42
Fla. L. Weekly D1048bTop of Form
Fla. L. Weekly D1048bTop of Form
Workers’
compensation insurance — Rates — Increase — Public records — Public
meetings — Trial court erred when it determined that rate increase approved by
Insurance Commissioner was void because Office of Insurance Regulation and
licensed insurance rating organization violated Sunshine Law under three
separate statutory provisions and because rating organization violated state
statutes when it denied individual’s request to access organization’s records
— Remand for reinstatement of OIR’s final order approving 14.5% increase in
workers’ compensation insurance rates — Sunshine Law violations — Section
627.091(6), which extended Sunshine Law to instances when a rate-determination
committee of a rating organization meets to determine workers’ compensation
insurance rates, did not apply to actuary employed by rating organization,
acting in his individual capacity, to meetings between actuary and his own
staff, to rating organization’s internal meetings, or to meetings between
rating organization and OIR that occurred after rating organization made a rate
determination and filed its proposal with OIR — Trial court erred in finding
that section 286.011 applied to rating organization, a private organization
that was not created by a public entity — Record did not support argument that
rating organization was subject to Sunshine Law because OIR delegated its
authority over rate filings to the organization — Trial court erred in
concluding that organization was subject to Sunshine Law pursuant to section 627.093,
which provides that section 286.011 is applicable to every rate filing,
approval or disapproval of filing, rating deviation from filing, or appeal from
any of these regarding workers’ compensation insurance — Access to records —
Rating organization was not required to provide individual with access to its
records under either section 627.291 or section 119.07
compensation insurance — Rates — Increase — Public records — Public
meetings — Trial court erred when it determined that rate increase approved by
Insurance Commissioner was void because Office of Insurance Regulation and
licensed insurance rating organization violated Sunshine Law under three
separate statutory provisions and because rating organization violated state
statutes when it denied individual’s request to access organization’s records
— Remand for reinstatement of OIR’s final order approving 14.5% increase in
workers’ compensation insurance rates — Sunshine Law violations — Section
627.091(6), which extended Sunshine Law to instances when a rate-determination
committee of a rating organization meets to determine workers’ compensation
insurance rates, did not apply to actuary employed by rating organization,
acting in his individual capacity, to meetings between actuary and his own
staff, to rating organization’s internal meetings, or to meetings between
rating organization and OIR that occurred after rating organization made a rate
determination and filed its proposal with OIR — Trial court erred in finding
that section 286.011 applied to rating organization, a private organization
that was not created by a public entity — Record did not support argument that
rating organization was subject to Sunshine Law because OIR delegated its
authority over rate filings to the organization — Trial court erred in
concluding that organization was subject to Sunshine Law pursuant to section 627.093,
which provides that section 286.011 is applicable to every rate filing,
approval or disapproval of filing, rating deviation from filing, or appeal from
any of these regarding workers’ compensation insurance — Access to records —
Rating organization was not required to provide individual with access to its
records under either section 627.291 or section 119.07
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON COMPENSATION
INSURANCE, FLORIDA OFFICE OF INSURANCE REGULATION, and DAVID ALTMAIER, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE FLORIDA OFFICE OF INSURANCE
REGULATION, Appellants, v. JAMES F. FEE, JR., INDIVIDUALLY, Appellee. 1st
District. Case Nos. 1D16-5408 & 1D16-5416. Opinion filed May 9, 2017. An
appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County. Karen A. Gievers, Judge.
Counsel: Thomas J. Maida, James A. McKee, Benjamin J. Grossman, and Nicholas R.
Paquette of Foley & Lardner LLP, Tallahassee, for Appellant National
Council on Compensation Insurance, Inc.; Shaw P. Stiller, Chief Assistant
General Counsel, and C. Timothy Gray and Lacy End-Of-Horn, Assistant General
Counsels, for Appellants Florida Office of Insurance Regulation and David
Altmaier. John K. Shubin, Salvatore H. Fasulo, Lauren G. Brunswick, and Mark E.
Grafton of Shubin & Bass, P.A., Miami, for Appellee. Andrea Flynn Mogensen
of Law Office of Andrea Flynn Mogensen, P.A., Sarasota, for Amicus Curiae The
Florida Press Association, The First Amendment Foundation, and The Associated
Press, Inc. Richard A. Sicking of Touby, Chait & Sicking, P.L., Coral
Gables, for Amicus Curiae Florida Professional Firefighters, Inc.
INSURANCE, FLORIDA OFFICE OF INSURANCE REGULATION, and DAVID ALTMAIER, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE FLORIDA OFFICE OF INSURANCE
REGULATION, Appellants, v. JAMES F. FEE, JR., INDIVIDUALLY, Appellee. 1st
District. Case Nos. 1D16-5408 & 1D16-5416. Opinion filed May 9, 2017. An
appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County. Karen A. Gievers, Judge.
Counsel: Thomas J. Maida, James A. McKee, Benjamin J. Grossman, and Nicholas R.
Paquette of Foley & Lardner LLP, Tallahassee, for Appellant National
Council on Compensation Insurance, Inc.; Shaw P. Stiller, Chief Assistant
General Counsel, and C. Timothy Gray and Lacy End-Of-Horn, Assistant General
Counsels, for Appellants Florida Office of Insurance Regulation and David
Altmaier. John K. Shubin, Salvatore H. Fasulo, Lauren G. Brunswick, and Mark E.
Grafton of Shubin & Bass, P.A., Miami, for Appellee. Andrea Flynn Mogensen
of Law Office of Andrea Flynn Mogensen, P.A., Sarasota, for Amicus Curiae The
Florida Press Association, The First Amendment Foundation, and The Associated
Press, Inc. Richard A. Sicking of Touby, Chait & Sicking, P.L., Coral
Gables, for Amicus Curiae Florida Professional Firefighters, Inc.
(ROWE, J.) The National Council on
Compensation Insurance (NCCI) and the Office of Insurance Regulation (OIR)
appeal the trial court’s order invalidating OIR’s approval of a 14.5% increase
in workers’ compensation insurance rates. For the reasons that follow, we
reverse the order in its entirety.
Compensation Insurance (NCCI) and the Office of Insurance Regulation (OIR)
appeal the trial court’s order invalidating OIR’s approval of a 14.5% increase
in workers’ compensation insurance rates. For the reasons that follow, we
reverse the order in its entirety.
I.
Facts
Facts
OIR regulates all insurance
activities in Florida, including all activities relating to workers’
compensation insurance. Insurance companies writing workers’ compensation
insurance policies in Florida must seek approval from OIR when setting or
changing insurance rates by filing a rate proposal. OIR reviews filings seeking
a rate change to determine if the proposed rate is “excessive, inadequate, or
unfairly discriminatory . . . in accordance with generally accepted and
reasonable actuarial techniques.” § 627.062(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2015). In
determining whether the rate proposal should be approved, OIR may examine the
statistical data supporting the proposed rate, and it may hold a public
hearing. §§ 627.091(2), .101, Fla. Stat. (2015). OIR takes official action on
rate filings through its agency head, the Commissioner of Insurance Regulation,
currently David Altmaier. See §§ 20.121(3)(a)1., (4), Fla. Stat. (2015).
activities in Florida, including all activities relating to workers’
compensation insurance. Insurance companies writing workers’ compensation
insurance policies in Florida must seek approval from OIR when setting or
changing insurance rates by filing a rate proposal. OIR reviews filings seeking
a rate change to determine if the proposed rate is “excessive, inadequate, or
unfairly discriminatory . . . in accordance with generally accepted and
reasonable actuarial techniques.” § 627.062(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2015). In
determining whether the rate proposal should be approved, OIR may examine the
statistical data supporting the proposed rate, and it may hold a public
hearing. §§ 627.091(2), .101, Fla. Stat. (2015). OIR takes official action on
rate filings through its agency head, the Commissioner of Insurance Regulation,
currently David Altmaier. See §§ 20.121(3)(a)1., (4), Fla. Stat. (2015).
Insurers have the option of directly
filing rate change proposals with OIR or joining a licensed rating organization
that will file the proposals on their behalf. § 627.091(4), Fla. Stat. (2015).
A rating organization is defined as “every person, other than an authorized
insurer, whether located within or outside this state, who has as his or her
object or purpose the making of rates, rating plans, or rating systems.” §
627.041(3), Fla. Stat. (2015). NCCI is a licensed rating organization operating
in more than forty states. And it represents and files rate proposals on behalf
of most of the workers’ compensation insurers in Florida.1 Before 1991, the responsibility for
establishing rates fell to NCCI’s Classification and Ratings Committee. NCCI
had such a committee in each state in which it operated, including Florida.
These rate-determination committees were composed of representatives of
competing workers’ compensation insurers who would meet periodically to fix the
rates to be submitted for approval to insurance regulators. The committees were
disbanded in 1991. Since then, no specific committee at NCCI has been assigned
responsibility for overseeing, reviewing, or preparing rate filings. In
Florida, the responsibility for rate determinations falls to a single employee
of NCCI, one of its actuaries — Jay Rosen.
filing rate change proposals with OIR or joining a licensed rating organization
that will file the proposals on their behalf. § 627.091(4), Fla. Stat. (2015).
A rating organization is defined as “every person, other than an authorized
insurer, whether located within or outside this state, who has as his or her
object or purpose the making of rates, rating plans, or rating systems.” §
627.041(3), Fla. Stat. (2015). NCCI is a licensed rating organization operating
in more than forty states. And it represents and files rate proposals on behalf
of most of the workers’ compensation insurers in Florida.1 Before 1991, the responsibility for
establishing rates fell to NCCI’s Classification and Ratings Committee. NCCI
had such a committee in each state in which it operated, including Florida.
These rate-determination committees were composed of representatives of
competing workers’ compensation insurers who would meet periodically to fix the
rates to be submitted for approval to insurance regulators. The committees were
disbanded in 1991. Since then, no specific committee at NCCI has been assigned
responsibility for overseeing, reviewing, or preparing rate filings. In
Florida, the responsibility for rate determinations falls to a single employee
of NCCI, one of its actuaries — Jay Rosen.
Before filing a rate proposal with
OIR, Rosen analyzes certain data to determine whether there is a need for a
change in insurance rates. After he decides that a rate change is needed, a
Technical Peer Review meeting is convened where other NCCI actuaries challenge
Rosen’s conclusions in order to assist him in defending his recommended rate
proposal. The next step in the process is a Phase II meeting where Rosen
provides an overview to other actuaries and members of NCCI’s regulatory
division explaining how he arrived at his rate proposal. After these meetings,
Rosen prepares the documents that are filed with OIR.
OIR, Rosen analyzes certain data to determine whether there is a need for a
change in insurance rates. After he decides that a rate change is needed, a
Technical Peer Review meeting is convened where other NCCI actuaries challenge
Rosen’s conclusions in order to assist him in defending his recommended rate
proposal. The next step in the process is a Phase II meeting where Rosen
provides an overview to other actuaries and members of NCCI’s regulatory
division explaining how he arrived at his rate proposal. After these meetings,
Rosen prepares the documents that are filed with OIR.
II.
Procedural History
Procedural History
NCCI announced in a May 2016 press
release that, as a consequence of the supreme court’s decision in Castellanos
v. Next Door Company, 192 So. 3d 431 (Fla. 2016), which declared
unconstitutional the statutory cap on claimants’ attorneys’ fees in workers’
compensation cases, a significant increase in workers’ compensation insurance
rates would be necessary. Following this announcement, James F. Fee, Jr., an
attorney and the sole owner of a law firm that purchases workers’ compensation
insurance in Florida, requested from NCCI “all pertinent information relating
to all NCCI rate and rule filings affecting Florida Workers’ Compensation
premiums that were in effect for the calendar years 2006 through 2016.” Fee
made this request shortly before NCCI submitted a proposal to OIR for a 17.1%
increase in the overall statewide workers’ compensation insurance rate; he made
a second records request after the proposal was submitted. NCCI responded by
providing Fee with the records it submitted to OIR with its rate filing.
release that, as a consequence of the supreme court’s decision in Castellanos
v. Next Door Company, 192 So. 3d 431 (Fla. 2016), which declared
unconstitutional the statutory cap on claimants’ attorneys’ fees in workers’
compensation cases, a significant increase in workers’ compensation insurance
rates would be necessary. Following this announcement, James F. Fee, Jr., an
attorney and the sole owner of a law firm that purchases workers’ compensation
insurance in Florida, requested from NCCI “all pertinent information relating
to all NCCI rate and rule filings affecting Florida Workers’ Compensation
premiums that were in effect for the calendar years 2006 through 2016.” Fee
made this request shortly before NCCI submitted a proposal to OIR for a 17.1%
increase in the overall statewide workers’ compensation insurance rate; he made
a second records request after the proposal was submitted. NCCI responded by
providing Fee with the records it submitted to OIR with its rate filing.
Before OIR could act on NCCI’s rate
filing, the supreme court decided Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg,
194 So. 3d 311 (Fla. 2016), holding that the 104-week statutory limit on
temporary total disability benefits was unconstitutional, and reinstating a
206-week limitation on these benefits. NCCI responded to the Westphal
decision by amending its filing to propose a rate increase of 19.6% to go into
effect on October 1, 2016. After NCCI amended its filing, OIR provided notice
that it would conduct a public hearing on the proposed rate increase. Fee then
made another request to NCCI, seeking any information related to the amended
rate filing and any additional information related to his prior requests. Two
weeks later, NCCI provided Fee with documents it submitted to OIR associated
with its 2016 amended rate filing. Days later, OIR published on the internet
all of NCCI’s rate filings from 2006 through 2016.
filing, the supreme court decided Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg,
194 So. 3d 311 (Fla. 2016), holding that the 104-week statutory limit on
temporary total disability benefits was unconstitutional, and reinstating a
206-week limitation on these benefits. NCCI responded to the Westphal
decision by amending its filing to propose a rate increase of 19.6% to go into
effect on October 1, 2016. After NCCI amended its filing, OIR provided notice
that it would conduct a public hearing on the proposed rate increase. Fee then
made another request to NCCI, seeking any information related to the amended
rate filing and any additional information related to his prior requests. Two
weeks later, NCCI provided Fee with documents it submitted to OIR associated
with its 2016 amended rate filing. Days later, OIR published on the internet
all of NCCI’s rate filings from 2006 through 2016.
Fee then filed suit against NCCI,
OIR, and Commissioner Altmaier and sought to enjoin the public hearing on
NCCI’s amended rate filing. Fee alleged that (1) NCCI violated the Sunshine
Law, section 286.011, Florida Statutes (2015), by failing to provide notice of
or a meaningful opportunity to participate in committee meetings where its rate
proposals were discussed; (2) the amended rate filing was void ab initio due to
violations of the Sunshine Law; (3) NCCI violated section 627.291(1), Florida
Statutes, by denying Fee access to records regarding the rate proposal; and (4)
NCCI violated the Public Records Act by failing to respond to Fee’s records
requests.
OIR, and Commissioner Altmaier and sought to enjoin the public hearing on
NCCI’s amended rate filing. Fee alleged that (1) NCCI violated the Sunshine
Law, section 286.011, Florida Statutes (2015), by failing to provide notice of
or a meaningful opportunity to participate in committee meetings where its rate
proposals were discussed; (2) the amended rate filing was void ab initio due to
violations of the Sunshine Law; (3) NCCI violated section 627.291(1), Florida
Statutes, by denying Fee access to records regarding the rate proposal; and (4)
NCCI violated the Public Records Act by failing to respond to Fee’s records
requests.
Despite the pending complaint, the
public hearing proceeded as scheduled on August 16, 2016. At the four-hour
hearing, every person who filled out a speaker card spoke, including an actuary
Fee hired to present testimony in opposition to the proposed rate increase. OIR
also allowed for additional commentary by holding open the time for written
public comments for an extra seven days. But after reviewing NCCI’s rate
proposal and considering public comments on the proposal, OIR rejected the
proposed 19.6% increase as unjustified. OIR determined that only a 14.5% rate
increase was appropriate. NCCI then submitted a revised rate proposal
requesting a 14.5% rate increase. On October 5, 2016, Commissioner Altmaier
issued a final order approving the revised rate proposal.
public hearing proceeded as scheduled on August 16, 2016. At the four-hour
hearing, every person who filled out a speaker card spoke, including an actuary
Fee hired to present testimony in opposition to the proposed rate increase. OIR
also allowed for additional commentary by holding open the time for written
public comments for an extra seven days. But after reviewing NCCI’s rate
proposal and considering public comments on the proposal, OIR rejected the
proposed 19.6% increase as unjustified. OIR determined that only a 14.5% rate
increase was appropriate. NCCI then submitted a revised rate proposal
requesting a 14.5% rate increase. On October 5, 2016, Commissioner Altmaier
issued a final order approving the revised rate proposal.
The trial court held an evidentiary
hearing on Fee’s complaint after the Commissioner approved the final order, but
before the rate went into effect. After hearing testimony and receiving
documentary evidence, the court determined that the order approving the rate
increase was void because NCCI and OIR violated the Sunshine Law under three
separate statutory provisions: section 627.091(6), Florida Statutes; section
286.011, Florida Statutes; and section 627.093, Florida Statutes. The trial
court also concluded that NCCI violated sections 627.291(1) and 119.07, Florida
Statutes, when it denied Fee access to its records. NCCI and OIR appeal.
hearing on Fee’s complaint after the Commissioner approved the final order, but
before the rate went into effect. After hearing testimony and receiving
documentary evidence, the court determined that the order approving the rate
increase was void because NCCI and OIR violated the Sunshine Law under three
separate statutory provisions: section 627.091(6), Florida Statutes; section
286.011, Florida Statutes; and section 627.093, Florida Statutes. The trial
court also concluded that NCCI violated sections 627.291(1) and 119.07, Florida
Statutes, when it denied Fee access to its records. NCCI and OIR appeal.
III.
Analysis
Analysis
We review the trial court’s factual
findings to determine whether they are supported by competent, substantial
evidence. McDougall v. Culver, 3 So. 3d 391, 392 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). But
we review the trial court’s interpretation of the law de novo. Liner v.
Workers Temp. Staffing, Inc., 900 So. 2d 473, 476 (Fla. 2008) (“We review
the statutory interpretation conducted by the trial court to reach this
ultimate ruling de novo, while we defer to those factual findings of the trial
court that are supported by competent, substantial evidence from the record.”).
findings to determine whether they are supported by competent, substantial
evidence. McDougall v. Culver, 3 So. 3d 391, 392 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). But
we review the trial court’s interpretation of the law de novo. Liner v.
Workers Temp. Staffing, Inc., 900 So. 2d 473, 476 (Fla. 2008) (“We review
the statutory interpretation conducted by the trial court to reach this
ultimate ruling de novo, while we defer to those factual findings of the trial
court that are supported by competent, substantial evidence from the record.”).
A.
Alleged Sunshine Law Violations
Alleged Sunshine Law Violations
The trial court found that NCCI and
OIR violated Florida’s Sunshine Law in three respects. First, the trial court
determined that NCCI violated section 627.091(6), Florida Statutes, by
conducting meetings of the statutory rate-determination committee outside the
sunshine. Second, the trial court found that OIR delegated its authority over
rate filings to NCCI, subjecting NCCI’s rate proposal activities to the
sunshine requirements of section 286.011, Florida Statutes. And third, the
trial court concluded that section 627.093, Florida Statutes, requires NCCI to
conduct its activities in the sunshine.
OIR violated Florida’s Sunshine Law in three respects. First, the trial court
determined that NCCI violated section 627.091(6), Florida Statutes, by
conducting meetings of the statutory rate-determination committee outside the
sunshine. Second, the trial court found that OIR delegated its authority over
rate filings to NCCI, subjecting NCCI’s rate proposal activities to the
sunshine requirements of section 286.011, Florida Statutes. And third, the
trial court concluded that section 627.093, Florida Statutes, requires NCCI to
conduct its activities in the sunshine.
i.
Section 627.091(6), Florida Statutes
Section 627.091(6), Florida Statutes
Florida’s Sunshine Law finds its
origins in section 286.011, Florida Statutes (2015), which provides:
origins in section 286.011, Florida Statutes (2015), which provides:
All
meetings of any board or commission of any state agency or authority or of any
agency or authority of any county, municipal corporation, or political
subdivision, except as otherwise provided in the Constitution, including
meetings with or attended by any person elected to such board or commission,
but who has not yet taken office, at which official acts are to be taken are
declared to be public meetings open to the public at all times, and no
resolution, rule, or formal action shall be considered binding except as taken or
made at such meeting. The board or commission must provide reasonable notice of
all such meetings.
meetings of any board or commission of any state agency or authority or of any
agency or authority of any county, municipal corporation, or political
subdivision, except as otherwise provided in the Constitution, including
meetings with or attended by any person elected to such board or commission,
but who has not yet taken office, at which official acts are to be taken are
declared to be public meetings open to the public at all times, and no
resolution, rule, or formal action shall be considered binding except as taken or
made at such meeting. The board or commission must provide reasonable notice of
all such meetings.
The Sunshine Law was made part of
the Florida Constitution in 1992, in article I, section 24, which requires
“[a]ll meetings of any collegial public body” to be open and noticed to the
public. By its express terms, the Sunshine Law applies exclusively to
governmental bodies and not to private entities. See Op. Att’y Gen. Fla.
16-01 (2016).
the Florida Constitution in 1992, in article I, section 24, which requires
“[a]ll meetings of any collegial public body” to be open and noticed to the
public. By its express terms, the Sunshine Law applies exclusively to
governmental bodies and not to private entities. See Op. Att’y Gen. Fla.
16-01 (2016).
Despite this limitation, the Florida
Legislature extended the scope of the law to include licensed insurance rating
organizations, such as NCCI, under certain specified circumstances:
Legislature extended the scope of the law to include licensed insurance rating
organizations, such as NCCI, under certain specified circumstances:
Whenever the
committee of a recognized rating organization with responsibility for
workers’ compensation and employer’s liability insurance rates in this state meets
to discuss the necessity for, or a request for, Florida rate increases or
decreases, the determination of Florida rates, the rates to be requested, and
any other matters pertaining specifically and directly to such Florida rates,
such meetings shall be held in this state and shall be subject to s. 286.011.
The committee of such a rating organization shall provide at least 3 weeks’
prior notice of such meetings to the office and shall provide at least 14 days’
prior notice of such meetings to the public by publication in the Florida
Administrative Register.
committee of a recognized rating organization with responsibility for
workers’ compensation and employer’s liability insurance rates in this state meets
to discuss the necessity for, or a request for, Florida rate increases or
decreases, the determination of Florida rates, the rates to be requested, and
any other matters pertaining specifically and directly to such Florida rates,
such meetings shall be held in this state and shall be subject to s. 286.011.
The committee of such a rating organization shall provide at least 3 weeks’
prior notice of such meetings to the office and shall provide at least 14 days’
prior notice of such meetings to the public by publication in the Florida
Administrative Register.
§ 627.091(6), Fla. Stat. (2015)
(emphasis added). This unique extension of the Sunshine Law applies only
when the rate-determination committee of a rating organization meets to determine
workers’ compensation insurance rates. NCCI argues, and it is undisputed, that
no committee at NCCI has been charged with the responsibility for determining
worker’s compensation insurance rates in over twenty-five years.2
(emphasis added). This unique extension of the Sunshine Law applies only
when the rate-determination committee of a rating organization meets to determine
workers’ compensation insurance rates. NCCI argues, and it is undisputed, that
no committee at NCCI has been charged with the responsibility for determining
worker’s compensation insurance rates in over twenty-five years.2
Although NCCI does not entrust a
specific committee with responsibility for determining workers’ compensation
insurance rates in Florida, Fee contends, and the trial court found, that the
following configurations of NCCI’s and OIR’s employees met and acted in place
of the rate-determination committee contemplated under the statute and that
meetings of those groups were subject to the sunshine: (1) Jay Rosen, in his
individual capacity; (2) the Team Peer Review and Phase II meeting
participants; (3) Rosen and his staff; and (4) NCCI’s and OIR’s staff. We
conclude that none of these individuals or groups meets the definition of the
rate-determination committee under the statute, and thus, none of these
meetings was subject to the sunshine.
specific committee with responsibility for determining workers’ compensation
insurance rates in Florida, Fee contends, and the trial court found, that the
following configurations of NCCI’s and OIR’s employees met and acted in place
of the rate-determination committee contemplated under the statute and that
meetings of those groups were subject to the sunshine: (1) Jay Rosen, in his
individual capacity; (2) the Team Peer Review and Phase II meeting
participants; (3) Rosen and his staff; and (4) NCCI’s and OIR’s staff. We
conclude that none of these individuals or groups meets the definition of the
rate-determination committee under the statute, and thus, none of these
meetings was subject to the sunshine.
Fee asserts that Rosen, in his
individual capacity, acted in place of the rate-determination committee
contemplated by section 627.091(6). This argument ignores the plain language of
the statute and the ordinary meaning of the terms within it. See McKenzie
Check Advance of Fla., LLC v. Betts, 928 So. 2d 1204, 1208 (Fla. 2006)
(explaining that statutory construction starts with an examination of the plain
language of the statute); State v. Bodden, 877 So. 2d 680, 685 (Fla.
2004) (observing that it is assumed that the legislature knows the ordinary
meaning of words when it enacts a statute). The statute applies only to
meetings of a rating organization committee where workers’ compensations
insurance rates are discussed and determined. A “committee” has been defined as
a “subordinate group,” not a single person. See Committee, Black’s
Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Moreover, the use of the term “meets”
indicates that the statute is designed to apply to a group of people, not a
single individual. The multi-person concept of the term “committee” further
finds support in well-established precedent construing the Sunshine Law. See
Sarasota Citizens for Responsible Gov’t v. City of Sarasota, 48 So. 3d
755, 764 (Fla. 2010) (explaining that Sunshine Law protections extend to formal
and informal meetings only when two or more members of the same board or
commission meet to deal with a matter on which action will be taken in the future);
Office of the Attorney General, Government-In-The-Sunshine Manual, at 18
(2016 ed.) (observing that the Sunshine Law does not “ordinarily apply to an individual
member of a public board or commission or to public officials who are not board
or commission members.” (emphasis added)). Thus, under the plain and ordinary
meaning of the terms “committee” and “meet,” Rosen, in his individual capacity,
does not act or “meet” as the statutory rate-determination committee
contemplated by section 627.091(6).
individual capacity, acted in place of the rate-determination committee
contemplated by section 627.091(6). This argument ignores the plain language of
the statute and the ordinary meaning of the terms within it. See McKenzie
Check Advance of Fla., LLC v. Betts, 928 So. 2d 1204, 1208 (Fla. 2006)
(explaining that statutory construction starts with an examination of the plain
language of the statute); State v. Bodden, 877 So. 2d 680, 685 (Fla.
2004) (observing that it is assumed that the legislature knows the ordinary
meaning of words when it enacts a statute). The statute applies only to
meetings of a rating organization committee where workers’ compensations
insurance rates are discussed and determined. A “committee” has been defined as
a “subordinate group,” not a single person. See Committee, Black’s
Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Moreover, the use of the term “meets”
indicates that the statute is designed to apply to a group of people, not a
single individual. The multi-person concept of the term “committee” further
finds support in well-established precedent construing the Sunshine Law. See
Sarasota Citizens for Responsible Gov’t v. City of Sarasota, 48 So. 3d
755, 764 (Fla. 2010) (explaining that Sunshine Law protections extend to formal
and informal meetings only when two or more members of the same board or
commission meet to deal with a matter on which action will be taken in the future);
Office of the Attorney General, Government-In-The-Sunshine Manual, at 18
(2016 ed.) (observing that the Sunshine Law does not “ordinarily apply to an individual
member of a public board or commission or to public officials who are not board
or commission members.” (emphasis added)). Thus, under the plain and ordinary
meaning of the terms “committee” and “meet,” Rosen, in his individual capacity,
does not act or “meet” as the statutory rate-determination committee
contemplated by section 627.091(6).
The trial court also concluded that
NCCI’s Team Peer Review and Phase II meetings, the meetings between Rosen and
his own staff, and the meetings between NCCI and OIR3 were the functional equivalent of the
rate-determination committee meetings described in section 627.091(6) and that
the actions of these groups were subject to the Sunshine Law. The trial court’s
conclusions are incorrect. With regard to NCCI’s internal meetings, the
Sunshine Law does not apply because none of the participants, other than Rosen,
had any authority to determine the worker’s compensation insurance rate to be
proposed to OIR. See Sarasota Citizens, 48 So. 3d at 762 (holding
that the dispositive question for whether the Sunshine Law applies to a
committee subordinate to or selected by a traditional governmental authority is
whether decision-making authority has been delegated to the committee); Cape
Publ’ns, Inc. v. City of Palm Bay, 473 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)
(holding that a committee that was formed to supply a city manager with
information so that he could properly exercise his duty to select a new police
chief was not subject to the Sunshine Law because the committee had no
decision-making authority). Instead, these meetings were held solely for the
purpose of gathering information. See Molina v. City of Miami,
837 So. 2d 462, 463 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (“In short, the committee is nothing
more than a meeting of staff members who serve in a fact-finding, advisory
capacity to the chief. The Government-in-the-Sunshine Law is not applicable to
meetings of staffers serving this function.”); Lyon v. Lake Cty., 765
So. 2d 785, 789 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (“When a committee has been established for
and conducts only information gathering and reporting, the activities of that
committee are not subject to section 286.011, Florida Statutes.”). And with
regard to the meetings between NCCI and OIR, those meetings occurred after NCCI
made a rate determination and filed its rate proposal with OIR. In no way could
those meetings be considered a meeting of a rate-determination committee of a
rating organization to determine the rates to be filed. Accordingly, neither
NCCI’s internal meetings nor the meetings between OIR and NCCI was subject to
the sunshine pursuant to section 627.091(6).
NCCI’s Team Peer Review and Phase II meetings, the meetings between Rosen and
his own staff, and the meetings between NCCI and OIR3 were the functional equivalent of the
rate-determination committee meetings described in section 627.091(6) and that
the actions of these groups were subject to the Sunshine Law. The trial court’s
conclusions are incorrect. With regard to NCCI’s internal meetings, the
Sunshine Law does not apply because none of the participants, other than Rosen,
had any authority to determine the worker’s compensation insurance rate to be
proposed to OIR. See Sarasota Citizens, 48 So. 3d at 762 (holding
that the dispositive question for whether the Sunshine Law applies to a
committee subordinate to or selected by a traditional governmental authority is
whether decision-making authority has been delegated to the committee); Cape
Publ’ns, Inc. v. City of Palm Bay, 473 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)
(holding that a committee that was formed to supply a city manager with
information so that he could properly exercise his duty to select a new police
chief was not subject to the Sunshine Law because the committee had no
decision-making authority). Instead, these meetings were held solely for the
purpose of gathering information. See Molina v. City of Miami,
837 So. 2d 462, 463 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (“In short, the committee is nothing
more than a meeting of staff members who serve in a fact-finding, advisory
capacity to the chief. The Government-in-the-Sunshine Law is not applicable to
meetings of staffers serving this function.”); Lyon v. Lake Cty., 765
So. 2d 785, 789 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (“When a committee has been established for
and conducts only information gathering and reporting, the activities of that
committee are not subject to section 286.011, Florida Statutes.”). And with
regard to the meetings between NCCI and OIR, those meetings occurred after NCCI
made a rate determination and filed its rate proposal with OIR. In no way could
those meetings be considered a meeting of a rate-determination committee of a
rating organization to determine the rates to be filed. Accordingly, neither
NCCI’s internal meetings nor the meetings between OIR and NCCI was subject to
the sunshine pursuant to section 627.091(6).
ii.
Section 286.011, Florida Statutes
Section 286.011, Florida Statutes
Fee also argued, and the trial court
found, that NCCI violated the Sunshine Law itself. Section 286.011, Florida
Statutes (2015), requires “[a]ll meetings of any board or commission of any
state agency or authority or of any agency or authority of any county, municipal
corporation, or political subdivision” to be held in the sunshine. The Sunshine
Law thus applies to governmental bodies and does not apply to private
organizations that were not created by a public entity. See Op. Att’y
Gen. Fla. 07-27 (2007). However, the sunshine requirements may apply if a
public entity has delegated “the performance of its public purpose” to a
private entity. Mem’l Hosp.-W. Volusia, Inc. v. News-Journal Corp., 729
So. 2d 373, 382-83 (Fla. 1999).
found, that NCCI violated the Sunshine Law itself. Section 286.011, Florida
Statutes (2015), requires “[a]ll meetings of any board or commission of any
state agency or authority or of any agency or authority of any county, municipal
corporation, or political subdivision” to be held in the sunshine. The Sunshine
Law thus applies to governmental bodies and does not apply to private
organizations that were not created by a public entity. See Op. Att’y
Gen. Fla. 07-27 (2007). However, the sunshine requirements may apply if a
public entity has delegated “the performance of its public purpose” to a
private entity. Mem’l Hosp.-W. Volusia, Inc. v. News-Journal Corp., 729
So. 2d 373, 382-83 (Fla. 1999).
Fee contends that NCCI was subject
to the sunshine because OIR delegated its authority over rate filings to NCCI.
However, no evidence in the record supports Fee’s argument. OIR approves and
disapproves rate filings; it does not make rate filings. Conversely, NCCI and
individual insurers have no authority to approve or disapprove rate filings;
rather, they are under a statutory mandate to file such proposals. §§
627.091(1), (4), Fla. Stat. (2015). OIR did not delegate to NCCI any authority
to carry out an agency function required to be performed in the sunshine. Thus,
Fee’s argument under section 286.011 fails.
to the sunshine because OIR delegated its authority over rate filings to NCCI.
However, no evidence in the record supports Fee’s argument. OIR approves and
disapproves rate filings; it does not make rate filings. Conversely, NCCI and
individual insurers have no authority to approve or disapprove rate filings;
rather, they are under a statutory mandate to file such proposals. §§
627.091(1), (4), Fla. Stat. (2015). OIR did not delegate to NCCI any authority
to carry out an agency function required to be performed in the sunshine. Thus,
Fee’s argument under section 286.011 fails.
iii.
Section 627.093, Florida Statutes
Section 627.093, Florida Statutes
The trial court also concluded,
without any argument by the parties, that NCCI was subject to the sunshine
pursuant to section 627.093, Florida Statutes. This statute provides as
follows: “Section 286.011 shall be applicable to every rate filing, approval or
disapproval of filing, rating deviation from filing, or appeal from any of
these regarding workers’ compensation and employer’s liability insurances.” §
627.093, Fla. Stat. (2015). The plain language of the statute thus extends
sunshine requirements only to rate filings; actions taken by OIR subsequent to
receiving a rate filing (approval, disapproval or deviation); and appeals of
OIR’s actions. The only portion of the statute that has any nexus to NCCI’s
activities in this case is the rate filing itself. And a rate filing is
specifically defined by statute to include the following information: (1)
“[t]he experience or judgment of the insurer or rating organization”; (2) an
“interpretation of any statistical data”;4 (3) “[t]he experience of other
insurers or rating organizations;” or (4) “[a]ny other factors which the
insurer or rating organization deems relevant.” § 627.091(2), Fla. Stat.
(2015). Reading section 627.093 in conjunction with the statutory definition of
a rate filing, it is clear that the sunshine requirements of section 627.093 do
not apply to NCCI beyond the rate filing itself. It does not extend to NCCI’s
rate determination activities or to its decision-making process leading to the
filing of a rate proposal. The trial court’s conclusion to the contrary is
incorrect.
without any argument by the parties, that NCCI was subject to the sunshine
pursuant to section 627.093, Florida Statutes. This statute provides as
follows: “Section 286.011 shall be applicable to every rate filing, approval or
disapproval of filing, rating deviation from filing, or appeal from any of
these regarding workers’ compensation and employer’s liability insurances.” §
627.093, Fla. Stat. (2015). The plain language of the statute thus extends
sunshine requirements only to rate filings; actions taken by OIR subsequent to
receiving a rate filing (approval, disapproval or deviation); and appeals of
OIR’s actions. The only portion of the statute that has any nexus to NCCI’s
activities in this case is the rate filing itself. And a rate filing is
specifically defined by statute to include the following information: (1)
“[t]he experience or judgment of the insurer or rating organization”; (2) an
“interpretation of any statistical data”;4 (3) “[t]he experience of other
insurers or rating organizations;” or (4) “[a]ny other factors which the
insurer or rating organization deems relevant.” § 627.091(2), Fla. Stat.
(2015). Reading section 627.093 in conjunction with the statutory definition of
a rate filing, it is clear that the sunshine requirements of section 627.093 do
not apply to NCCI beyond the rate filing itself. It does not extend to NCCI’s
rate determination activities or to its decision-making process leading to the
filing of a rate proposal. The trial court’s conclusion to the contrary is
incorrect.
B.
Access to Records
Access to Records
Fee also alleges that NCCI failed to
fully and completely respond to his records requests, in violation of two
statutes: section 627.291, Florida Statutes; and section 119.07, Florida
Statutes. We conclude that NCCI was not required to provide Fee with access to
its records under either provision.
fully and completely respond to his records requests, in violation of two
statutes: section 627.291, Florida Statutes; and section 119.07, Florida
Statutes. We conclude that NCCI was not required to provide Fee with access to
its records under either provision.
i.
Section 627.291, Florida Statutes
Section 627.291, Florida Statutes
Fee contends that he is entitled to
access NCCI’s records pursuant to section 627.291, Florida Statutes (2015), as
an insured affected by a rate or aggrieved by a rating system. The statute
provides as follows:
access NCCI’s records pursuant to section 627.291, Florida Statutes (2015), as
an insured affected by a rate or aggrieved by a rating system. The statute
provides as follows:
(1) As to
workers’ compensation and employer’s liability insurances, every rating
organization and every insurer which makes its own rates shall, within a
reasonable time after receiving written request therefor and upon payment of
such reasonable charge as it may make, furnish to any insured affected by a
rate made by it, or to the authorized representative of such insured, all
pertinent information as to such rate.
workers’ compensation and employer’s liability insurances, every rating
organization and every insurer which makes its own rates shall, within a
reasonable time after receiving written request therefor and upon payment of
such reasonable charge as it may make, furnish to any insured affected by a
rate made by it, or to the authorized representative of such insured, all
pertinent information as to such rate.
(2) As to
workers’ compensation and employer’s liability insurances, every rating
organization and every insurer which makes its own rates shall provide within
this state reasonable means whereby any person aggrieved by the application
of its rating system may be heard, in person or by his or her authorized
representative, on his or her written request to review the manner in which
such rating system has been applied in connection with the insurance afforded
him or her. If the rating organization or insurer fails to grant or rejects
such request within 30 days after it is made, the applicant may proceed in the
same manner as if his or her application had been rejected. Any party affected
by the action of such rating organization or insurer on such request may,
within 30 days after written notice of such action, appeal to the office, which
may affirm or reverse such action.
workers’ compensation and employer’s liability insurances, every rating
organization and every insurer which makes its own rates shall provide within
this state reasonable means whereby any person aggrieved by the application
of its rating system may be heard, in person or by his or her authorized
representative, on his or her written request to review the manner in which
such rating system has been applied in connection with the insurance afforded
him or her. If the rating organization or insurer fails to grant or rejects
such request within 30 days after it is made, the applicant may proceed in the
same manner as if his or her application had been rejected. Any party affected
by the action of such rating organization or insurer on such request may,
within 30 days after written notice of such action, appeal to the office, which
may affirm or reverse such action.
§ 627.291, Fla. Stat. (2015)
(emphasis added).
(emphasis added).
Fee asserts that as an insured who
would be affected by NCCI’s proposed rate increase, he was entitled to access
all pertinent records relating to NCCI’s rate filing. But the plain language of
the statute requires rating organizations to turn over “all pertinent
information” to an insured who has been “affected” by a rate. Even assuming
that Fee had standing as an insured, he could not have been “affected” by a
rate that had yet to go into effect and would never go into effect as OIR
ultimately rejected NCCI’s request for a 19.6% rate increase. The legislature
drafted the statute in the past tense, and it is presumed that the legislature
understood this language would limit any rating organization’s obligation to
turn over rate information to rates that were already in effect. See State
v. McNeil, 162 So. 3d 274, 279 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (holding that the
legislature is presumed to understand the rules of grammar when enacting a
statute).
would be affected by NCCI’s proposed rate increase, he was entitled to access
all pertinent records relating to NCCI’s rate filing. But the plain language of
the statute requires rating organizations to turn over “all pertinent
information” to an insured who has been “affected” by a rate. Even assuming
that Fee had standing as an insured, he could not have been “affected” by a
rate that had yet to go into effect and would never go into effect as OIR
ultimately rejected NCCI’s request for a 19.6% rate increase. The legislature
drafted the statute in the past tense, and it is presumed that the legislature
understood this language would limit any rating organization’s obligation to
turn over rate information to rates that were already in effect. See State
v. McNeil, 162 So. 3d 274, 279 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (holding that the
legislature is presumed to understand the rules of grammar when enacting a
statute).
Moreover, all portions of a statute
must be read together to achieve a consistent whole. Borden v. East-European
Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 595 (Fla. 2006). The language contained in section
627.291(2), also written in the past tense, supports a construction of the
statute that would require disclosure of information for only rates that are
already in effect. Subsection (2) requires rating organizations to provide
reasonable means for any person “aggrieved by the application of its rating
system” to review the manner in which “such rating system has been applied” to
his or her insurance. § 627.291(2), Fla. Stat. (2015). Further, when both
subsections are read together, it is apparent that this statute was designed to
allow an insured to obtain information about a rate that is in effect or was in
effect and to determine whether he has grounds to challenge the application of
the rate to him. Because nothing in section 627.291 makes it applicable to
pending or rejected rate filings, NCCI was not required to provide records in
response to Fee’s requests.
must be read together to achieve a consistent whole. Borden v. East-European
Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 595 (Fla. 2006). The language contained in section
627.291(2), also written in the past tense, supports a construction of the
statute that would require disclosure of information for only rates that are
already in effect. Subsection (2) requires rating organizations to provide
reasonable means for any person “aggrieved by the application of its rating
system” to review the manner in which “such rating system has been applied” to
his or her insurance. § 627.291(2), Fla. Stat. (2015). Further, when both
subsections are read together, it is apparent that this statute was designed to
allow an insured to obtain information about a rate that is in effect or was in
effect and to determine whether he has grounds to challenge the application of
the rate to him. Because nothing in section 627.291 makes it applicable to
pending or rejected rate filings, NCCI was not required to provide records in
response to Fee’s requests.
ii.
Section 119.07, Florida Statutes
Section 119.07, Florida Statutes
Fee also argues, and the trial court
found, that NCCI violated the Public Records Act, which provides that “[i]t is
the policy of this state that all state, county, and municipal records are open
for personal inspection and copying by any person. Providing access to public
records is a duty of each agency.” § 119.01, Fla. Stat. (2015). The Act defines
an “agency” to include any private business entity “acting on behalf of any
public agency.” § 119.011(2), Fla. Stat. (2015). “This broad definition [of
agency] serves to ensure that a public agency cannot avoid disclosure under the
Act by contractually delegating to a private entity that which otherwise would
be an agency responsibility.” News & Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Schwab, Twitty
& Hanser Architectural Grp., Inc., 596 So. 2d 1029, 1031 (Fla. 1992).
Thus, in order to find that NCCI was subject to section 119.07, the trial court
was required to determine whether NCCI acted on behalf of a governmental
agency. In making this determination, it was necessary for the court to examine
multiple factors, including the nine factors outlined in Schwab. 596 So.
2d at 1031. But, here, the trial court expressly declined to apply the Schwab
factors and concluded that NCCI was subject to section 119.07.5 This was error. Economic Dev.
Comm’n v. Ellis, 178 So. 3d 118, 121 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015).
found, that NCCI violated the Public Records Act, which provides that “[i]t is
the policy of this state that all state, county, and municipal records are open
for personal inspection and copying by any person. Providing access to public
records is a duty of each agency.” § 119.01, Fla. Stat. (2015). The Act defines
an “agency” to include any private business entity “acting on behalf of any
public agency.” § 119.011(2), Fla. Stat. (2015). “This broad definition [of
agency] serves to ensure that a public agency cannot avoid disclosure under the
Act by contractually delegating to a private entity that which otherwise would
be an agency responsibility.” News & Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Schwab, Twitty
& Hanser Architectural Grp., Inc., 596 So. 2d 1029, 1031 (Fla. 1992).
Thus, in order to find that NCCI was subject to section 119.07, the trial court
was required to determine whether NCCI acted on behalf of a governmental
agency. In making this determination, it was necessary for the court to examine
multiple factors, including the nine factors outlined in Schwab. 596 So.
2d at 1031. But, here, the trial court expressly declined to apply the Schwab
factors and concluded that NCCI was subject to section 119.07.5 This was error. Economic Dev.
Comm’n v. Ellis, 178 So. 3d 118, 121 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015).
IV.
Conclusion
Conclusion
The trial court erred in declaring
OIR’s final order void and in concluding that NCCI and OIR violated the
Sunshine Law. The trial court also erred in determining NCCI violated section
627.291, Florida Statutes, and the Florida Public Records Act, by not providing
Fee with access to certain records. Accordingly, we REVERSE the trial court’s
final order, and REMAND for reinstatement of OIR’s final order issued on
October 5, 2016, approving a 14.5% increase in the workers’ compensation
insurance rates. (KELSEY and JAY, JJ., CONCUR.)
OIR’s final order void and in concluding that NCCI and OIR violated the
Sunshine Law. The trial court also erred in determining NCCI violated section
627.291, Florida Statutes, and the Florida Public Records Act, by not providing
Fee with access to certain records. Accordingly, we REVERSE the trial court’s
final order, and REMAND for reinstatement of OIR’s final order issued on
October 5, 2016, approving a 14.5% increase in the workers’ compensation
insurance rates. (KELSEY and JAY, JJ., CONCUR.)
__________________
1Pursuant to a separate contract with
OIR, NCCI also serves as the statistical agent for Florida. In this role, NCCI
compiles data regarding the loss, expense, and claims experience of workers’
compensation insurance carriers. See § 627.331(3), Fla. Stat. (2015).
OIR, NCCI also serves as the statistical agent for Florida. In this role, NCCI
compiles data regarding the loss, expense, and claims experience of workers’
compensation insurance carriers. See § 627.331(3), Fla. Stat. (2015).
2The trial court concluded that
NCCI’s disbanding of its Classification and Rate Committee in 1991 and its
delegation of the responsibility for rate proposals to one person was an
attempt to evade the sunshine. But the application of the Sunshine Law does not
depend on a party’s “intentions, sincerity of purpose or noble motives.” IDS
Props., Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 279 So. 2d 353, 357 (Fla. 4th DCA
1973). Further, it is unclear on this record how the trial court reached the
conclusion that NCCI restructured its rate-proposal process in over forty
states to avoid compliance with Florida’s Sunshine Law.
NCCI’s disbanding of its Classification and Rate Committee in 1991 and its
delegation of the responsibility for rate proposals to one person was an
attempt to evade the sunshine. But the application of the Sunshine Law does not
depend on a party’s “intentions, sincerity of purpose or noble motives.” IDS
Props., Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 279 So. 2d 353, 357 (Fla. 4th DCA
1973). Further, it is unclear on this record how the trial court reached the
conclusion that NCCI restructured its rate-proposal process in over forty
states to avoid compliance with Florida’s Sunshine Law.
3Fee did not allege that the meetings
between NCCI and OIR were subject to the sunshine under this provision, and the
issue was not listed in the pre-hearing stipulation; thus, the trial court
erred by addressing this issue. See LPI/Key W. Assocs., Ltd. v.
Beachcomber Jewelers, Inc., 77 So. 3d 852, 854 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (“A
pretrial stipulation limiting the issues to be tried is ‘binding upon the
parties and the trial court, and should be strictly enforced.’ ”) (quoting Broche
v. Cohn, 987 So. 2d 124, 127 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008))).
between NCCI and OIR were subject to the sunshine under this provision, and the
issue was not listed in the pre-hearing stipulation; thus, the trial court
erred by addressing this issue. See LPI/Key W. Assocs., Ltd. v.
Beachcomber Jewelers, Inc., 77 So. 3d 852, 854 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (“A
pretrial stipulation limiting the issues to be tried is ‘binding upon the
parties and the trial court, and should be strictly enforced.’ ”) (quoting Broche
v. Cohn, 987 So. 2d 124, 127 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008))).
4We note that if OIR requests an
examination of the underlying statistical data for a certain rate filing, this
information would not be subject to public disclosure due to the exemptions
described in section 624.319, Florida Statutes (2015).
examination of the underlying statistical data for a certain rate filing, this
information would not be subject to public disclosure due to the exemptions
described in section 624.319, Florida Statutes (2015).
5In the brief filed with this Court,
neither Fee nor Amicus Florida Press Association attempt to defend the trial
court’s ruling that NCCI was subject to the Public Records Act. However, when
asked at oral argument to concede error on this point, Fee’s counsel instead
attempted to defend the trial court’s ruling by arguing that the trial court did
not need to rely on the Schwab factors because of the other relevant
statutory provisions dealing with an insured’s access to records from a
workers’ compensation insurance company.
neither Fee nor Amicus Florida Press Association attempt to defend the trial
court’s ruling that NCCI was subject to the Public Records Act. However, when
asked at oral argument to concede error on this point, Fee’s counsel instead
attempted to defend the trial court’s ruling by arguing that the trial court did
not need to rely on the Schwab factors because of the other relevant
statutory provisions dealing with an insured’s access to records from a
workers’ compensation insurance company.
* * *