Workers’
compensation — State employees — Evidence supported JCC’s finding that
claimant suffered a compensable accident for which she has coverage from state
— Appellate court is without jurisdiction to address claim that section
445.009(11), Florida Statutes unconstitutionally bars claimant’s entitlement to
indemnity benefits

RAMONA ZAVALA, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
COMMISSION OF MID-FLORIDA, INC. D/B/A METRO ORLANDO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
COMMISSION/ESIS, INSPERITY SUPPORT SERVICES, LP/ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE
COMPANY/SEDGWICK CMS, Appellees, and WORKFORCE OF CENTRAL FLORIDA/FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES-DIVISION OF RISK MANAGEMENT,
Appellees/Cross-Appellants. 1st District. Case No. 1D14-4617. Opinion filed
October 15, 2015. An appeal from an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims.
Neal P. Pitts, Judge. Date of Accident: November 12, 2013. Counsel: Kelli
Biferie Hastings of the Law Office of Kelli B. Hastings, PLLC, Orlando, and
Adam Littman of Adam Ross Littman, P.A., Winter Park, for
Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Kristen J. Longberry of The Longberry Law Firm, P.A.,
Orlando, for Appellees and Gerald F. Znosko of Znosko & Reas, P.A.,
Orlando, for Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

(RAY, Judge.) In this workers’ compensation case, Claimant appeals a
nonfinal order that adjudicates compensability of her accidental injury. In a
bifurcated order meeting the requirements of Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.180(b)(1)(C), the Judge of Compensation Claims found that the State
of Florida (Appellees/Cross-Appellants) is Claimant’s employer for the purpose
of workers’ compensation coverage under subsection 445.009(11), Florida
Statutes (2013), and that, although Claimant sustained a compensable workplace
injury, she is not entitled to payment of indemnity benefits in accordance with
the same statutory provision. In the cross-appeal, the State challenges the
JCC’s finding of a compensable workplace injury, which was based on the JCC’s
rejection of the applicability of the “going and coming” rule.

Because competent substantial evidence supports the JCC’s finding of a
compensable workplace injury, we affirm the issue raised on cross-appeal
without comment. With regard to the appeal, we also affirm the JCC’s finding
that the State is Claimant’s sole employer for payment of benefits under the
plain language of subsection 445.009(11), which deems a participant in an adult
or youth work activity under chapter 445 to be “an employee of the state for
purposes of workers’ compensation coverage.”

Although we affirm the order on appeal on the issue of compensability —
i.e., the determination that Claimant sustained an accidental workplace injury
for which she has coverage from the State — we cannot, because of
jurisdictional restraints, reach the second issue raised on appeal by Claimant:
whether subsection 445.009(11) unconstitutionally (or impermissibly) bars her
entitlement to indemnity benefits. In an order entered November 26, 2014, this
court appropriately advised the parties that this appeal and cross-appeal would
proceed as one taken under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.180(b)(1)(C)
and thus would be limited to the appealable portions of the nonfinal order
adjudicating compensability. See Consultants & Designers v. Brown,
677 So. 2d 915, 917 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (concluding rule permitting appeal of
nonfinal order adjudicating compensability “contemplates that only the ruling
on the issue of compensability may be challenged on interlocutory appeal”).
Here, the JCC’s denial of indemnity benefits goes beyond the issue of
compensability. The appealed order is a nonfinal order with regard to indemnity
benefits because the JCC reserved for another day adjudications on Claimant’s
entitlement to medical benefits and other claims.* Thus, the ruling on
indemnity benefits is an issue this court may address only upon entry of an
order resolving, with finality, all the disputes raised in the underlying case.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM that portion of the appealed nonfinal order
adjudicating compensability and expressly decline to consider Claimant’s
constitutional challenge to subsection 445.009(11) for lack of jurisdiction.
(ROBERTS, CJ., and THOMAS, J., CONCUR.)

__________________

*Consistent with the nonfinal nature of the order, the JCC directed the
parties to schedule a second merits hearing to resolve the substantive claims
and defenses.