Torts — School boards — Sovereign immunity — Presuit notice

Torts
— School boards — Sovereign immunity — Presuit notice — City’s action
against school board arising out of collision between motorcycle operated by
city police officer and school bus — Trial court did not err in concluding
that city provided sufficient information to school board and Department of
Financial Services to put them on notice of accident, its time and location,
the injuries suffered, and that a claim was being made

SCHOOL BOARD OF BROWARD COUNTY, a State Agency or Political
Subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellant, v. CITY OF CORAL SPRINGS, as
Assignee of John Malvin, Appellee. 4th District. Case No. 4D15-2213. March 2,
2016. Appeal of a non-final order from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth
Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Thomas M. Lynch, IV, Judge; L.T. Case No.
14-008726 CACE (05). Counsel: Nicolette N. John of Vernis & Bowling of
Broward, P.A., Hollywood, for appellant. Warren Brown and Jorge A. Pena of Brown
& Pena, P.A., Hollywood, for appellee.

(PER CURIAM.) The School Board of Broward County (School
Board) appeals a trial court order which denied its motion for summary
judgment, determining as a matter of law that it is not entitled to sovereign
immunity. This portion of the non-final order is appealable. Fla. R. App. P.
9.130(a)(3)(C)(xi).1 As to that ruling, we affirm.

John Malvin (Malvin) is a police officer employed by the
City of Coral Springs (City). He was operating a motorcycle in the course of
his employment in August 2011 when he had an accident involving a school bus
owned by the School Board. The City paid him worker’s compensation benefits,
and he assigned his claims to the City. The assignment provided that the City
would recover from any judgment or settlement with the School Board and other
defendants as reimbursement for worker’s compensation benefits previously paid
to Malvin. Once reimbursement was satisfied, any remaining judgment or
settlement would inure to Malvin. In exchange for the assignment, the City and
worker’s compensation carrier agreed to sue the School Board and the individual
defendant on Malvin’s behalf. Malvin was to be indemnified from any liability,
cost or expense arising from the lawsuit.

In May 2014, the City, as assignee of Malvin, sued the
School Board and sent a letter to the School Board and the Florida Department
of Financial Services advising them of the personal injury claim they brought
“as subrogee of John Malvin.” The School Board argued in defense that the
action was barred by sovereign immunity and, alternatively, failure to comply
with the presuit notice requirements of section 768.28, Florida Statutes (2011)
for waiver of sovereign immunity in tort actions. It filed a motion for final
summary judgment on these and other issues.

No factual issues were in dispute. The trial court’s order
denying summary judgment turned exclusively on questions of law. Review is de
novo. Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071, 1074 (Fla.
2001); Eco-Tradition, LLC v. Pennzoil Quaker State Co., 137 So. 3d 495,
496 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).

We reject the School Board’s challenge to the sufficiency of
the notice the City provided pursuant to section 768.28(6), Florida Statutes
(2011). This is the only sovereign immunity issue the School Board has raised
in its initial brief. The notice requirement is intended to give the State and
its agencies adequate notice of claims filed against them and to provide them
with time to investigate and respond. Aitcheson v. Fla. Dep’t of Highway
Safety & Motor Vehicles, 117 So. 3d 854, 856 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)
(citing Cunningham v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 782 So. 2d
913, 915 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (citing Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Reyes, 688 So.
2d 311 (Fla. 1996))). While notice is statutorily required, its form and
content are not specified in the statute. Aitcheson, 117 So. 3d at 856
(citing LaRiviere v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist., 889 So. 2d 972, 974 (Fla.
4th DCA 2004)). The trial court did not err in concluding that the City
provided sufficient information to the School Board and the Florida Department
of Financial Services to put them on notice of the accident, its time,
location, the injuries suffered and that a claim was being made.

Affirmed. (CIKLIN, C.J., TAYLOR and MAY, JJ.,
concur.)

__________________

1The trial court also ruled on
assignability of the claim against the School Board and the timeliness of the
lawsuit against it given the provisions of section 440.39(4), Florida Statutes
(2011). We decline to consider the arguments as to these claims, however, as
our jurisdiction does not extend to them. They are not independently appealable
under any of the provisions of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130, and
the appellate courts are without jurisdiction to review them simply because
they are included in the same order along with a ruling which is appealable. See
RD & G Leasing, Inc. v. Stebnicki, 626 So. 2d 1002, 1003 (Fla. 3d DCA
1993) (holding that where a non-final order subject to review under Rule 9.130
contains other rulings which are not independently appealable, they do not “tag
along” for purposes of jurisdiction and review by the appellate court). See
also Swartz v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 97 So. 3d 267 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012).

* *
*