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Fla. L. Weekly D2469bop of Form
Fla. L. Weekly D2469bop of Form
Workers’
compensation — Compensable accidents — Law enforcement officers —
Hypertension — Single reported elevated blood pressure reading at claimant’s
pre-employment physical examination did not constitute evidence of the
condition of hypertension — Judge of compensation claims did not err by
determining that claimant was entitled to statutory presumption of
compensability
compensation — Compensable accidents — Law enforcement officers —
Hypertension — Single reported elevated blood pressure reading at claimant’s
pre-employment physical examination did not constitute evidence of the
condition of hypertension — Judge of compensation claims did not err by
determining that claimant was entitled to statutory presumption of
compensability
CITY OF TAVARES and GALLAGHER
BASSETT SERVICE, INC., Appellants, v. BILLY HARPER, Appellee. 1st District.
Case No. 1D17-0027. Opinion filed October 24, 2017. An appeal from an order of
the Judge of Compensation Claims. W. James Condry, Judge. Dates of Accident:
January 5, 2016, and April 20, 2016. Counsel: Mark Hicks of Hicks, Porter,
Ebenfeld & Stein, P.A., Miami, and James B. Birmingham of Fulmer, Leroy
& Albee, PLLC, Orlando, for Appellants. Kimberly A. Hill of Kimberly A.
Hill, P.L., Fort Lauderdale, and Kristine Callagy of Bichler, Oliver, Longo
& Fox, PLLC, Maitland, for Appellee.
BASSETT SERVICE, INC., Appellants, v. BILLY HARPER, Appellee. 1st District.
Case No. 1D17-0027. Opinion filed October 24, 2017. An appeal from an order of
the Judge of Compensation Claims. W. James Condry, Judge. Dates of Accident:
January 5, 2016, and April 20, 2016. Counsel: Mark Hicks of Hicks, Porter,
Ebenfeld & Stein, P.A., Miami, and James B. Birmingham of Fulmer, Leroy
& Albee, PLLC, Orlando, for Appellants. Kimberly A. Hill of Kimberly A.
Hill, P.L., Fort Lauderdale, and Kristine Callagy of Bichler, Oliver, Longo
& Fox, PLLC, Maitland, for Appellee.
CORRECTED
OPINION
OPINION
(PER CURIAM.) In this workers’
compensation appeal, the Employer/Servicing Agent (E/SA) seek review of the
Judge of Compensation Claims’ (JCC’s) order finding that Claimant, a law
enforcement officer, established the compensability of his hypertension under
the statutory presumption in the Heart-Lung Statute, section 112.18(1), Florida
Statutes (2015). According to the E/SA, Claimant’s pre-employment physical
examination report indicated evidence of hypertension which, in accordance with
the plain language of the statute, precludes Claimant’s reliance on the
presumption. But, because we conclude that competent substantial evidence (CSE)
supports the JCC’s finding that the single reported elevated blood pressure
reading at the pre-employment physical examination did not constitute evidence
of the condition of hypertension, we affirm.
compensation appeal, the Employer/Servicing Agent (E/SA) seek review of the
Judge of Compensation Claims’ (JCC’s) order finding that Claimant, a law
enforcement officer, established the compensability of his hypertension under
the statutory presumption in the Heart-Lung Statute, section 112.18(1), Florida
Statutes (2015). According to the E/SA, Claimant’s pre-employment physical
examination report indicated evidence of hypertension which, in accordance with
the plain language of the statute, precludes Claimant’s reliance on the
presumption. But, because we conclude that competent substantial evidence (CSE)
supports the JCC’s finding that the single reported elevated blood pressure
reading at the pre-employment physical examination did not constitute evidence
of the condition of hypertension, we affirm.
In 2016, Claimant experienced two
incidences of severely elevated blood pressure and was temporarily taken off of
work. He was subsequently diagnosed with hypertension which eventually came
under good control with medication. Claimant then sought a determination of
compensability of his hypertensive condition as a workplace injury in
accordance with the section 112.18(1) statutory presumption. This statute
provides, in pertinent part, that any health condition or impairment of a law
enforcement officer caused by hypertension and resulting in disability “shall
be presumed to have been accidental and to have been suffered in the line of
duty unless the contrary be shown by competent evidence.” § 112.18(1)(a), Fla.
Stat. (2015). But to qualify for the presumption, Claimant was required to
show, among other things, that he successfully passed a pre-employment physical
examination which “failed to reveal any evidence of such condition.” Id.;
see also Volusia Cty. Fire Servs. v. Taaffe, 27 So. 3d 81, 82 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2009) (holding that pre-employment physical examination finding claimant
fit for duty but noting a diagnosis of hypertension precluded presumption of
compensability of hypertension under section 112.18(1)); Miami-Dade Cty. v.
Davis, 26 So. 3d 13, 17-18 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (holding that section
112.18(1) presumption was precluded where relevant pre-employment physical
revealed claimant suffered from heart disease).
incidences of severely elevated blood pressure and was temporarily taken off of
work. He was subsequently diagnosed with hypertension which eventually came
under good control with medication. Claimant then sought a determination of
compensability of his hypertensive condition as a workplace injury in
accordance with the section 112.18(1) statutory presumption. This statute
provides, in pertinent part, that any health condition or impairment of a law
enforcement officer caused by hypertension and resulting in disability “shall
be presumed to have been accidental and to have been suffered in the line of
duty unless the contrary be shown by competent evidence.” § 112.18(1)(a), Fla.
Stat. (2015). But to qualify for the presumption, Claimant was required to
show, among other things, that he successfully passed a pre-employment physical
examination which “failed to reveal any evidence of such condition.” Id.;
see also Volusia Cty. Fire Servs. v. Taaffe, 27 So. 3d 81, 82 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2009) (holding that pre-employment physical examination finding claimant
fit for duty but noting a diagnosis of hypertension precluded presumption of
compensability of hypertension under section 112.18(1)); Miami-Dade Cty. v.
Davis, 26 So. 3d 13, 17-18 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (holding that section
112.18(1) presumption was precluded where relevant pre-employment physical
revealed claimant suffered from heart disease).
Here, Claimant’s 2007 pre-employment
physical examination report listed a single blood pressure reading of 140/60,
which, according to the unrefuted medical opinions in this record, is
considered high.1 The condition of hypertension,
however, was not noted in the report; in fact, the findings were described as
normal. Furthermore, medical records documenting Claimant’s medical history
from 2011 through the end of 2015 did not reveal any reference to hypertension
or to any other elevated blood pressure readings. The medical opinions
indicated that an isolated elevated blood pressure reading could be caused by
hypertension, but also by a number of other conditions unrelated to
hypertension, including what is commonly referred to as “white coat” syndrome.2 For that reason, they opined, two or
three abnormal readings within a period of time are necessary to confirm the
condition of hypertension.
physical examination report listed a single blood pressure reading of 140/60,
which, according to the unrefuted medical opinions in this record, is
considered high.1 The condition of hypertension,
however, was not noted in the report; in fact, the findings were described as
normal. Furthermore, medical records documenting Claimant’s medical history
from 2011 through the end of 2015 did not reveal any reference to hypertension
or to any other elevated blood pressure readings. The medical opinions
indicated that an isolated elevated blood pressure reading could be caused by
hypertension, but also by a number of other conditions unrelated to
hypertension, including what is commonly referred to as “white coat” syndrome.2 For that reason, they opined, two or
three abnormal readings within a period of time are necessary to confirm the
condition of hypertension.
Ultimately, the JCC found that the
pre-employment physical examination did not show evidence of the condition of
hypertension in this case and concluded that Claimant was entitled to rely on
the statutory presumption. In reaching this conclusion, the JCC relied on the
opinion of Dr. Perloff, Claimant’s independent medical examiner (IME), who
testified that there is a distinction between a single isolated measurement in
the hypertensive range and the actual disease process of hypertension. In his
opinion, one high blood pressure reading could be evidence of hypertension;
however, he also testified that he found it “hard to believe” that the 2007
reading “really represent[ed] hypertension” given that it is “extremely rare
that patients become hypertensive and then are not” and, as noted here,
Claimant did not have any documented elevated readings for approximately nine
years after his pre-employment physical. Significantly, both Dr. Perloff and
Dr. Nocero, the E/SA’s IME, agreed that Claimant’s responses to stress
suggested “white coat” syndrome as a possible explanation for the single
elevated reading during the pre-employment physical examination.
pre-employment physical examination did not show evidence of the condition of
hypertension in this case and concluded that Claimant was entitled to rely on
the statutory presumption. In reaching this conclusion, the JCC relied on the
opinion of Dr. Perloff, Claimant’s independent medical examiner (IME), who
testified that there is a distinction between a single isolated measurement in
the hypertensive range and the actual disease process of hypertension. In his
opinion, one high blood pressure reading could be evidence of hypertension;
however, he also testified that he found it “hard to believe” that the 2007
reading “really represent[ed] hypertension” given that it is “extremely rare
that patients become hypertensive and then are not” and, as noted here,
Claimant did not have any documented elevated readings for approximately nine
years after his pre-employment physical. Significantly, both Dr. Perloff and
Dr. Nocero, the E/SA’s IME, agreed that Claimant’s responses to stress
suggested “white coat” syndrome as a possible explanation for the single
elevated reading during the pre-employment physical examination.
On appeal, the E/SA argue that the
JCC erred as a matter of law because the statute refers to any evidence
of a condition and does not require evidence sufficient to support an actual
diagnosis. To the extent this issue turns on the JCC’s interpretation and
application of the statute, our review is de novo; but, to the extent it
turns on the resolution of facts, review is for CSE. See Benniefield v. City
of Lakeland, 109 So. 3d 1288, 1290 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).
JCC erred as a matter of law because the statute refers to any evidence
of a condition and does not require evidence sufficient to support an actual
diagnosis. To the extent this issue turns on the JCC’s interpretation and
application of the statute, our review is de novo; but, to the extent it
turns on the resolution of facts, review is for CSE. See Benniefield v. City
of Lakeland, 109 So. 3d 1288, 1290 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).
We begin our analysis with the
language of the statute. It is well-established that “[w]hen the language of
the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning,
there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and
construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” Holly
v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984). Furthermore, courts are “without
power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify,
or limit, its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications. To do
so would be an abrogation of legislative power.” McLaughlin v. State,
721 So. 2d 1170, 1172 (Fla. 1998) (quoting Holly, 450 So. 2d at 219); see
also Fast Tract Framing, Inc. v. Caraballo, 994 So. 2d 355, 357 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2008) (citing State v. Rife, 789 So. 2d 288, 292 (Fla. 2001)).
language of the statute. It is well-established that “[w]hen the language of
the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning,
there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and
construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” Holly
v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984). Furthermore, courts are “without
power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify,
or limit, its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications. To do
so would be an abrogation of legislative power.” McLaughlin v. State,
721 So. 2d 1170, 1172 (Fla. 1998) (quoting Holly, 450 So. 2d at 219); see
also Fast Tract Framing, Inc. v. Caraballo, 994 So. 2d 355, 357 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2008) (citing State v. Rife, 789 So. 2d 288, 292 (Fla. 2001)).
Here, the wording of the statute
provides that the law enforcement officer “must have successfully passed a
physical examination” which “failed to reveal any evidence of any such
condition.” The E/SA argue that the plain meaning of “any evidence” would
include the one reading because “evidence” is broadly defined as simply
“[s]omething (including testimony, documents, and tangible objects) that tends
to prove or disprove the existence of an alleged fact; anything presented to
the senses and offered to prove the existence or nonexistence of a fact.” Black’s
Law Dictionary 673 (10th ed. 2014). Presumably, under the interpretation
advocated by the E/SA reasoning, a false positive would also qualify as “any
evidence.” This interpretation would eviscerate the statutory presumption and
it ignores the second part of the relevant portion of the statute which
requires that the evidence relate to the listed condition: in this case,
Claimant’s hypertension first identified as such in 2016. This additional
language means that the factually specific nature of the presumption requires
evidence specific to the facts of the claim and in the context of the unique
medical history of the claimant — not simply “any evidence” as it may apply to
the population at large.
provides that the law enforcement officer “must have successfully passed a
physical examination” which “failed to reveal any evidence of any such
condition.” The E/SA argue that the plain meaning of “any evidence” would
include the one reading because “evidence” is broadly defined as simply
“[s]omething (including testimony, documents, and tangible objects) that tends
to prove or disprove the existence of an alleged fact; anything presented to
the senses and offered to prove the existence or nonexistence of a fact.” Black’s
Law Dictionary 673 (10th ed. 2014). Presumably, under the interpretation
advocated by the E/SA reasoning, a false positive would also qualify as “any
evidence.” This interpretation would eviscerate the statutory presumption and
it ignores the second part of the relevant portion of the statute which
requires that the evidence relate to the listed condition: in this case,
Claimant’s hypertension first identified as such in 2016. This additional
language means that the factually specific nature of the presumption requires
evidence specific to the facts of the claim and in the context of the unique
medical history of the claimant — not simply “any evidence” as it may apply to
the population at large.
Our reading of the plain language
here is consistent with this court’s opinion in Talpesh v. Village of Royal
Palm Beach, 994 So. 2d 353, 354-55 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). In Talpesh,
the JCC ruled that the presumption under section 112.18(1) did not apply to
that claimant’s coronary artery disease because the pre-employment examination
revealed high blood pressure. This court found that the JCC erred because the
examination did not reveal the specific listed condition of heart disease. The Talpesh
court then determined that the claimant there was entitled to the presumption
that his coronary heart disease was caused by his occupation.
here is consistent with this court’s opinion in Talpesh v. Village of Royal
Palm Beach, 994 So. 2d 353, 354-55 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). In Talpesh,
the JCC ruled that the presumption under section 112.18(1) did not apply to
that claimant’s coronary artery disease because the pre-employment examination
revealed high blood pressure. This court found that the JCC erred because the
examination did not reveal the specific listed condition of heart disease. The Talpesh
court then determined that the claimant there was entitled to the presumption
that his coronary heart disease was caused by his occupation.
Here, the findings of fact similarly
establish that the pre-employment examination failed to reveal the specific
listed condition: i.e., hypertension. Furthermore, CSE supports the JCC’s
conclusion that Claimant’s elevated blood pressure reading at the pre-employment
physical examination was not evidence of hypertension. Indeed, based on the
medical opinions in this case, it appears that this single isolated elevated
reading in Claimant’s medical history was more likely than not an indication of
“white coat” syndrome at the pre-employment physical.
establish that the pre-employment examination failed to reveal the specific
listed condition: i.e., hypertension. Furthermore, CSE supports the JCC’s
conclusion that Claimant’s elevated blood pressure reading at the pre-employment
physical examination was not evidence of hypertension. Indeed, based on the
medical opinions in this case, it appears that this single isolated elevated
reading in Claimant’s medical history was more likely than not an indication of
“white coat” syndrome at the pre-employment physical.
Accordingly, because the JCC did not
err when he determined that Claimant is entitled to the statutory presumption
in section 112.18(1), we affirm the order on appeal.
err when he determined that Claimant is entitled to the statutory presumption
in section 112.18(1), we affirm the order on appeal.
AFFIRMED. (WETHERELL and M.K.
THOMAS, JJ., CONCUR; B.L. THOMAS, C.J., DISSENTS WITH OPINION.)
THOMAS, JJ., CONCUR; B.L. THOMAS, C.J., DISSENTS WITH OPINION.)
__________________
1A normal reading would be 120/80.
2“White coat” syndrome describes a
transient increase in blood pressure caused by the stress of undergoing a blood
pressure reading. It is considered a normal phenomenon that requires no medical
treatment.
transient increase in blood pressure caused by the stress of undergoing a blood
pressure reading. It is considered a normal phenomenon that requires no medical
treatment.
__________________
(B.L. THOMAS, C.J., DISSENTING.) I
respectfully dissent. The issue before us is whether a high blood pressure
reading of 140/60 constitutes “any evidence” of hypertension that would exclude
the statutory presumption that certain conditions are accidental and occur
within the line of duty. This is a pure question of law, reviewed de novo. Citizens
Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Perdido Sun Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 164 So. 3d 663, 666
(Fla. 2015) (“As the issue presented involves a question of statutory
construction, this Court’s review is de novo.”). Both the majority opinion and
Appellee acknowledge that Appellee’s 2007 blood pressure reading of 140/60 was
a high reading. In addition, Appellant’s medical expert testified that such a
reading is evidence of Stage I hypertension.
respectfully dissent. The issue before us is whether a high blood pressure
reading of 140/60 constitutes “any evidence” of hypertension that would exclude
the statutory presumption that certain conditions are accidental and occur
within the line of duty. This is a pure question of law, reviewed de novo. Citizens
Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Perdido Sun Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 164 So. 3d 663, 666
(Fla. 2015) (“As the issue presented involves a question of statutory
construction, this Court’s review is de novo.”). Both the majority opinion and
Appellee acknowledge that Appellee’s 2007 blood pressure reading of 140/60 was
a high reading. In addition, Appellant’s medical expert testified that such a
reading is evidence of Stage I hypertension.
The statute requires no more
evidence than this to exclude the presumption. Section 112.18(1)(a), Florida
Statutes, states:
evidence than this to exclude the presumption. Section 112.18(1)(a), Florida
Statutes, states:
Any condition or impairment of health of any . . . law
enforcement officer . . . caused by . . . hypertension resulting in total or
partial disability or death shall be presumed to have been accidental and to
have been suffered in the line of duty unless the contrary be shown by
competent evidence. However, any such . . . law enforcement officer must have
successfully passed a physical examination upon entering into any such service
as a . . . law enforcement officer, which examination failed to reveal any
evidence of any such condition.
enforcement officer . . . caused by . . . hypertension resulting in total or
partial disability or death shall be presumed to have been accidental and to
have been suffered in the line of duty unless the contrary be shown by
competent evidence. However, any such . . . law enforcement officer must have
successfully passed a physical examination upon entering into any such service
as a . . . law enforcement officer, which examination failed to reveal any
evidence of any such condition.
(Emphasis added.) The Center for
Disease Control and Prevention describes hypertension as high blood pressure:
“About High Blood Pressure (Hypertension): High blood pressure has no
warning signs or symptoms, and many people do not know they have it. The
only way to know if you have it is to measure your blood pressure. Then you
can take steps to control it if it is too high.” See https://search.cdc.gov/search?query=hypertension&utf8=%E2%9C%93&affiliate=cdc-main
(emphasis added) (last visited Sept. 27, 2017). By definition, then, evidence
of a reading of high blood pressure is, at the very least, an indication of
hypertension under section 112.18(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Disease Control and Prevention describes hypertension as high blood pressure:
“About High Blood Pressure (Hypertension): High blood pressure has no
warning signs or symptoms, and many people do not know they have it. The
only way to know if you have it is to measure your blood pressure. Then you
can take steps to control it if it is too high.” See https://search.cdc.gov/search?query=hypertension&utf8=%E2%9C%93&affiliate=cdc-main
(emphasis added) (last visited Sept. 27, 2017). By definition, then, evidence
of a reading of high blood pressure is, at the very least, an indication of
hypertension under section 112.18(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
The majority opinion misinterprets
the statute by conflating the concepts of weight and admissibility. See
Miller v. State, 597 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1991) (holding that duration between
alleged impaired driving and performance of blood alcohol test went to
credibility and weight of evidence, not admissibility, provided test is
conducted within a reasonable time after being stopped by law enforcement); Thomas
v. Hogan, 308 F.2d 355, 361 (4th Cir. 1962) (en banc) (holding factors of
reliability of medical record supporting determination of intoxication based on
blood composition went to weight of evidence, not admissibility, absent showing
of “complete” unreliability). There is no argument that Appellee’s 2007 blood
pressure measurement was somehow unreliable, improperly read or invalidly
administered; instead, the weight of the reading was disputed by Appellee. Furthermore,
both the majority opinion and the Judge of Compensation Claims superimpose the
requirement of a diagnosis in the statutory exclusion.
the statute by conflating the concepts of weight and admissibility. See
Miller v. State, 597 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1991) (holding that duration between
alleged impaired driving and performance of blood alcohol test went to
credibility and weight of evidence, not admissibility, provided test is
conducted within a reasonable time after being stopped by law enforcement); Thomas
v. Hogan, 308 F.2d 355, 361 (4th Cir. 1962) (en banc) (holding factors of
reliability of medical record supporting determination of intoxication based on
blood composition went to weight of evidence, not admissibility, absent showing
of “complete” unreliability). There is no argument that Appellee’s 2007 blood
pressure measurement was somehow unreliable, improperly read or invalidly
administered; instead, the weight of the reading was disputed by Appellee. Furthermore,
both the majority opinion and the Judge of Compensation Claims superimpose the
requirement of a diagnosis in the statutory exclusion.
The acknowledgment of Appellee’s
high blood pressure reading is equivalent to the principle of “admissibility” of
evidence before a fact finder. No one could credibly assert that Appellee’s
pre-employment report of elevated blood pressure was not admissible, but a
party could legitimately argue that a single blood pressure reading is not
persuasive. That would be quite different, however, than a judge ruling that
the factfinder would not be allowed to even learn of the reading. And whether
Appellee’s reading was a product of “white-coat” syndrome or any other
non-hypertensive source, even if true, is irrelevant under the statute,
because: 1) the record contained Appellee’s pre-employment physical which
showed a reading of high blood pressure; 2) such a reading is an indication —
i.e., “evidence” — of the existence of hypertension, although doctors can
disagree as to how much weight to give this evidence; and 3) the statute does
not require any specific quantum of evidence to disallow the statutory
presumption.
high blood pressure reading is equivalent to the principle of “admissibility” of
evidence before a fact finder. No one could credibly assert that Appellee’s
pre-employment report of elevated blood pressure was not admissible, but a
party could legitimately argue that a single blood pressure reading is not
persuasive. That would be quite different, however, than a judge ruling that
the factfinder would not be allowed to even learn of the reading. And whether
Appellee’s reading was a product of “white-coat” syndrome or any other
non-hypertensive source, even if true, is irrelevant under the statute,
because: 1) the record contained Appellee’s pre-employment physical which
showed a reading of high blood pressure; 2) such a reading is an indication —
i.e., “evidence” — of the existence of hypertension, although doctors can
disagree as to how much weight to give this evidence; and 3) the statute does
not require any specific quantum of evidence to disallow the statutory
presumption.
Had the legislature intended to
require the existence of “substantial evidence” of hypertension before disallowing
the evidentiary presumption at issue, it would have done so. The legislature,
in fact, did just that in another statute, when it created a statutory
presumption of driver impairment by declaring that “a blood-alcohol level or
breath-alcohol level of 0.08 or higher, that fact is prima facie evidence that
the person was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that
his or her normal faculties were impaired.” § 316.1934(2)(c), Fla. Stat. The
legislature defined the contrary presumption by providing that a reading of
less than 0.05 creates a presumption that the driver was “not under the
influence of alcoholic beverages . . . .” § 316.1934(2)(a), Fla. Stat.
require the existence of “substantial evidence” of hypertension before disallowing
the evidentiary presumption at issue, it would have done so. The legislature,
in fact, did just that in another statute, when it created a statutory
presumption of driver impairment by declaring that “a blood-alcohol level or
breath-alcohol level of 0.08 or higher, that fact is prima facie evidence that
the person was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that
his or her normal faculties were impaired.” § 316.1934(2)(c), Fla. Stat. The
legislature defined the contrary presumption by providing that a reading of
less than 0.05 creates a presumption that the driver was “not under the
influence of alcoholic beverages . . . .” § 316.1934(2)(a), Fla. Stat.
Unlike that statute, which
quantified a weight of the evidence to invoke an evidentiary presumption, here,
the legislature chose not to designate any quantity of evidence that
would disallow the presumption that a specified condition was accidental and
occurred in the line of duty. Thus, the doctors’ view that “two or three
abnormal readings within a period of time are necessary to confirm the
condition of hypertension” is not the criteria provided by the legislature in
section 112.18(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Instead, the legislature balanced the
interests of the relevant class of employees to whom it chose to grant the
advantageous statutory presumption against the tax burdens on the public, by
requiring that the employee’s pre-employment physical not contain any evidence
of the condition.
quantified a weight of the evidence to invoke an evidentiary presumption, here,
the legislature chose not to designate any quantity of evidence that
would disallow the presumption that a specified condition was accidental and
occurred in the line of duty. Thus, the doctors’ view that “two or three
abnormal readings within a period of time are necessary to confirm the
condition of hypertension” is not the criteria provided by the legislature in
section 112.18(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Instead, the legislature balanced the
interests of the relevant class of employees to whom it chose to grant the
advantageous statutory presumption against the tax burdens on the public, by
requiring that the employee’s pre-employment physical not contain any evidence
of the condition.
Finally, the majority opinion’s
reliance on Talpesh v. Village of Royal Palm Beach, 994 So. 2d 353,
354-55 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), is misplaced, because in that case, this court
correctly held that high blood pressure is not, by its nature, medical evidence
of coronary artery disease or heart disease. While high blood pressure may or
may not be evidence of heart disease, it is evidence of hypertension.
Therefore, this court should reverse with direction that the statutory
presumption does not apply here as a matter of law.
reliance on Talpesh v. Village of Royal Palm Beach, 994 So. 2d 353,
354-55 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), is misplaced, because in that case, this court
correctly held that high blood pressure is not, by its nature, medical evidence
of coronary artery disease or heart disease. While high blood pressure may or
may not be evidence of heart disease, it is evidence of hypertension.
Therefore, this court should reverse with direction that the statutory
presumption does not apply here as a matter of law.
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