42
Fla. L. Weekly D1297aTop of Form
Fla. L. Weekly D1297aTop of Form
Workers’
compensation — Attorney’s fees — Stipulation — Judge of compensation claims
denied claimant due process by denying approval of a stipulation for attorney’s
fees payable by employer/carrier for past benefits secured without a proper
evidentiary hearing affording opportunity to be heard
compensation — Attorney’s fees — Stipulation — Judge of compensation claims
denied claimant due process by denying approval of a stipulation for attorney’s
fees payable by employer/carrier for past benefits secured without a proper
evidentiary hearing affording opportunity to be heard
JOSE DELGADO, Appellant, v. CITY CONCRETE
SYSTEMS, INC. and FCCI INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellees. 1st District. Case No.
1D16-4759. Opinion filed June 6, 2017. An appeal from an order of Judge of
Compensation Claims. John J. Lazzara, Judge. Date of Accident: April 23, 2014.
Counsel: Kevin R. Gallagher of Gallagher Law Group, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Portuallo of Eraclides, Gelman, Hall, Indek, Goodman,
Waters & Traverso, Jacksonville, for Appellees.
SYSTEMS, INC. and FCCI INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellees. 1st District. Case No.
1D16-4759. Opinion filed June 6, 2017. An appeal from an order of Judge of
Compensation Claims. John J. Lazzara, Judge. Date of Accident: April 23, 2014.
Counsel: Kevin R. Gallagher of Gallagher Law Group, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Portuallo of Eraclides, Gelman, Hall, Indek, Goodman,
Waters & Traverso, Jacksonville, for Appellees.
(PER CURIAM.) In this workers’
compensation case, Claimant appeals an order of the Judge of Compensation
Claims (JCC) denying, in part, approval of a stipulation for a $20,000.00
attorney’s fee payable by the Employer/Carrier (E/C) for past benefits secured.
In the order, the JCC found that he could not “in good conscience” approve the
requested fee amount, which was based on the hours expended by Claimant’s
attorney, and he reduced the fee to $4,293.80, representing a statutory
guideline fee under section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes. He also ordered the
E/C to pay Claimant the difference between the stipulated fee amount and the
reduced fee. On appeal, Claimant raises several challenges, including a denial
of due process. Because, as we discuss below, the due process concerns here
compel us to reverse the order and remand for a full evidentiary hearing, we
find it unnecessary to address all the issues raised in this appeal.
compensation case, Claimant appeals an order of the Judge of Compensation
Claims (JCC) denying, in part, approval of a stipulation for a $20,000.00
attorney’s fee payable by the Employer/Carrier (E/C) for past benefits secured.
In the order, the JCC found that he could not “in good conscience” approve the
requested fee amount, which was based on the hours expended by Claimant’s
attorney, and he reduced the fee to $4,293.80, representing a statutory
guideline fee under section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes. He also ordered the
E/C to pay Claimant the difference between the stipulated fee amount and the
reduced fee. On appeal, Claimant raises several challenges, including a denial
of due process. Because, as we discuss below, the due process concerns here
compel us to reverse the order and remand for a full evidentiary hearing, we
find it unnecessary to address all the issues raised in this appeal.
Claimant, a construction worker,
alleged a compensable workplace injury in April 2014 resulting in a loss of
hearing. The E/C initially denied the claim, but eventually accepted
compensability and provided benefits. In July 2015, Claimant requested approval
of an attorney’s fee he owed his attorney for obtaining a washout settlement of
his workers’ compensation case under section 440.20(11)(c), Florida Statutes.
The JCC entered an order approving the settlement fee in August 2015. But
evidently the parties had also negotiated a separate E/C-owed attorney’s fee
based on the past benefits secured and had agreed to delay the submission of
this side stipulation for approval of that fee pending the Florida Supreme
Court’s decision on the constitutionality of the guideline fee in Castellanos
v. Next Door Co., 192 So. 3d 431 (Fla. 2016) (holding statute mandating use
of statutory guideline for attorney fee calculation is unconstitutional).
alleged a compensable workplace injury in April 2014 resulting in a loss of
hearing. The E/C initially denied the claim, but eventually accepted
compensability and provided benefits. In July 2015, Claimant requested approval
of an attorney’s fee he owed his attorney for obtaining a washout settlement of
his workers’ compensation case under section 440.20(11)(c), Florida Statutes.
The JCC entered an order approving the settlement fee in August 2015. But
evidently the parties had also negotiated a separate E/C-owed attorney’s fee
based on the past benefits secured and had agreed to delay the submission of
this side stipulation for approval of that fee pending the Florida Supreme
Court’s decision on the constitutionality of the guideline fee in Castellanos
v. Next Door Co., 192 So. 3d 431 (Fla. 2016) (holding statute mandating use
of statutory guideline for attorney fee calculation is unconstitutional).
In May 2016, after the supreme court
rendered its opinion in Castellanos, the attorneys for the parties
submitted for the JCC’s approval the side stipulation for the $20,000.00
attorney’s fee payable by the E/C. The JCC subsequently held a telephonic
hearing which he described at the hearing as being called at his own request
for the purpose of considering the stipulated fee and going over “a couple of
matters” with the attorneys. After a brief discussion, the JCC ordered
Claimant’s attorney to submit his time records. Claimant’s attorney
subsequently submitted his time records and shortly thereafter the JCC entered
the order which is the subject of this appeal.
rendered its opinion in Castellanos, the attorneys for the parties
submitted for the JCC’s approval the side stipulation for the $20,000.00
attorney’s fee payable by the E/C. The JCC subsequently held a telephonic
hearing which he described at the hearing as being called at his own request
for the purpose of considering the stipulated fee and going over “a couple of
matters” with the attorneys. After a brief discussion, the JCC ordered
Claimant’s attorney to submit his time records. Claimant’s attorney
subsequently submitted his time records and shortly thereafter the JCC entered
the order which is the subject of this appeal.
Under Chapter 440, attorney’s fees
“may not be paid for a claimant in connection with any proceedings arising
under this chapter, unless approved by the [JCC] or court having jurisdiction
over such proceedings.” § 440.34(1), Fla. Stat. Thus, the JCC here had both the
authority and the obligation to review the attorney fee stipulation and to
approve or disapprove the agreed-upon fee. See Luces v. Red Ventures,
140 So. 3d 999, 999-1000 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (affirming JCC’s disapproval of
stipulated attorney’s fee based on JCC’s finding that evidence did not support
purported statutory basis for fee, but reversing JCC’s award of disapproved fee
amount directly to claimant as improper reformation of contract). Nevertheless,
“[d]ue process concerns preclude a ruling on matters which have not been placed
at issue, as the parties are entitled to notice so that they may fairly present
their case.” Florida Power Corp. v. Hamilton, 617 So. 2d 333, 334 (Fla.
1st DCA 1993). See also Isaac v. Green Iguana, Inc., 871 So. 2d
1004 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (reversing, as offending procedural due process right
of claimant, JCC’s ruling reached in absence of prior notice and opportunity to
defend). This court has further held that, because parties are entitled to
notice of the issues to be determined at a hearing, an order that is not in
accord with the understanding with which the workers’ compensation hearing was
undertaken and participated in is a denial of due process and must be reversed.
Moya-Perguero v. Trucks and Parts of Tampa, Inc., 77 So. 3d 912 (Fla.
1st DCA 2012); see also School Dist. of Hillsborough Cnty. v. Dickson,
67 So. 3d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); Southeast Recycling v. Cottongim,
639 So. 2d 155, 157 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (finding that award of chiropractic
care must be reversed because due process concerns precluded expansion of scope
of hearing to include chiropractic care where matter not placed at issue and no
evidence of need for chiropractic care presented).
“may not be paid for a claimant in connection with any proceedings arising
under this chapter, unless approved by the [JCC] or court having jurisdiction
over such proceedings.” § 440.34(1), Fla. Stat. Thus, the JCC here had both the
authority and the obligation to review the attorney fee stipulation and to
approve or disapprove the agreed-upon fee. See Luces v. Red Ventures,
140 So. 3d 999, 999-1000 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (affirming JCC’s disapproval of
stipulated attorney’s fee based on JCC’s finding that evidence did not support
purported statutory basis for fee, but reversing JCC’s award of disapproved fee
amount directly to claimant as improper reformation of contract). Nevertheless,
“[d]ue process concerns preclude a ruling on matters which have not been placed
at issue, as the parties are entitled to notice so that they may fairly present
their case.” Florida Power Corp. v. Hamilton, 617 So. 2d 333, 334 (Fla.
1st DCA 1993). See also Isaac v. Green Iguana, Inc., 871 So. 2d
1004 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (reversing, as offending procedural due process right
of claimant, JCC’s ruling reached in absence of prior notice and opportunity to
defend). This court has further held that, because parties are entitled to
notice of the issues to be determined at a hearing, an order that is not in
accord with the understanding with which the workers’ compensation hearing was
undertaken and participated in is a denial of due process and must be reversed.
Moya-Perguero v. Trucks and Parts of Tampa, Inc., 77 So. 3d 912 (Fla.
1st DCA 2012); see also School Dist. of Hillsborough Cnty. v. Dickson,
67 So. 3d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); Southeast Recycling v. Cottongim,
639 So. 2d 155, 157 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (finding that award of chiropractic
care must be reversed because due process concerns precluded expansion of scope
of hearing to include chiropractic care where matter not placed at issue and no
evidence of need for chiropractic care presented).
In the Luces case, the JCC
disapproved the stipulated attorney’s fee based on his finding that the
evidence did not support a finding of a “medical only” claim — the alleged
basis of the fee. 140 So. 3d at 999-1000. But, before ruling, the JCC first
“invited counsel for the parties to seek a telephonic hearing and provide
additional evidence” in support of the allegation. Id. at 999. In
contrast, the JCC here, following the very brief telephone hearing, disapproved
of the stipulated fee in a seven-page order that assumed certain unestablished
facts and strongly suggested that the attorneys engaged in collusion to commit
fraud under section 440.105(4), Florida Statutes. Although the JCC’s order
states that an evidentiary hearing was held, there is little support for this
statement in the record. The hearing transcript — only ten pages long — does
not in any way suggest an evidentiary hearing took place. The parties were not
asked to submit evidence or present witnesses. During the hearing, the JCC
questioned the attorneys about the basis for the fee, but did not indicate any
issues of fraud or collusion. Counsel for the parties filed motions for
rehearing disputing the assumed facts and requesting the opportunity to provide
further evidence. Nevertheless, the JCC denied these motions for rehearing on
the ground that time for submitting additional evidence had “long passed.”
disapproved the stipulated attorney’s fee based on his finding that the
evidence did not support a finding of a “medical only” claim — the alleged
basis of the fee. 140 So. 3d at 999-1000. But, before ruling, the JCC first
“invited counsel for the parties to seek a telephonic hearing and provide
additional evidence” in support of the allegation. Id. at 999. In
contrast, the JCC here, following the very brief telephone hearing, disapproved
of the stipulated fee in a seven-page order that assumed certain unestablished
facts and strongly suggested that the attorneys engaged in collusion to commit
fraud under section 440.105(4), Florida Statutes. Although the JCC’s order
states that an evidentiary hearing was held, there is little support for this
statement in the record. The hearing transcript — only ten pages long — does
not in any way suggest an evidentiary hearing took place. The parties were not
asked to submit evidence or present witnesses. During the hearing, the JCC
questioned the attorneys about the basis for the fee, but did not indicate any
issues of fraud or collusion. Counsel for the parties filed motions for
rehearing disputing the assumed facts and requesting the opportunity to provide
further evidence. Nevertheless, the JCC denied these motions for rehearing on
the ground that time for submitting additional evidence had “long passed.”
Given the JCC’s failure to provide
the parties with proper notice and the opportunity to be heard on the issues
that the JCC found determinative in his ruling, we find the JCC violated
Claimant’s right of due process with entry of the final order here.1 We, therefore, REVERSE and REMAND for
a properly noticed evidentiary hearing. (WOLF, RAY, and BILBREY, JJ., CONCUR.)
the parties with proper notice and the opportunity to be heard on the issues
that the JCC found determinative in his ruling, we find the JCC violated
Claimant’s right of due process with entry of the final order here.1 We, therefore, REVERSE and REMAND for
a properly noticed evidentiary hearing. (WOLF, RAY, and BILBREY, JJ., CONCUR.)
__________________
1Our holding should not be construed
as limiting the power of a JCC to approve or disapprove an attorney’s fee under
section 440.34(1). See also § 440.33(1), Fla. Stat. (describing the
powers of a JCC). Undoubtedly, a JCC has such power so long as the parties are
afforded due process.
as limiting the power of a JCC to approve or disapprove an attorney’s fee under
section 440.34(1). See also § 440.33(1), Fla. Stat. (describing the
powers of a JCC). Undoubtedly, a JCC has such power so long as the parties are
afforded due process.
* * *