and that these
principles require the forum court to consider: “(1) whether the relationship
between the defendant and the other person makes the imposition of vicarious
liability reasonable and (2) whether there is a reasonable relationship between
the defendant and the state whose local law is to be applied.”
legal issue in dispute is whether Appellee, as owner of the automobile, may be
held vicariously liable for Appellant’s injuries and damages under Florida’s
dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Comment a. to section 145 of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws recognizes that sections 156-174 of
the Restatement focus on specific issues in tort, providing that the best way
to bring more precision into the conflict of laws arena is by attempting to
provide special rules for particular issues in tort. On the precise issue of
vicarious liability, comment a. to section 174 of the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws directs the forum court to apply “the local law of the state
which has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties
with respect to the issue of vicarious liability” in deciding “whether one person
is liable for the tort of another.” See also Cates v. Creamer, 431 F.3d
456, 463 (5th Cir. 2005). Comment a. to section 174 further provides that the
state whose vicarious liability law is to be applied should be selected in
accordance with the choice-of-law principles stated in section 6 and that these
principles require the forum court to consider: “(1) whether the relationship
between the defendant and the other person makes the imposition of vicarious
liability reasonable and (2) whether there is a reasonable relationship between
the defendant and the state whose local law is to be applied.”
Pursuant to sections 6 and 174, we
conclude that Florida has the most significant relationship to the occurrence
and the parties on the issue of vicarious liability. First, Appellee is a
Florida resident and the vehicle that his brother-in-law allegedly operated in
a negligent manner was both registered and insured in Florida. As such, there
is a “reasonable relationship” between Appellee and Florida. Second, Appellant
is also a Florida resident. Applying Florida law on the issue of vicarious
liability is consistent with the policy behind its dangerous instrumentality
doctrine; that is, to “protect[ ] plaintiffs from impecunious drivers by
imposing liability on the owners of the vehicles.” Cates, 431 F.3d at
465. Third, Behrens, who has not been sued or otherwise named as a party in the
underlying litigation, is a resident of Pennsylvania. Florida’s manifest
interest in both protecting its residents and holding its residents responsible
under its dangerous instrumentality doctrine far outweighs any interest that
South Carolina may have in the application of its laws here, where neither
driver nor owner resides in South Carolina. Moreover, while both states have a
public policy of protecting an injured plaintiff against monetary costs at the
hands of a negligent defendant, South Carolina does not impose vicarious
liability upon owners of automobiles. Thus, the application of Florida’s law in
this case more readily serves this purpose without offending South Carolina.
Additionally, South Carolina would appear to have little, if any, interest in
protecting Appellee, a Florida resident, from liability under Florida’s
vicarious liability law. Fourth, pursuant to section 6(2)(a), given that the
only two parties to his action are Florida residents, the needs of the
interstate system appear to be minimally impacted. Fifth, under section
6(2)(d), neither Appellee nor his brother-in-law had any “justified
expectations” that the law of South Carolina as opposed to the law of Florida
would apply when Behrens borrowed Appellee’s car, and we find it entirely
reasonable for Appellee to be vicariously liable for the actions of his
brother-in-law’s allegedly negligent driving. Finally, pursuant to section
6(2)(f) and (g), we find no difficulty or any lack of predictability or
certainty in applying Florida’s dangerous instrumentality law to a motor
vehicle accident where both vehicles are licensed, registered, and insured in
Florida and both parties to the litigation are Florida residents, irrespective
of where the motor vehicle accident occurred.
conclude that Florida has the most significant relationship to the occurrence
and the parties on the issue of vicarious liability. First, Appellee is a
Florida resident and the vehicle that his brother-in-law allegedly operated in
a negligent manner was both registered and insured in Florida. As such, there
is a “reasonable relationship” between Appellee and Florida. Second, Appellant
is also a Florida resident. Applying Florida law on the issue of vicarious
liability is consistent with the policy behind its dangerous instrumentality
doctrine; that is, to “protect[ ] plaintiffs from impecunious drivers by
imposing liability on the owners of the vehicles.” Cates, 431 F.3d at
465. Third, Behrens, who has not been sued or otherwise named as a party in the
underlying litigation, is a resident of Pennsylvania. Florida’s manifest
interest in both protecting its residents and holding its residents responsible
under its dangerous instrumentality doctrine far outweighs any interest that
South Carolina may have in the application of its laws here, where neither
driver nor owner resides in South Carolina. Moreover, while both states have a
public policy of protecting an injured plaintiff against monetary costs at the
hands of a negligent defendant, South Carolina does not impose vicarious
liability upon owners of automobiles. Thus, the application of Florida’s law in
this case more readily serves this purpose without offending South Carolina.
Additionally, South Carolina would appear to have little, if any, interest in
protecting Appellee, a Florida resident, from liability under Florida’s
vicarious liability law. Fourth, pursuant to section 6(2)(a), given that the
only two parties to his action are Florida residents, the needs of the
interstate system appear to be minimally impacted. Fifth, under section
6(2)(d), neither Appellee nor his brother-in-law had any “justified
expectations” that the law of South Carolina as opposed to the law of Florida
would apply when Behrens borrowed Appellee’s car, and we find it entirely
reasonable for Appellee to be vicariously liable for the actions of his
brother-in-law’s allegedly negligent driving. Finally, pursuant to section
6(2)(f) and (g), we find no difficulty or any lack of predictability or
certainty in applying Florida’s dangerous instrumentality law to a motor
vehicle accident where both vehicles are licensed, registered, and insured in
Florida and both parties to the litigation are Florida residents, irrespective
of where the motor vehicle accident occurred.
In sum, under the facts of this
case, Florida is the state with the most significant relationship for the issue
of vicarious liability, and the trial court should have applied Florida’s
dangerous instrumentality law. Accordingly, we reverse the final summary
judgment and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
case, Florida is the state with the most significant relationship for the issue
of vicarious liability, and the trial court should have applied Florida’s
dangerous instrumentality law. Accordingly, we reverse the final summary
judgment and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED. (WALLIS, J.,
concurs. TORPY, J., concurs and concurs specially, with opinion.)
concurs. TORPY, J., concurs and concurs specially, with opinion.)
__________________
1The South
Carolina Supreme Court has explained that the Family Purpose Doctrine arises
from the law of agency and is derived from the notion that one “who has made it
his business to furnish a car for the use of his family is liable as principal
or master when such business is being carried out by a family member using the
vehicle for its intended purpose, the family member thereby filling the role of
agent or servant.” Gause v. Smithers, 742 S.E.2d 644, 648 (S.C. 2013)
(quoting Campbell v. Paschal, 347 S.E. 2d 892, 897 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986).
To impose liability under this doctrine, the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant is the head of the family and that the defendant owned, maintained,
or furnished the automobile. Id. In the present case, Appellee’s
brother-in-law, Behrens, is an adult who resides with his own family in
Pennsylvania. Thus, under South Carolina’s Family Purpose Doctrine, the trial
court concluded that Appellee would not be liable to Appellant for Behrens’
allegedly negligent operation of Appellee’s car. The undisputed evidence before
the trial court demonstrates that Behrens is not a member of Appellee’s family
or, stated differently, Appellee is not the head of Behrens’ family.
Carolina Supreme Court has explained that the Family Purpose Doctrine arises
from the law of agency and is derived from the notion that one “who has made it
his business to furnish a car for the use of his family is liable as principal
or master when such business is being carried out by a family member using the
vehicle for its intended purpose, the family member thereby filling the role of
agent or servant.” Gause v. Smithers, 742 S.E.2d 644, 648 (S.C. 2013)
(quoting Campbell v. Paschal, 347 S.E. 2d 892, 897 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986).
To impose liability under this doctrine, the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant is the head of the family and that the defendant owned, maintained,
or furnished the automobile. Id. In the present case, Appellee’s
brother-in-law, Behrens, is an adult who resides with his own family in
Pennsylvania. Thus, under South Carolina’s Family Purpose Doctrine, the trial
court concluded that Appellee would not be liable to Appellant for Behrens’
allegedly negligent operation of Appellee’s car. The undisputed evidence before
the trial court demonstrates that Behrens is not a member of Appellee’s family
or, stated differently, Appellee is not the head of Behrens’ family.
2As to the
fourth contact under section 145(2), there is no pre-accident relationship
between Appellant and Appellee.
fourth contact under section 145(2), there is no pre-accident relationship
between Appellant and Appellee.
__________________
(TORPY, J., concurring and
concurring specially.) I fully concur with the majority opinion. I write
separately to address arguments not raised by the parties, including the effect
of section 324.021(9)(b)3., Florida Statutes (2017). Although the Dangerous
Instrumentality Doctrine was originally created by decisional law, since 1999,
it has been codified in a statute that supersedes other statutes or “existing
case law.” It provides that the owner of a vehicle who loans it to “any
permissive user shall be liable for the operation of the vehicle or the
acts of the operator in connection therewith” up to certain limits, depending
on what insurance limits are obtained. § 324.021(9)(b)3., Fla. Stat. (2017)
(emphasis added). This statute imposes and limits the liability of an “owner,”
a defined term that includes the holder of “legal title.” § 324.021(9)(a), Fla.
Stat. (2017).
concurring specially.) I fully concur with the majority opinion. I write
separately to address arguments not raised by the parties, including the effect
of section 324.021(9)(b)3., Florida Statutes (2017). Although the Dangerous
Instrumentality Doctrine was originally created by decisional law, since 1999,
it has been codified in a statute that supersedes other statutes or “existing
case law.” It provides that the owner of a vehicle who loans it to “any
permissive user shall be liable for the operation of the vehicle or the
acts of the operator in connection therewith” up to certain limits, depending
on what insurance limits are obtained. § 324.021(9)(b)3., Fla. Stat. (2017)
(emphasis added). This statute imposes and limits the liability of an “owner,”
a defined term that includes the holder of “legal title.” § 324.021(9)(a), Fla.
Stat. (2017).
When an owner invokes the laws of
Florida to obtain title and registration of a vehicle, the owner accepts the
concomitant financial responsibility imposed by Florida law. This
responsibility includes that which is imposed by section 324.021(9)(b)3.
Nothing in this statute purports to limit the scope of this liability to
permissive use that originates in this state or to injuries caused within the
geographic confines of this state. The statute recognizes that the vehicle
owner is in the best position to secure resources to pay for injuries and
ensure that the vehicle, a dangerous instrument, is entrusted to careful
drivers. See Burch v. Sun State Ford, Inc., 864 So. 2d 466, 470 (Fla.
5th DCA 2004) (identifying policy for Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine). New
York is one of the few states with a similar statute. I agree with much of the
analysis of our sister court in New Jersey, which concluded that the New York
statute imposing vicarious liability controlled where the vehicle was
registered in New York even though the collision there occurred in New Jersey. Dolan
v. Sea Transfer Corp., 942 A.2d 29, 36-37 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).
Here, Florida has similarly manifested a paramount interest in ensuring that
owners of vehicles titled and registered in Florida assume responsibility for
injuries arising from the use of those vehicles.
Florida to obtain title and registration of a vehicle, the owner accepts the
concomitant financial responsibility imposed by Florida law. This
responsibility includes that which is imposed by section 324.021(9)(b)3.
Nothing in this statute purports to limit the scope of this liability to
permissive use that originates in this state or to injuries caused within the
geographic confines of this state. The statute recognizes that the vehicle
owner is in the best position to secure resources to pay for injuries and
ensure that the vehicle, a dangerous instrument, is entrusted to careful
drivers. See Burch v. Sun State Ford, Inc., 864 So. 2d 466, 470 (Fla.
5th DCA 2004) (identifying policy for Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine). New
York is one of the few states with a similar statute. I agree with much of the
analysis of our sister court in New Jersey, which concluded that the New York
statute imposing vicarious liability controlled where the vehicle was
registered in New York even though the collision there occurred in New Jersey. Dolan
v. Sea Transfer Corp., 942 A.2d 29, 36-37 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).
Here, Florida has similarly manifested a paramount interest in ensuring that
owners of vehicles titled and registered in Florida assume responsibility for
injuries arising from the use of those vehicles.
I also agree with the approach taken
by New York’s highest court in Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y.
1972). The first so-called “Neumeier rule” addresses issues of “loss
allocation,” such as vicarious liability, where the plaintiff and defendant
have a common domicile. See id. at 457; see also Padula v. Lilarn
Props. Corp., 644 N.E.2d 1001, 1003 (N.Y. 1994). In this circumstance, the
law of the common domicile controls the loss allocation issue, irrespective of
where the tort occurred. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Yantambwe, 276
A.D.2d 108, 111 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (Virginia law controlled issue of
vicarious liability in suit arising from collision occurring in New York, where
plaintiff and defendant shared common Virginia domicile).
by New York’s highest court in Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y.
1972). The first so-called “Neumeier rule” addresses issues of “loss
allocation,” such as vicarious liability, where the plaintiff and defendant
have a common domicile. See id. at 457; see also Padula v. Lilarn
Props. Corp., 644 N.E.2d 1001, 1003 (N.Y. 1994). In this circumstance, the
law of the common domicile controls the loss allocation issue, irrespective of
where the tort occurred. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Yantambwe, 276
A.D.2d 108, 111 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (Virginia law controlled issue of
vicarious liability in suit arising from collision occurring in New York, where
plaintiff and defendant shared common Virginia domicile).
* * *