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November 27, 2015 by admin

Workers’ compensation — Costs — Stipulations — Judge of compensation claims erred in denying stipulation regarding costs payable by employer/carrier on ground that no supporting documentation describing the costs was provided

40 Fla. L. Weekly D2616gTop of Form

Workers’
compensation — Costs — Stipulations — Judge of compensation claims erred in
denying stipulation regarding costs payable by employer/carrier on ground that
no supporting documentation describing the costs was provided — Under administrative
rule applicable to instant case, which did not involve a settlement under
section 440.20(11), parties are permitted to stipulate to payment of attorney’s
fees and costs, with no requirement that agreed-upon costs be justified or
detailed

FRANCISCO GOBEL, Appellant, v. AMERICAN AIRLINES AND
SEDGWICK CMS, Appellees. 1st District. Case No. 1D15-2374. Opinion filed
November 24, 2015. An appeal from an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims.
Gerardo Castiello, Judge. Date of Accident: July 25, 2010. Counsel: Mark L.
Zientz, Law Offices of Mark L. Zientz, Miami, and Toni L. Villaverde, Toni L.
Villaverde, PLLC, Coral Gables, for Appellant. Clinton C. Lyons, Jr., Moran
Kidd Lyons Johnson, P.A., Orlando, for Appellees.

(PER CURIAM.) In this workers’ compensation case, Claimant
appeals the Judge of Compensation Claims’ (JCC’s) order denying stipulated
litigation costs of $200 payable by the Employer/Carrier (E/C). The E/C has
filed notice that it takes no position in this appeal. Because the JCC focused
on an inapplicable administrative rule to deny the stipulated costs, we
reverse.

Following Claimant’s successful pursuit of a claim for
medical benefits, the parties submitted to the JCC a stipulation resolving the
remaining claims for attorney’s fees and costs. The JCC denied the stipulation
regarding the costs payable by the E/C because no supporting documentation
describing the costs was provided. The JCC expressed concern that he was unable
to determine if the claimed costs were truly costs as opposed to attorney’s
fees disguised as costs. Claimant argued that no documentation was necessary
given Florida Administrative Code Rule 60Q-6.123(5) which provides, in part,
that “[a] claim for cost reimbursement in the amount of $250 or less shall not
be set forth with specificity or detail.” The JCC rejected Claimant’s argument
based upon his determination that the administrative rule is not valid. Both
the JCC and Claimant, however, mistakenly assumed the applicability of rule
60Q-6.123(5) to this case.

By its title and its context, rule 60Q-6.123(5) applies only
to settlements under section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes, where a claimant is
responsible for paying his or her own attorney’s fees and costs out of a lump
sum settlement extinguishing liability for all claims. In contrast, the
stipulation here is for E/C-paid costs. Florida Administrative Code Rule
60Q-6.124(2), which is the applicable rule for fees and costs paid by a carrier
apart from section 440.20(11) settlements, permits parties to “stipulate to the
payment of attorney’s fees and costs,” with no requirement that the agreed-upon
costs be justified or detailed. Such matters are governed by the law of
contracts and settlement, with no specialized rules.

Claimant is not being asked to pay the costs incurred by his
lawyer. The JCC’s apparent concern for Claimant’s welfare is misplaced where
the E/C agrees to pay the payment of unspecified costs. While we express no
opinion concerning the validity of rule 60Q-6.123(5) for settlements under
section 440.20(11), the rule does not apply to the facts here. Accordingly, we
REVERSE and REMAND for entry of an order awarding costs as agreed by the E/C
and as permitted by rule 60Q-6.124. (SWANSON, MAKAR, and BILBREY, JJ., CONCUR.)

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