39 Fla. L. Weekly D1438a
Torts — Discovery — Psychological examination — Although
court could properly compel plaintiff who claims damages for mental anguish
after being bitten by defendant’s dog to submit to psychological examination, it
was a departure from essential requirements of law to require plaintiff to
submit to psychological examination without specifying the time, place, manner,
conditions, and scope of the examination
court could properly compel plaintiff who claims damages for mental anguish
after being bitten by defendant’s dog to submit to psychological examination, it
was a departure from essential requirements of law to require plaintiff to
submit to psychological examination without specifying the time, place, manner,
conditions, and scope of the examination
CRYSTAL L. MADDOX, Petitioner, v. ROBERT J. BULLARD, Respondent. 5th
District. Case No. 5D14-303. Opinion filed July 11, 2014. Petition for
Certiorari Review of Order from the Circuit Court for Brevard County, Lisa
Davidson, Judge. Counsel: Daniel P. Faherty, of Telfer, Faherty, Anderson &
Hawkins, PL, Titusville, for Petitioner. Elizabeth C. Wheeler, of Elizabeth C.
Wheeler, P.A., Orlando, for Respondent.
District. Case No. 5D14-303. Opinion filed July 11, 2014. Petition for
Certiorari Review of Order from the Circuit Court for Brevard County, Lisa
Davidson, Judge. Counsel: Daniel P. Faherty, of Telfer, Faherty, Anderson &
Hawkins, PL, Titusville, for Petitioner. Elizabeth C. Wheeler, of Elizabeth C.
Wheeler, P.A., Orlando, for Respondent.
(ORFINGER, Judge.) Crystal L. Maddox seeks a writ of certiorari to quash an
order compelling her to submit to a psychological examination based on her claim
for damages for mental anguish after Robert J. Bullard’s dog bit her. She
contends that the trial court’s order departs from the essential requirements of
the law in requiring a psychological examination under Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.360. We grant the petition for certiorari in part, and quash the
order to the extent that it fails to comply with rule 1.360(a)(1)(B).
order compelling her to submit to a psychological examination based on her claim
for damages for mental anguish after Robert J. Bullard’s dog bit her. She
contends that the trial court’s order departs from the essential requirements of
the law in requiring a psychological examination under Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.360. We grant the petition for certiorari in part, and quash the
order to the extent that it fails to comply with rule 1.360(a)(1)(B).
Rule 1.360(a) provides that an examination is authorized when the examined
party’s condition is in controversy, and the requesting party has good cause to
request the examination. The party submitting the request must affirmatively
show that “each condition as to which the examination is sought is really and
genuinely in controversy and that good cause exists for ordering each particular
examination.” Boyles v. Mid-Fla. Tel. Corp., 431 So. 2d 627, 639 (Fla.
5th DCA 1983) (citing Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964)). At
any hearing on the request for compulsory examination, the requesting party has
the burden of affirmatively showing that both the “in controversy” and “good
cause” prongs have been satisfied. E.g., Wade v. Wade, 124 So. 3d
369, 374 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). In granting the request, rule 1.360(a)(1)(B)
provides that the trial court’s order for a compulsory examination “shall
specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination.”
party’s condition is in controversy, and the requesting party has good cause to
request the examination. The party submitting the request must affirmatively
show that “each condition as to which the examination is sought is really and
genuinely in controversy and that good cause exists for ordering each particular
examination.” Boyles v. Mid-Fla. Tel. Corp., 431 So. 2d 627, 639 (Fla.
5th DCA 1983) (citing Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964)). At
any hearing on the request for compulsory examination, the requesting party has
the burden of affirmatively showing that both the “in controversy” and “good
cause” prongs have been satisfied. E.g., Wade v. Wade, 124 So. 3d
369, 374 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). In granting the request, rule 1.360(a)(1)(B)
provides that the trial court’s order for a compulsory examination “shall
specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination.”
At the hearing on Maddox’s motion for protective order, the trial court
granted Bullard’s request for a compulsory psychological examination pursuant to
the rule. However, the trial court’s order specified only the time, place, and
the name of the psychologist who would perform the examination. Although
Maddox’s counsel asked the trial court to define the boundaries of the
psychologist’s examination, the trial court declined to do so. The trial court’s
order does not specify the manner, conditions, or scope of the examination,
thereby, in effect, giving the psychologist “carte blanche” to perform any type,
and all manner, of psychological inquiry, testing, and analysis on Maddox for up
to four continuous hours. This violates clearly established principles of law,
resulting in a miscarriage of justice. See In Interest of T.M.W.,
553 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (quashing order for compelled psychological
examination of child because order did not specify manner, scope or conditions
of exam).
granted Bullard’s request for a compulsory psychological examination pursuant to
the rule. However, the trial court’s order specified only the time, place, and
the name of the psychologist who would perform the examination. Although
Maddox’s counsel asked the trial court to define the boundaries of the
psychologist’s examination, the trial court declined to do so. The trial court’s
order does not specify the manner, conditions, or scope of the examination,
thereby, in effect, giving the psychologist “carte blanche” to perform any type,
and all manner, of psychological inquiry, testing, and analysis on Maddox for up
to four continuous hours. This violates clearly established principles of law,
resulting in a miscarriage of justice. See In Interest of T.M.W.,
553 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (quashing order for compelled psychological
examination of child because order did not specify manner, scope or conditions
of exam).
Bullard had the burden to establish good cause for each particular
examination. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.360(a)(2); Boyles, 431 So. 2d at 639. This
burden was not met since Bullard did not allege or establish good cause for the
examination that the psychologist wished to conduct. Without knowing the
particular examinations that the psychologist planned to conduct, the trial
court should not have granted Bullard’s request. For these reasons, we grant the
petition to the extent that the order compels Maddox to submit to a
psychological examination without specifying the time, place, manner,
conditions, and scope of the examination. However, we deny the petition for writ
of certiorari insofar as it asks this Court to hold that the trial court may not
compel Maddox to submit to a psychological examination. Bullard may seek a new
order that complies with rule 1.360.
examination. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.360(a)(2); Boyles, 431 So. 2d at 639. This
burden was not met since Bullard did not allege or establish good cause for the
examination that the psychologist wished to conduct. Without knowing the
particular examinations that the psychologist planned to conduct, the trial
court should not have granted Bullard’s request. For these reasons, we grant the
petition to the extent that the order compels Maddox to submit to a
psychological examination without specifying the time, place, manner,
conditions, and scope of the examination. However, we deny the petition for writ
of certiorari insofar as it asks this Court to hold that the trial court may not
compel Maddox to submit to a psychological examination. Bullard may seek a new
order that complies with rule 1.360.
Certiorari GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; Order QUASHED. (SAWAYA and
WALLIS, JJ., concur.)
WALLIS, JJ., concur.)
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