42
Fla. L. Weekly D1508bTop of Form
Fla. L. Weekly D1508bTop of Form
Torts
— Releases — Trial court properly entered summary judgment for defendant on
basis of general release executed by plaintiff where plaintiff’s claims accrued
prior to execution of general release
— Releases — Trial court properly entered summary judgment for defendant on
basis of general release executed by plaintiff where plaintiff’s claims accrued
prior to execution of general release
OSVALDO MARTINEZ, Appellant, v.
PREFERRED CARE PARTNERS, INC., et al., Appellees. 3rd District. Case No.
3D16-440. L.T. Case No. 12-39331. July 5, 2017. An Appeal from the Circuit
Court for Miami-Dade County, Beatrice Butchko, Judge. Counsel: Osvaldo
Martinez, in proper person. Legon Fodiman, P.A., and Todd R. Legon and William
F. Rhodes, for appellees.
PREFERRED CARE PARTNERS, INC., et al., Appellees. 3rd District. Case No.
3D16-440. L.T. Case No. 12-39331. July 5, 2017. An Appeal from the Circuit
Court for Miami-Dade County, Beatrice Butchko, Judge. Counsel: Osvaldo
Martinez, in proper person. Legon Fodiman, P.A., and Todd R. Legon and William
F. Rhodes, for appellees.
(Before ROTHENBERG, C.J., and EMAS
and LOGUE, JJ.)
and LOGUE, JJ.)
(ROTHENBERG, C.J.) Osvaldo Martinez
(“Martinez”) appeals the trial court’s entry of an order granting final summary
judgment in favor of Preferred Care Partners, Inc. (“PCP”), Preferred Care
Partners Medical Group, Inc., Preferred Care Partners Holding Corp., Joseph L.
Caruncho, and Justo Luis Pozo (collectively, “the defendants”). We affirm.
(“Martinez”) appeals the trial court’s entry of an order granting final summary
judgment in favor of Preferred Care Partners, Inc. (“PCP”), Preferred Care
Partners Medical Group, Inc., Preferred Care Partners Holding Corp., Joseph L.
Caruncho, and Justo Luis Pozo (collectively, “the defendants”). We affirm.
The record reflects that Martinez
previously owned companies that entered into a Network Risk Agreement with PCP.
According to the agreement, PCP was to provide Martinez’s companies with
Medicare-eligible members in its healthcare plan; Martinez’s companies would
provide medical care for those members; and the parties would split the
capitation from the federal government. Martinez sued the defendants on October
5, 2012 for allegedly committing various tortious acts. The defendants filed a
motion for summary judgment as to all of Martinez’s claims based, in part, on
the general release Martinez executed on January 18, 2012, releasing the
defendants from the claims alleged in his complaint.
previously owned companies that entered into a Network Risk Agreement with PCP.
According to the agreement, PCP was to provide Martinez’s companies with
Medicare-eligible members in its healthcare plan; Martinez’s companies would
provide medical care for those members; and the parties would split the
capitation from the federal government. Martinez sued the defendants on October
5, 2012 for allegedly committing various tortious acts. The defendants filed a
motion for summary judgment as to all of Martinez’s claims based, in part, on
the general release Martinez executed on January 18, 2012, releasing the
defendants from the claims alleged in his complaint.
A general release is construed
according to the principles governing the construction of contracts. Plumpton
v. Cont’l Acreage Dev. Co., 830 So. 2d 208, 210 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). The
general release in the instant case unambiguously covers “all manner of claims”
that Martinez and the companies he formerly owned “have, had, or may have had”
against the defendants “from the beginning of the world to present.” Such
all-encompassing language fully protects the defendants, as it is undisputed
that the claims in Martinez’s complaint accrued prior to the execution of the
general release. See AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Gelpi, 12 So. 3d
783, 786 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); Brewer v. Laborfinders of Tampa, 944 So. 2d
1102, 1103 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).
according to the principles governing the construction of contracts. Plumpton
v. Cont’l Acreage Dev. Co., 830 So. 2d 208, 210 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). The
general release in the instant case unambiguously covers “all manner of claims”
that Martinez and the companies he formerly owned “have, had, or may have had”
against the defendants “from the beginning of the world to present.” Such
all-encompassing language fully protects the defendants, as it is undisputed
that the claims in Martinez’s complaint accrued prior to the execution of the
general release. See AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Gelpi, 12 So. 3d
783, 786 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); Brewer v. Laborfinders of Tampa, 944 So. 2d
1102, 1103 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).
It is also undisputed that Martinez
failed to file a reply containing any legal theory that could result in the
avoidance of the defendants’ general release. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.100
(“If an answer or third-party answer contains an affirmative defense and the
opposing party seeks to avoid it, the opposing party must file a reply
containing the avoidance.”); CJM Fin., Inc. v. Castillo Grand, LLC, 40
So. 3d 863, 864 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (affirming summary judgment “because the
clear language of a release barred the claim and [the plaintiff] failed to
properly plead any legal theory that would have avoided the release”).
Accordingly, the trial court properly entered final summary judgment in favor
of the defendants.
failed to file a reply containing any legal theory that could result in the
avoidance of the defendants’ general release. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.100
(“If an answer or third-party answer contains an affirmative defense and the
opposing party seeks to avoid it, the opposing party must file a reply
containing the avoidance.”); CJM Fin., Inc. v. Castillo Grand, LLC, 40
So. 3d 863, 864 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (affirming summary judgment “because the
clear language of a release barred the claim and [the plaintiff] failed to
properly plead any legal theory that would have avoided the release”).
Accordingly, the trial court properly entered final summary judgment in favor
of the defendants.
Affirmed.
* * *