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Fla. L. Weekly D1780aTop of Form
Fla. L. Weekly D1780aTop of Form
Torts
— Automobile accident — Insurance — Uninsured motorist — Trial court
departed from essential requirements of law by granting uninsured motorist
insurer’s motion to sever claims against it from claims against alleged
tortfeasor where claims were inextricably interwoven — Appeals — Certiorari
is appropriate remedy where order severing UM claims from claims against
tortfeasor may risk inconsistent outcomes and result in material injury that
cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal
— Automobile accident — Insurance — Uninsured motorist — Trial court
departed from essential requirements of law by granting uninsured motorist
insurer’s motion to sever claims against it from claims against alleged
tortfeasor where claims were inextricably interwoven — Appeals — Certiorari
is appropriate remedy where order severing UM claims from claims against
tortfeasor may risk inconsistent outcomes and result in material injury that
cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal
JESSICA Y. CHOI, Petitioner, v.
AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY and HALEY P. BEUTLER, Respondents. 2nd District.
Case No. 2D16-4642. Opinion filed August 16, 2017. Petition for Writ of
Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Elizabeth G. Rice,
Judge. Counsel: Kristin A. Norse and Stuart C. Markman of Kynes, Markman &
Felman, P.A., Tampa; and Joseph Bryant and A. Crosby Crane of Morgan &
Morgan, Tampa, for Petitioner. Michael L. Forte of Rumberger, Kirk &
Caldwell, P.A., Tampa, for Respondent Auto-Owners Insurance Company. No
appearance for remaining Respondent.
AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY and HALEY P. BEUTLER, Respondents. 2nd District.
Case No. 2D16-4642. Opinion filed August 16, 2017. Petition for Writ of
Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Elizabeth G. Rice,
Judge. Counsel: Kristin A. Norse and Stuart C. Markman of Kynes, Markman &
Felman, P.A., Tampa; and Joseph Bryant and A. Crosby Crane of Morgan &
Morgan, Tampa, for Petitioner. Michael L. Forte of Rumberger, Kirk &
Caldwell, P.A., Tampa, for Respondent Auto-Owners Insurance Company. No
appearance for remaining Respondent.
(SILBERMAN, Judge.) The underlying
action is an automobile negligence action filed by Jessica Y. Choi against
alleged tortfeasor Haley P. Beutler and Choi’s underinsured motorist (UM)
insurance carrier, Auto-Owners Insurance Company. Choi seeks certiorari review
of an order granting Auto-Owners’ motion to sever the causes of action against
the two defendants. We conclude that because all three claims were inextricably
interwoven, the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of the
law by granting the motion to sever. Accordingly, we grant the petition.
action is an automobile negligence action filed by Jessica Y. Choi against
alleged tortfeasor Haley P. Beutler and Choi’s underinsured motorist (UM)
insurance carrier, Auto-Owners Insurance Company. Choi seeks certiorari review
of an order granting Auto-Owners’ motion to sever the causes of action against
the two defendants. We conclude that because all three claims were inextricably
interwoven, the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of the
law by granting the motion to sever. Accordingly, we grant the petition.
The automobile accident occurred in
September 2014. According to the amended complaint, Choi was a passenger in a
car that was struck by Beutler’s vehicle. Choi was seriously injured, and
Beutler was underinsured. In count one, Choi sought recovery from Beutler for
the injuries she suffered in the accident under a negligence theory. In count
two, Choi sought UM benefits from Auto-Owners for damages she suffered in
excess of the amount covered by Beutler’s insurance policy. In count three,
Choi sought punitive damages against Beutler based on a claim that Beutler was
intoxicated to the extent her faculties were impaired at the time of the
accident.
September 2014. According to the amended complaint, Choi was a passenger in a
car that was struck by Beutler’s vehicle. Choi was seriously injured, and
Beutler was underinsured. In count one, Choi sought recovery from Beutler for
the injuries she suffered in the accident under a negligence theory. In count
two, Choi sought UM benefits from Auto-Owners for damages she suffered in
excess of the amount covered by Beutler’s insurance policy. In count three,
Choi sought punitive damages against Beutler based on a claim that Beutler was
intoxicated to the extent her faculties were impaired at the time of the
accident.
Auto-Owners filed a motion to sever
the UM claim against it from the claims against Beutler in counts one and
three. Auto Owners contended that Florida’s nonjoinder statute, section
627.4136(1), Florida Statutes (2014), required separate trials of Choi’s claims
against the tortfeasor and the UM carrier. Auto-Owners also argued it was
entitled to severance under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.270(b) to avoid
prejudice from the jury’s discovering that Choi had insurance coverage and that
Beutler was intoxicated at the time of the accident. The trial court granted
the motion finding “Auto-Owners’ arguments to be the more logical and better
reasoned view of the current state of the law and application of the rules of
procedure in Florida.”
the UM claim against it from the claims against Beutler in counts one and
three. Auto Owners contended that Florida’s nonjoinder statute, section
627.4136(1), Florida Statutes (2014), required separate trials of Choi’s claims
against the tortfeasor and the UM carrier. Auto-Owners also argued it was
entitled to severance under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.270(b) to avoid
prejudice from the jury’s discovering that Choi had insurance coverage and that
Beutler was intoxicated at the time of the accident. The trial court granted
the motion finding “Auto-Owners’ arguments to be the more logical and better
reasoned view of the current state of the law and application of the rules of
procedure in Florida.”
“A petitioner seeking a writ of
common law certiorari ‘must establish (1) a departure from the essential
requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the remainder of
the trial (3) that cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal.’ ” Rogan v.
Oliver, 110 So. 3d 980, 982 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (quoting Parkway Bank v.
Fort Myers Armature Works, Inc., 658 So. 2d 646, 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)).
The second and third elements are jurisdictional, and the failure to establish
those elements requires dismissal of the petition without considering the
merits. Id.
common law certiorari ‘must establish (1) a departure from the essential
requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the remainder of
the trial (3) that cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal.’ ” Rogan v.
Oliver, 110 So. 3d 980, 982 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (quoting Parkway Bank v.
Fort Myers Armature Works, Inc., 658 So. 2d 646, 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)).
The second and third elements are jurisdictional, and the failure to establish
those elements requires dismissal of the petition without considering the
merits. Id.
“Certiorari is an appropriate remedy
for orders severing or bifurcating claims which involve interrelated factual
issues because severance risks inconsistent outcomes.” Minty v. Meister
Financialgroup, Inc., 97 So. 3d 926, 931 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (quoting Kavouras
v. Mario City Rest. Corp., 88 So. 3d 213, 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)). Choi’s
claims against Auto-Owners and Beutler involve more than interrelated factual
issues. In seeking recovery under the UM benefits available to her, Choi has in
essence the same cause of action against her UM insurer, Auto-Owners, that she
has against the underinsured tortfeasor, Beutler, for damages for bodily
injury. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kilbreath, 419 So.
2d 632, 634 (Fla. 1982). Thus, an order severing Choi’s UM claim against
Auto-Owners from her claims against Beutler may risk inconsistent outcomes and
result in material injury that cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal.
for orders severing or bifurcating claims which involve interrelated factual
issues because severance risks inconsistent outcomes.” Minty v. Meister
Financialgroup, Inc., 97 So. 3d 926, 931 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (quoting Kavouras
v. Mario City Rest. Corp., 88 So. 3d 213, 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)). Choi’s
claims against Auto-Owners and Beutler involve more than interrelated factual
issues. In seeking recovery under the UM benefits available to her, Choi has in
essence the same cause of action against her UM insurer, Auto-Owners, that she
has against the underinsured tortfeasor, Beutler, for damages for bodily
injury. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kilbreath, 419 So.
2d 632, 634 (Fla. 1982). Thus, an order severing Choi’s UM claim against
Auto-Owners from her claims against Beutler may risk inconsistent outcomes and
result in material injury that cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal.
On the merits, Choi argues that the
severance order departs from the essential requirements of the law because it
rests on Auto-Owners’ argument that the nonjoinder statute applies to require
severance. However, Auto-Owners has changed its argument from that which it
presented below. It no longer asserts that the nonjoinder statute requires
severance of the UM claim. Rather, it correctly recognizes that joinder is
permitted under the circumstances present here. But it asserts that the trial
court had the discretion to grant the motion to sever under rule 1.270(b)
because the prejudice to Auto-Owners outweighs Choi’s preference to have the
claims tried together.
severance order departs from the essential requirements of the law because it
rests on Auto-Owners’ argument that the nonjoinder statute applies to require
severance. However, Auto-Owners has changed its argument from that which it
presented below. It no longer asserts that the nonjoinder statute requires
severance of the UM claim. Rather, it correctly recognizes that joinder is
permitted under the circumstances present here. But it asserts that the trial
court had the discretion to grant the motion to sever under rule 1.270(b)
because the prejudice to Auto-Owners outweighs Choi’s preference to have the
claims tried together.
Rule 1.270(b) generally gives courts
the discretion to sever claims “in furtherance of convenience or to avoid
prejudice.” However, it is well-settled that it is a departure from the
essential requirements of the law to sever claims that are inextricably
interwoven based on the risk of inconsistent verdicts. See Rocket
Grp., LLC v. Jatib, 174 So. 3d 576, 576 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015); Minty,
97 So. 3d at 931; Kavouras, 88 So. 3d at 214; Bethany Evangelical
Covenant Church of Miami, Fla., Inc. v. Calandra, 994 So. 2d 478, 479 (Fla.
3d DCA 2008); Maris Distrib. Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 710 So. 2d
1022, 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). Thus, to the extent the trial court relied on
rule 1.270(b) to support its decision, it was a departure from the essential
requirements of the law.
the discretion to sever claims “in furtherance of convenience or to avoid
prejudice.” However, it is well-settled that it is a departure from the
essential requirements of the law to sever claims that are inextricably
interwoven based on the risk of inconsistent verdicts. See Rocket
Grp., LLC v. Jatib, 174 So. 3d 576, 576 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015); Minty,
97 So. 3d at 931; Kavouras, 88 So. 3d at 214; Bethany Evangelical
Covenant Church of Miami, Fla., Inc. v. Calandra, 994 So. 2d 478, 479 (Fla.
3d DCA 2008); Maris Distrib. Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 710 So. 2d
1022, 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). Thus, to the extent the trial court relied on
rule 1.270(b) to support its decision, it was a departure from the essential
requirements of the law.
Furthermore, we note that severance
would not avoid prejudice to Auto-Owners arising from the claims against
Beutler. First of all, the jury would still learn that Choi had insurance
coverage in the severed UM action against her insurer. Second, the jury
would also learn that Beutler was intoxicated at the time of the accident in
the severed UM action. As we stated previously, Choi’s cause of action against
Auto-Owners for damages arising from Beutler’s negligence is at heart the same
as her cause of action against Beutler. While Choi need not establish
entitlement to punitive damages in her action against Auto-Owners, the facts
regarding Beutler’s alleged intoxication will be relevant to the issue of fault
if Auto-Owners challenges liability, as it asserts it will. See Frazee
v. Gillespie, 124 So. 6, 9-10 (Fla. 1929) (holding that the intoxication of
a driver may be a basis for liability for injuries sustained as a result of an
accident if the accident was caused by a negligent or wrongful act that
resulted from being intoxicated).
would not avoid prejudice to Auto-Owners arising from the claims against
Beutler. First of all, the jury would still learn that Choi had insurance
coverage in the severed UM action against her insurer. Second, the jury
would also learn that Beutler was intoxicated at the time of the accident in
the severed UM action. As we stated previously, Choi’s cause of action against
Auto-Owners for damages arising from Beutler’s negligence is at heart the same
as her cause of action against Beutler. While Choi need not establish
entitlement to punitive damages in her action against Auto-Owners, the facts
regarding Beutler’s alleged intoxication will be relevant to the issue of fault
if Auto-Owners challenges liability, as it asserts it will. See Frazee
v. Gillespie, 124 So. 6, 9-10 (Fla. 1929) (holding that the intoxication of
a driver may be a basis for liability for injuries sustained as a result of an
accident if the accident was caused by a negligent or wrongful act that
resulted from being intoxicated).
In conclusion, the trial court
departed from the essential requirements of the law by granting the motion to
sever three inextricably interwoven claims. We therefore grant the petition for
certiorari and quash the order granting Auto-Owners’ motion to sever.
departed from the essential requirements of the law by granting the motion to
sever three inextricably interwoven claims. We therefore grant the petition for
certiorari and quash the order granting Auto-Owners’ motion to sever.
Petition granted; order quashed.
(CASANUEVA and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.)
(CASANUEVA and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.)