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December 2, 2016 by admin

Workers’ compensation — Mediated settlement agreement — Enforcement

41
Fla. L. Weekly D2688a
Top of Form

Workers’
compensation — Mediated settlement agreement — Enforcement — Where parties
entered into mediated settlement agreement which required claimant to execute a
general release and resignation in favor of employer, written paperwork
prepared by employer/carrier included references to circumstances whereby
claimant and his attorney would indemnify and hold harmless the
employer/carrier, and claimant and his attorney struck those provisions and
returned signed paperwork to the employer/carrier, it was error for judge of
compensation claims to deny claimant’s motion to enforce the agreement on the
basis that there was no meeting of the minds — “Release” differs from
“indemnification,” and indemnification was not an essential term of the
agreement — Inclusion of indemnification in paperwork prepared by
employer/carrier constituted a new offer which claimant declined to accept, but
claimant’s rejection of the new offer did not nullify the previous agreement

ERLIYING
SOTO, Appellant, v. C-WORTHY CORP./SUMMIT HOLDINGS-CLAIMS CENTER, Appellees.
1st District. Case No. 1D16-1968. Opinion filed December 1, 2016. An appeal
from an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims. Daniel A. Lewis, Judge. Date
of Accident: September 1, 2015. Counsel: Kimberly A. Hill of Kimberly A. Hill,
P.L., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellant. H. George Kagan of Miller, Kagan,
Rodriguez & Silver, P.L., West Palm Beach.

(PER
CURIAM.) In this workers’ compensation appeal, Claimant seeks reversal of the
Judge of Compensation Claims’ (JCC’s) denial of his motion to enforce a
mediation settlement agreement. For the following reasons, we agree the JCC erred
in denying Claimant’s motion.

The
parties participated in a mediation conference which resulted in a mediation
conference report and a written mediation settlement agreement. The written
settlement agreement required Claimant to “execute a general release and
resignation in favor of the employer.” When the settlement paperwork prepared
by the Employer/Carrier (E/C) was received by Claimant’s attorney, it included
references to several circumstances whereby Claimant and his attorney would
“indemnify and hold harmless” the E/C. Claimant and his attorney struck those
provisions, and returned the signed paperwork to the E/C.

When
the E/C advised Claimant they were backing out of the settlement, Claimant’s
attorney forwarded a copy of the paperwork on to the JCC with a motion seeking
approval of the attorney’s fee and allocation of child support arrearage. After
the E/C filed a motion objecting to the approval of Claimant’s motion, Claimant
filed a motion to enforce the settlement and the JCC held an evidentiary
hearing on the motion.

In
his order denying Claimant’s motion, the JCC determined that the parties did
not reach a meeting of the minds regarding the indemnification language.
Accordingly, he found that an essential element of the agreement was not established,
and on that ground determined the agreement was not enforceable.

On
appeal, Claimant argues that because a “release” differs from
“indemnification,” indemnification was not an essential term of the agreement
and, thus, the JCC erred in finding the parties failed to agree on an essential
term. Because it is not disputed that the mediation settlement agreement was
unambiguous, Claimant argues that the JCC should have reviewed only the terms
of the agreement when determining whether there was a meeting of the minds.

“[I]t
is within the province of the JCC to determine whether a settlement was
reached, and if so, to establish its terms.” Chubb Group Ins. Co. v.
Easthagen
, 889 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Settlement agreements “are
governed by the rules for interpretation of contracts[,] are highly favored and
will be enforced whenever possible.” Robbie v. City of Miami, 469 So. 2d
1384, 1385 (Fla. 1985) (citation omitted). “The making of a contract depends
not on the agreement of two minds in one intention, but on the agreement of two
sets of external signs — not on the parties having meant the same thing but on
their having said the same thing.” Id. (quoting Blackhawk Heating
& Plumbing Co. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp.
, 302 So. 2d 404, 407 (Fla.
1974). “Where the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, the parties’
intent must be gleaned from the four corners of the document.” Crawford v.
Barker
, 64 So. 3d 1246, 1255 (Fla. 2011). Because resolution of this issue
requires interpretation of a written document, review is de novo. See Risco
USA Corp. v. Alexander
, 91 So. 3d 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012).

The
JCC assumed that a general release would include an indemnification agreement
and it is this assumption that led to his error. Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “release” as “[l]iberation from an obligation, duty, or demand; the act
of giving up a right or claim to the person against whom it could have been
enforced.” 1292 (7th ed. 1999). To “indemnify” requires one “[t]o reimburse
(another) for a loss suffered because of a third party’s act or default.” 772
(7th ed. 1999). Thus, an agreement to sign a release does not result in an
agreement to indemnify the other party.

The
facts here are analogous to the facts in Bonagura v. Home Depot, 991 So.
2d 902 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). In Bonagura, it was undisputed that the
parties reached a “binding oral settlement agreement.” Id. at 904. The
paperwork prepared subsequently included material matters — a general release
— that had not been discussed. Id. at 905. The Bonagura Court
determined that “[b]ecause no release was negotiated and settled, this release
is not a part of the parties’ settlement or ‘necessary paperwork’ to be
executed.” Id. Here, the parties executed an unambiguous written
agreement to settle this matter and no mention was made regarding
indemnification. Because indemnification had not been negotiated, its inclusion
in the “necessary paperwork” exceeded the scope of the written agreement, such
that it was in effect a new offer which Claimant declined to accept. See
id. Claimant’s rejection of this new offer did not, however, nullify the
previous agreement under the terms as set out in the valid, binding settlement
agreement. See id.

Accordingly,
the order is REVERSED, and the matter REMANDED for entry of an order granting
Claimant’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement. (WOLF, RAY, and MAKAR,
JJ., CONCUR.)

* *
*


 

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