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Fla. L. Weekly D1298aTop of Form
Fla. L. Weekly D1298aTop of Form
Workers’
compensation — Employer-employee relationship — Claimant who participated in
tryout with Arena Football League team was not an employee of the Arena
Football League where standard player contract signed by claimant was not
signed on the “League Signature” line — League’s decision to allow claimant to
participate in tryout did not constitute League’s assent to contract — Judge
of compensation claims erred in finding that there was an employer-employee
relationship on date of claimant’s injury
compensation — Employer-employee relationship — Claimant who participated in
tryout with Arena Football League team was not an employee of the Arena
Football League where standard player contract signed by claimant was not
signed on the “League Signature” line — League’s decision to allow claimant to
participate in tryout did not constitute League’s assent to contract — Judge
of compensation claims erred in finding that there was an employer-employee
relationship on date of claimant’s injury
ARENA FOOTBALL LEAGUE and ARENA
FOOTBALL ONE, LLC, Appellants, v. BRYON BISHOP, Appellee. 1st District. Case
No. 1D15-5130. Opinion filed June 6, 2017. An appeal from an order of the Judge
of Compensation Claims. Thomas W. Sculco, Judge. Date of Accident: July 31,
2013. Counsel: Meredith A. Chaiken of Tenberg Chaiken, Lighthouse Point, for
Appellants. Charles H. Leo of the Law Offices of Charles H. Leo, PA, Orlando,
and Richard W. Ervin III, of Fox & Loquasto, PA, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
FOOTBALL ONE, LLC, Appellants, v. BRYON BISHOP, Appellee. 1st District. Case
No. 1D15-5130. Opinion filed June 6, 2017. An appeal from an order of the Judge
of Compensation Claims. Thomas W. Sculco, Judge. Date of Accident: July 31,
2013. Counsel: Meredith A. Chaiken of Tenberg Chaiken, Lighthouse Point, for
Appellants. Charles H. Leo of the Law Offices of Charles H. Leo, PA, Orlando,
and Richard W. Ervin III, of Fox & Loquasto, PA, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
(WINSOR, J.) Bryon Bishop once
played for the Orlando Predators in the Arena Football League (“AFL”). Although
he and the team parted ways after just one season, Bishop later participated in
a Predators tryout, hoping to resume his professional football career. On the
second day of the two-day tryout, Bishop suffered an on-the-field injury. The
issue in this case is whether the AFL must provide workers’ compensation
benefits for that injury.1
played for the Orlando Predators in the Arena Football League (“AFL”). Although
he and the team parted ways after just one season, Bishop later participated in
a Predators tryout, hoping to resume his professional football career. On the
second day of the two-day tryout, Bishop suffered an on-the-field injury. The
issue in this case is whether the AFL must provide workers’ compensation
benefits for that injury.1
Bishop’s entitlement to benefits
turns on whether he was an AFL employee, which turns on what we make of the
“Standard Player Contract” that Bishop signed (the “Contract”). A claimant does
not always need a formal employment contract to receive workers’ compensation
benefits, of course, see, e.g., Jenks v. Bynum Transp., Inc., 104
So. 3d 1217, 1222 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), but the parties agree that Bishop’s
claim depends on this Contract.
turns on whether he was an AFL employee, which turns on what we make of the
“Standard Player Contract” that Bishop signed (the “Contract”). A claimant does
not always need a formal employment contract to receive workers’ compensation
benefits, of course, see, e.g., Jenks v. Bynum Transp., Inc., 104
So. 3d 1217, 1222 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), but the parties agree that Bishop’s
claim depends on this Contract.
Bishop contends the Contract shows
he was an AFL employee; the AFL contends just the opposite.2 The judge of compensation claims
sided with Bishop, and the AFL appeals. Because the decision below turned on
issues of law, our review is de novo. See BOLD MLP, LLC v. Smith,
201 So. 3d 1261, 1261 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016); see also Bend v. Shamrock Servs.,
59 So. 3d 153, 156 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (noting that JCCs “may be required to
interpret contracts” to determine coverage).
he was an AFL employee; the AFL contends just the opposite.2 The judge of compensation claims
sided with Bishop, and the AFL appeals. Because the decision below turned on
issues of law, our review is de novo. See BOLD MLP, LLC v. Smith,
201 So. 3d 1261, 1261 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016); see also Bend v. Shamrock Servs.,
59 So. 3d 153, 156 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (noting that JCCs “may be required to
interpret contracts” to determine coverage).
The Contract says that “[t]he League
hires the Player as a skilled football player for employment beginning February
1, 2013 and ending August 31, 2013.” It has three signature lines: one for
“Player Signature,” one labeled “Team Rep. Acknowledgement (Mandatory),” and
one for “League Signature.” Bishop signed on the “Player Signature” line, and
the Orlando Predators’ coach signed on the “Team Rep. Acknowledgement.” But the
“League Signature” line remained blank. So was there a contract or wasn’t
there?
hires the Player as a skilled football player for employment beginning February
1, 2013 and ending August 31, 2013.” It has three signature lines: one for
“Player Signature,” one labeled “Team Rep. Acknowledgement (Mandatory),” and
one for “League Signature.” Bishop signed on the “Player Signature” line, and
the Orlando Predators’ coach signed on the “Team Rep. Acknowledgement.” But the
“League Signature” line remained blank. So was there a contract or wasn’t
there?
Bishop offers several arguments as
to why we should find there was an agreement, notwithstanding the missing
signature. One argument is that no AFL signature was required because the
Contract itself does not say signatures are required. This argument cannot succeed;
a contract cannot be enforceable against a nonsignatory simply because it does
not expressly provide that signatures are required. Cf. D.L. Peoples Grp.,
Inc. v. Hawley, 804 So. 2d 561, 563 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (“Where one
contracting party signs the contract, and the other party accepts and signs the
contract, a binding contract results.”). A contract requires mutual assent, Gibson
v. Courtois, 539 So. 2d 459, 460 (Fla. 1989), and a form contract that
provides it is between two parties,3 that includes a signature line for
both parties, and that has only one party’s signature cannot — without more —
demonstrate mutual assent.
to why we should find there was an agreement, notwithstanding the missing
signature. One argument is that no AFL signature was required because the
Contract itself does not say signatures are required. This argument cannot succeed;
a contract cannot be enforceable against a nonsignatory simply because it does
not expressly provide that signatures are required. Cf. D.L. Peoples Grp.,
Inc. v. Hawley, 804 So. 2d 561, 563 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (“Where one
contracting party signs the contract, and the other party accepts and signs the
contract, a binding contract results.”). A contract requires mutual assent, Gibson
v. Courtois, 539 So. 2d 459, 460 (Fla. 1989), and a form contract that
provides it is between two parties,3 that includes a signature line for
both parties, and that has only one party’s signature cannot — without more —
demonstrate mutual assent.
Bishop points to language in the
Contract that provides a mechanism for the AFL to unilaterally cancel the
contract after its execution. The Contract says that “after execution,” the
Contract will be filed with the AFL headquarters. The AFL’s Director of
Football Operations then has “the right to disapprove this Contract” for
various reasons. If the Director exercises that right, “both parties will be
relieved of their respective rights and obligations under this Contract.” The
Contract further provides that absent “disapproval” within seven days, approval
is automatic.
Contract that provides a mechanism for the AFL to unilaterally cancel the
contract after its execution. The Contract says that “after execution,” the
Contract will be filed with the AFL headquarters. The AFL’s Director of
Football Operations then has “the right to disapprove this Contract” for
various reasons. If the Director exercises that right, “both parties will be
relieved of their respective rights and obligations under this Contract.” The
Contract further provides that absent “disapproval” within seven days, approval
is automatic.
No one from the AFL ever gave notice
that the Contract was “disapproved.” But notwithstanding Bishop’s arguments,
this does not mean the Contract was automatically approved — or that a binding
agreement was formed. If the Contract had been executed, those provisions would
have allowed the AFL to terminate the agreement, but that does not help us
decide whether the Contract was executed in the first place. If it was not, the
Contract’s “disapproval” provisions never came into play. Indeed, if there was
never mutual assent — evidenced by signatures or otherwise — then those
provisions, like all the Contract’s provisions, mean nothing.
that the Contract was “disapproved.” But notwithstanding Bishop’s arguments,
this does not mean the Contract was automatically approved — or that a binding
agreement was formed. If the Contract had been executed, those provisions would
have allowed the AFL to terminate the agreement, but that does not help us
decide whether the Contract was executed in the first place. If it was not, the
Contract’s “disapproval” provisions never came into play. Indeed, if there was
never mutual assent — evidenced by signatures or otherwise — then those
provisions, like all the Contract’s provisions, mean nothing.
Bishop also suggests that the AFL
could assent to the Contract without signing it. It is true that parties may
show assent through means other than signatures. Gateway Cable T.V., Inc. v.
Vikoa Constr. Corp., 253 So. 2d 461, 463 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971) (“The object
of a signature is to show mutuality or assent, but these facts may be shown in
other ways, for example, by the acts or conduct of the parties.”). But in this
case, the only AFL action Bishop claims showed the AFL’s assent was the AFL’s
decision to let Bishop participate in the tryout. We cannot conclude that
allowing a player to participate in a tryout shows assent to “hire[ ] the
Player as a skilled football player” for the duration of a football season.
could assent to the Contract without signing it. It is true that parties may
show assent through means other than signatures. Gateway Cable T.V., Inc. v.
Vikoa Constr. Corp., 253 So. 2d 461, 463 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971) (“The object
of a signature is to show mutuality or assent, but these facts may be shown in
other ways, for example, by the acts or conduct of the parties.”). But in this
case, the only AFL action Bishop claims showed the AFL’s assent was the AFL’s
decision to let Bishop participate in the tryout. We cannot conclude that
allowing a player to participate in a tryout shows assent to “hire[ ] the
Player as a skilled football player” for the duration of a football season.
The JCC’s conclusion below — that
Bishop “was under contract with [the AFL] at the time of his alleged injury” —
was incorrect. Accordingly, and because there was no employer-employee
relationship on the date of the injury, we reverse and remand for entry of an
order denying Bishop’s claims.
Bishop “was under contract with [the AFL] at the time of his alleged injury” —
was incorrect. Accordingly, and because there was no employer-employee
relationship on the date of the injury, we reverse and remand for entry of an
order denying Bishop’s claims.
REVERSED and REMANDED. (WINOKUR and
JAY, JJ., concur.)
JAY, JJ., concur.)
__________________
1Bishop actually suffered two
separate injuries — one on each day of the two-day tryout. The judge of
compensation claims rejected Bishop’s claim related to the first day’s injury,
and Bishop has not challenged that ruling. We therefore do not consider that
injury. Nor do we consider section 440.02(17)(c)(3), Florida Statutes (2013),
which excludes professional athletes from workers’ compensation coverage. For
reasons not pertinent here, the judge of compensation claims found that
provision inapplicable, and no one has challenged that decision on appeal.
separate injuries — one on each day of the two-day tryout. The judge of
compensation claims rejected Bishop’s claim related to the first day’s injury,
and Bishop has not challenged that ruling. We therefore do not consider that
injury. Nor do we consider section 440.02(17)(c)(3), Florida Statutes (2013),
which excludes professional athletes from workers’ compensation coverage. For
reasons not pertinent here, the judge of compensation claims found that
provision inapplicable, and no one has challenged that decision on appeal.
2Unlike in the National Football
League, in which individual team organizations employ their own players, see
National Football League, Wikipedia,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Football_League (last visited May 17,
2017) [https://perma.cc/D5L6-XG4C], in the AFL, every player is a league
employee. Indeed, the Contract provides that “both the Player and the League
verify and certify that this Contract is only between the Player and the
League, and not between the Player and his assigned team.”
League, in which individual team organizations employ their own players, see
National Football League, Wikipedia,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Football_League (last visited May 17,
2017) [https://perma.cc/D5L6-XG4C], in the AFL, every player is a league
employee. Indeed, the Contract provides that “both the Player and the League
verify and certify that this Contract is only between the Player and the
League, and not between the Player and his assigned team.”
* * *